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Abstract.
8
Principles of design composition are commonly understood to pertain to geometrical systems for arranging 
parts in assembling a formal whole. Connection to socio-cultural ‘meaning’ and relevance arguably occurs 
primarily via the assumed divinity or universality of these systems. In the contemporary architectural world, 
where explicitly held beliefs in fundamental, geometrically defi ned principles or values have dissipated, 
guiding principles of composition appear to be obsolete. This seems particularly true in relation to work that 
highlights the processual – or change, responsiveness, interactivity and adaptability – since this implies that 
the composition remains in fl ux and unable to be grounded in the composition of form. While processually 
infl ected architecture (referred to here as ‘processual architecture’), has been an active fi eld since at least the 
1960’s, it has been signifi cantly developed since design experiments involving digital computation intensifi ed 
in the 1990s. For this fi eld of work,  both highly celebrated and criticised as superfi cial or unethical, any 
connection to ‘meaning’ or value that might be offered by principles of composition would appear especially 
lost. 
This thesis reviews, counterpoises and reorients these assumptions, arguing a case for the value of 
processual architecture that has not been previously articulated. After the last 10 to 15 years of digital 
experimentation, it is clear that digital technology in itself is not the primary issue, but simply part of a 
complex equation. The thesis articulates this ‘equation’ through the model of emergence, which has been 
used in the fi eld with increasing prominence in recent years. Through both practice-based research and 
theoretical development, a processually infl ected theory of composition is proposed through an aesthetically 
oriented connection between models of emergence, affect, resonance and an ethics of behaviour, or a mode 
of engaging in the world. This offers pathways through which the potential of processual architecture might 
be productively developed, a contribution holding particular value for architectural pedagogy and for opening 
up this fi eld of work into a deeper engagement with pressing contemporary socio-political issues. 
The thesis demonstrates how the cultivation of particular modes of attention and engagement, found to 
hold an implicit but nevertheless amplifi ed signifi cance within processual architecture, make it possible to 
develop an embodied awareness pertaining to an ‘ethico-aesthetic know-how’. This know-how is acquired 
and matured through attention to the affective dimensions that arise through the process and products of 
design activity. The approaches demonstrated by the thesis highlight aspects of design activity that are 
routinely suppressed in architectural discourse, generating new insights into the importance of affect for 
design process, design products and the relations between them. The ethical dimensions of such an approach 
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become especially poignant through the explicit connection made between design activity and the 
practices of everyday life. Relationships between architecture and the social become re-energised, 
in a radically alternative manner to the social agendas of modernism or the more literary critiques 
of post-modernism. 
Through detailed discussions of the specifi c, local conditions with a series of  design projects 
I have undertaken, I argue how and why close attention to the affective dimensions of design 
process offers new and productive ways to approach research through design practice. This offers 
a response to the calls for new ‘post-critical’ forms of research through empowering both sides of 
a previously held divide: theory and practice. 
The introduction outlines the issues addressed and the methodology employed and the con-
clusion outlines the theory of composition proposed by this thesis. Between these two ‘ends’, a 
series of ‘Acts’ are arranged into three Parts. These ‘Acts’ can be considered as enactments of 
the process of researching, each assembling and reassembling key issues and ideas. Each Part 
involves a different emphasis in terms of both content and mode of enquiry: 
1.  A largely theoretical, critical analysis of a broadly scoped situation and set of related 
concepts. 
This involves an analysis of relations between emergence, aesthetics and ethics, situated against 
a general diagram of contemporary socio-cultural conditions and its relations to my experience 
of making an etching/drawing. I draw upon theories from philosophy/aesthetics, science and 
psychology in establishing the nature of an ethico-aesthetic know-how. 
2.  Analyses of specifi c, relevant architectural work.
This part outlines the fi eld of processual architecture and its relationship to a history of 
composition theory. It focuses on a critique of Greg Lynn’s practice, as a prominent and exemplary 
fi gure in the fi eld, with attention to younger practices such as biothing, Minifi e Nixon and kokkugia. 
I discuss my experience of making a series of plaster sculptural objects, an investigation poised 
in relation to Lynn’s animated diagrams, to explore issues of perception, aesthetic vitality and the 
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nature of the event of making. The late 19th century thesis of Heinrich Wölffl in on psychology 
and architecture, as well as Robin Evan’s essays on translation and geometry in architecture, 
provide counterpoints aiding the critique of Lynn’s work. Through these specifi c examples I review 
a range of aesthetic concepts, design problems and tools such as style, sensibility, translation 
and diagrams, re-framed in terms of ethico-aesthetic know-how. I argue that the comportment, 
or stance and manner of an author, whatever kind of artefact they might be producing, has 
immeasurable implications on that which it becomes possible to openly account for, pay attention 
to or gain access to.
3.  A very particular exploration of local, affective conditions of design practice.
Detailed examinations of a series of collaborative design research projects, in the form of 
interactive installations that I have been involved in, draw attention to affective dimensions 
within a variety of engagements, in a range of different acts and situations. This part develops 
compositional armatures tailored for an ethico-aesthetic know-how in design composition, 
alternately discussed as ‘fl exible moulds’ and ‘affective diagrams.’ These ‘armatures’ offer elastic 
or dynamically responsive frameworks for cultivating the modes of engagement discussed in 
terms of an ethico-aesthetic know-how. 
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Introduction.
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The age of emergence
For those of us old enough to remember, the process of writing has been 
transformed since the personal computer. No more scribbling out and 
rewriting. No more typing up and formatting only after it’s been written. 
On the one hand we can more intensively rearrange words, rewrite, over 
write, recompose, polish. On the other hand when writing and making it 
public happens in the same set of gestures (sms, email, wiki, blogging 
etc) there is an intensifi ed informality. The ‘properness’ of the text breaks 
down as writing tends toward the immediacy of speaking. Graffi ti and 
notes passed furtively during class gave us these qualities, but information 
technology allowed it to spread like a contagion. The gap between creative 
composition, its reception and refl ection folds inward.
This is one small example of a broad set of tendencies that are presented 
here as endemic of the contemporary situation in the ‘developed’ world. 
The last decade has involved quite extraordinary shifts in the fl ows and 
rhythms of daily life. It still astounds me that the commencement of this 
doctoral research project in 1997, the year I also commenced my fi rst full 
time academic position, coincided with my introduction to the internet, 
email and mobile phones as a feature of daily work practices. These 
technologies had been around for quite a while, but not to the degree that 
they were then beginning to deeply infuse the architecture of our social 
and cultural operations. One could say that this past decade has been a 
passage through the late phases of the information age and that, as we 
now tentatively step into a world increasingly infl ected by both digital and 
biotechnology, we are entering another phase shift, which I refer to as ‘the 
age of emergence.’ 
The term ‘emergence’ refers to a model of the complex operations of the 
world and is seen to be “a ubiquitous feature of the world around us.”1 As 
such, emergence becomes the name for a contemporary understanding of 
1.  Holland (1998), p2
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the laws of nature. From there, it’s not so big a leap into the subject of God. 
As a discursive construct it seeks to explain, often through mathematical 
frameworks, the way that complex, global forms of organization come into 
being through simple, local behaviours and rules, in the absence of any 
apparent, centralized or dominant control mechanism. A very powerfully 
signifi cant feature of emergence is that it is no less applicable to economic 
systems, games and urban planning than it is to living and natural systems. 
With emergence, culture and nature are artfully swept together. 
There is no one reason why emergence as an operational model has, 
particularly since the 90s, been intensively researched and enjoyed some 
special status in terms of our developing understanding of the laws of 
nature. However, there is no doubt that it provides a model that describes 
the nature and organisation of contemporary socio-cultural operations 
particularly well, and vice versa. Emergence becomes an academic 
construct for approaching the atmosphere of our present era and defi ning, 
to some extent, what it means to be ‘contemporary’. 
The art of emergence
The science of emergence has been developed through digital technology, 
where simple mathematical processes have been seen to give rise to 
impressively complex forms of organization. Within the associated discourse, 
something related to the ‘art of emergence’ is sometimes tentatively 
discussed or mentioned in passing. At times, the need for understandings 
coming from outside the strictly scientifi c have been suggested as crucial 
for approaching the mysteries plaguing the model of emergence, but 
research has largely been restrained to scientifi c frameworks. 
Perhaps strangely, this remains largely true even where artists and 
architects working with digital technology have attempted to directly 
approach emergence. The overwhelmingly predominant tendency in the 
relevant examples in art and architecture has been to approach the work 
from a largely scientifi cally-oriented perspective with far more attention to 
techniques and technologies than to the aesthetic properties or implications 
of their work. This is almost certainly not the case in terms of what goes on 
when an artist or architect create their works, but it is the case when they 
come to discuss it. This unspeakable absence or lack of acknowledgement 
is symptomatic of a broader problem in the arts and humanities related to 
the supremacy of scientifi c frameworks. My aim here is to contribute to an 
effort to strike a better balance, where aesthetics is revived as a worthy 
and valuable aspect of research. 
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If processes of emergence are ubiquitous in the world around us, 
operating as part of the laws of nature, they are also integral to the way 
in which the world and life comes-into-being and endures. In other words, 
emergence is an issue of composition: the process and outcome of combining 
things to form a whole. As soon as that connection is made, the notion 
of composition as a formal arrangement of parts is given a processual or 
performative spin, because emergence models processes of interaction or 
the dynamics of unfolding relations. In turning to the aesthetic dimensions 
and implications of emergence, I predominantly approach it through the 
notion of composition, in which the role of diagrams is nested and out of 
which related understandings of styles and sensibility are developed. 
Processual architecture and philosophy
Along these lines, this thesis explores architectural composition in the age 
of emergence, making propositions about the implicit shift of attentions 
and ethical dimensions therein. To a large extent it has arisen through 
an effort to outline the value of a fi eld of digitally infl ected architectural 
research I refer to as ‘processual architecture.’ I have taken up the work 
of Greg Lynn, whose practice made an incalculably infl uential move in 
the mid-1990s, as being of special importance within this fi eld. As such, 
processual architecture is closely associated with what was more commonly 
referred to as ‘folding’ or ‘blob architecture’, both of which came to stand 
as dominant ‘avant-garde’ domains of digital design. While the broader 
fi eld involves and incorporates very signifi cant divergence and variety, it 
can nevertheless be seen as an identifi ably new discursive milieu or style 
that came to the foreground in the 90s and has endured through its own 
developments and new trajectories to the present time. 
I have been deeply compelled by this fi eld of work, possibly even 
more so since it lost much of its 90’s shine. But there has been reason to 
feel suspicious of its seductions and rhetorics.2 As clearly compelling as 
this work has been, the depth of its value and substance has been less 
obvious to many. Relevant practitioners have often discussed the work in 
troublingly unsatisfying ways. The work itself was often diffi cult to build 
and/or rested on emerging technologies that promised more than they 
could currently deliver. After the last decade of digital exploration, it is 
clear that digital technology in itself is not the primary issue, but simply 
part of an equation. However, the articulation of a fi tting equation that 
might outline a broader and richer project implicit to the fi eld is hard to 
fi nd. My hope is that this doctoral thesis offers one such articulation. 
2.  A pervasive sense of the disturbing effects 
of digital architecture and the assessment of 
such work as lacking in ethical depth is well 
covered in Ostwald (2004). A related, but far 
more romantic, response to this fi eld of work 
can be found in Perez-Gomez (2006) where he 
dismisses the area as fundamentally unethical: 
“some contemporary architects have sought 
to collapse ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ in new 
‘algorithmic’ processes of design that avoid 
subjective ‘judgement’ and produce novelty 
through instrumental mathematical operations. 
Made possible by powerful computers and 
ingenious software the new algorithmic magic 
creates novelty without love, resulting in short-
lived seduction, typically without concern for 
embodied cultural experience, character and 
appropriateness’’ (p. 28).
15
As a discursive phenomenon that took the place of its predecessor, 
deconstructivist architecture, there was an explicitly articulated turn 
away from contradiction and confl ict toward pliancy and smoothness.3 For 
some critics, this involved a defi cit of critical analysis and a superfi cial 
formalism. The proliferation of renders in which forms fl oated against 
black backgrounds seemed to speak of an ungroundedness. If these were 
explorations of potential more than existing possibility, what were the 
more specifi c behavioural traits and broader values of this potential?
I initially approached this question partly through a deep interest in the 
lineage of thought often held under the name of Deleuzian or process philos-
ophy: a fi eld of non-reductive, materialist thought through which concepts 
of emergence are historically entangled. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
had caught my wide-eyed attention some years before I heard of Lynn, 
who drew Deleuze and Gottfried Leibniz into his Folding in Architecture, 
and the innovative mix of philosophy, technology and technique drawn 
together in his later book, Animate Form. I spent years immersed in 
Deleuze, Guattari, Leibniz and Henri Bergson before I stumbled upon Brian 
Massumi and his early writing about Greg Lynn. Gradually, Massumi’s 
work took on the most infl uential role in my research,4 amidst the broader 
fi eld of process philosophy. One way of understanding the process of this 
doctoral research is as a re-processing of Massumi’s writings, or recasting 
the complex confi gurations he assembles through other material, with the 
aim of transducing it into forms that more deeply imbricate the practices 
of architectural design. 
Process philosophy overlaps with post-structuralism, the target of Alan 
Sokal’s famous 1996 hoax and the subsequent book ‘Fashionable Nonsense’. 
This derogatory term, ‘fashionable nonsense,’ resonates with and sums 
up a commonly held view of processual architecture by the mainstream 
architectural profession and conservatively oriented academia. Many of the 
objections made by these positions are not too hard to understand or even, 
at times, sympathise with. But they are often based in a blunt dismissal of 
ways of thinking and practicing that diverge from a very particular logic or 
kind of activity. While I have not addressed these objections and dialogues 
in any detail, my hope is that I have suffi ciently outlined the insensitive 
‘dumbness’ of reductive standpoints in general while also acknowledging 
their usefulness, value and power.   
3.  See Greg Lynn, ‘Architectural Curvilinearity. 
The Folded, the Pliant and the Supple’, in Lynn, 
Greg and Papadakis, Andreas (1993), pp8-15
4.  Given the signifi cance afforded to laughter 
in Act 4, it is not insignifi cant that one of the 
attractions to Massumi’s work was the fact that 
I would often fi nd myself laughing out loud 
while reading his texts. Very few philosophical 
texts have this effect on me.
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Modes of Research
Early in my candidature, we witnessed a discursive pronouncement regarding 
the demise of critical theory as the authoritative mode of research.5  This 
was not disconnected, I would argue, to the nuances and implications of 
processual architecture. Was this apparently ‘post-critical’ phase a stumble 
into formalist thoughtlessness or was it a different way of thinking deeply? 
Was it just smooth advertising and the gleam of new technologies that 
made it compelling, or was it truly resonating with some of the more 
confounding but key aspects of our broad contemporary situation? Was its 
success reducible to political supremacy, cultural networks and wealthy, 
elite practitioners or did it actually touch a deep contemporary nerve of 
broad cultural signifi cance? My hunch was that the more generous view 
in each case was the more accurate answer. But this is not to say that 
the work was unproblematic. In my discussion on the work of Greg Lynn, 
it is through the very struggles and problems that can be seen to have 
arisen in his work that much is revealed. These struggles are especially 
poignant because they resonate with very substantial, ethical problems of 
our time. 
In addition to the more critical and/or philosophical modes of analysis, I 
have undertaken a signifi cant amount of project-based research. This has 
enabled me to develop a range of understandings that would simply not 
have been possible if I had restrained myself to books and writing. Project 
work both grounded and re-distributed my enquiry into material-social 
fi elds of action. Project-based modes of enquiry gathered impetus and 
signifi cance for me in the years following the birth of my child: the most 
powerfully non-reductive, materialist experience I could hope for. As an 
experience that occurred almost perfectly at the mid-point of the doctoral 
research, it gave an impetus to a second phase that gradually unfolded 
and transformed all that had occurred in the fi rst half.
To a signifi cant degree, this thesis involves an effort to develop a way of 
approaching research that deeply imbricates both theorizing and creative 
practices. It began in thesis mode and then turned into a PhD by project, 
a doctoral model based on project work with an exegesis. It then shifted 
back into thesis mode when I realized I had written far more than the proj-
ect mode would allow. As such, the research straddles these two modes, 
being a substantial written thesis that involves a great deal of project work 
as part of its enquiry.
5.  See Hayes; Kennedy (2000)
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But as a whole, I prefer to see this doctorate as a project that contains 
an assemblage of inter-related projects within it. These projects vary 
signifi cantly in nature and scope: there is critical, theoretical enquiry, 
drawings, sculptural objects and interactive installations. These some-
times involve (almost) working alone, other times working explicitly with 
others through collaborations and teaching. Thinking occurs through them 
and across these modes and media. 
The projects discussed in this thesis were like living creatures that I 
was responsible for, but were never utterly in my control. They provided 
legs with which vaguely forming ideas could learn to walk and take 
unplanned excursions to return with unexpected surprises. They frustrated 
my progress, always seemed to be diverting me from focussed paths, 
confusing me with their immensity, fatiguing me with their demands and 
unpredictability. But then, they would turn around and help me realise 
something that I didn’t see coming at all, because it was embedded too 
deeply in the invisible ground of the taken-for-granted. They threw me 
around and often tripped me up, to then cast the habitually-invisible back 
into view. It takes many falls before we learn to walk, and perhaps just 
as many to learn how to re-appreciate the ground we crawled on, but this 
time with the benefi t of having also experienced a sprint for the horizon. 
 Perhaps this thesis, just quietly, is partly a manifesto about parenting. 
If creative practice might teach us something also useful to parenting, 
the reverse is perhaps even more likely. Children teach us as we teach 
them, just as projects help develop our practice as much as we guide 
their development.  But if some parts of this thesis could be seen as 
covert guides to parenting, this is only because my investigations became 
increasingly aimed at appreciating how much we are guided by the things 
we set out to guide. This is an important ingredient, I believe, for a ‘recipe’ 
that turns designing into research. 
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On Generalisation
What becomes articulated here is, on one level, folded out of the personal: 
it is my creative practice that inheres the methodologies of research. 
I have been researching ‘ways of doing’ and could not have done this 
without doing, or practicing (whether writing or making physical objects). 
I can’t escape the specifi city at work here, nor do I believe it would be 
benefi cial to do so. The personal is one moment of a broader condition 
– it is both idiosyncratic and collective. My attention in this document 
vacillates between very, perhaps painfully personal accounts and extremely 
abstract, more generalised accounts of the world. In between, there are 
other modes that nestle into mixed doses of intimacy and distance. 
Within conventional understandings of research the ‘personal’ is seen 
as a weakness, where the subjective is understood as always doubtful: 
a purely relative phenomenon, burrowing into lonely habitats lacking 
necessary connection to universal truth. Worse: it can swing wide of the 
recognised marker of generalisation, which is perhaps the biggest reason 
why so little research can bear to admit to it. Usually, the value of a 
scientifi c generalisation lies in its potential to be repeated. It is a kernal 
of truth because it indicates pathways to reliable outcomes. It is seen as 
transcending the specifi city of the moment because any difference this 
entails is rendered trivial or inconsequential. The effectiveness of this 
approach is often very real. But it has limitations, for what happens to the 
so-called trivial or inconsequential? It is unacknowledged. The kinds of 
intelligence required to respond to the nuances of specifi city are ignored.
But news of the insoluble affects of the observer are no longer headlines. 
Sciences self-unsettlingly announced this a long time ago. Furthermore, it 
has been thoroughly argued (via pragmatist, phenomenological and post-
structuralist thinkers) that personal subjectivity is always more or less 
collective because experience rests on both physiological and culturally 
infl ected constitutions. 
Nevertheless, the habits of research culture persist with largely 
suppressing this dimension. The habitual is an architecture with about 
as much resilience as buildings: they are hard to change or move. One 
dubious habit of research conventions is the stance of the all-knowing-
human-subject observing the natural ‘object’ while being immune to 
observation themselves. The irony is that this all-knowingness dampens the 
development of valuable generalisations which might hinge on the degree 
to which they can survive the specifi city of events. As phenomenology and 
radical empiricism insist, “There is no abstract knower of an experience 
that is separate from the experience itself.”6 There is no generalisable 
knowledge or intelligence that did not arise through specifi city. 
6.  Varela, Thompson and Rosch, The Embodied 
Mind, p26
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Words for related kinds of intelligence are ‘responsivity’ and ‘spontaneity’. 
Generalisation that values this intelligence is not just about repeating, it is 
about differentiation through repeating or iterating. All practices develop, 
refi ne, perfect their concepts, proofs, compositions, performances etc. To 
practice is to repeat, wherein the differences are recognised, accounted 
for and absorbed; that which comes to be ‘true’ needs to be tested and 
developed through the specifi cities of difference. As Rudolf Arnhein has 
written: 
“True generalisation is the way by which the scientist perfects his concepts and 
the artist his images. It is an eminently unmechanical procedure, requiring not 
so much the zeal of the census-taker, the bookkeeper, or the sorting machine as 
the alertness and intelligence of a functioning mind.”7 
An alert intelligence, that can artfully deal with the contingencies of any 
moment, is what scientifi c generalisation artfully passes over in silence.
Methodology
“In some historical moments and with regard to some empirical questions, the 
role of theory may be to summarize fi ndings and predict what one is likely to 
fi nd in the future....[but] we need a different kind of theory, one that will warn 
us of what we dare not miss as we conduct the research that the uniqueness of 
the current moment makes unavoidable.”
Jack Katz, ‘Start Here: Social Ontology and Research Strategy’
Sociologist Jack Katz, in a paper, ‘Start Here. Social Ontology and Research 
Strategy,’ outlines a methodological approach that has assisted me in 
clarifying the approach taken in this thesis. Katz promotes an approach 
to research that is explicitly attuned to the embodied nature of all action. 
Implicitly, he assumes a spatiality founded in lived, bodily space-relations. 
While he rarely makes explicit reference to the role of the built environment 
in his analyses, his methodology is, I believe, beautifully set up to consider 
the intersections of the social, the built environment and acts of creative 
production. 
The ground of Katz’s research is a complex, thick horizontal fi eld of 
relationships in which no part of reality is signifi cantly ‘elevated’ above any 
other. This ground is inhabited as a spatial experience; nothing escapes an 
7.  Arnheim (1997), p187
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experiential fi eld in which all dimensions of events collaboratively interact, 
even those dimensions that are only virtually present, such as memories 
or histories. Crime, for instance, is not to be regarded as the product of 
some kind of power structure (applied from above) but is “a form of social 
interaction built up through other forms of social interaction.”8 Similarly, 
laughter, crying and anger are not simply the products of, say, humour, 
sadness and hatred, because the act of emotional expression and the 
associated category of feeling are co-created as interlaced social interaction. 
Analogously, a creative research project is not simply the product of, say, 
design intent, a proposition or even a research question because all of 
these are co-created as interlaced social or discursive interaction. Research 
questions and intentions need to at least begin taking form from the start, 
but if they haven’t shifted by the end of that event, little has occurred. The 
questions and intentions shaping a research project are reshaped by the 
events of researching.
Within Katz’s experiential space of interaction, all action is motivated, 
situated and pragmatic, to the extent that perception is inseparable from 
the process of doing something. Perception is not passive reception of 
information ‘out there’, it is conditioned and produced by what we do and 
how we do it. That which we come to perceive occurs in relation to our 
behavioural capacities and modes of attention therein. These capacities 
are not simply given, but are dependent on the modes and degrees of 
attention that any subject is ‘trained’ to achieve. This includes, though not 
exclusively, the kinds of attention we learn in educational institutions. 
Behaviour, down to the minutiae of its gestures, is always part of a 
project. This includes interaction with our environments: 
“Everyone and every material environment we encounter has a pragmatic 
signifi cance for us. Even if it is only as a ‘familiar’ environment that, by requiring 
no special attention, enables us to focus energies on something for which it is 
the framing background.”9  
The thick space of experience is always being grained, textured and 
directed by these background conditions. While aspects of this texture come 
to light, much of it remains in shadow. Perception is largely nonconscious. 
It is ‘nonconscious’ rather than ‘unconscious’, because unlike the later, the 
former is not so much repressed as simply operating outside the range 
of our particular capacities for conscious awareness.10  Consciousness 
arises through embodied means to the extent that its opacity always casts 
shadows:
8.  Katz (2002), p4
9.  Ibid, p4
10.  It should be acknowledged that Katz uses 
the word ‘unconscious’ and that my distinction 
between these terms draws on Stern (2004).
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“Everything bought into focal attention, all contents of consciousness, any 
thought contemplated, even the frames of awareness and the perceived context 
of action are all always created through the action of a body that in some back 
region operates in the shadows, beyond the immediate reach of awareness.”11 
In trying to work through the less ‘visible’ strings that puppeteer our 
actions, this ‘back region’ has been a primary area of attention in this 
thesis. This is partly about developing an awareness of action we tend 
not to consciously notice, but it is also about working out unrealised 
connections. This is not unlike the art of the detective. 
The detective looks for clues that might lead to otherwise hidden facts 
regarding how something happened. Usually, detective stories revolve 
around a crime of some kind in which there is a clear motive for concealing 
evidence regarding what actually happened; to escape condemnation, the 
criminal must maintain the appearance of innocence. But if we think of 
crime as fi rstly a form of social interaction rather than the violation of law, 
as Katz (1988) argues at length, we begin to see how all social interaction 
involves similarly motivated concealments. 
In a similar fashion, I have approached the products and processes 
of creative production as forms of social or relational interaction, rather 
than acts applied to the social. Taking account of the fact that all forms 
of perception and conduct are always embodied and actively generative, 
holds implications, as Katz suggests, that call for a radical reappraisal of 
conventional research practices. Katz’s reappraisal suggests that:
“a researcher who would understand and explain any form of social conduct 
should seek evidence about:
(1) how it is constituted through interaction, in one sense or another 
collaboratively and in anticipation of its meaning from the standpoint of others;
(2) how everything, even the most seemingly idle comment or glance, is part 
of practical course of action, a project, the innovative execution of a recipe, an 
effort to do a certain kind of social thing;
(3) how all awareness and action is created by corporeal processes that are 
themselves beyond the actor’s direct awareness, but that are visible to the 
researcher.”
Implicit to Katz’s outline here is an attention to the relationship between 
micro-scale interactions and a larger or more encompassing aesthetics 
of activity.  He draws attentions to fl eeting, often apparently trivial or 
‘naturalised’ expressions, such a cough, a laugh and a look, and shows 
11.  Katz (2002), p4
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how these can be understood as artfully concealed strategies and tactics. 
In being revealed, these acts draw attention to the aesthetics of composure 
– or how the dynamics of exchange and expression are, in themselves, 
acts of aesthetic composition. In exploring the relationship between micro- 
and macro-scales of activity, Katz’s work demonstrates how, as I argue, 
the ethico-aesthetics of emergence has always been pertinent and integral 
to everyday life. 
Here I am seeking to understand and explain the activity of design 
composition (or ‘creative process’) as a form of ‘conduct’. In dealing with it 
in this way, I am then able to offer a way of understanding and explaining 
the way in which dimensions of a project that vary wildly in nature (such 
as formal descriptions, poetics and technical processes) can collaborate in 
generating an overall composition.
The three forms of evidence Katz lists are not strictly delimited and are 
far from water-tight containers; they all fold into one another, by necessity. 
While the fi rst two are not hard to relate to the activity of designing, the 
third kind of evidence requires some reappraisal here. Katz, in considering 
sociological research, separates the ‘actor’ and the ‘researcher’, one of 
whom is able to observe (and should be on the look out for) processes that 
the other is unaware of. In considering the act of making something as a 
research event, the maker is not able to observe themselves or their own 
corporeal processes if they are, by nature, beyond their direct awareness. 
The ‘actor’ and the ‘researcher’ loop into the one person. But another entity 
partners that actor-researcher: the artefact. Across this thesis, I have 
discussed various ways in which otherwise outside-of-awareness corporeal 
processes – such as kinds of attention, the stance or posture of authors and 
relational tensions embodied in a design arrangement – become embodied 
in and through a range of compositional arrangements (not all of which 
emphatically pertain to design activity). The things we write, draw, make 
etc all embody a certain arrangement of content that is indicative of the 
way in which we approached, worked with and processed that content. 
Various artefacts – both ‘end-products’ and traces of process (sketches, 
memories, emails, notes etc) – are left behind in the way that a video of 
an interaction might be left behind for future close analysis. These kinds 
of artefacts, along with nuances of interaction (between both elements of 
an artefact and collaborators), are used as material for analysis in terms 
of how they contribute to assembling a composition understood in terms 
of behavioural or eventful texture. 
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The artefact and the events of a design process don’t ‘bear witness’ to 
things in the same way that a sociologist12  can – who is conventionally set 
apart from the events in order to observe – and I am not offering the kind 
of analysis that might be gleaned from the stance of a sociologist.13  What 
I am doing here involves utilising an attention to resonance to draw out 
the signifi cance of routinely backgrounded, outside-of-awareness events 
within design activity. 
Importantly, every resonance has its own complexion or texture (like 
the idiosyncratic quality of every laugh). This texture becomes most 
emphatically present in moments of intensity (of expression and change). 
Katz sketches out how such a texture arises in a way that encompasses 
other facets of social conduct:
“Something is happening in crying, for example, that goes beyond any strategic 
‘work’ that the person may be ‘doing’ and that is not captured by discriminating 
the interaction ‘practices’ the person’s behaviour demonstrates. Some sort of 
feeling arises. Between oneself and the world there is a new term, a holistically 
sensed, new texture in the social moment, and one relates to others in and 
through that emergent and transforming body for experience. A kind of 
metamorphosis occurs in which the self goes into a new container or takes on 
a temporary fl esh for the passage to an altered state of social being.”14  (my 
emphases)
This ‘new texture’ is the quality or complexion of an event of resonance: 
an always collaboratively (ie collaborations of human and inhuman, actual 
and virtual dimensions) constituted aesthetic of the event. 
The way in which I came to give structure, or contour, to the sheer and 
inexhaustible complexity entailed in any design event involved recognising 
moments of resonance arising between events and things. This becomes 
most clearly manifest in Act 9 and 10 which discusses two collaborative 
projects in terms of a particular assemblage of relations that are cast and 
recast through multiple and diverse events, scales and media. Each of 
these recastings resonate to produce the emergent ‘texture’ of the project 
– its composure or conduct. These collections of resonating assemblages 
were gathered through affording events such as laughter and collaborative 
disagreements,15 unusual signifi cance in that they came to be seen as 
integral, rather than incidental, to the composition of the projects. 
This approach to studying conduct becomes both signifi cant and 
possible because I am not only studying material produced by others, I am 
researching through producing material that is, in turn, studied. As such, 
12. Note Irving Goffman who was infl uentially 
famous for writing sociology from the point of 
view of a participant – perhaps a party guest, 
or a man in a train or waiting room. 
13.  However, this is more-or-less the mode 
of research that Inger Mewburn, who plays an 
important part in the project based research 
discussed in this thesis, has gone on to adopt in 
her doctoral research. Her close and thorough 
analysis of gesture and the incorporations of 
physical objects within design process and 
exchanges between designers, is generating 
some fascinating insights. I anticipate that her 
work will produce some clarifi cations on issues 
left swinging vaguely here and enable some 
productive future development on this thesis.
14. Katz (1999), p343
15.  When something is done or said in 
passing, it is a peripheral issue that, for 
some reason that is often not at all clear, was 
felt to be worth doing or saying. It provides 
detail that is usually posed as ornamental or 
incidental (unnecessary/irrelevant/secondary). 
But as a feature appearing on the surface it 
burrows in, knots, ripples and spreads its 
fl avour, qualitatively shifting that which it was 
intended to simply pass by. The in-passing can 
be indicative of dimensions not immediately 
available to awareness.
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I become a detective who is also a suspect, a researcher who places her 
own compositional performances under painful scrutiny. The three kinds 
of evidence listed by Katz become analogous to the three ways in which I 
consider my project work, which I understand in terms of the cast.
Every project involves a cast. Etymologically, the cast is ‘to throw’ or 
‘a throw’.16 The verb, to cast, involves selecting and collecting, throwing, 
shaping and synthesising. The noun, a cast, refers to three kinds of objects: 
a throw or a gesture, a collection of things or forces and an overall shape, 
container or mould. Think of the cast that constitutes a play or fi lm: a 
collection of characters that create a web of relations. In casting for a fi lm, 
a set of actors are thrown together as particular materials that fl esh out 
the relationships of the overall fi lm. The action of casting is done with a 
cast: each ‘thing’ that counts as a cast is something that holds an active 
multiplicity into a unity. It is a highly processual object. In every project 
we can distinguish three primary, inseparable components: 
1. the particulars of the (inter)actions through which something emerges 
(materials, processes, techniques, discursive/social fi eld);  
2. the effort or striving to do a certain thing (often called intention, 
motivation or desire)
3. the aesthetic nature of the cast (the dominant, overall quality of 
action, connection or composition)
The qualities of the cast17 (or project) are dependent on the relations 
between these three dimensions: how the various aspects or parameters 
of the cast come to affect one another.
Methodologically, one doesn’t seek the three forms of evidence in a 
one-by-one manner, as in a list of items that gets ticked off. The process 
is far more non-linear and entangled. Crucially this involves attention to 
the qualitative dynamics of relations. Projects become relationships unto 
themselves: ships or vessels that carry certain relations across variable 
waters. But this ship, as Foucault would have it, is one whose inside “is 
merely the fold of the outside, as if a ship where a folding of the sea.”18 
16.  Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.
etymonline.com : c.1230, from O.N. kasta “to 
throw.” The noun sense of “a throw” (c.1300) 
carried an idea of the form the thing takes 
after it has been thrown, which led to varied 
meanings, such as “group of actors in a play” 
(1631). O.E.D. fi nds 42 distinct noun meaning 
and 83 verbal ones, with many sub-defi nitions. 
A cast in the eye preserves the older sense of 
“warp, turn,” in which it replaced O.E. weorpan 
(see warp), and is itself largely superseded 
now by throw. Still used of fi shing line and 
glances. Castaway fi rst recorded 1526. Cast-
iron is 1664.
17.  I should additionally note that one 
sense of the word ‘cast,’ that of the container 
through which contents are shaped, is also 
described by the word ‘mould.’ When I come 
to discuss the project, the Animate Casts, I 
distinguish between the ‘cast’ and the ‘mould’ 
as the object and the container that shaped the 
object. There was some diffi culty with spelling, 
because the word can be spelt in two ways: 
‘mold’ and ‘mould.’ I chose ‘mould’ (other than 
when quoting)  because the inclusion of the ‘u’ 
visually stretches out the connection between 
the fi rst and second parts of the word; it is an 
open form, seeming to diagram a vessel that 
you could pour something into. As trivial as 
this might seem, this small move was part of 
the larger attention to performing an embodied 
expression of that which is being said, where 
there is a collaboration between distinct 
dimensions of something. 
18.  Deleuze (1988), p97.
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Thesis Composition
Just as this research moves through a diversity of project material, the 
process of doing it has involved folding into and out of diverse fi elds of 
enquiry. While I will maintain that architecture is the primary fi eld of 
reference, this research signifi cantly involves psychology, philosophy, 
aesthetics, emergence theory, sociology, interaction and installation art. For 
the reader, I imagine this might present itself as a very busy accumulation 
of detail, as the text winds its way through one divergence after another. 
Certainly, during the process of writing it often felt that there was so much 
‘stuff’ involved that the whole thing was insufferably weighed down with 
messy and overly packed baggage. While a great deal was discarded along 
the way, working with a very mixed bag of material was necessary because 
I was exploring performative patterns that can only become evident when 
they move, variably, through a variety of situations. This differential 
iteration (or variational repetition) modulates those patterns of behaviour 
into a texture or tactile consistency, with the very same gesture through 
which those patterns and their resonance become evident. 
This performative texture ties together an internal diversity. It feels 
like a very delicate glue and I hope that, for a reader, there are not too 
many parts that are still heavier than the glue can manage, or too many 
trajectories that spin the journey so far off track that the consistency 
breaks down. 
Given the importance I afford to the embodied performance of ideas 
in partnership with other (such as cognitive) articulations, the thesis 
would lack integrity if I had not attempted to ‘do what I say.’ This mode 
of ‘holding together’ or composing this thesis is also a form of ‘argument’ 
integral to one of the main propositions of the thesis: that modes of 
composition particular to the age of emergence attain coherence through 
generating resonance between the collaborating dimensions of any event 
– in this case, between any Act. Each Act involves a jostling of theories, 
events, issues and images. Each one recalibrates key ideas – such as 
emergence, aesthetics, style, diagrams, etc – through arranging sets of 
examples such that their affi nities resonate, while their differences shift 
one another about. It is a process of mutual recalibration or infl ection of 
the similarities and differences between examples and key concepts, both 
within and across Acts.
Composition becomes performative and pertains to forms only in terms 
of the dynamics in which they are engaged. In the name of this performative 
emphasis, I have chosen to refer to the sections that constitute the thesis 
as ‘Acts’ rather than ‘chapters’ where the sub-sections within each Act 
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become ‘scenes.’ Images are often used non-descriptively, in the sense 
that they do not show something directly discussed. Rather, these are 
intended to resonate with the confi gurations being assembled through the 
text.
The thesis fi nally became organized into three parts, each involving a 
cluster of ‘Acts’. These three parts move through a process of:
1. Mapping and diagramming key issues.
2. Fleshing these out through issues pertaining to architectural 
composition.
3. Development of aesthetic concepts through project-based research. 
As it turns out, these three stages are roughly analogous to the three 
forms of evidence. Each gives priority to a kind of attention, while folding 
the others through them in various ways. While the fi rst part is largely 
theoretical and general, the second part becomes more situated in terms 
of the engagement with particular examples. The third part adopts a 
deeper level of situated, embodied attention to processes of composition 
through projects that I have been involved in. Overall, there is a movement 
toward increasing lightness and an attention to the sensuous aspects of 
practicing. 
Part 1, Mapping The Field, encompassing acts 1 to 3, sets the scene 
through a diagram of contemporary society and broadly maps out the 
issues pertaining to emergence, aesthetics and the relations between 
them and ethics.
Part 2, Architectural Composition: expression, diagramming and 
style, encompassing acts 4 to 7, broadly maps out issues pertaining 
to architectural composition, processual architecture and the relations 
between them, going on to fl esh out these relations in terms of a range 
of aesthetic concepts, problems and tools such as style, sensibility, 
translation and diagrams. 
Part 3, Collective Composition, encompassing acts 8 to 10, is where 
the discussion moves the ideas developed in Parts 1 and 2 through 
a range of collaborative projects undertaken as part of my research. 
These projects enable the notion of the fl exible mould and the affective 
diagram to be explored in terms of embodiment and states of experience, 
through which a more thoroughly-embodied understanding of ethico-
aesthetic know-how of emergence can be articulated. 
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Rather than include outlines of each of the ten Acts here, I have placed 
an outline at the commencement of each in the body of the document. 
The conclusion enacts a synthesis of the key issues that arose across 
the Acts. This bifurcates into two interlaced parts:
1. The model of composition proposed by this thesis
2. The poise or stance that becomes an integral aspect of this mode 
of composition: an ethico-aesthetic know-how. 
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PART ONE 
Mapping the Field 
30
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Act 1. Diagramming Contemporary Space
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Act 1 enacts a rendering of the background or atmosphere of the thesis, introducing 
a diagrammatic drawing and an account of its making. The relations embodied in the 
drawing are drawn out through a narrative account of the emergent organization of our 
contemporary situation. This diagram is one that ‘haunts’ the thesis, acting as something 
of a backdrop that remains suspended behind the scenes of each act, to eventually be 
transformed into an active player of the foreground in the very fi nal act. 
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1. Fur fi elds
“When we really live in a poetic image, we learn 
to know, in one of its tiny fibres, a becoming of 
being that is an awareness of being’s inner disturbance.”1  
“There are times when it is best to hide all clocks
To write in hair-like lines
And let them waver in the breeze –
     delicate moments.”2 
I sit quietly, my body curling over a small, white cardboard surface, my 
muscles minutely flexing about the end of a scalpel that I press into the card. 
I infest the cardboard with a field of tiny, delicate lines cut into the surface. The 
scalpel flicks softly with each cutting gesture. Each line is of the same nature: 
they all have a directionality where one end is a point of incision, the other end a 
taper - much like a fibre of fur or hair emerging from skin. Immersed in the act of 
doing, I am only partially conscious of my adherence to the general rules at work in the relations 
between these marks. Each line is almost but not quite parallel to its neighbour and each sits in a balancing of 
difference between all its neighbours; movement and shifts of flow contour are always unravelling. Pulling back, my focus 
shifts from line against line relations to the flow of the field. As each mark gestures its way into the surface, a differentiated field 
of flow formations emerge. Gradually, the smooth white card becomes delicately textured from the cuts. I run my fingers over it 
and feel the shift from smooth to hairy, the texture passing through me with rhythmic contour. There is a passing image involved 
in this feeling that folds back into the making as I continue to flickeringly etch the lines into a surface that seems to be opening 
up before my eyes and passing through my skin. It is a meditative process: repetitive and detailed like embroidery or knitting; a 
slow labour of incremental accumulation but exponential gathering. Form and sense unfold and gather. The expression of an event 
is falling into place as part of its own process of registration. When my fingers and back muscles start to stiffen and ache the 
compulsion to continue won’t let me rest. I am caught, swept into this process until the surface is covered. There are no smooth 
areas remaining. All is texture. Sitting back into a different posture, I pick up a soft chalk pastel and rub my fingers into it. The 
ridges of my finger whorls lift the chalk off into a slurry of powder which feels like the smoothest of all skin: velvety soft. 
I rub this velvet dust into my hairy card. The cuts fill up with pigment and the lines leap out of the surface to greet 
the eye. I peer closely into the surface to see the powder cramming into the grooves and smoothing into the 
minute variations and fibrosity of the card between cuts. The colour massages the white into a flow of 
finely furred skin. Texture. It’s all about texture. 
                                           ~
1.  Bachelard (1994), p. 220. 2.  From a sketchbook of the author, 1996. 35
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I made these ‘fur fi eld’ drawings as cards for friends.3 In retrospect, I 
can understand them as diagrams that attempt to feel out the multiplicity of 
relations that constitute any larger, more general relationship formations. 
This was not clear to me at the time, as I abstractly acted it out. But as I 
made them into gift cards, they felt like delicate gestures of friendship or 
relation; a giving of something that was almost fragile in its sensitivity; 
a laying bare of a fi eld of nerve endings gyrating in an effort to fi nd the 
words to say. But they would only whisper wordless secrets. Certainly, I 
found them to be drawings that I could not easily make sense of. They 
were fi elds in which I was semi-lost, or at least, in which my capacity to 
think cognitively was lost. To a signifi cant degree, the research ‘gathered 
here today’ in the ceremony of this thesis, has been an effort to think 
something diffi cult for thought; to bring cognitive articulation to and 
through this sense of textured fi elds that seemed so precise and vague at 
the same time. 
What constitutes the nature of these drawings? They are fi elds of similar 
units in fl ow formations. The fl ow is a collective activity: a multitude of 
units that form a differentiated continuity. A mass of individual units are 
connected through common internal relations and laws of interrelation. 
Collective movements offer a sense of the tendencies of relations therein. 
What became evident through the process of drawing the ‘fur fi elds’ 
was that the patterns or formations of the fi eld could not be entirely pre-
planned. If I tried to map out in advance, a general schema for the fl ow 
- a swirl here, a ridge there - I wasn’t able to match the schematic as 
the lines gradually covered the surface. The fl ow seemed to have it’s own 
‘push’ or its own ‘will’ through the local relations of the lines. On the other 
hand, I did always need to operate with a sense of the fl ow formations 
that I wanted to tend toward. The process of making these surfaces was, 
as Brian Massumi puts it, both “involuntary and elicited”,4 being squeezed 
out from between and across the global scale (the overall fi eld and its 
internal differentiations) and the local scale (the particular marks and their 
relations with neighbouring marks).
This tension between being carried away by the internal forces of the 
fl ow and pre-planning or designing the fl ow formations describes a defi ning 
aspect, as discussed in the next act, of the ‘art of emergence’. 
3.  These drawings did not, however, begin with 
gift cards. They are a drawing type I fi rst used 
in developing diagrams for a thesis completed 
in 1996, titled Performing in the Blur. The Fluid 
Visions of DeLoReS. These diagrams were used 
to model the primary condition that the thesis 
set out to articulate: the Deleuzian-Leibnizian 
‘Fold’ in terms of the nomadic conditions of 
contemporary cultural formations across art/
architecture, science and philosophy.
4.  Massumi (2002a), p. 189. 
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2. Coming-together: fi nding composure
I wait for the “best” moment. Yes, I say to myself, there will come a moment 
when I will be able to gather my forces, have a vision of the Whole, and from this 
place and this time will emerge The Act. Everyday I wait. I try to egg it on with 
cigarettes and coffee, or by not smoking and not drinking coffee. I’m waiting 
for my freedom, waiting for all the conditions to come together that will make 
possible what I want to do. Time passes. A lot of time passes. I’m waiting for it 
to stop, for it to gather itself into an image, of myself, of my life, of the world. 
I’m waiting for the movement to stop and refl ect itself back to itself - refl ection 
is the condition of action, isn’t it?
But it turns its face away, dissolves into a hundred tiny details on a cruelly 
indifferent time-line, dissolves me into a hundred tiny details, pure moving 
mass. It is true that in trying all of these different postures, I might just crack 
the code, it might all “come together”. But it is undeniable that this moment will 
not have been one of discovery but of invention.5 
The Act’s of this thesis did not emerge easily; they too were egged on with 
lots of coffee and cigarettes. A lot of time passed. Every time it all seemed 
to be ‘coming together’ it would also turn away, dissolving “into a hundred 
tiny details, pure moving mass”: something like the ‘fur fi elds’ images that 
haunted me. I wanted to do something with them, make something of 
them and from them. I tried fi nding interesting forms in them, extracting 
something that could be taken elsewhere. It was hopeless. All I could do 
is either do them or look at them. And there they would be: useless furry 
fi elds made of dumb little lines, saying nothing, going no-where and yet 
glowing with compulsively personal poignance.  
The passage by Melissa McMahon above, which resonated in my 
struggle with the ‘fi elds’, is a prologue to an essay titled “Beauty; Machinic 
repetition in the age of art’. Here, she comments on Walter Benjamin’s 
suggestion that the modern artwork lacks the ability to provide an image 
or an aesthetic synthesis. The role of such an image is to provide a point 
of orientation for the individual in relation to community and world. Its 
absence is an aspect of the distracted nature of the contemporary spectator 
or ‘mass’ wherein a fragmentation of experience renders the sense of a 
meaningful whole relatively unattainable. The modern subject fi nds itself 
alienated from a mechanism (capitalist society) that both encompasses 
and ignores: “I distinguish myself from the mechanism; however, ‘it’ does 
not return the favour.”6 This mechanism, ticking along a ‘cruelly indifferent 
time-line’, disables the ‘here and now’ of aesthetic experience. Rather than 
5. Melissa McMahon, ‘Beauty: machinic 
repetition in the age of art’, in Massumi 
(2002b), p. 3.
6.  Ibid, p. 5.
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a durationally extensive ‘here and now’, time gets caught in ‘any-moment-
whatsoever’. In other words, every moment becomes a fragment that must 
struggle for connection to a larger whole or image that locates, orients and 
identifi es the signifi cance of that moment. Alienation and disorientation 
ensues. 
As McMahon comments, the emergence of mechanistic paradigms went 
hand in hand with the emergence of the modern individual. It also, quite 
evidently I think, assisted in ushering in the problem of emergence itself. 
Simply put, this problem lies in a diffi cultly reconciling two apparently 
disjunct, but intrinsically connected and equally real occurrences: the 
nature of the whole and the action of the parts. This is an age-old problem 
of composition, resting on the way in which it all ‘comes together.’ 
1.05  Pia Ednie-Brown, Diagram from sketch book, October 1996.  
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3. Figuring the moment: a caricature
3.1 Diagramming the Situation
“Every society has its diagram(s).”7 
What is going on in the present is always of pressing concern to us. The 
present is where past and future coexist and is always the only actual 
site of our ongoing assessments of life: of what to do next given what 
has already happened and what might happen in the future (whether 
0.5 seconds or 500 years away). The present is an unavoidable actuality 
that is conditioned by and conditions our ways and means of confi guring 
futures and pasts. 
At present, we are in the midst of a broadly felt 
sense that we have passed through a paradigmatic 
hinge, that we are now in a new age that can be 
distinguished, say, from the industrial age. This shift 
has been given many names. It lives in the move 
from the ‘modern to the postmodern’, from the ‘age 
of mechanical reproduction to the digital era’, from 
‘human to posthuman’, from ‘disciplinary societies 
to societies of control’ and from the ‘industrial 
to the information age’, from ‘Fordism to Post-
Fordism’. The namings are part of the josslings in 
and between discourses, with all the contestations, 
cross-referencings and contradictions this might 
suggest. There is a widespread, multiplied sense that 
a signifi cant paradigmatic change has occurred and/
or is well underway: the gossip has spread, even if 
a bit like Chinese whispers in its multiple forms and 
interpretations. Each ‘take’ on the paradigm shift 
offers an image through which to understand it. The 
multiplication of those images, in the outpourings of 
discourse, elaborates the idea: saying the same thing in different ways 
and via different material allows for a fl eshing out of the image. 
Whatever name is used to describe an era and whatever shape and 
content is given to outline the nature of associated cultural paradigm, in 
Deleuzian-Foucauldian terms, we are attempting to articulate a ‘diagram’. 
For Foucault, as Deleuze puts it, the diagram is “the presentation of the 
7.  Deleuze (1988), p. 35. 
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relations between forces unique to a particular formation”.8 The diagram 
is about how things work, abstractly. How formations are confi gured; how 
and what relations constitute them. As such “there are as many diagrams 
as there are social fi elds in history”.9 
Foucault’s book ‘Discipline and Punish’ presents a detailed exploration 
of the diagram of disciplinary societies – for which he offers Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon as an exemplary fi gure. This plan is a model of 
effi ciency: the many cells, arranged around the outer circumference of 
circular plan, is under surveillance by a centrally placed disciplinary body. 
A single body can’t watch every cell at every moment but prisoners can’t 
see if they are being watched at any one time or not. Unable to know, they 
have to assume they are being watched at all times. 
Here, the disciplinary body-eye – invisibly, effi ciently 
and indifferently – controls bodies, analysing, placing 
and moulding them. Rigidity, strictness and a stiffness 
of posture manners disciplinary practice. Armies and 
the fl oral arrangements of synchronized swimmers 
offer clear images of disciplinary functioning. It is 
a social arrangement in which the actions of bodies 
are moulded by and into an indifferent, centralised, 
geometrical, governing system. 
In Gilles Deleuze’s paper, ‘Postscript to Societies of 
Control’ he outlines (with somewhat uncharacteristic 
clarity) the conditions that can be seen to mark the 
late twentieth century as a transformation out of 
the regime of disciplinary societies. His paper is a 
caricature: a simplifi ed, exaggerated image made 
to foreground a particular way of perceiving a broad 
or generalised transformation. He creates quite a 
clear picture of a shift from one condition to another, 
pushing into the background his more usual, complex, 
folding thought. In doing this, the paper offers some 
selectively outlined ‘images’ through which to think about the shift out of 
disciplinary frameworks. 
As he portrays it, in the shift to ‘societies of control,’ disciplinary 
confi nement breaks out into modulations and undulations, “forming a 
system of varying geometry whose language is digital.”10 The inspector 
is now nowhere to be found; being dispersed, multiplied and “moving 
8.  Ibid, p. 72. 
9.  Ibid, p. 34.
10.  Deleuze (1995), p. 178.
1.06  Jeremy Bentham, 
Drawing of the Panopticon.
1.07  The Parade Berlin, early 1900s.
1.08  Earthcore rave party.
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among a continuous range of different orbits.”11 With money, gold is no 
longer the numerical datum and markets fl oat and undulate with a global 
market and exchange rates. “Surfi ng”, he says “have taken over from the 
old sports.”12 As Deleuze suggests, different “weapons” are required to 
deal with these conditions, but the nature of these weapons remain under 
question. Manuel DeLanda’s new book, A New Philosophy of Society, fl eshes 
out a Deleuzian ‘assemblage theory’ that offers a framework and, perhaps, 
conceptual ‘weapons’ or ‘tools’ for the modelling of these conditions.13
The aim of the short section to follow is to offer a diagrammatic fi gure 
of the contemporary conditions in which I see the explorations of this 
thesis to be situated. Like Deleuze’s paper, I offer nothing more than a 
caricature: an exaggerated fi gure sketched out with what they call ‘artistic 
licence’. The fi gure does not come to rest, although it lands in an unsettling 
suspension that is much like the ‘fur fi elds’. This can be read as an historical 
narrative or story that gives a bit of fl esh to the diagrammatic fi gure. 
Even though this section leaves us with more-or-less the same image 
that we started with (the fur fi elds), we will nevertheless have built up 
an accompanying story. It will have acquired, in other words, some depth 
with which later probes can be met with responsive resonance. 
11.  Ibid, 180.
12.  Ibid, p. 180.  
13.  One of DeLanda’s main points is an 
insistence on the relative autonomy of scaled 
levels of emergent phenomena.
1.09  Daumier, Two Lawyers (about 1866).
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3.2 Breakdown; the textural orgy of multiplicity
Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’, highlights the relationship between perception and 
technology within the social fi eld of his era. He suggested that technologies 
of reproduction were ushering in a new modus operandi for the newer forms 
of (mechanically reproduced) art where their affects are unconsciously 
absorbed rather than being subjects of critical refl ection. He called this 
‘tactile appropriation’. 
In particular, he placed great importance on the role of fi lm in mobilising 
the masses through tactile appropriation. He makes an analogy between 
the deepening of apperception14 provoked by two 19th century techno-
logical inventions, fi lm and Freudian theory. Both “isolated and made ana-
lyzable things which had heretofore fl oated along unnoticed in the broad 
stream of perception.”15 Through the framing of shots and their juxtapo-
sitions, the close up, the slow motion etc, that which tended to remain 
unconsciously absorbed becomes more readily analysed and explored con-
sciously. As fi lm enlarges the minutiae of the everyday and brings the blur 
of unnoticed actions into focus, the habitual, or the unconsciously enacted, 
is opened up to analysis. 
Benjamin proposes that while fi lm opened a space of micro-analysis, 
it closed the space of contemplative distance, where art was no longer 
refl ected upon but absorbed by the public through tactile means. Benja-
min points to everyday architecture as the cultural form that has always 
operated in such a way. As cultural participation involves a more emphatic 
and diverse public mass, it is now the public, which takes up the position 
of the critic. But this critic, he says, is an absent-minded one. In a state 
of distraction, the public masters new tasks as matters of habit “under the 
guidance of tactile appropriation.”16 Tactile appropriation is barely felt; its 
affects operate largely in the background of consciousness.  
14.  We may then defi ne Apperception as the 
movement of two masses of consciousness 
(Vorstellungsmassen) against each other so 
as to produce a cognition” William James. 
Principles of Psychology. ch 19
ht tp://psychc lass i cs .yorku.ca/James/
Principles/
15.  Benjamin(1968), p. 235.
16.  Ibid, p. 240.
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3.3 Virtuosity and Spatial Experience; from patterns to textures 
“Just like the clock maker metaphors of the Enlightenment, or the dialectical 
logic of the nineteenth century, the emergent worldview belongs to this moment 
in time, shaping our thought habits and coloring our perception of the world.”17
 
Conditions have changed since 1936. The confi gurations Benjamin outlines 
in his essay have become both intensifi ed and transformed.18 The public 
mass is larger, more dense, more dispersed and more media soaked. 
Paulo Virno discusses related aspects of contemporaneity in relation to 
the ‘virtuoso’. Virtuousos “are those who produce something which is not 
distinguishable, nor even separable, from the act of production itself.”19 He 
put forward ‘the activity of the speaker’ as a prime example because that 
which is spoken becomes inseparable from the way in which it is said. He 
delineates two characteristics which defi ne the nature of the virtuoso. The 
fi rst is lack of distinguishable end product and the second is the necessity 
of an audience, being an activity that requires the presence of others. 
Confl ating virtuosity and contemporary or ‘Post-Fordist’ tendencies of 
production means we are in an age that foregrounds two kinds of activity: 
the performative and the intrinsically collective constitution of individual 
utterance. 
Theories of emergence offer related ways of framing the operations 
of these contemporary tendencies.  Emergence, often discussed as a 
‘bottom-up’ phenomenon, involves no master plan implemented from 
above or from some centre of surveillance. Rather, a multitude of local, 
distributed interactions, each of which has no (apparent) sense of any 
overall, larger plan, provokes sophisticated organisational complexes. 
The classic examples are ants and cellular automata: where a mass of 
individual ‘agents’ (programmed ‘cells’ or ants) operate within simple 
behavioural patterns or rules that together self-organise into patterns, or 
the intelligent ‘organism’ that is an ant colony.
Let’s think about the fi eld of our cultural present. The broad socio-
economic atmosphere in which we are situated seems to increasingly 
display emergent behaviour: our systems becoming responsive, 
decentralised, self-perpetuating networks demonstrating life-like activity 
to which no simple cause and effect relations can be attributed. Think of 
the stock market, reality TV, the intertwinement of media, politics and the 
multitude, terrorism, climate change and mobile phone swarming. These 
very contemporary situations all highlight virtuosity within their modes of 
engagement and participation. Concurrently, they all offer highly emergent 
outcomes. Emergent phenomena are, in a sense, the elusive products of 
17.  Johnson (2004), p. 66.
18.  Bruce Mau argues that Benjamin’s notion 
that mechanical reproduction drains the 
work of art of its aura has turned out to the 
contrary: “the circulated image has not stolen 
the aura from the original; it has borrowed and 
reinvested it. Today, the works of the greatest 
value, both in monetary terms and in auratic 
density, are precisely those images most 
reproduced. Mau (2000), p81. While this is 
an astute observation, I would argue that the 
aura referred to by Mau is not quite the same 
as Benjamins. In the absence of the original, 
the force of the auratic power has no locatable 
source and is quite radically distributed. The 
capacity for the aura to provide a point of 
orientation for the individual in relation to 
community and world takes on quite a different 
hue. 
19.  Virno (2004), p. 90.
46
a virtuosic event or culture, but as a ‘product’ it is inseparable from the 
multiplicity that creates it and pervasive in that it modulates that very 
multiplicity. The moment it emerges out of a fi eld it curls back in. 
This is collective or swarm intelligence. It is also a virtuosic intelligence, 
which many fi nd diffi cult to make sense of – or discern as ‘sensible’ 
– dismissing it as some kind of stupidity. The integrity and sanctity of 
ideologically defi ned, critical and refl ective 
stances are characteristically frustrated by 
these forms of organization. The compulsive 
‘positionings’ that structure these modes of 
engagement are destabilised by seemingly 
irrational and ‘dumb’ swarmings, perhaps 
exemplifi ed by the uncontrollable volatility 
of the stock market and resonating with the 
commonly dismissive attitudes to Reality 
TV, echoing responses to early cinema.
The success of, for instance, the recent 
phenomena Big Brother is not only due 
to its innovative combination of liveness, 
interactivity and everyday familiarity, 
it produces a kind of diagram of our 
contemporary modes of participation. It 
contracts and intensifi es with diagrammatic 
poignance. The public becomes a more 
lively presence: a textured mass in the 
background whose directional sways 
register amidst the swing of events. Big Brother involves feedback, 
operating much like democratic politics and the phenomena of polling. 
But attracting the votes is certainly not an issue of ideological persuasion. 
Similarly, political leadership is not primarily about ideological integrity, 
it is an art of opportunistic timing and tweaking: of probability based 
judgements regarding the timing and tone of actions that might swing and 
sway public sentiment. Events emerge out of a complex dynamic system 
of interactions between media, public sentiment and political fi gures, if we 
can even properly distinguish these three nodes. 
These feedback systems of dynamic, emergent tendency point to the 
nature of the diagram being sought here. If we turn to the drawn diagrams 
all around us, these have been dominated by nodes and links: bubble 
diagrams, fl ow charts and link maps being key examples. But, something 
1.10 Gérard Fromanger, Existe (1976).
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has been happening there: our nodal diagrams are becoming so intense, 
with increasingly micro-levels of analysis and the prolifi c linking and node 
making, that these images are starting to become masses and differentiated 
fi elds rather than singular zones with links between them.
In the breakdown of disciplinary categorisation, we face a texture 
that is diffi cult to compress or contract into clear diagrams. Our modes 
of organisation are, in the broadest sense, being reconfi gured along with 
perception, implicating our sense of space and the abstract. This has not 
been without signifi cant struggle and confusion.20
The patterned routines of disciplinarity can be seen to have been 
infl ected into textured fi elds of emergence: from orderly lists to masses 
of erratic links, from synchronised swimming to surfi ng, from a world 
measured against standards and horizons to one balancing on the multiple 
curves of an ever shifting ground. This shift of pattern to texture becomes 
my way of imagining the diagrammatic shift from disciplinary societies to 
the age of emergence, one that becomes played out in numerous guises 
in the acts to come. 
Texture can be distinguished from pattern in important ways. Pattern 
implies rigidity and repetition within which difference is suppressed or 
avoided whereas the characteristics of texture are dependent upon the 
specifi c differences within repetitions or refrains. 
Pattern implies repetition that suppresses variation. Texture implies 
repetition through variation. 
20.  For an account of the struggle to usefully 
diagram socio-cultural conditions in the context 
of ‘creative industries’ policy making, see: 
Ednie-Brown (2001a).
1.11  Adam Fuss, ‘Untitled’ (1988). 1.12  Alisa Andrasek (biothing), Pavillion design (2007). 
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The fur fi elds were a way of ‘fi guring’ the invisible relations of that 
texture. If space is the relations we live, here was my diagram of lived 
space. William James describes how this works: 
“space-relations… are nothing but sensations of particular lines, particular angles, 
particular forms of transition, or (in the case of a distinct more) of particular 
outstanding portions of space after two fi gures have been superposed. These 
relation-sensations may actually be produced as such, as when a geometer 
draws new lines across a fi gure with his pencil to demonstrate the relations 
of its parts, or they may be ideal representations of lines, not really drawn. 
But in either case their entrance into the mind is equivalent to a more detailed 
subdivision, cognizance, and measurement of the space considered. The bringing 
of sub-divisions to consciousness constitutes, then, the entire process by which 
we pass from our fi rst vague feeling of a total vastness to a cognition of the 
vastness in detail.”21
1.18  Alisa Andrasek (biothing), bone 
assemblage from The Invisibles animation 
(2003).
1.17  Casea Reas, ‘Triptych of images from Process 6 (software)’ (2005). 
1.16  Diagram of the ‘Knowledge Nation’, 
Australian Labour party’s education policy, 2001.
1.13  Cecil Balmond, digital model. 1.15  Mapping of internet, The Opte Project, 
Date: Nov 23 2003.
1.14  Karl Chu,  Xphylum (1998).
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1.19 Xin Danwen, ‘disCONNEXION, A_06 from the series 2002-3. 1.20  Xin Danwen, ‘disCONNEXION, A_07 from the series 2002-3.
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4. Space is the relations we live
A common understanding of space is an undifferentiated fi eld that passively lies between things. This is a habit 
of thought, feeling and expression. This habit is a very silent, powerfully affective architectural formation. It 
moulds our perception and experience of the world and modulates our expressions therein. In building up such 
armatures of belief and action, we solidify the ground of our worldly experience. Mostly, we let the ground be 
background, acting out our lives in ways that this foundation makes possible. Sometimes, we loose our footing, 
become destabilised and maybe fall.  The ground looms forward as both lost and re-found; at the same time that 
its surety is in question, its powerful actuality is realised. It is real-ised or intensely real because it leaps into the 
foreground, posing questions and problems as it does so. What was actual becomes virtual and vice-versa: the 
real is in a tumble or turbulence of reconfi guration. Things are not found; they emerge. 
Understanding our selves as collectively defi ned, both from within and from without, tends to go hand in hand 
with a sense of space as full, active and generated by lived relations themselves. If space is the relations we live 
(rather than live in), then we affect it through the way that we live. Or in other words,  the nature of space unfolds 
from the nature of our actions, and vice versa. Spatiality is an ethically loaded issue. 
Technologies – our machines, our concepts, our systems and processes, our artefacts – are no mere adjunct to 
the processes that constitute living, they literally become part of and affect those processes. Industrial technol-
ogy, digital technology and bio-technology, for instance, have all altered the ways in which we and other creatures 
live. If space is the relations we live, it is now lived differently. 
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When space is assumed homogenous and neutral (or, in 
other words, nothing in itself) relations between things located 
in its emptiness seem spatially unbothered. But as soon as you 
put a few things in space and start to fi ll that emptiness with 
multiple relations, it starts to feel quite busy fairly quickly. One 
relation affects another and they start to blur into more of a 
textured fi eld than a set of discrete clarifi cations. It gets hard 
to separate things from relations and space from either. Once 
space gets relationally busy, it bustles with textured movement, 
even if nothing actually gets up and moves. It becomes a fi eld 
of fl ux and change. Stillness, as Leibniz suggested, is only an 
infi nitesimally small movement. Everything moves, always. If 
architecture is about static immobility, then it is not of this 
world. In this world, process is fundamental and rather than 
changeless stabilities, continual variation becomes the datum. 
Space is plastic, actively and affectively. We could argue 
that this has always been the case, but it seems to be more 
powerfully true of contemporary space, or the sense of space 
that loosely defi nes the nature of our present era. 
Our sense of space, no matter how implicitly understood 
this may remain, is at the core of architectural production and 
affect. Architectural production that embraces the ethical-aes-
thetic know-how of emergence involves a sense of space that 
operates between the catastrophic breakdown and the stable 
ground.  
1.21  Photograph of Francis Bacon’s studio.
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1.22  Henry Michaux, Mescalin drawing (1955).
1.23  Tony Sherman, ‘Lady Macbeth’ (1994-5). Published in Moos (1996).
1.23
1.22
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We formalise our thinking-feeling-expressing 
relations through the objects we make: they 
embody our tendencies and orientations at the 
same time that they orient us. Histories of arefacts 
and the fl ows of stylistic formations lie in our wake, 
in our periphery, sometimes transpositionally up 
ahead, in the rear and over to the side. These fl ows 
of style-formations map out a differentiated ground 
of expression that is always reforming, a condition 
given an apt formal articulation in Charles Jencks’ 
diagrams (fi g 1.24) and more recently in Jeffrey 
Kipnis’s diagrams for the Wexner Centre for the 
Arts exhibition he organised, Mood River (fi g 1.25, 
26). 
We orient ourselves in our particular conditions 
through these different expressions. Those 
expressions widely agreed to be ‘contemporary’ 
are recognised as such because the relations they 
embody resonate with the compositional texture 
of our sense of space: with the way that things 
seem to be ‘holding together’ and moving along. 
Artefacts and events are felt to be exemplary of 
a contemporary condition when they resonate 
with something we often bundle up in the term 
1.24 Charles Jencks, ‘The Century is Over, Evolutionary Tree of 20th century 
architecture’
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‘atmosphere’. In itself, atmosphere is invisible, but this invisibility is in-the-visible; the visible world presents us 
with signs of performative tendencies. New expressions can make knots in the fi eld of expression in such a way 
that the nature of that expression, here and now, personally and culturally, fi nds itself making sense rather than 
answering to common (or ready-made) sense. 
When such knots reconfi gure or signifi cantly infl ect the fi eld of common sense, they ‘stand out’ like a sore 
thumb or a fl uorescence, provoking us to collectively consider its undeniable entrance into the scene of the quietly 
familiar. That which ‘stands out’ is also something that we cannot simply fi t into the habitual armatures of action. 
They become surrounded by an intensive chatter through which we strive to turn the agitations of potential into 
something more manageable. A great deal is said not only through the content of these utterances, but also 
through the manner and tone of the conversations, the rythms and pulses of interactions, the feedback loops: 
the dance of discourse. Performative dimensions tell us a great deal about the implicit pathways through which 
sense emerges from our efforts.  
A suggestion of this thesis is that emergence offers a model of creative genesis and practice that has a poignant 
resonance in contemporary socio-political conditions. As late capitalism faces its own fragilities and uncontrollable 
powers, contemporary socio-political formations become more expressly emergent than in other historical eras. 
No contemporary formation is an uncontested or unproblematic issue. The contestations, battles, tensions etc are 
indispensible to that very poignancy. The ‘contemporary’ claims the power of collective ground, territorial disputes 
are implicit and unravel from there. Despite and because of the struggle and vibrancy of negotiation, we tend to 
collectively understand that which matters at-the-moment: that which counts as a highly ‘contemporary’ problem 
or formation. The conditions of capitalism encourage that fl ow to be always under active, collective redefi nition. 
Political tides turn, fashions bend, shift and twist, meaning rises and falls. No one is entirely in control, everything 
is always at risk. As certain formations rise into a dominance of power, they can only do so through a certain 
elasticity, poised to adapt at every moment. 
1.25, 26  Jeffrey Kipnis, diagrams from Mood River exhibition catalogue. 
1.25 1.26
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ACT 2.  Models of Emergence
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Act 2 introduces a brief history of emergence as a construct that arose in philosophy, to 
be more recently developed through the sciences. I argue that the tensions internal to 
the scientifi cally oriented developments of emergence theory are raised by the fact that 
it confronts intrinsically aesthetic issues that the reductive conventions of science are ill 
equipped to deal with. On the other hand, I suggest that it also raises the opportunity for 
aesthetics to gather a more detailed understanding of its abstract operations. In laying 
the ground for this to be explored further in the next act, I work through two key ideas. 
The fi rst is John Holland’s suggestion that the key to the mysteries of emergence lies in 
a model of creative process, but that such a model is yet to be developed. The second is 
the relationship of ‘the art of emergence’ to Francisco Varela’s notion of ‘ethical expertise’ 
or ‘know-how’.  
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2.01  Botticelli Sandro, ‘The Birth of Venus’ (1485-86).
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1. Emergence and the limits of scientifi c explanation
The question, ‘what is Emergence?,’ has historically given rise to a 
polyphony of vague answers. It is a notion that has snowballed into layers 
of white noise and froth. Joseph Earley claims that “the word ‘emergence’ 
was fi rst used in English during the sixteenth century — as a fancy and 
learned way to refer to the process of coming up out of the sea.”1 This 
remains an amusingly apt kernel for the subsequent development of the 
term, which became a name for something that eludes causal explanation 
– or whose process of coming-into-being is untrackable.
Emergent phenomena are properties that seem to exist at a differ-
ent level to the interactions that generate them. They are properties of a 
whole that seem magically disconnected from the properties of its parts. 
Not only are they mysterious, they are as ubiquitous as Life itself, that 
being the most powerfully mysterious of emergent phenomena.  
My attempt to survey the literature on emergence opened up an over-
whelmingly vast terrain of publications, expansively cast across a broad 
set of discursive fi elds, such as philosophy, computer science, artifi cial life, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, consciousness studies, developmental 
psychology, psychoanalysis and group therapy, art, economics, organi-
zational management and planning, sociology, epidemiology, agriculture, 
and ecology, biology and chemistry. Obviously, the questions that arise in 
different fi elds around the problem of emergence vary in nature. For cre-
ative practices such as art and architecture, emergence generally appears 
as an issue in relation to works that involve digital computation and inter-
activity. Inquiries are commonly concerned with the invention of genera-
tive and/or interactive systems (or designing a design system rather than 
a design product). 
From its earliest conjectures, the issue of emergence has been tied 
up with the battles between theories of evolution and creationism; the 
world as machine and the existence of God. It is a construct that seeks to 
1.  Earley, Joseph. (2002). Earley cites his 
source as: Brown, L., ed., The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon, Oxford, 
1993).
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explain how novelty arises, whether that be new species of life, innovative 
theories or technical objects. As such, emergence intrinsically concerns 
processuality and how things are created or generated and has signifi cant 
relevance to problems of creative process. 
For the sciences, there is a palpable anxiety concerning the fact that 
emergence refers to something that can’t be fully explained. There is no 
scientifi c defi nition of emergence. However, there are well-understood 
descriptions. Steven Johnson’s popular book, Emergence, fi rst published 
in 2001, summarises emergence as the ‘movement from low-level rules 
to higher-level sophistication’.  One of the more cited publications on the 
subject, ‘Emergence. From Chaos to Order’ (1998), is by John Holland, 
a professor of psychology, electrical engineering and computer science 
who is promoted as ‘the father of genetic algorithms’.2 Here he similarly 
describes the hallmark of emergence as “much coming from little.”4 But 
these are provisional descriptions strapped around an elusive problem and 
as Holland goes on to admit: “It is unlikely that a topic as complicated 
as emergence will submit weakly to a concise defi nition, and I have no 
such defi nition to offer”.3 At the end of his book, he outlines a series of 
obstacles standing in the way of a better understanding of emergence. But 
before he launches into this list he writes: 
“There is one larger issue, however, that I will avoid. It may be that the parts 
of the universe that we can understand in a scientifi c sense – the parts of the 
universe that we describe via laws (axioms, equations) – constitute a small 
fragment of the whole. If that is so, then there may be aspects of emergence 
that we cannot understand scientifi cally.”4
As Mark Bedau writes: ‘Strong emergence starts where scientifi c 
explanation ends.’5 How might these scientifi cally unattainable aspects be 
understood? Aesthetically? 
Clearly, emergence propels the sciences into an internal confl ict. The 
‘nature’ of the whole is a question that philosophy and aesthetics are more 
familiar with. Science is more or less concerned with explaining the way 
things work rather than the nature of that way of working. The nature of 
that mysterious ‘product’ of emergence problematically glows in fi elds ill-
equipped with adequate tools of analysis. 
2.  On back cover of Holland (1999).
3.  Ibid, p. 3.
4.  Ibid, p. 231.
5.  Bedau (2002), p. 5.
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2. The emergence of emergentism
Brian McLaughlin’s often cited history of the modern emergentist tradition 
reaches back to John Stuart Mill’s ‘System of Logic’ of 1843 and then through 
Alexander Bain’s ‘Logic’ of 1870 before George Henry Lewes introduced 
the term ‘emergent’ as a philosophical concept in 1875 in his ‘Problems 
of Life and Mind’. That which Lewes meant by ‘emergent’ was what Mills 
called a ‘heteropathic effect’, where the collocation of causes gives rise to 
an effect that cannot be reduced to a sum of those causes. Lewes work 
was principally a study of psychology and was based in a conjunction 
of mind and body, leading to his The Physical Basis of Mind in 1877. 
This gave impetus to a fi eld of philosophical enquiry in the late 19th and 
early 20th century, named the ‘British Emergentists’ by Mclaughlin.6 This 
peaked in the 1920’s, in a movement known as emergent evolutionism.7
 Emergentism targetted a middle ground between the mechanists and the 
vitalists, in a non-reductive materialism.
The publications usually cited as central to this 1920s eruption of 
emergentism are Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Diety (1920), Roy 
Wood Cellars’s Evolutionary Naturalism (1922), Conway Lloyd Morgan’s 
Emergent Evolution (1923) and Charles Dunbar Broad’s The Mind and its 
Place in Nature (1925).
Emergentism is a subset of process philosophy, which stretches out 
over a more expanded philosophical history. Nicholas Rescher, in a survey 
of process philosophy,8 lists the leading proponents as Heracleitus, 
Gottfried Leibniz, Henri Bergson, C. S. Peirce and William James, moving 
on to involve Alfred North Whitehead, Samuel Alexander and Conroy 
Lloyd Morgan. But we can further extend this through Neitzsche, Gilbert 
Simondon, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and on to Brian Massumi, Isabele 
Stengers and others. Arran Gare (2002) traces connections between 
Lloyd Morgan, Alexander and Whitehead, pointing out that the process 
philosophy of the later was an effort to develop a theory of emergence, 
then traced back to Gottfried Leibniz and Henri Bergson, both of whom 
are signifi cant infl uences on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze’s 
work, especially his book on Leibniz, The Fold, played a central role in 
Greg Lynn’s later theoretical underpinnings of his publications The Fold in 
Architecture and Animate Form as well as Bernard Cache’s related work 
in Earth Moves (1995). The fold is a non-reductive materialist concept of 
immediate affi nity with emergentism, relating to the fold of body and mind 
or soul; to the intertwinement of thinking and feeling; of the actual and 
the virtual. In picking up on these few threads of immediate connection, 
we can see that ‘emergentism’, as part of process philosophy, is weaved 
into the threads of contemporary architectural discourse. 
6.  McLaughlin (1992).
7.  Goldstein (1999), p. 53.
8.  Rescher (2001).
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Another thread seems worth mentioning here in passing. While I have 
been unable to fi nd any evidence of direct association, one might speculate 
on the infl uence of Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity on Seigfried Giedion’s 
Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition from 1941. 
The deep relation of emergentism to debates on the processual nature of 
life resonates with Geidion’s approach to the historical task. His foreward 
to the fi rst edition of this book gives italic emphasis to the line: “History is 
not a compilation of Facts, but an insight into a moving process of life.”9 
Similarly, he claims that an architecture, once it appears, “constitutes an 
organism in itself, with its own character and its own continuing life.”10 
Furthermore, both publications give signifi cant emphasis to notions 
of space-time and motion. Further research into this connection might 
cast new light on the nuances of Giedion’s incalculably infl uence on the 
development of architectural discourse. Giedion was a student of Heinrich 
Wölffl in, whose work will be discussed in Act 5.
A more extensive study on the mutual infl uences would, no doubt, 
unravel a complex and extensive weave. Here, I am not attempting to 
trace such a history but to outline the emphasis of this philosophical arena. 
Process philosophy gives ontological priority to processes, forces, and 
change rather than objects, agents and stasis as the basic substance of 
the world. This means that it focusses on ontogenesis rather than ontology 
per se: becoming rather than being. The ontogenetic aspect of process 
philosophy makes it “a philosophy of the event concerned directly with 
becoming.”11 
In such a framework, there are no entirely stable categories. All 
categories of distinction, such as body, mind, objective, subjective, actual, 
virtual etc, become artefacts that emerge out of a more primary level of 
reality. At the basis of all process philosophy is a very unstable or always 
shifting ground of change or perpetual emergence. 
9.  Geidion (1997), p. vi.
10.  Ibid, p. 20.
11.  Massumi (2002a), p. xxiv.  Here 
Massumi is describing Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘expressionism’.
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3. What sort of emergent whole?
“Notions such as emergence and complexity are nothing apart from the inten-
tions of those who use them.”12  Isabelle Stengers 
“What makes the models and their use potentially dangerous is the strong claim 
that the business of science is to explain away what is only subjective opinion and 
illusion…How are we to avoid taking a simulation as scientifi c theory, explaining 
away what the model had no need to take into account”13  Isabelle Stengers
Just as defi ning emergence has not been straight forward, the limits of what 
counts as emergent is a contested question. Some say that everything, 
to some degree, is emergent because emergence is simply indicative 
of the way of nature. Others say that authentic emergence is rare and 
particular. Initially, in Lewes early use of the term he distinguished between 
‘resultant’ and ‘emergent’. Mark Bedau also makes this distinction, then 
going on to divide all that fi ts into the emergent category into three types 
of emergence: nominal, weak and strong.14
Nominal emergence becomes a way of describing the qualitative 
properties of virtually all phenomena for which a common or scientifi c 
explanation is available. For example, the properties of water are a 
nominally emergent phenomenon where individual molecules of a cup of 
water do not share the properties of water (their collective wholeness), 
such as fl uidity and transparency. 
Strong emergence refers to the more extreme manifestations of 
emergence, with related names in the literature being ‘ontological’, ‘radical’ 
and ‘non-reducible’ emergence. This is the most confounding of emergent 
phenomena in that they are both utterly irreducible to causes and exhibit 
irreducible macro-causal powers, where the macro folds back to affect 
the micro in what is called ‘downward causation’.15 This contravenes or at 
least complicates the common defi nition of emergence as expressed, for 
instance, by Johnson as “movement from low-level rules to higher-level 
sophistication.”16 In other words, a strong emergent phenomenon turns 
back to affect the assemblage from which it arose, thereby also affecting 
itself. There is, as Bedau puts it, “something viciously circular about 
downward causation.”17 Not only are its macro properties autonomous, 
its entire being or system attains autonomy. Bedau locates most of the 
contemporary interest in strong emergence in “concerns to account for 
those aspects of mental life like the qualitative aspects of consciousness 
that most resist reductionistic analysis.”18 This is also a principle interest 
in the work of Franscico Varela and Humberto Maturana who cast this 
12.  Stengers (1997), p. 12.
13.  Stengers (2004), p. 98.
14.  Emergence is also commonly categorised 
into ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’.
15.  Bedau (2002), p. 4.
16.  Johnson (2004), p. 18.
17.  Bedau (2002), p. 16.
18.  Ibid, p. 5.
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circular or cyclical process of autonomy as integral to the nature of living 
systems, as outlined in their notion of autopoeisis. Emergence becomes 
manifestly ontogenetic and ontological in its extreme or strong cases, 
because the former micro-macro dichotomy is looped together into a 
system of becoming. 
Between nominal and strong emergence, Bedau then outlines a type 
called weak emergence, that science is better equipped to deal with. An 
example of weak emergence is a computational event, whether digital or 
‘natural’: “The iteration and aggregation of local causal interactions that 
generate natural phenomena can be viewed as a computation, just like the 
causal processes inside a computer.”19
Downward causation is a feature of weak emergence but not in the 
same problematic manner of strong emergence. One simple example of 
weak downward causation, given by Bedau, is that of a traffi c jam causing 
his car’s motion to slow and its movements become erratic. Relations 
between micro-components (such as cars, peak activity and traffi c system 
pathways) give rise to the macro pattern formation of a traffi c jam. The car 
is affected, but not in nature as it remains the same car it was before and 
after the traffi c jam (though if one was to regard this issue on a different 
time frame,  I’m sure it would not be diffi cult to trace a history of how the 
increase of traffi c jams has affected automobile design). The emergence 
of a traffi c jam manifests as something like a shift from fl owing liquid 
to a more solid formation, like water freezing and then melting again.20
 The circle of affects is not ‘vicious’. So, no problem: “The weak emergent 
macro-cause is nothing but the iteration of the aggregate micro causes. 
Ontological and causal reduction holds.”21 
Bedau is unsure as to whether this scientifi cally admissable type of 
emergence might be “all the emergence we need”, however he seems 
fairly sure that:
“Computer simulations allow weak emergence to extend reductionism into new 
territory, but they do so by embodying the idea that something’s nature can 
depend on its genesis. Thus, the macro can depend on the context-sensitive 
process from which it arises and by which it is maintained.”22
The ‘context-sensitive’ aspect of weak emergence is one of its crucial 
points; it has to be part of an event, such as a computer simulation, for 
it to occur. But while computer simulations may embody the idea that the 
19.  Ibid, p. 9.
20.  An apt description of this is offered by 
William Braham: “many kinds of traffi c jams 
occur once a certain threshold volume of cars 
is on the highway. The creeping stop or stop-
and-start traffi c that results is not caused by 
any one person’s speed or decision to drive, 
but occurs like the change of phase as freely 
fl owing liquid congeals into a solid at a certain 
temperature (and pressure).” ‘in Kolarevic/
Malwawi (2005)
21.  Ibid, p. 17.
22.  Ibid, p. 22.
64
nature of something (such as an instance of weak emergence) depends 
on the particular interactions of its genesis, they can’t explain these 
particularities in terms of its nature. The pathway of reducability works 
only in one direction. 
Bedau distinguishes these types of emergence from things that are not 
emergent, or resultant properties, which “are those that can be predicted 
and explained from the properties of the components.”23 To illustrate 
resultant properties he uses the example of a 
circle. Circles can be described as a collection 
of points, each of which has no shape or 
circular property, that come together to 
make a circularity. Circularity is a property of 
wholeness, not of its parts. Just as fl uidity is 
a property of water but not of its molecules, 
this sounds, nominally at least, emergent. 
But Bedau argues that this is actually a 
resultant property because we know precisely 
how those points make a circle: by being 
equidistant from a particular point. The idea 
of the point and the rules of generating circles 
are embedded in the systemic consistency of 
Euclidean geometry. Everything of the circle’s 
genesis becomes systematically explained 
simply because a circle can be a result of that 
known system. If this seems a slippery point 
of distinction, it is. We might know how those 
points make a circle, but what do we know 
of how that combination and that generative 
procedure makes a circularity? A circle is a 
thing. Circularity is a qualitative property of 
that thing. 
If we dig a little deeper we fi nd a particularly vicious circle. Euclidean 
geometry is a system that can not be attributed to any simple causes 
(unless we believe it to be a law of a strongly emergent phenomena 
called God or some universal truth). Euclidean geometry is argueably an 
emergent system in itself, becoming “the context-sensitive process from 
which [a particular idea of the circle] arises and by which it is maintained.” 
We appear to be going around in circles. 
23.  Ibid, p. 4.
2.02  Giovanni di Paolo, ‘The Creation of the World and the Expulsion from Paradise’ (1445).
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The distinction gets slippery in another way when we realise that there 
are other ways of understanding a circle. Robin Evans describes three 
other ways in which a circle can be generated, none of which refer to a 
centre point.24  The simplest of these is “the track that would be produced 
by a bicycle with handlebars fi xed at a given angle to the frame”.25  A 
circle appears and a circularity is enacted, but there is no designation of 
centre.  
We might also consider the less geometrical appeals to circularity used 
to diagrammatically describe a set of relations or actions of some kind. 
One example of this could be the “viciously circular” downward causation 
of strong emergence. These feedback loops do not actually occur in perfect 
circular formation, they may not even be circular at all, actually. However, 
they are imagined and explained as such; a circle (virtually) appears and 
a circularity is described. 
If we try to simultaneously imagine all these ways in which a circle can 
be generated, it becomes an idea, an image and a formation that buzzes 
with a multitude of virtual lives. The circle has no necessaily singular cause 
but becomes situated in a fi eld of potential and implicit histories. How the 
general fi gure of the circle and the quality of circularity arose and led to its 
innumerable potential instances could not, I would suggest, be convincingly 
subject to reductive explanation. This swarming fi eld of circularity plays 
an implicit role in the ongoing life of all circles; in their actual action in 
the world. Rendering a circle as a reductively simple resultant, is a way of 
casting this swarm aside wherein it becomes a dead, scientifi c object. It 
strips it of “the context-sensitive process from which it arises” removing all 
that is considered trivial and suppressing the potentially disruptive effects 
of any implicit undercurrent. This stripping away of implicit potential solidi-
fi es a particular context “by which it is maintained” (such as Eucidean 
Geometry) while making it diffi cult for it any other context-sensitive pro-
cess to manipulate or transform it. Robin Evans puts it succinctly:
“Triangles, rectangles and circles as defi ned in Euclid have been pretty well 
exhausted as subjects of geometrical enquiry. As these elements lose their mys-
tery, interest in them subsides, but in this state of devaluation they become 
more valuable elsewhere because their behaviour is completely predictable. 
Consequences can be foreseen. Dead geometry is an inoculation against uncer-
tainty.”26
24.  Robin Evans takes issue with the apparent 
logical necessity of defi ning a circle in terms of 
a central reference point in his essay, ‘Perturbed 
Circles’, offering three ways of generating of a 
circle that do not involve a centre point. Robin 
Evans, Robin (1995), n. 84, p. 376.
25.  Evans (1995) n. 84, p. 376.
26.  Evans (1995), p. xxvii.
2.03  Theodoros Pelecanos, The Ouroboros 
(1478). In alchemical tract titled Synosius.
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For this thesis, with its orientation toward process philosophy, the system 
of becoming that characterises strong emergence is of most importance 
– it is asserted as ubiquitous within a particular mode of relatedness. It 
depends, in other words, on how one engages with and perceives events. 
In orienting oneself toward process and change as the ground of the world 
and life, Bergson insists that consciousness must “detach itself from the 
already-made and attach itself to the being-made”27 in order for it to 
get to the principles of it’s emergence. Already-made laws maintain an 
impeccable garden in which new life is outlawed, tending to restrain the 
perceived from fl owing out of delimited moulds and training it to turn a 
blind eye to the movements always stirring the surface of perception. A ‘still 
life’ does not remain the same from moment to moment. Our perception 
of an object is less of an encounter with a form than, as Massumi puts it, 
a ‘form of encounter’:
“what we extract is not a “form” as we normally think of one. It is not static. It 
is a dynamism, composed of a number of interacting vectors. The kind of “unity” 
it has in no way vitiates that multiplicity - it is precisely an interaction between 
a multiplicity of terms, an interrelation of relations, an integration of disparate 
elements. It is diagram of a process of becoming.”28
Bedau’s categories of the resultant and of nominal and weak emergence 
are not necessarily as evacuated of strongly emergent characteristics as he 
claims - they simply can be understood as such (to often very useful and 
pragmatic ends) when thought is cast into ways of relating to things that 
tend toward the reductive. Bedau’s call for science to put strong emergence 
aside in favour of the more reductionist friendly weak emergence skirts 
the danger that Isabelle Stengers pointedly enunciates in the quote at the 
beginning of this episode: the danger of “explaining away what the model 
had no need to take into account.” 
As stated earlier, theories of emergence are intrinsically concerned 
with how things are created or generated. This has a clear and obvious 
relevance for any kind of creative practice, which can include scientifi c 
endeavour. While science tends to seek ways of reductively explaining how 
that genesis occurs, Isabelle Stengers urges scientists to be mindful of the 
creative activity that this entails. 
Emergence is a construct or a model of creation. Models can often 
be approached as static things made to ‘grasp’ activity and fi x it into 
more manageable forms. In this episode I have been trying to elucidate 
something of what reductive ways of approaching emergence ‘explains 
27.  Ibid, p. 237.
28.  Massumi (1992), pp. 13-14.
2.04  El Lissitzky, Self-portrait (1924).
2.05  Lázló Moholy-Nagy, ‘Wie bleibe Ich jung 
und schön’ (1925).
2.04
2.05
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away’ from the model: the qualities of activity or the aesthetic dimensions 
that are so powerfully an aspect of emergence. In unpacking that which 
gets packed away, I have been laying a path toward a more aesthetically 
inclined notion of emergence as an elastic, dynamic model pertaining to 
a mode of engagement, a way of relating, a perceptual orientation and a 
mode of composition. 
2.06  John Conway’s automaton.
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4. Shifting attention
“Scholarly thought and professional research have produced solutions that may 
be compared with those that folk cultures and lay crafts have devised. Conjuring 
up mysteries and demonstrating a competence to solve them is the central work 
of sorcerers…Perhaps there is also a kind of magic in the routine presentation of 
self in everyday life.”29 
Emergent phenomena may be those holistic properties that befuddle the 
reductive tools and conventions of science, appearing as if by the hands of 
sorcerers, but they are nevertheless deeply familiar to us all. Some of the 
more aesthetically oriented examples of character, atmosphere and style 
are also deeply familiar qualitative ‘things’; textures or consistencies that 
we know even though we are not sure how we know them or how they 
come into being. 
Contemporary accounts of emergence do not tend to discuss these 
kinds of phenomena, concentrating more on organizational complexes 
which clearly arise through operational systems (such as behaviour in 
economic markets, games, cellular automata) and/or those apparently 
independent of human perception (weather, ant colonies, crops and nature 
in general). 
John Holland’s Emergence offers a rare exception. In one poignant 
section he moves into the realms of aesthetics in addressing the question 
of the nature of emergent phenomena. After devoting the majority of the 
book to an intricate exploration of constrained generating procedures, or 
the micro-laws of specifi c processes of emergence, he turns to address their 
connection to the macro level, or to the emergent phenomena themselves: 
“Whether it is Conway’s automaton or some real world process, we do not 
expect the emergent phenomena we observe to have simple descriptions 
in terms of the underlying laws. Indeed, in both cases, we search avidly 
for simplifying macrolaws.”30 
Holland insists that a deeper understanding of emergence requires that 
we better understand, or model, the macrolaws of emergent phenomena. 
He writes that as we move between levels, there is an axiomatic shift: the 
scope and nature of the laws of the system of activity changes. There is 
shift in order. A move ‘down’ to the micro-level involves a burrowing into 
the details, wherein we loose sight of the global qualities of the macro-level. 
On the other hand, a moving out to survey the big picture means that the 
details can no longer be seen. This shift in law and order, inasmuch as it 
29.  Katz (1999), p. 309.
30.  Holland (1999), p. 189.
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describes a leaping between scientifi c reductionism and aesthetic wholes, 
can also be likened to movements of attention involved in stepping back 
from a drawing to appreciate the overall composition and then shifting 
back in, to working up close on the more local behaviours within the pen 
work techniques. Refi ning our understanding of how these levels work 
together entails a kind of attention that deepens the creative process. Or, 
perhaps more precisely, it offers (at least) two different kinds of depth, 
adding dimensions to the fi eld of attention. For Holland, the (creative) 
process of invention or innovation offers clues regarding what we might 
need to look out for. 
5. Creative process as a model of emergence
“The menace here is that the complexity fi eld may play exactly the same role as 
the traditional sciences of simple, linear systems: ‘Let us begin with the complex, 
the rest is the same, just still more complex’ …I trust that the fi eld of complexity 
may answer the challenge of resisting power and accept this new version of 
Joseph Needham’s remark: if there is ever to be any coherence between the 
brain as a very, very complex system and the production of experience, it will be 
complex-systems theory that will have changed.“ Stengers (2004, 98-99)
One example of strong emergence is the coming-into-being of innovation. 
An innovation may emerge, but we can’t track the steps back to generalize 
that process in order to control the production of more innovation, at will. 
The process is not reproducible – evidenced in the struggles to generate 
successful institutes and research centres whose mandate is: innovate. 
Innovation is clearly not only something that is emergent, it just as clearly 
folds back to alter the conditions from which it arose, exhibiting that 
‘vicious circle’ of ‘downward causation.’  “Ultimately”, Holland writes, “to 
understand emergence, we must understand the process that engenders 
these inventions.”31 Holland writes that true innovation involves a leap 
that remains mysterious only because we lack a well-defi ned model of the 
creative process. 
The ‘creative process’ is not the same thing as the mechanical laws 
that internally defi ne a system displaying emergent outcomes. It is also 
not the same as the conventions through which scientifi c research dis-
plays its processes of enquiry, which Holland characterizes as “careful, 
step-by-step reasoning, each step following directly and closely from the 
previous step.”32 The problem with this neat and tidy form of explanatory, 
31.  Holland (1999), p. 202.
32.  Ibid, pp. 204-5.
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logically reasoned display, he writes, is that “this widely accepted scientifi c 
standard has given rise to a view, held by some scholars and scientists, 
that this step-by-step, almost mechanical procedure is the way that sci-
ence is actually constructed. It is a view that marginalizes imagination and 
creation. But few scientists, if any, actually carry out their research in this 
fashion.”33 
Invention in the sciences occur, Holland argues, via quite a different 
process: one of a transversal mapping of relations from one model into 
another new model. As an example he refers to James Clerk Maxwell’s use 
of a mechanism-oriented fl uid mechanical model to arrive at his equations 
for electromagnetic fi elds Maxwell writes about holding onto a ‘clear physi-
cal conception’, borrowed from one area of physical science, in develop-
ing a new conception of another. Holland discusses this as a metaphoric 
conjunction where a source model is used to develop a target model, via 
the link of metaphor. 
But this transversal movement of a pattern from one site to another 
does not happen without involving the affects of a submerged, embedded 
background of disciplinary knowledge and assumptions, accumulated as 
“a complicated aura of technique, interpretation, and consequences, much 
of it unwritten.”34 Both source and target come to the party of metaphoric 
conjunction with their auratic accumulations unfolding a “recombination of 
these auras, enlarging the perceptions associated with both the target and 
the source.”35 The result: something new. While the new thing is, most 
explicitly, the ‘target’, the source is also renewed. In other words, the new-
ness is all encompassing: what emerges is an all-over, over-all shift in the 
nature of the world. As Sanford Kwinter has noted, “each innovation is the 
product of single and novel way of being in the world, an invention that 
then re-disposes the world according to entirely new rhythmic values.”36 
Holland loosely suggests that an as-yet-unformulated carrier model of 
creative process would pertain to the conjunction of poetry and physics. 
“In a sense,” he writes “the poetic framework is too loose whereas the 
scientifi c framework is too tight.”37 The loose and the tight need to join 
forces, combining their ‘auras’ in a mutually transformative conjunction. 
The  important implication here is that the invention of a model of creative 
process would involve a mutually affecting conjunction of science and 
aesthetics. 
This potential does not seem far from the fact that emergence alerts 
us to the relation between different modes of knowing the same thing, 
generally understood in terms of the difference between laws of the micro 
and the macro. This can be generalised into two divergent and competing 
33.  Ibid, p. 205.
34.  Ibid, p. 206.
35.  Ibid, pp. 207-8.
36.  Kwinter (2000) p. 35.
37.  Ibid, p. 219.
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epistemologies, roughly sketched out here as science and aesthetics. 
As different modes of attention, scientifi c reduction is oriented toward 
discrete micro-relations and aesthetics toward the macro-confi gurations. 
In the inventive, creative process – as in strong emergence – both modes 
or levels are involved in change, affecting one another in a co-determining 
manner.
At fi rst sight the creative leap arising from metaphoric conjunctions 
between models might seem more like a macro-macro pattern match, 
rather than the leap between the micro and the macro that tends to 
describe emergence, placing it in an ambiguous relation to the usual 
description. But the conjunction between patterns or models involves both 
micro and macro levels. In fact, it involves a breakdown of the two-tiered 
model into a far more spatial one, where an intensive order arises through 
the intimate meeting of disparate micro-organisations, such that together, 
they transform or leap into a change of overall state. 
The promise in developing the model of emergence along these lines 
does not just lie in scientifi c forms of attention becoming more attuned to 
aesthetics, but also in aesthetic forms of attention becoming more attuned 
to the scientifi c. Or, as Kwinter eloquently put it (quoted earlier), that they 
both become “re-disposed according to entirely new rhythmic values.” An 
overall pulse or rhythm holds together events in particular ways that are 
inescapably a designation of value and an instantiation of ‘style’ (to be 
discussed later). 
Coming to terms with such ‘values’ ushers ethics into the picture. Ethics 
entails an attention to the ways in which we behave or engage within the 
world: a composition of behaviour or composure. These ‘ways’ are patterns 
of behavioural tendency, pertaining to how we assign value in negotiating 
the power of relations (in affecting and being affected). Such patterns or 
refrains are not simply static assemblages (like fi xed diagrams), as they 
have temporal shape that is perhaps best described as rhythmic. It is not 
just that a pattern is repeated rhythmically, because the texture of the 
throb and beat is part of how it all holds together into a composure. 
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6. Situated composure –  the ethics and art of emergence
“To tend the stretch of expression, to foster and infl ect it rather than trying to 
own it, is to enter the stream, contributing to its probings: this is co-creative, 
an aesthetic endeavour. It is also an ethical endeavour, since it is to ally oneself 
with change: for an ethics of emergence.”38 Brian Massumi (my emphasis) 
In a paper titled ‘The Challenge of Complexity: Unfolding the Ethics of 
Science,’ Isabelle Stengers warns against complusive reductionism and 
calls for scientists to take a more generative, risky, uncertain stance. This, 
she suggests, is an ethics that unfolds from complexity science iself: 
“Complexity, as it started with the discovery and study of surprising properties, 
usually related to the irreducible importance of nonlinear relations … would 
produce the opportunity to entertain a different relation with the past, 
emphasising openness, surprise, the demand of relevance, the creative aspect 
of the scientifi c adventure, and not reduction to simplicity. True scientifi c 
simplicity is never reductive; it is always a relevant simplicity that is a creative 
achievement.”39
Related issues are explored through a remarkable little book called 
Ethical Know-How. Action, Wisdom and Cognition by Francisco Varela. 
Varela distinguishes between ethical expertise and ethical deliberation. 
Most western writers on ethics, he claims, tend to focus on reasoning as 
the central issue40 wherein ethics becomes an issue of deliberation. Ethical 
expertise does not centre itself on rational judgements of reasoning or on 
how this may be applied as ethically instrumental. Rather, it is based on 
the inextricability of the specifi c tissue of circumstances or situatedness. 
With some affi nity with Foucauldian and Spinozist approaches to ethics, as 
well as Felix Guattari’s notion of the ethico-aesthetic, his notion of ethical 
know-how dwells in a “skillful approach to living … based on a pragmatics 
of transformation that demands nothing less than a moment to moment 
awareness of the virtual nature of our selves.”41 To act ethically, one must 
be acting with sensitivity to the particularities of the situation where there 
is not a reliance on a set of rules: 
“To gather a situation under a rule a person must describe the situation in terms 
of categories we may call cognitive. Instead, if we try and see correspondences 
and affi nities, the situation at hand becomes much more textured. All relevant 
aspects are included, not just those which fi t the reduction of a categorical 
analysis.”42
38.  Massumi (2002b), p. xxii.
39.  Stengers (2004), p. 96.
40.  Varela (1999), p. 23.
41.  Ibid, p. 75.
42.  Ibid, p. 28.
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This might be as simple as being attentive to the implicit potential of a 
circle. Action becomes infused with potential relevance, becoming situated 
in a fi eld of potential such that the creative and transformative possibilities 
are multiplied and amplifi ed. The kind of know-how being discussed here 
does not exclude forms of knowing that ‘fi t the reduction of a categorical 
analysis.’  ‘Knowledge of’ and ‘know-how’ are not set up in opposition; 
know-how incorporates both rational forms of categorical analysis and the 
situated forms of aestheically inclined knowing, that I will discuss in the 
next Act. 
Theorist Mark Taylor, in summarising ‘the moment of complexity’, 
writes that “according to complexity theorists, all signifi cant change takes 
place between too much and too little order,”43 resonating with Holland’s 
suggestion that innovation requires fi nding an artful middle ground 
between the looseness of poetry and the tightness of science. Along these 
lines, Varela has suggested that:
“intelligence should guide our actions, but in harmony with the texture of 
the situation at hand…truly ethical behaviour takes the middle way between 
spontaneity and rational calculation.”44 
This property of ethical expertise might also be called ‘the art of 
emergence’. Steven Johnson writes that: “We are only just now developing 
such a language to describe the art of emergence. But here’s a start: great 
designers … have a feel for the middle ground between free will and the 
nursing home, for the thin line between too much order and too little. They 
have a feel for the edges.”45 
Stenger’s assertion that an ethics that unfolds from complexity science 
calls for a more uncertain stance, can also be seen as a call for scientists to 
embrace the art of emergence wherein, perhaps, lies the missing model of 
creative process. It would seem that the ‘art of emergence’ involves what 
Varela calls ethical ‘know-how’. In the coming together of these terms, 
I will use Guattari’s useful term in coining the phrase: ‘ethico-aesthetic 
know-how.’
I should emphasise here that ethics is not about the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, 
redemption or claims for redemptive powers. Its about a ‘measured’ prac-
tice of engaging with the world, of how we behave, of what we acknowl-
edge is at stake. Ethico-aesthetic know-how is about the amplifi cation of 
potential – which doesn’t necessarily lead to the ‘good’ because it magni-
fi es risk. Rather than being framed around the virtuous, ethico-aesthetic 
know-how is about the virtuouso: the skilled performer. Even if there are 
43.  Taylor (2001), p. 14.
44.  Varela (1999), pp. 31-32.
45.  Johnson (2004), p. 189.
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no easy rules or moral guidelines here, there is an important principle or 
navigational directive. That is: that the performance of any act strives for 
a balance between affecting and being affected, between active refl ec-
tion and the immediacy of embodied response, between sensitive respon-
siveness and determined agency. This is a politics of action that neither 
caves in passively to collective desires or beliefs nor holds to individualism, 
authorship or dictatorship as the power of truth. It is both determined and 
respectful, pushy and playful. It involves raising both thinking and acting 
to their highest powers, such that they affect and fold into one another. Or, 
in short, ethico-aesthetic know-how involves the embodiment of wisdom.
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ACT 3. The Ethico-Aesthetics of Emergence - æ
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Act 3 discusses an approach to aesthetics relevant to the issues raised in the previous Act. 
After a discussion about the socio-political relevance and some background history of the 
aesthetic, I outline Richard Shustermann’s pragmatist (or radical empiricist) aesthetics 
and move to develop his suggestions via William James and the experience of relation, 
affect and related forms of attention. A model pertaining to the ontogenesis of the self 
by psychologist, Daniel Stern, then offers a way of objectively detailing the operations of 
affect. The abstract but ineluctably embodied models of perception discussed here are 
posed in terms of the forms of attention and expression involved in the art or ethico-
aesthetics of emergence.  
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3.01  Bouguereau, Adolphe-William, ‘The Birth of Venus’ (1879).
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1. The relevance of aesthetics
“Affect holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after ideology. For although 
ideology is still very much with us, often in the most virulent of forms, it is no 
longer encompassing. It no longer defi nes the global mode and functioning of 
power. It is now one mode of power in a larger fi eld that is not defi ned, overall, 
by ideology. This makes it all the more pressing to connect ideology to its real 
conditions of emergence.”1  
Terry Eagleton’s ‘The Ideology of the Aesthetic’, approaches the subject 
of aesthetics with an interest in the relations between aesthetics and the 
specifi cities of “dominant ideological forms of modern class-society and 
indeed from a whole new form of human subjectivity appropriate to that 
social order.”2 In relation to the swelling of an aesthetic paradigm, referred 
to in the quote from Massumi above, Eagleton offers a useful, historically 
related argument that ideology is not only part of the construction of 
aesthetics but that the aesthetic “provides an unusually powerful challenge 
to these dominant ideological forms, and is in this sense an eminently 
contradictory phenomenon.”3 The twist of Eagleton’s book is that in 
exploring the ideology of the aesthetic, he quietly offers an account of how 
aesthetics overfl ows ideology. If aesthetics is born from that which it then 
powerfully challenges, it has, by stealth, taken over the role of dominance. 
This resonates with the attempts of modernity to avert attention away 
from the volatility of affect and toward stable, measurable reason, only to 
render all stability volatile in turn. 
My brief attention to Eagleton’s project here is due to his emphasis 
on linkages between aesthetics, the body and political ideology. We need 
look no further than contemporary western politics to see that the role of 
ideology is complicated: beliefs, attitudes and values have an ambiguous 
role in the operations of contemporary democracy. While remaining an 
1.  Massumi (2002), p. 42. 
2.  Eagleton (1990), p. 3.
3.  Ibid.
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important oraganisational device, ideology is just one instrument in the 
orchestra of a more encompassing system: a self-organising, complex, 
dynamic one. Some remarkable analyses explore the political performative 
intricacies of, for instance, Ronald Reagan4  and the Bush government5 (by 
Brian Massumi) and Pauline Hansen6 in Australia (by Anna Gibbs). Politics 
operates via aesthetic paradigms. This shift has also been remarked upon 
in some detail in the work of those such as Negri and Hardt, Paulo Virno 
and – earlier – Felix Guattari, who signalled broad cultural shifts toward an 
‘ethico-aesthetic paradigm’ in his late work Chaosmosis:
“The aesthetic power of feeling, although equal in principle with the other 
powers of thinking philosophically, knowing scientifi cally, acting politically, seems 
on the verge of occupying a privileged position within the collective Assemblages of 
enunciation of our era.”7
But in these investigations, ‘the body’ is not all fl esh and blood, 
because it has been expanded into a relation between corporeality and 
the technologies and social assemblages that modulate bodies.  Once you 
open the bag of the body’s skin onto such a expanded fi eld of activity, 
that which counts as embodiment swells into a virtually inconceivable 
complexity of interrelatedness that threatens to shatter any sense of 
coherence into a multitude of fragments. The fl esh of embodiment, or 
that which which threads together the expanse of human and inhuman, 
tangible and intangible, is what we call affect; slippery, ungraspable and 
ever on the (collective) move. These papers indicate how political power is 
amassed through affective nets – abstractly cast through the multitude in 
gestures whose impacts operate largely outside of awareness. 
The orientation toward aesthetics that I discuss here has some reso-
nance with Eagleton’s interest in the relations between aesthetics and the 
‘ideological forms of modern class-society’ in that it is a response to the 
confi gurations of contemporary, western cultural formations - as different 
to that of ‘modern class society’ - and the shifts in human subjectivity that 
are a fundamental part of these reconfi gurations. 
The social fi eld is a complex, dynamic fi eld of relations through which 
our navigations are signifi cantly guided by feeling. In tackling, as Guattari 
phrased it, “the collective Assemblages of enunciation of our era” through 
the privileged role of the “aesthetic power of feeling” we have already 
accumulated many resources through social development. Our social 
conduct is, however, so everyday and immediate that we rarely think of 
it as guided by an aesthetic know-how. But as Katz generously suggests, 
4.  Massumi (2002). 
6.  Gibbs (2001).
5.  Massumi (2005a).
7.  Guattari, Félix (1995), p. 101.
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there is an “aesthetic genius” at work in the production of convincing 
emotional expression. If we remind ourselves that social conduct involves 
great efforts of composure, developed initially through many years of 
childhood training, then the great efforts of aesthetic composition do not 
seem so remotely unrelated. It starts to become evident that ‘feelings’ in 
themselves are not suffi cient guides, either for social conduct or creative 
composition, but the contours of the map and the navigational techniques 
are nevertheless embedded in the aesthetic: 
“We rest our subjectivity on rhythmic sensibilities, feelings for directions, and 
visions of unfolding patterns, allowing aesthetics to guide us.”8 
2. The body of aesthetics
Discursive tackling of aesthetic issues goes back at least to classical 
antiquity, but the usual marker of the birth of aesthetics (as a modern 
discourse so named) is given to Alexander Baumgarten and his Aesthetica 
of 1750. Baumgarten formulates aesthetics as a ‘sister’ of logic, a feminine, 
inferior version of reason. In contrast to conceptual thought or the refi ned 
action of minds, Baumgarten’s aesthetics pertains to the more confused 
realm of perception and sensation – or the more crude action of bodies. 
But this confusion is more about ‘fusion’ than muddle,9 where that which 
constitutes the aesthetic is a unity that defi es the compartmentalisation of 
reason. Whereas rational analysis operates by breaking things down into 
parts such that the relations between them can be clearly understood, the 
aesthetic attains clarity through indissoluble unity or complexity.
But how does aesthetics approach its indissoluble product? Aesthetics, 
as a fi eld of enquiry, began with an asymmetrical distinction between 
reason and sensation, with the aim of accounting for the later in terms 
of the former. Historically the task of aesthetics has been to hold the 
operations of feelings and sensations in the hand of rational analysis, to 
capture their volatile willfulness in the clean containers of immaterial logic 
– without, of course, putting at risk the absolute power of reason. 
Conventionally, aesthetics largely deals with its subject through 
problems of fi ne art. It addresses issues such as the nature of aesthetic 
unity, beauty, style, character, sensibility, taste and related operations of 
perception and sensation. These issues are commonly considered in terms 
of the work of art (or architecture) and in distinguishing categories therein. 
Modernity involved massive developments in techniques of manipulation 
and reform, which had profound effects on subjectivity and experience.10 
8.  Katz, Jack (1988), p. 5.
9.  see Eagleton (1990), p. 15.
10.  Technology has had an enormous role to 
play in this. Walter Benjamin’s juxtaposition 
of the new analytic powers emerging through 
both Freudian analysis and fi lm made this 
partnership of infl uence quite clear.  As 
part of the emergence of the printing press 
and technologies of time, photography and 
cinematography, radiography and telephony, 
electricity and technologies of transportation 
and speed, the intensifi cation of cities and their 
infrastructures – to name a few – the landscape 
of experience was transformed. As Sara Danius 
(2002:3) has argued, technology had an 
integral role in reconfi guring perceiving and 
knowing, a transformative shift that unleashed 
“the problem that so many modernist texts and 
artifacts stubbornly engage: how to represent 
authentic experience in an age in which the 
category of experience itself has become a 
problem.” 
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One signifi cant aspect of this shift was the development of psychology and 
the manipulation of ‘inner’ worlds of feeling, subjectivity and behaviour 
toward better functioning citizens. It is through this discourse that we can 
see a gradual development of the concept of affect; a concept that has 
now been matured to the extent that it offers aesthetics a more detailed 
contour map of its operational ground. Via this conceptual tool, aesthetics 
increasingly becomes related to practices of life, experience and becoming. 
This infl ection of aesthetics is central to the way in which I am approaching 
it here. 
Along related lines, Richard Shusterman’s Pragmatist Aesthetics, 
originally published in 1992, aims to revive John Dewey’s pragmatist 
approach to aesthetics in Art as Experience (1934) that, for a variety of 
reasons, fell by the wayside under the subsequent dominance of analytic 
aesthetics.11  As Shusterman writes, with analytic aesthetics, “the aim was 
to analyse and clarify the concepts and practices of established criticism, 
not to revise them in any substantial sense. It was to give a true account 
of our concept of art, not to change it.”12 Dewey’s aim, by contrast, was to 
reconnect aesthetics with the practices of living, wherein it could be aimed 
at “achieving richer and more satisfying experience, in experiencing that 
value without which art would have no meaning or point, without which 
it cannot as a global phenomenon exist or be understood, let alone be 
defi ned.”13 
Shusterman recasts Dewey’s project into that which he calls 
‘somaesthetics’. Interestingly enough, this involves looping back to 
Baumgarten’s founding mid-eighteenth century text wherein he fi nds a 
far broader scope afforded to aesthetics, implicating the art of living, that 
seems to have gone astray in the interim period. As Shusterman writes, 
Baumgarten’s aims for a formal philosophical discipline of aesthetics went 
beyond that which now tends to defi ne the fi eld, as “the theory of fi ne 
art and natural beauty.”14 An aspect of Baumgarten’s aesthetics involves 
forms of practical training and exercise:
”Contrasting such aesthetic drill to the mechanical drill of soldiers, Baumgarten 
defi nes it as including also the systematic practicing of improvisation and even 
the playing of games, as well as exercises in the more erudite arts.”15 
11.  It seems plausible that this occurred as 
part of the same fi eld of infl uence in which 
both debates of emergence and composition 
quelled.
12.  Shusterman (2000), pp. 17-18.
13.  Ibid, p. 18.
14.  Ibid, p. 264.
15.  Ibid, p. 265.
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However, Baumgarten diverts an attention to bodily feeling, calling for a 
focus on the more controlled, improved guidance of the mind. Shusterman 
proposes somaesthetics as a philosophical fi eld that could redeem Baum-
gaten’s agenda for an art of living or life-improving discipline while ending 
“the neglect of the body that Baumgarten disastrously introduced.”16 
Somaesthetics proposes a new “discipline” that already has a long 
history and many refi ned practices at hand. Shusterman cites Alexander 
Technique, Bioenergetics, Feldenkrais Method, yoga, meditation, T’ai chi 
along with disciplines like the martial arts, athletics, gymnastics, aero-
bics and weightlifting. Franscisco Varela’s controversial turn to Buddhist 
meditation practices as an integral aspect of his research offers a related 
stance (though not referenced by Shusterman). The newness and value 
of somaesthetics, claims Shusterman, lies in placing this stance within 
the territory of philosophy, wherein relevant body-practices might ben-
efi t from “a structuring overview or architectonic to integrate its very dif-
ferent, seemingly incommensurable, discourses into a more productively 
systematic fi eld.”17 And, at the same time, this might offer philosophy a 
better grasp of its embodied conditions and a more pragmatic orientation 
to ‘body talk’. 
Shusterman’s theory of somaesthetics has some obvious appeal in 
relation to the notion of aesthetics being developed here.  His attempt 
to reconnect embodied practice with philosophical thought has some 
affi nity, especially given its special attention to connecting aesthetics with 
pragmatism or radical empiricism. 
In introducing this fi eld, Shusterman emphasises that its “purpose is to 
show its potential utility, not its radical novelty”18, quoting William James’ 
recognition that pragmatism, as much as it was a radical empiricism, was 
also simply “a new name for some old ways of thinking.”19 In turning to 
James we also fi nd a productive way of diving into the micro level potential 
of Shusterman’s somaesthetics. With James, any closed object or ‘dumb 
matter’ that might be implied in ‘the body’ or ‘the fl esh’ is opened into the 
more abstract, connective fi eld of affective relations, or in other words, 
where relations are, in any case, affective. 
16.  Ibid, p. 267.
17.  Ibid, p. 271.
18.  Ibid, p. 263.
19.  Ibid.
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3.03 3.04
3. The experience of relation
Referring to William James, Brian Massumi notes that: “relations are no 
less fundamentally given, no less directly given, than discrete objects 
and their component properties. That they are directly given means that 
they are directly perceived. Relation is immediately perceived as such.”20 
Relations are not abstractions ascertained through an extraction away 
from a more immediate reality, relations are the immediacy of experience, 
which is already abstract. 
This experiential immediacy is perhaps 
easiest to understand in terms of spatial 
relations. The relations that constitute our sense 
of spatiality are always an issue of dynamic 
movement.  They are a physics of dynamic 
exchange: the physics of feeling and the feeling 
of physics. Cats excel at physics. They feel it 
out expertly, performing it with astonishing 
precision. Clumsiness is uncharacteristic of the 
species: they don’t commonly knock over the 
wine glass when they leap onto the table. They 
calculate on-the-fl y differentiations (relations) 
with agile precision. Cats calculate with 
feeling, as we all do. We don’t generally stop 
to think, rationally calculate, and certainly not 
to measure, the spatial relations we negotiate 
on an everyday level. We know a relation 
through feeling it: through the sensation of its 
patterned gradients. As William James puts it:
“The line is the relation; feel it and you feel the relation, see it and you see 
the relation … all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom, and … as the 
sensations lie together in the unity of consciousness, no new material element 
whatever comes to them from a supra-sensible source.”21 
If the feeling of relations operates at the ‘bottom’ of our spatial 
knowledge, then spatial knowledge is, at its most vital level, an aesthetic 
phenomenon. This is quite different to the idea that spatial knowledge is, 
fi rst and foremost, a measurable fi eld of extension and that our feelings or 
sense of that given space is secondary.
The relation of distance between two points is easily thought of as a 
static relation of quantitative rather than qualitative nature. But as we 
draw and measure the line that defi nes a distance, we have moved along 
20.  Massumi (2002a), p. 231.
21.  James (1890), pp. 151-153.
3.03  Constant Nieuwenhuys, Ode a la Odeon (1969). Constant’s drawings, such as 
this one, could be seen as studies of the complex texture of relations.  3.04  Diller and 
Scofi dio, Withdrawing Room (1987). Much of Diller and Scofi dio’s work, such as this 
installation project offers critical probes into the dynamics of socio-spatial relations.
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it. We have journeyed in a way that defi es all 
measured distance. Distance can, obviously, 
often be measured. But what tends to be 
forgotten about such a distance relation is 
the quality of the movement it involves. In 
other words, what can get forgotten is how 
we knew anything about it in the fi rst place, 
allowing the tools that helped to develop that 
knowledge in a particular way to become the 
most important thing to know.
Relations are differential movements 
between conditions. They are always caught 
in the act: acts such as feeling the difference 
between hot and hotter, walking a path between 
door and bed, having a wall between bedroom 
and kitchen, enacting an exchange of goods, 
identifying a group. Each of these acts involve 
differentiation and transaction; gradients of 
transition; qualities of connection. Relations 
simultaneously connect and differentiate, but 
each time they do it, they do it differently. 
For instance, the wall between bedroom 
and kitchen both separates and gives them 
adjacency. But the quality and nature of both 
separation and adjacency differs according to 
that which the wall offers the relation: such 
as it’s materiality, thickness-thinness, acoustic 
properties, height, potential openings or 
internal windows. Then, what we hear, see and 
come to know across that wall and whether 
we want to know it can offer further layers 
to that quality of separation and adjacency. 
The quality of relation that we feel between 
bedroom and kitchen is contingent on the 
material, spatio-temporal situation. Relations 
are always inseparable from events. They are 
also at the basis of how we know and feel our 
way around, affectively. 
3.05
3.06
3.07
3.05  Space Relation Diagram, from William W. Caudill, Space for Teaching, 1941.  3.06  Circulation diagrams from Bruno Taut, Die neue Wohnung, 1924.  
3.07  Sections through the Moller House (1928), Vienna, Adolf Loos.
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4. Affect
Affect operates at the level of what William James calls ‘pure experience’ 
which he describes as:
 “the immediate fl ux of life which furnishes the material to our later refl ection 
with its conceptual categories. Only new-born babies, or men in semi-coma from 
sleep, drugs, illness, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in 
the literal sense of a that which is not yet any defi nite what, tho’ ready to be 
all sorts of whats; both full of oneness and manyness…Pure experience in this 
state is but another name for feeling and sensation… Its purity is only a relative 
term, meaning the proportional amount of unverbalised sensation which it still 
embodies.”22
Affect is that ‘immediate fl ux of life’ that we modulate into gestures 
and named feelings. While affect is often associated with, or thought to 
mean, emotion, in order for it to understood as something relevant to 
activity beyond overt and consciously expressed gestures, affect needs 
to be understood as being part of but not reducible to the emotive.23 
William James asserts and Brian Massumi reiterates “we don’t run because 
we feel afraid, we feel afraid because we run.24 Emotions turn the force 
of relations into gestures or postures, bringing them into consciousness, 
redirecting them as they turn and unfold: they are an act through which 
we name, categorise, modulate and realise orientations toward an event 
or thing. 
Affect is often confused with effect. Each of the terms, affect and 
effect, pertain to a way of understanding how things happen. Effects come 
from causes: things that happen as a result of something else. They are 
related to what Bedau called ‘resultant properties.’ Affect is more complex 
and deeply involved in emergent phenomena.  It pertains to the force of 
relations: the infl uence of relations on one another. Because relations are 
never singular, always occuring in multitudes or as event-textures, their 
affective ‘force’  can never be the effect of a cause, as it arises or very 
literally emerges out of a sea of relations.  Much of this relational texture 
stirs elusively in what can only shimmer vaguely as potential. To the extent 
that affect always pertains to dynamic, complex assemblages of relations, 
it is always complex, involving an intricate interweaving of diversity and 
variety, actual and virtual.25 Affect pertains, to put it more qualitatively, to 
the fi nely grained complexion of events. 
Poised in this abstract manner, affect can be seen then to operate at 
the micro level of phenomena or at the local level of interactions from 
which emergent phenomena arise. Emergent phenomena, such as will and 
22.  James (1977), p. 215.
23.  For an extended account of why affect and 
emotion ought not to be confused, see Massumi 
(2002a), particularly: pp. 23-45.
24.    “He means ‘consciously afraid.’ We 
have already begun to experience fear 
nonconsciously, wrapped in action, before 
it unfurls from it and is felt as itself, in its 
distinction from the action with which it arose. 
Activation is a better word than action, because 
fear can be, and often is, paralyzing. When it 
is, in the place of action there is agitation, a 
poising for action, the taut incipiency of action 
that may fail to take defi nitive form. Where 
a specifi c action does unfold, its onset still 
will have been in an indistinction with affect, 
in that vague feeling-acting-coming-on, in 
a durationless moment of suspense in the 
time-slip of threat. It will have been a shock 
to the system whose immediacy disconnects 
the body from the ongoing fl ow of its activities 
while already poising it for a restart.” Massumi 
(2005), p. 36.
25.  Massumi analyes this in depth in his paper 
‘The Autonomy of Affect’, Massumi (2002a), 
pp. 23-45. 
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consciousness, as Massumi puts it, are “limitative, derived functions that 
reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed.”26  Aesthetic 
percepts such as beauty similarly capture a complexity, while resisting 
reduction. However, as I will go to discuss, once affect is understood to 
constitute the basic micro-relations of aesthetic percepts, it becomes 
possible to explore the operations of its micro-level interactions. Massumi’s 
work on affect also shows how feedback loops, or what Bedau and others 
call ‘downard causation’, are necessarily an aspect of the operation of 
affect. He does this though a discussion on what is called ‘the missing half 
second’.
26.  Massumi (2002a), p. 29. Massumi 
suggests here that will and consciousness are 
“subtractive”, but I wonder if they are just as 
much a contraction as a subtraction. Following 
on from the last Act and the discussion on the 
perception of circles, one could possibly say that 
the degree to which an emergent phenomena 
is subtractive and/or the contractive, relates to 
its balance of aesthetic ‘fullness’ and cognitive 
reduction. In other words, the more contractive 
it is, the more it is aesthetically inclined, and 
the more subtractive it is, the more reductively 
cognitive it becomes.
3.08  Pia Ednie-Brown, Field drawing (2004). Pencil on canvas and gesso.
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In the 1970s, Benjamin Libet claimed that there is a half second delay 
between the fi rst sparks of brain activity and the conscious awareness of 
what sparked it. But this doesn’t mean it takes that long to act - it means 
we start acting prior to conscious volition. We haven’t had a chance to 
feel it sensuously and yet, folding through the present, is the infl uence 
of an unfelt background action. Libet’s fi ndings have sparked some very 
considerable debates, many concerning the actual length of the gap and 
what traverses it, but also regarding the nature and/or existence of free 
will.27  It is not necessary here to delve extensively into the details of 
these debates, but two aspects of them are worth mentioning here.
Much of the debate largely revolves about the perceived disjunction 
between scientifi c reductionism and Libet’s claims regarding free will. 
In the name of scientifi c reductionism, many claim that Libet’s fi ndings 
suggest that free will is illusory. Libet disagrees. He tentatively proposes 
a model through which the gap between neural activity and conscious will 
could be understood such that it does not preclude free will. He calls this 
a ‘conscious mental fi eld’ (CMF) where emergent conscious experience is 
represented as a fi eld. This fi eld does not simply emerge through neural 
activity but affects it in turn.  As Libet writes:
“The CMF theory is outrageously radical, in that it proposes a mode of intracerebral 
communication they can proceed without requiring neural pathways. But, as 
Niels Bohr remarked, a theory that is not bizarre has no chance of providing a 
breakthrough advance.”28  
While this may be unlikely to convince the majority of scientists, it 
is no less radical than the case of strong emergence. Certainly, Stanley 
Klein (2002) poses a suggestion that a deep understanding of emergence 
renders Libet’s suggestions not as incompatible with scientifi c belief as 
others claim. 
This issue of free will or volition is related to the problem of backward 
referral: If we feel something after it actually happened, how do we connect 
the sensation with its cause? Libet claims that the sensation, coming after 
the signal, covers the gap by referring back to it: 
“In other words, it is the content of the subjective experience, of the neuronally 
delayed awareness, that is modifi ed by the referral to the earlier timing signal.”29
  
27.  see Klein (2002).
28.  Libet: 2003, pp. 27-28.
29.  Libet: 2000, p. 7.
88
In writing about Libet’s lag, Massumi shows how this looping back adds 
up to something extraordinarily spatio-temporally complex and vague:
“Since any lapse of time is infi nitely divisible, and at every instant there must 
be some kind of stimulus arriving through one sense channel or another, if you 
try to fi ll in what happens in the half-second lapses of awareness, things get 
downright hallucinogenic…Every awareness that achieves actual expression will 
have been in some way modulated by the swarm from which it emerged.” 
The awareness that emerges comes from a kind of nonconscious choice, 
contracted and/or subtracted from the swarm, where: 
“the missing half second is not missed because it is empty, but because it is 
overfull, in excess of the actually-performed action and of its ascribed meaning.30
 
If this immediate past, as Whitehead has also suggested, is “the 
foundation of our present existence”,31 then those foundations are not 
only pre-verbal, they are pre-sensuous. They are, nevertheless, the glue 
of the sensuous. This glue is something Massumi names as affect: 
“Impersonal affect is the connecting thread of experience. It is the invisible glue 
that holds the world together. In event.”32  
Massumi is making a notable leap here: he is taking the contents of 
the lag from the personal to the impersonal. He is moving it beyond our 
tiny minds and into a vast collective glue. A-massive-mind-expansion-
through-all-matter. This, understandably, is somewhat mind-boggling. But 
in boggling the mind it opens up what matters: affect.   
The primacy of affect infl ects the notion of aesthetics as a reasoning 
of sensation to a form of knowing that pertains to the experience of 
relation. Through the concept of affect, aesthetics becomes rooted in but 
nevertheless more than a problem of bodily sensation because affect is 
inhuman and inorganic in itself: it is collective, in that it is not owned by 
anyone. 
30.  Massumi (2002a), p. 29.
31.  “Roughly speaking, it [the immediate past] 
is that portion of our past lying between a tenth 
of a second and half a second ago. It is gone, 
and yet it is here. It is our indubitable self, the 
foundation of our present existence. Yet the 
present occasion while claiming self-identity, 
while sharing the very nature of the byegone 
occasion in all its living activities, nevertheless 
is engaged in modifying it, in adjusting it to 
other infl uences, in completing it with other 
values, in defl ecting it to other purposes. The 
present moment is constituted by the infl ux of 
the other into that self-identity which is the 
continued life of the immediate past within the 
immediacy of the present.” Whitehead (1932), 
p 136.
32.  Massumi (2002a), p. 217.
  Massumi (2002a), p. 196.
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5. Attention
One important factor conditioning the experience of relation is modes of 
attention, involving what is included in our spectrum of attention and the 
way in which we confi gure that spectrum. Attention, as Charles Sanders 
Peirce wrote, “is the power by which thought at one time is connected with 
and made to relate to thought at another time.”33 It is a kind of cross-
referencing. Understanding a circle to be nothing more than the resultant 
of a given system is a fairly strictly channelled, focussed cross-referencing 
that enables things to fi t neatly into cognitive categories. To be less kind, 
one could call it a limited form of attention. Seeing the circle as a bundle 
of potential is a more broadly scoped act of cross-referencing that makes a 
mess of neat categories. To be less kind, one could call it a lack of focussed 
attention. 
A key consequence of these two kinds of attention is that the former 
sees in terms of cause and effect, stripping away, as much as possible, 
the force of affect, while the later opens up potential without necessarily 
offering clear paths of action. Is there a kind of attention that appreciates 
both focussed delimitation and vague potential? This would be the kind of 
attention we are striving for in relation to the ethical expertise and the art 
of emergence discussed earlier. 
Imagine a situation where we can feel cause-effect relations quite 
simply: if you hit a ball with a stick, it’s resultant trajectory is the outcome 
of a relation between ball and stick that we can simply understand. There 
is a cause, there is an effect. This is a set of relationships that we can feel 
clearly, directly and maintain as discrete. Of course, in actuality, there 
is a far more vast set of infl uences that come to play, such as wind, the 
condition of the ball, the shape of the stick, the manner of the strike etc. 
But these are often subtle enough nuances for the bigger, simpler act to 
dominate our sense of the cause as fairly singular. 
In (apparent) contrast, emergent events are the product of such a 
complexity of interrelation that we can’t feel a discrete form of cause 
because they arise from a multi-dimensional fi eld of particulars. The 
relations are not singular links or lines, they are patterns or textures of 
multiple, mostly invisible links and lines. No one trajectory can simply 
dominate. Weather, for example, is a moody, complex beast that is not 
reducible to simple cause-effect relations. Predicting the weather is 
always an issue of probability: of likelihood rather than certainty. Scientifi c 
methods of weather prediction have become far more sophisticated, but 
remain far from fail safe. But prior to weather maps and supercomputer 
33.  Peirce, (1992), p. 44.
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number crunching, people were predicting the weather, ‘nonscientifi cally’: 
making forecasts though ‘pattern reading’ the sky, the colours and shapes 
of clouds, the appearance of the moon, the nature of the sunset, the wind, 
etc.  So how were they doing it? Aesthetically? 
In untying the fi eld of attention from one-to-one correspondences, 
emergent phenomena demand a different kind of attention. This form of 
attention involves reading patterns and/or textures and seems to be an 
eminently aesthetic issue. 
Over this and the last act, approaches toward the phenomenon of 
emergence have been shifted from the scientifi c to the aesthetic or to the 
experience of (affective) relations. But the goal here is to also move in the 
other direction, allowing aesthetics to attain a fi ne grain of computational 
precision. 
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6. Stern and the experience of emergent process
“A crucial term here is “sense of”, as distinct from “concept of” or “knowledge of” 
or “awareness of” a self or other. The emphasis is on the palpable experiential 
realities of substance, action, sensation, affect, and time. Sense of self is not a 
cognitive construct. It is an experiential integration.”34 
Developmental psychologist, Daniel Stern, 
has developed an especially useful model for 
understanding the operations of affect, offering 
some precise delimitation to affect such that it can 
gather some contour. His model is related to the 
development of self from birth to around 4 years of 
age. This is outlined in his book, The Interpersonal 
World of the Infant, fi rst published in 1985 and 
revised in 2000. Stern’s is an account of the 
ontogenesis of the self - or how that organization 
that we call the self comes into being and develops. 
It is a model of the experience of the self and offers 
some extraordinarily clarifying differentiations 
between kinds of relatedness, although here I 
will only be addressing, in any detail, the form of 
relatedness that operates at the foundation of his 
model. 
While Stern’s research focuses on the early 
development of the human child his model is taken 
on here for that which it has to offer the issue 
of relatedness to a far broader range of subject 
matter, well beyond the area of early childhood and 
into fi elds that do not even necessarily involve or 
remain limited to human relatedness. 
Stern’s theory counters the common 
understanding of development wherein infants 
gradually learn to put together diverse kinds 
of information from the various senses into an 
integrated, perceptual model of the world. The 
pre-integration stage is intense between birth 
and about two months of age, where “the infant 
is generally thought to occupy some kind of pre-
social, precognitive, preorganised life phase.”35 
Rather, he proposes that the newborn is in a state of 
34.  Stern (2000), p. 71. 
35.  Ibid, p. 37.
3.09  Daniel Stern’s diagram of the layered domains of sense of self and the 
approximate age that each emerges. Once emerged, all layers are seen to coexist 
and mutually inform one another throughout life. 
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intense integration that is gradually pulled apart into related components 
or differentiated into a more workable model of experience. Development 
becomes not about integrating, which is already in place, but about dif-
ferentiating domains of integration.
This occurs in layers of developmental phases, none of which supercede 
the other, but join the already established layers. As can be seen in fi g 
3.09, between birth and the third year of age a series of layers or domains 
of self develop. Once formed, each layer remains active as part of the on-
going development of the self throughout adult life: “the domains remain 
forever as distinct forms of experiencing social life and self. None are lost 
to adult experience. Each simply gets more elaborated.”36 Each domain is 
effectively a form of experiencing, involving different kinds of relatedness, 
or different modes of relating. 
6.1 The sense of an emergent self
The most fundamental domain is the sense of an emergent self. This 
domain of experience constitutes the core of what differentiates Stern’s 
model from the dominant models preceding his own. Stern writes that in 
the works of those such as Piaget, disparate experiences of the newborn 
operate as ‘islands of consistency’ between which the organization of 
experience is gradually formed; 
“They thus tend to interpret the product of those integrating steps as the sense 
of self. But what about the process itself – the very experience of making the 
leaps and creating relations between previously unrelated events.”37 
Stern then suggests that: 
“the infant can experience the process of emerging organization as well as the 
result, and it is this experience of emerging organization that I will call the 
emergent sense of self. It is the experience of a process as well as a product.”38
 
This ‘experience of a process as well as a product’ is relevant to how 
we gather a sense of external objects as well as to a sense of self. Clearly, 
there are important distinctions to be made between our own sense of 
self and the sense of a form’s compositional coherence, one important 
distinction being the issue of self-perception. A sense of self is obviously a 
self-perception, unlike the perception of some external thing. But Stern’s 
model asserts that the later is not possible without the former: a sense 
36.  Ibid, p. 32.
37.  Ibid, p. 45.
38.  Ibid.
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of self is a condition of the possibility of perceiving any other sense of 
coherence. It is on the basis of such an argument that I highlight the 
relevance of the ‘personal’ and self-awareness in developing the sensitivity 
required for ‘context-sensitive’ relevance. This kind of awareness is 
important for working with Stern’s notions of ‘vitality affect’, ‘activation 
contour’ and ‘forms of feeling’, that I will now discuss.
 
6.2 Vitality affects
“The world is not reducible to the recognized ability of objective form to conserve 
its sensuous identity in each of its serial locations. That ability is the product of 
another power: that of unrecognized, nonsensuous, affective linkages to bring 
“extremely diverse” nonlocal differences together qualitatively. Affect brings 
form qualititatively to life.” (my emphasis)39 
Drawing on a range of experiments conducted with very young 
babies, Stern argues that the infant is born with an extraordinary 
capacity for cross-modal fl uency, or amodal perception. Here, the infant 
takes information received from any sensory mode and experiences it 
simultaneously in others, making a correspondence between, for instance, 
an auditory temporal pattern and a visually presented pattern. He argues 
that this involves a mysterious kind of amodal representation; one which 
is recognised by all the senses.  As he writes:
“These abstract representations that the infant experiences are not sights and 
sounds and touches and nameable objects, but rather shapes, intensities, and 
temporal patterns – the more “global” qualities of experience.”40 
Amodal perception is fundamentally affective, pertaining to the ‘force’ 
or patterns of relations, and he approaches the workings of this amodal 
realm through a quality of experience that he refers to as ‘vitality affects’. 
Drawing on the philosopher Suzanne Langer, this term deals with qualities 
of feeling that aren’t well accommodated within normative categories of 
feeling - such as sadness, happiness, fear, disgust etc - that are called 
categorical affects (pioneered by Charles Darwin). Vitality affects cannot 
be named in the same way, and are elusive qualities that can only be 
described through actions or verbs, such as ‘surging’, fading away’, 
‘fl eeting’, rushing’, ‘bursting’, ‘tingling’ etc rather than the states or nouns 
of categorical affects.
39.  Massumi (2003), p. 146. 
40.  Stern (2000), p. 51. 
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We are never without the presence of vitality affects, even if we are 
mostly not conscious of them. We feel them as part of categorical affects, 
in rushes of anger or waves of disgust, but we can also experience them 
without these categories being explicit. As an example of this,  Stern 
(following Langer) cites abstract dance and music, where the viewer-
listener is presented primarily with variations in movement, rhythm and 
speed, tensions and relaxations, patterns and disturbances. In not resorting 
to plot or explicitly designating categorical affects, the choreography 
negotiates affects rather than specifi c contents of feeling.41 Stern likens 
the relation between the viewer-listener and abstract dance or music to 
that between the pre-verbal infant and parent, where it is the manner of 
the parents performance that is primarily experienced whether, from the 
point of view of the parent, that behaviour is linked to some categorical 
affect or not. While the manner through which the most mundane things 
are done, such as the way in which someone walks, is always affecting how 
we feel about that person and what they do, this is primary for babies.  For 
the baby, it matters little whether someone is saying the words ‘everything 
is ok’ or ‘the world is falling apart’. What matters is how those words are 
spoken.42 Importantly, this implies that prior to the development of modes 
of relatedness involving, say, narrative structure and semantics, there is 
an abstract level of structure – or in effect, a-signifying meaning – that 
later comes to silently infuse and infl ect all others. Vitality affects are 
“time-shapes” and which “lend themselves to associative networks.”43 
 
6.3 Activation contours and forms of feeling
“Impersonal affect is the connecting thread of experience. It is the invisible glue 
that holds the world together. In event.”44 
Vitality affects are experienced as patterned changes over time which 
Stern calls activation contours. He uses the example of a parent soothing 
a baby by saying “There, there, there…” where the fi rst part of the word 
is stressed followed by a trailing off. Similarly, the parent might stroke the 
baby with a series of gestures that enact a similar patterning, with each 
stroke decreasing in pressure. Each version of soothing, he suggests, would 
result in the same or very similar vitality affect experience.45 Instead of 
one stroking-mother and another “there, there”-mother, the infant would 
experience only a single vitality affect in soothing activities - a ‘soothing 
vitality affect mother’.”46 These activation contours are that which yoke 
41.  Ibid, p. 56.
42.  This notion can be illustrated by the classic 
lullaby: “Rock-a-bye Baby on the tree top, 
when the wind blows the cradle will rock, when 
the bough breaks the cradle will fall and down 
will come baby cradle and all”. This lullaby has 
lulled many a baby to sleep. If the baby could 
understand the words spoken, it could very 
well be far too frightened to fall asleep. What 
matters is the manner in which this little rhyme 
is sung.
43.  Stern (2004), p. 65.
44.  Massumi (2002a), p. 217.
45.  Stern (2000), p. 58.
46.  Ibid, pp. 58-9.
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diverse experiences together, linking them into a single “form of feeling”.47 
Activation contours thereby underlie vitality affects, acting as the basis of 
this amodal representation. When activation contours resonate together, 
they produce a kind of form of feeling, not unlike, perhaps, Heinrich 
Wölffl in’s idea of the ‘force of form’ discussed in act 5. 
A signifi cant aspect of the activation contour is that it moves beyond 
subjectivity, acting as “an objectifi able time-shape of a stimulus.”48 This 
way of understanding the basic makeup of affect lends itself to the ways 
in which those such as Brian Massumi discuss affect as “pre-personal” and 
“the glue of the world”. It gives an objective operational understanding 
to the “mysterious’ nature of amodal representation, which is argued by 
Stern to be, nevertheless, the fundamental domain of human subjectivity 
and the basis of all creativity:
“This global subjective world of emerging organisation is and remains the 
fundamental domain of human subjectivity. It operates out of awareness as the 
experiential matrix from which thoughts and perceived forms and identifi able 
acts and verbalised feelings will later arise. It also acts as the source for ongoing 
affective appraisals of events. Finally, it is the ultimate reservoir that can be 
dipped into for all creative experience. All learning and all creative acts begin 
in the domain of emergent relatedness. That domain alone is concerned with 
the coming-into-being of organisation that is at the heart of creating and 
learning.”49 
Stern’s vitality affects and activation contours offer a way into developing 
Holland’s missing creative-process-model. That which passes across 
becomes understood as an activation contour, which is quite simply, a 
patterned change over time. In the matching up or correspondence of such 
patterns, instances are yoked together into a ‘form of feeling’ – becoming, 
like the “soothing-vitality-affect-mother”, a model of a recognised identity 
or an affectively defi ned entity. So, if we consider, again, the innovative, 
creative leap between models, what occurs is this yoking together of 
complex patterns into a ‘form of feeling’.
As Holland says, we just don’t know how the intuitive leap, or how the 
primary step of “perceiving seminal patterns” occurs. But Stern offers a 
detailed, empirically developed account of abstract relatedness that forms 
the basis of creative activity. His model incorporates both transversal 
pattern conjunctions (implicating Holland’s metaphoric conjunction) and a 
layered depth that involves both up and down movements (implicating the 
top-down and bottom-up actions of emergence).
47.  Ibid, p. 54. Stern takes this term from 
philosopher Suzanne Langer.
48.  The Present Moment, p. 62.
49.  Stern (2000), p. 67. 
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A metaphoric conjunction is not an instance of one thing simply being 
like or imitating another thing, as we often see when new technology is 
used to emulate older, more familiar technologies. Innovation entails a 
transformative recasting. Similarly, the vitality affects of amodal perception 
are only tied secondarily to imitation as an albeit crucial part of the more 
primary operations of ‘attunement.’
“Imitation renders form, attunement renders feeling,” writes Daniel 
Stern. Attunement renders feeling because it involves an entering into 
a rhythm with something, into a transformational re-patterning. It is not 
about copying or being something, but about embodying, in some way, a 
rhythm or pattern by transforming it into another form of expression: 
”Attunement takes the experience of emotional resonance and automatically 
recasts that experience into another form of expression. Attunement thus need 
not proceed toward empathic knowledge or response. Attunement is a distinct 
form of affective transaction in its own right.”50 
Amodal perception involves a range of such recastings, where diverse 
dimensions modulate each other into a jossle of texture in which sense 
gathers. It is always cross-modal: connecting into a vibrating, unlocatable 
atmosphere. Other terms for attunement might be ‘affect matching’ or 
‘affect contagion’.51 After the match or the sympathetic fi t, it spreads like 
the ripples from a pebble dropped in water.
Amodal perception pertains to the experience of emergence and to 
the kind of attention we are striving for in relation to ethical expertise 
and the art of emergence. They are abstract but also inseparable from 
embodiment and expression. Perhaps more importantly, they move across 
scales: working at the level of generalised vagueness but also at the level 
of micro-relations. Activation contours move across forms of expression 
such that they collaborate in the formation of emergent textures or forms 
of feeling. 
Stern’s model (and his related work with the ‘Process of Change Study 
Group’52) reiterates the earlier discussion on kinds of attention, where at 
the core of ‘the art of emergence’ are modes of relatedness that involve an 
intense integration (both internal to the self and of self and world) in which 
a whole situation is felt out, but it also points to a micro-level of detailed 
relational operations through vitality affects and activation contours. What 
he calls ‘amodal perception’ would seem usefully related to an attention 
pertaining to the art of emergence.
51.  Ibid, p. 145.
51.  Stern (1985), p. 143.
52.  Stern et al (1998).
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7. The ethico-aesthetics of emergence
Through the above emphases on modes of attention and perception, the 
aesthetic, like Varela’s ethics, becomes quite emphatically an issue of know-
how rather than simply a ‘knowledge of’. It is a know-how of relatedness 
involving an attention to micro-patterns and rhythms as well as macro-
textures. It entails a ‘sense of’ before a ‘knowledge of’ compositional 
coherence.53 Rather than aesthetics pertaining to ‘wholes’ or ‘unities’, it 
becomes an embodied appreciation of complexity: of complex assemblages 
of dynamic relations. 
As a companion to the aesthetic and the ethical, emergence is a way of 
appearing, making, acting, doing; a mode of composition or an organising 
principle that always involves drawing forms of coherence out of a texture 
of collectively transformational patternings. 
This drawing-out is ongoing because the emergent texture folds back to 
affect the complex of patterns from which it emerged. This is just as true 
for the apparent stability of objects as it is for tangible ephemeralities such 
as atmospheres; one only need stubbornly regard the former in terms 
of a squirmingly active background that tinges its edges and peripheries 
with living fl uorescence – even if mutedly or nominally so. In its strongest 
forms emergence always involves a composure that is both powerfully 
and delicately balanced within the ever changing dynamics of situations. 
By nature, the art of emergence involves riding these conditions. As such, 
the experienced practice of the art of emergence involves ethico-aesthetic 
know-how.
Ethico-aesthetic know-how pertains to our composure as tempered 
within the ever-shuffl ing textured fi elds of relational dynamics. It comes to 
bear through the manner of our engagements, our modes of attention and 
the dynamic balance we can strike between affecting and being affected, 
between active refl ection and the immediacy of embodied response, 
between sensitive responsiveness and determined agency.
The ethico-aesthetics of emergence refers, then, to a know-how whose 
compositional coherence – or ‘holding together’  – unsettles or modulates 
that composure, as it folds back into itself.  The crucial attention to the 
texture of events is not just an awareness of some ‘outside’ situation, 
because it relies on self-awareness, or a sense of the texture of the self. 
The ethico-aesthetics of emergence pertains to responsive, situated 
expression that loops back onto itself, folding other textures of experience 
into its transformations. This, as we shall see, is what happens with the 
fur fi elds across the trajectory of this thesis. Importantly, as Stern’s work 
suggests, our attention needs to turn toward the experience of process.  
53.  This shift to ‘know-how’ rather than 
‘knowledge of’ is a useful move in relation 
to attempts to discuss aesthetics and ethics 
(or the ethico-political) in accounts such as 
Gigliotti (1995) and Eagleton (1990). The 
shift of emphasis on these issues made by 
Varela enables a more direct access to the 
development of pragmatic approaches to the 
questions raised, for instance, in Gigliotti 
(1995). 
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PART TWO
Architectural Composition: expression, 
diagramming and style
100
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ACT 4. Rising out of the Affective Sea; Architectural Composition 
and Emergence
102
Act 4 is a survey of behavioural tendencies across two related areas of activity: the act 
of theorising architectural composition and the fi eld of architectural enquiry I refer to as 
‘processual architecture.’  The development of architectural composition is explored in a 
partial way – that is, with a particular emphasis on the role of theorising or articulating 
models of composition. The Act works through a brief history of composition theory, before 
mapping out aspects of the 20th century historical lineage that led to the processual 
architecture that emerged in the 90s. A picture of the fi eld of processual architecture is 
built up while connecting this picture back to earlier compositional practices and ideas. 
This process is also one of gathering evidence and mounting an argument regarding the 
emergence of new modes of composition within the fi eld. One of the primary issues at 
stake is that composition starts to operate in terms of the articulation of behavioural 
tendencies and the performance of processes rather than in terms of systems of 
geometrical arrangement. Exploring how theories of composition have behaved, or what 
role they have enacted in their fi eld, leverages some analogous relationships across 
historical periods and within the process of composition itself. This enables me to suggest 
some key issues that have provoked the development of new modes of composition 
through processual architecture. 
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1. Composition and the ethics of emergence
“Composition is less a critical thought project than an integrally experienced 
emergence. It is a creative event.”1   
If we can say that all good design outcomes are to some degree emergent, 
then a full account of how their parts added up to that resulting whole would 
seem lost to the causal mysteries of emergence. The creative struggle to 
get something to ‘come together’ or to emerge does not get any easier 
when we don’t know how it happened last time. This particularly becomes 
a problem when we make things within a discursive community.  If we 
have diffi culty discussing how we produced something, we fall into another 
set of straining postures, trying to ‘pull together’ a convincing account of 
the thing and its process of making. The role of these articulations are 
signifi cant; they offer tendrils of connection into a discursive fi eld; casting 
threads into a fabric that never stops weaving. All too often, the discursive 
account, which is also both invented and discovered, involves pretending 
that what we realised at the end was what we intended all along, as if 
the process taught us nothing because we were, very professionally, ‘in 
control’ or that the process was nothing but a means to an end. Somewhere 
between the mystery and the pretence is the undeniable: the process of 
invention-discovery. We are not passive vessels for the passage of some 
divine creative will, nor were we entirely or autonomously in control. We 
participate in the world at every turn. 
For design and composition theory, this emphasis on participation and 
‘know-how’, as discussed in the last act, implicates the behaviour and 
performance of the designer amidst the act of designing.  In the fi eld of 
architectural discourse I go on to discuss as ‘processual architecture’, there 
is a focus on setting up conditions through which outcomes will emerge. 
1.  Massumi (2002a), p174
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4.01  Humphrey Repton, ‘Characters of Houses’ (1816).
The performance of the designer is met with dynamic, life-like diagrams 
that are themselves confi gured in terms of behaviours and performance. 
Implicitly, composition becomes less of a set of rules or methodologies and 
more of an ethics of engagement.
Emergence, as I have earlier suggested, is implicitly a model of 
composition – of the way things ‘hold together’ – that always involves 
drawing forms of coherence out of a texture of collective constitution. In 
later acts I will argue that emergent coherence always involves confl ict 
and incompatibilities amidst its collectivity. This act begins that argument 
through suggesting that new theories or models composition always 
emerge out of a discursive confl ict in an attempt to hold incompatibilities 
together into the one collective fi eld. 
2.  The emergence of composition theory
While composition, Robin Evans writes, “is where the geometry of 
architecture is usually sought,”2 geometry is not always where composition 
is sought. In fact, the idea seemed to have emphatically arrived just as 
geometry was loosing grip on its superior reality. Colin Rowe’s essay 
‘Character and Composition’ comes to suggest that; 
“…the word ‘composition’ really entered the English architectural vocabulary as a 
result of the formal innovations of the Picturesque, and that it was conceived as 
being peculiarly applicable to the new, free, asymmetrical organisations which 
could not be comprehended within the aesthetic categories of the academic 
tradition.”3 
Rowe observes that in early nineteenth century English publications, 
2.  Evans (1995), p. xxxi.
3.  Rowe (1988), p. 65.
106
Robinson, John Beverley 
(1914). First published 
1908. 
Haneman, John Theodore 
(1923).
“the words ‘composition,’ ‘character,’ ‘effect,’ ‘interest,’ and ‘expression’ are 
liberally scattered; and the further these architects succeed in emancipating 
themselves from the Anglo-Palladian tradition, the more prone they are to the 
use of this new vocabulary.”4
The turn to the idea of composition in the picturesque climate of the 
eighteenth century was related to a shift from a belief in the truth value 
of geometry – or form in itself – to the perception or effects of form. As 
part of the growing sense of a fi eld of perceptual, picturesque movement, 
ties between particular formal conventions and types of buildings were 
loosened, giving rise to a polyphony of choice from a smorgasbord of 
styles. The use of the idea of ‘character’ and the production of a character 
appropriate to the task at hand prevailed as a way of holding together the 
mixing of stylistic manners.  The idea of architectural character goes back 
to Vitruvius and was employed by Humphrey Repton, who popularised 
attention to stylistic differentiation in the early 19th century.5 
It is important to recognise here that the rise of the idea of architectural 
character offers a no less abstract6 way of defi ning the aesthetic standards 
of architecture than mathematical or geometrical systems, it was just 
endowed with more movement and vagueness of measure. 
It was in the early twentieth century that theories of architectural 
composition became an explicitly intense fi eld of academic endeavour. This 
peaked with a notable expansion of literature on principles of composition 
in architecture publications of the 1920s. These publications included 
John Harbeson’s The Study of Architectural Design (1926), John Theodore 
Haneman’s A Manual of Architectural Compositions (1923), Howard 
Robertson’s The Principles of Architectural Composition (1924), Nathaniel 
Curtis’s Architectural Composition (1926), Trystan Edward’s Architectural 
Style (1926), Robert Atkinson and Hope Bagenal’s Theory and Elements 
of Architecture (1926). These built upon a collection early 20th century 
texts such as John Belcher’s Essentials in Architecture (1907), John 
Beverly Robinson’s Architectural Composition (1908) and David Jacob 
Varon’s Indication in Architectural Design (1916). An intrinsic aim of these 
publications is summed up in the subtitle to John Beverley Robinson’s 
Architectural Composition: ‘An Attempt to Order and Phrase Ideas which 
hitherto have been only Felt by the Instinctive Taste of Designers.’ 
These texts can be distinguished from preceding compositional 
emphases of working from stylistic typologies, attempting to articulate 
underlying principles related to ‘the grammar of design.’ This phrase 
was adopted by Trystan Edward’s infl uential treatise of aesthetics,7 The 
4.  Ibid
6. The way in which I understand the term 
‘abstract’ departs from the common idea of 
abstraction as a withdrawal from material 
actuality. Rather, the abstract is transpositional 
or nonlocal; able to move, transformationally, 
through and between diverse instances. This 
describes the nature of affect, as embodied 
abstraction. For a detailed development of this 
understanding of both affect and the abstract, 
see Brian Massumi (2002a).
5. Crook (1989), p24
7. Howard Robertson, a principle of the 
Architectural Association in London, 
acknowledged and elaborated upon Edwards 
principles in his own theories of composition, 
similarly separating ‘abstract composition’ from 
the ‘elements’ of composition.
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4.02 Trystan Edwards and the principles of ‘Number’, ‘Punctuation’ and ‘Infl ection’.
Edwards (1945).
Things Which Are Seen (1921), which proposed number, punctuation 
and infl ection as the foundations of beauty and vitality in architecture.8 
Edwards later worked these principles into his book Architectural Style 
(1926) to be republished in 1945 as Style and Composition in Architecture 
and, as testiment to his resilient insistence, reworked twenty two years 
later in Towards Tomorrow’s Architecture (1968).
This shift toward abstract principles was deeply involved in the desire to 
provide a bridge with which to straddle traditional and modernist positions. 
Modernist orientations stood starkly against the historical backdrop of 
picturesque diversity. For progressive modernism it became an issue of 
the One outlined against the many; holding a boldly delineated stance 
sharply silhoutted against a blurry fi eld of liberally remixed nostalgia. 
Painterly notions such as character were no longer adequate in holding 
this new confl ict into the one fi eld. New tools were required, which took 
the form of these abstract, geometrically based but plastic principles of 
composition. As a claim that was common to these composition theorists, 
Edwards proclaimed that his grammar of design, “enables us to appreciate 
the qualities which distinuish all manners of building whether they be past 
or present, of the West or of the East.”9 On a similar note John Beverley 
Robinson’s 1908 Architectural Composition denies any attempt to lay down 
any standard of taste, except that: 
″Any system of composition to be at all valid must be independent of the 
variations in methods that have prevailed, and must be applicable to all styles 
that have existed and to all that shall thereafter come to life. Such illustrations 
as are given are chosen intentionally from the most widely varying types″10
8.  “In so far as a building expresses these 
principles it seems to be imbued with vitality, 
but in so far as it violates them it appears dull 
and lifeless” Edwards (1945), p. 25.
9.  Edwards (1945), pp. 27-8.
10.  Robinson (1914), p. 4.
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These early years of the twentieth century also involved an intense 
development of functionalist approaches to architecture, based on a 
rational and systemic analyses of the architectural program. Hyungmin 
Pai’s historical study11 argues that composition theory intensifi ed a zone 
of academic architectural endeavour while keeping planning rationalization 
at bay: “Composition, as a set of analytical procedures and perceptual 
effects, could thus avoid being entangled with the rationalized procedure 
of planning”12. But while it may have avoided this particular tangle, it was 
also a way of asserting the signifi cance of the aesthetic within the new 
dance of rationalist abstraction. The new compositional principles could 
only straddle the competing formal positions by managing to generate a 
posture attuned to scientifi c reductionism. Edwards’ ‘number’, ‘punctation’ 
and ‘infl ection’ were abstract enough to become diagrammatically active 
in any formal composition. They mixed the diagrammatic sensibilities 
of modernist abstraction with the (fl exibility of) geometrical orders of 
historical styles.
In  ‘Character and Composition’, Colin Rowe also notes that “a surpris-
ing number of books upon this subject [of composition] were published 
during these years [1900-1930]”. Alongside these texts, the manifestos of 
the modern movement were simultaneously proliferating. Their proximity 
was not a comfortable one, because, as Colin Rowe summarises: 
“the most cursory reading of any of the pronouncements of the great innovators 
of the 1920s suggests that for fi gures such as le Corbusier, Mies Van der Rohe, and 
Gropius, the existence of any such principles of composition as the academicians 
presumed was not only dubious but irrelevant. These men were convinced that 
an authentic architecture could only be a rationalization of objective facts.”13
While the modernist canon threw itself into the swelling powers of 
rationalization with impassioned, feverish, doctrinaire embrace, theories 
of composition adopted a more moderate tone of tempering its advance 
by embedding abstract, measured attentions within aesthetic standards. 
Either way, but in different ways, affective intensity was fostered in 
partnership with the agendas of cool objective calculation.
~
11.  Pai (2002).
12.  Ibid, p106.
13.  Rowe (1988) p. 60
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In both the mid-18th century and the 1920s the idea of composition rose 
to the surface as part of a climate of change, where prevailing styles, 
sensibilities and forms of authority take a turn. Composition theory seems 
to be in the habit of stepping up – or emerging – when a strong sense of 
movement and the smell of change dominates the atmosphere. 
In both cases the role of composition theory was to articulate and/
or generate some kind of collectively unanimous ground. Both charac-
ter and geometrically based principles offered a platform on which the 
contestations that emerged in conditions of confl ict could negotiate their 
differences and remain part of a shared envelope of activity. 
Furthermore, it would appear that emergence theory shares this 
attribute with composition theory. This affi nity becomes strengthened by 
historical coincidence, both peaking simultaneously in the very particu-
lar climate of Britain in the 1920s. In these contexts, both were used to 
temper the advance of more stringent forms of scientifi c or modernist 
reductionism, while also dancing to its tune. They each carried out a simi-
lar simultaneity of defense and assimilation. In each case, the crux of the 
issue lies in a folding together of two different forms of knowing: the holis-
tic, aesthetic and sensate – commonly associated with feeling – and the 
reductive, scientifi c and analytical – commonly associated with thinking. 
Implicitly there was an appeal to affect. 
In short, I am suggesting that at the basis of both theories of composi-
tion and emergence is the fold of thinking-feeling, embodied abstraction 
or affect.  
Emergence pertains to a process through which things appear, and as 
such implies a mode of composition or a way of doing. Composition refers 
to how things both ‘come together’ and then ‘hold together’ into an entity. 
It is about binding forces. If affect lies at the basis of these theoretical 
arenas, it is also their binding force. As Massumi suggests: “Impersonal 
affect is the connecting thread of experience. It is the invisible glue that 
holds the world together. In event.”14  
But while affect might be the shared binding force of emergence and 
composition, they are not the same thing. Composition offers emergence 
a model for its art; for, as Johnson put it, its “feel for the edges.” Com-
position has the potential, in other words, to offer emergence theory the 
missing model of creative process. But the potential contribution works in 
the other direction as well, where models of emergence offer composition 
a calculated, ordered precision to its processes. As I see it, the focus on 
models of emergence in architectural practice is striving toward making 
this very contribution.
14.  Massumi (2002a), p. 217.
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3.  Wittkower
If composition theory, as an area of aesthetic enquiry, always involves a 
negotiation of sensation and rationality this takes on a different colour 
in Rudolf Wittkower’s, Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism, 
which dates back to 1949, being republished in 1952 and again, revised, 
in 1962. This book predominantly stands as a signifi cant reappraisal of 
Renaissance architecture. Wittkower delved into his subject with the aim 
of recasting the reputation of Renaissance architecture as hedonist or 
“purely aesthetic” into the more godly pose of an architecture “conceived 
as an image or mirror of a pre-ordained mathematical harmony of the 
universe.”15 Wittkower’s argument involved an attempt to articulate a 
coherent set of principles that the Renaissance masters never managed to 
complete themselves: “Of the architectural treatises planned by the great 
masters of the High Renaissance none was completed, nor has enough 
come down to us to gauge their opinions accurately.”16  Events of the 
intervening period, it would seem, enabled Wittkower to turn back and 
scoop together the edges of an incomplete compositional agenda. 
Robin Evans argues that Wittkower positions the true meaning of archi-
tecture’s ulterior reality in symbolic frameworks, where the “architectural 
historian stood over them as guardian and expositor, protecting and per-
petuating their meanings. The symbolic in Architectural Principles is the 
authorized.“17  This comment is not entirely out of tune with Wittkower’s 
own comments that the analogy between musical and visual proportion, 
forged through an arithmetic of mathematic ratios and fundamental to the 
Renaissance style as a whole, was responsible for raising the liberal arts 
(painting, sculpture, architecture) from a manual occupation to an aca-
demic science. It gave, in other words, an academic, scientifi c authority 
to architecture. This transformation, he writes, “was the greatest achieve-
ment of 15th century artists.”18  According to Wittkower’s account, the 
Renaissance architects interpreted and developed upon classical antiquity 
to authorize the status of their art. As Evans implies, Wittkower’s admi-
ration for this authorizing function of mathematical ratios was also an 
admiration for the kind of posture he took for himself. He commences the 
book with the assertion that “the forms of the Renaissance church have 
symbolic value or, at least, that they are charged with a particular meaning 
which the pure forms as such do not contain.”19 However, this statement is 
a little at odds with other assertions made as the book unfolds.
Wittkower emphasizes that, for the Renaissance architects the genera-
tive use of divine proportions was based on a belief in the actual divinity of 
mathematical ratios. They were not signs of divinity stuck onto form that 
lacked divinity in themselves. Wittkower emphasises that:
15.  Wittkower (1971). From the Introduction 
(no page numbers)
16.  Ibid, p13
17.  Evans (1995), p5
18.  Wittkower (1971), p117
19.  Ibid, p1 Evans’ suggests that, by 
implication, Wittkower places academic 
authority as gatekeeper to that value anf 
meaning. 
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 “the Renaissance analogy of audible and visual proportions was no mere 
theoretical speculation; it testifi es to the solemn belief in the harmonic 
mathematical structure of all creation”20 
While this divine structure was undeniably transcendent, in the sense 
that it was understood to be the organising principle of all creation, it 
was also embedded enough to be inseparable from actual structure. The 
mathematical ratios were understood to exercise their power across and 
within things: they embrace and express the cosmic order, crossing not 
only between different types of artefact (sound-image-form) but also 
between artefact and the perceiving body. What mathematical ratios were 
for the Renaissance, is what emergence is for us today. 
What comes as a surprise given his earlier assertions that the forms 
of the Renaissance churches do not themselves contain the meaning they 
symbolically carry, is that he himself admits a belief in the effi cacy of this 
relation between objective proportions and subjective perception, when he 
writes: “The geometrical keynote is subconsciously rather than consciously 
perceptible to everyone who visits Palladio’s villas and it is this that gives 
his buildings their convincing quality.”21  Here he seems to agree with the 
Renaissance architects that the use of proportional systems was “not an 
academic matter, but a spatial experience.”22 
On the one hand Wittkower asserts that the symbolism is not embedded 
in the forms themselves and on the other, a subconsciously felt, embedded 
experiential reality that is an ultimate authority because, on some level, 
it is assumed to be universally true (being subconsciously perceptible to 
“everyone”). This conjunctive power in which objective proportions and 
subjective perception merge in a  “spatial experience” that is “subconsciously 
rather than consciously perceptible to everyone” is the compositional score 
that, despite being otherwise denied, becomes revealed as if through a slip 
of the tongue. In his 1971 introduction Wittkower admits to a blindspot 
that is telling: 
“When I wrote this book, the close link between proportion and perspective in 
the minds of Renaissance thinkers had not fully dawned upon me. It occurred 
to me only later that probably Brunelleschi himself and certainly Alberti, Piero 
della Francesca, Leonardo, and others had seen this problem very clearly and 
studied it intensely. They saw no contradiction between objective proportions 
and subjective perception”.23
20.  Ibid, p. 117.
21. Ibid, p. 72.
22.  Ibid, p. 115.
23.  Wittkower(1971), From the Introduction 
(no page numbers).
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4.03 Goldstein’s diagram of the mathematical and scientifi c roots of 
emergence.
4.04 Goldstein’s diagram with specifi c zones indicated (by author).
Neither, it would seem, does Wittkower actually see a contradiction. 
Perspective offered a degree of ‘proof’ regarding the lack of contradiction 
between objective proportion and the ability to objectively, mathematically, 
measure out the subjective terrain of the individual view point. 
While Wittkower did not use the word ‘composition’ in any way central to 
his arguments, his propositions were implicitly motivated toward promoting 
that which composition always draws upon: embodied abstraction or 
affect.
4. The growth of systemic analysis
After their simultaneous peaking, the parallels between emergence and 
composition theory continued as they both ‘went under’. By the end of the 
1920s, the more radical forms of modern architecture landed in Britain and 
composition theory was increasingly dismissed. Similarly, the use of the 
word ‘emergence’ as a subject of philosophical debate quelled in the late 
1920s. Debates regarding emergence came back into active currency in the 
1990s, when it proliferated exponentially across diverse fi elds of research. 
In the interum fi fty or sixty years, a series of mathematical, scientifi c 
and philosophically intertwined fi elds accumulated a range of concepts, 
tools and techniques which provided the ways and means to reveal factors 
involved in the production of emergent phenomena. Jeffrey Goldstein’s 
‘Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues’24 offers a useful (even if 
contestable) mapping of these mathematical and scientifi c roots of late 
twentieth century emergence theory (Fig 4.03). 
24. Goldstein (1999), p. 53
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Relations between those early discursive fi elds mapped by Goldstein 
and architectural practice and discourse gathered force in the 1960s. In 
relation to social theory and urban planning, the work of Jane Jacobs, most 
famously her The Death and Life of Great American Cities of 1961, was a 
work that brought the notion of self-organising systems to urban systems 
thinking. Michael Ostwald’s doctoral thesis, Multidirectional Appropriations 
of Theory between Architecture and the Sciences of Complexity, clusters 
together the works of Jane Jacobs, Robert Venturi, Christopher Alexander 
and Lucien Kroll as those comprising “the canon of architectural complexity 
prior to the infl uence of various appropriations, slippages and migrations 
from Complexity Science.”25 which included the work of Peter Eisenman, 
Charles Jenks, Ushida Findlay and Co-op Himmelblau, amongst others.  
The architectural infl uences and associations explored by Ostwald can 
be located within a particular region in Goldstein’s diagram (non-linear 
dynamical systems and the nodes that hover about it - see fi g 4.04).26
 But there is another lineage that traces a path from cybernetics, through 
both evolutionary biology and computational theory as it heads toward 
emergence. 
One fi gure whose history spans much of this lineage is John Frazer, 
who was a student of cybernetician Gordon Pask. His An Evolutionary 
Architecture was published in 1995, a culmination of work than began 
thirty years prior when he arrived at the Architectural Association (AA) 
in London as a student. Frazer’s work reaches back to the 1960s when 
the AA was preoccupied with, as he describes: “issues of fl exibility, 
impermanence, prefabrication, computers, robotics, and a global approach 
to energy, resources and culture.”27 Needless to say, forty years after 
Howard Robertson’s 1924 Principles of Architectural Composition, later a 
principle of the AA, the scene had undergone quite radical change. 
Frazer locates Gordon Pask’s essay, ‘The Architectural Relevance of 
Cybernetics’ published in 1969, as the key marker in the unfolding of 
a development of architecture and cybernetics. Here Pask claims that a 
desire for systems oriented thinking was implicit to much of the novel 
techniques developed over the previous 80 years or so, but that there was 
no theory for this. Pask cites the Fun Palace, a project he was involved in 
with Cedric Price from 1960, as a key example of the systems thinking in 
architecture at the time.
Publicly unfolded in 1961, the Fun Palace coincided with the launch of 
Archigram, who shared an orientation toward architecture as event and 
mobility.  Peter Cook’s 1967 book, Architecture: action and plan,28congeals 
a certain attitude of the time toward architecture’s transient, responsive, 
reconfi gurable future. His book brings together very diverse architectural 
examples that thread together, he writes, through the “search for absolutes 
25. Ostwald (1998), p. 58.
26.  The limits of Ostwald’s analysis of the 
connections and borrowings between complexity 
science and architecture were defi ned by his 
delimitation of the term ‘complexity science’ 
as referring “only to the combination of 
chaos theory, nonlinear dynamics and fractal 
geometry”  Ibid, p. 54.
27.  Frazer (2001), p. 643.
28.  Cook (1967).
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4.05  Network diagram by Christopher Alexander. 4.06  Peter Eisenman, House IV (1971).
[which] lies behind most experimental or defi nitive architecture.”29 This 
statement implicates ‘experimental and defi nitive architecture’ in the 
project I am claiming for composition theory. 
In other diverse examples such as Christopher Alexander, Eisenman 
and the ‘ekistics’ of Constantinos Dioxiadis there is a common orientation 
toward diagrammatic analysis, where new techniques and approaches 
toward the understanding of architectural problems were developed, as 
well as new diagrammatic modes of generating architectural solutions. 
The 1960s and 70s were obsessed with diagrammatic, analytical, systemic 
processuality. The aesthetic dimensions of these discursive developments 
operated largely in a covert rather than an articulated manner. The 
embodied abstraction that operates at the folding core of both emergence 
and composition was not exactly suppressed, but it was, on the whole, 
denied acknowledgment. 
In terms of the discursive developments that subsequently unfolded 
after the 1920s stylistic clash, modernism’s triumph thoroughly installed 
into architectural discourse a rejection of aesthetic categories over more 
scientifi cally oriented standards of measure.30 In 1947, Seigfried Giedion 
noted that:
“In our period, feeling seems to be much more diffi cult than thinking. Man is 
able to invent nearly everything he wants in science and in all kinds of gadgets; 
but as soon as we approach the emotional, or, if you prefer, the aesthetic sphere, 
we meet the strongest resistence…The result is that aesthetic values born out of 
the spirit of our period remain ignored.”31 
 But quite obviously, a strong aesthetic consistency operated at the core 
of the canons of modernist architecture, which most certainly amounted 
to a recognizable and acknowledged (international) style. However, in 
what amounted to a pathological denial, architecture became strangely 
ill-equipped to account for its aesthetic dimensions; a state of play, I 
would argue, that architecture is only now showing some nascent signs 
of recovery.
29.  Ibid, p. 5.
30.  Peter Downton has related to me that 
when fi rst tutoring in architectural design 
at the University of Melbourne in 1973, they 
were expressly forbidden to make aesthetic 
comments on student work, having to confi ne 
themselves to functionally related issues with 
some basis in science
31.  Giedion (1958), pp68-69
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4.08  John Frazer, ‘Reptile Structural System’ (1966 +).
4.07  John Frazer, digital models.
5. Processual architecture
Alongside the resurgence of debates regarding emergence, which is 
inseparable from developments in digital technology, the 1990’s involved 
a signifi cant shift in the status of digital tools for architectural practices. 
They moved from periphery to centre stage, from anomaly to everyday. 
This leap of presence primarily shifted drafting from 
drawing board to computer, which, along with companion 
email and network practices and the gradual digitisation of 
construction processes, ushered in signifi cant shifts in the 
fl ows and rhythms of practice. On the edges of conventional 
practice and at the centre of avant-garde discourse, the 
opportunities offered by digital tools for the purposes of 
generative architectural design processes were being more 
avidly explored. 
John Frazer’s work is amongst the earliest research 
to investigate generative design systems using genetic 
algorithms. In developing an “evolutionary model” of 
architecture he recommends that the “concept is process-
driven; that is, by form-generating rules which consist not 
of components, but of processes.”31  The fi nal section of 
Frazer’s text, titled ‘Characteristics of the New Architecture’, 
which takes up little more than one page of the entire book, 
clearly demonstrates a reticence to offer an image of how 
these processes might be formally inclined. He writes: 
“In the systems we have been discussing, global behaviour is 
an emergent property often unpredicated by local rules. In the 
same way, the emergent architecture will also be unpredicated. 
It is tempting to show examples or simulations of what the new 
architecture might be like, but the emphasis at this stage must be 
on process, in order to maintain the universality of the model.”32 
Frazer’s approach assumes that the designer is not directing these 
processes with a target in mind, but that it must simply ‘emerge’ through 
the mechanics of process. He offers some description of what the process 
model will operationally do, in terms of exhibiting metabolism, its feedback 
interactions with the environment and so on. However, these processes 
are described in largely reductively mechanical terms, resisting any appeal 
to aesthetic properties or to the experience of these relations.
31.  Frazer (1995), p. 65.
32.  Ibid, pp. 102-103.
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4.09  Greg Lynn, ‘Stranded Sears Tower’.
Lynn (1999)
Lynn (1993)
Hensel; Menges; Weinstock 
(2004)
As much as Frazer was a clear pioneer of the fi eld, Greg Lynn had a deeper 
and more infl uential impact. Via the publications Folding in Architecture 
(1993) and Animate Form (1999), Lynn’s contagious move was to link 
technology, technique and philosophy, offering both ways of doing and 
modes of thinking. This particular nexus within architecture was an invention 
we can attribute to Lynn, albeit with crucially signifi cant contributions from 
those around him. In Folding in Architecture, Lynn explicitly claimed that 
‘Folding’ was taking over the position that ‘Deconstructivist Architecture’ 
had previously held in architectural discourse. Like a newly confi gured 
wave passing through the same waters, many of the same designers 
were  cited as exemplary. Peter Eisenman, Frank Gehry and Philip Johnson 
remained involved. As the fi eld developed, the work of Bernard Cache, 
Marcos Novak, Karl Chu, Ed Keller, Lars Spuybroek, Mark Goulthorpe, Mark 
Burry, Tom Kovac, Stephen Perrella, Reiser and Umemoto, UN Studio, Stan 
Allen, Jeffrey Kipnis, Sanford Kwinter, Manuel DeLanda, Michael Speaks 
and Brian Massumi were some of the more obvious contributors, many of 
whom made contributions that acted as precursors to Lynn’s book, which 
deftly ‘solidifi ed’ trends that had been moving in that direction.  Other 
experimental practices like Dilller and Scofi dio, Arakawa and Gins, Ashton 
Raggatt McDougall and Minifi e Nixon have, I would suggest, tinged the 
peripheries of this fi eld with idiosyncratic but deeply relevant work. A 
cluster of younger or more recent architectural practices, such as biothing, 
kokkugia, Arandah/Lasch and the ‘Emergence and Design Group’ are 
explicitly claiming processes of emergence as central to the concerns of 
their research. 
All of this work could be loosely clustered together and tied back to much 
avant-garde work of the 60’s, under the name of ‘processual architecture.’ 
This naming acknowledges its association with process philosophy and 
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4.10  Lars Spuybroek, Water Pavilion.
its characteristic tendency to privilege things ‘in process’. The formation 
of the fi eld was characterized by kinetic objects and animated diagrams, 
moving and gyrating in differentiating fi elds of data. Architectural artefacts 
became more life-like, bringing the process of formation skyrocketing 
into the foreground in a literal and visible sense. More commonly, this 
fi eld of work is referred to as ‘digital architecture’, but in naming the fi eld 
otherwise, we dislodge the centrality of digital technology, without removing 
its signifi cant role. As stated earlier, it seems clear that digital technology 
is not the primary issue being explored by this fi eld of work, but simply a 
signifi cant part of the equation. All the work in this cluster of experimental 
architecture – in varying ways and degrees – foreground processes of 
formation as constituting key properties or defi ning conditions of the 
product. Built outcomes become emphatically responsive, interactive and/
or experientially challenging, while design processes become products in 
themselves. As an extension of the systemic processuality and emphasis 
on responsivity in the 1960s, this fi eld of work operated to further unsettle 
the clarity of distinction between process and product. 
The discourse of ‘Folding’ signalled the desire to incorporate disparate 
elements into smooth mixtures, melting the fi ssures and shards of 
deconstruction into a liquidity of form. The desire for continuity and 
processes of transformation was widespread in the 90s. In addition to 
the temporal forms of continuous transformation in digital animations, 
its formal manifestation appeared in a proliferation of uninterrupted, 
modulating surfaces. Buildings became endless ramps and fl oors, walls 
and ceilings folded into one another. The explicit nature of the desire to 
produce smooth unities that incorporate difference meant that curvilinear 
geometries were an obvious formal language, given that the gradations and 
infl ections of curves precisely enact differentiated but smooth continuity. 
Through their intertwinement with digital tools curves became smoother, 
tighter, more malleable and more elegant postures than the kindred blob 
eruptions of the 1960s. This was often connected the emerging fi eld of 
interactive architecture – so infl uentially marked by Spuybroek’s Water 
Pavillion (1993-1997) and Goulthorpe’s Aegis Hyposurface (1999-2001), 
which involved signifi cant input from Mark Burry.  This trajectory is currently 
being extended and developed by a set of related younger practices such 
as SERVO, biothing and The Responsive Systems Group.33  The general 
area is being developed through the numerous new degrees being offered 
in interactive architecture through Architecture Schools and is registered 
in publications such as, amongst increasingly numerous others, Lucy 
Bullivant’s 4D: Interactive Architecture and Ruairi Glynn’s blog, Interactive 
33.  see Hight; Perry (2006).
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4.11  Lars Spuybroek, Water Pavilion interior shots.
Architecture dot Org.34  Glynn notes that within this new fi eld emerging 
within architecture: “Instead of defi ning a fi xed architectural product it 
is an architecture in constant fl ux best suited to prototyping and semi-
permanent installations.”35  Architecture becomes performative, a term 
that has increasingly bled into the literature devoted to ideas about more 
building-centred architectural speculations, such as in Kolarevic/Malkawi 
(2005), Rahim (2006), Hensel et al (2004), Hensel et al (2006).
The signifi cance of the dynamically interactive capacities of digital 
technology is not simply about the ability of artefacts to perform in 
terms of literal movements, nor is it simply about the ability to produce 
new, digital design systems and formal complexity. The fi eld takes on a 
deeper complexion when seen as a development upon the emphasis on 
performance, action and ephemerality in the 60’s, evident in the adaptable, 
mobile architectures, installations and urban systems planning by those 
such as the Eames, the Situationists, Cedric Price, Peter Cook, Constantinos 
Doxiados, the Metabolists, Archigram and Buckminster Fuller.36 The 
emphasis on behaviour and performance starts to fl ip the problem of 
composition from a formal arrangement into the more behavioural and 
ethically infl ected terrains of ‘composure’ or poise. In Kolarevic and 
Malkawi’s Performative Architecture: Beyond Instrumentality (2005), they 
recognise “an interesting gap in the aesthetics (and ethics) between form-
oriented or cultural performance-oriented designers (Frank Gehry, Greg 
Lynn, etc) and those whose work aims at environmental performance 
(Thomas Herzog, Glenn Murcutt, etc.)”37  The divide articulated here is 
one where the later kind of performative emphasis tends toward very 
linear but textured form with an emphasis on physical materiality, whereas 
the former tends toward curvilinear, smooth form with an emphasis, as I 
am arguing here, on virtual materiality (or affect). This divide is an old 
one referred to earlier and that I later discuss, via Reyner Banham,  as 
a battle between the ‘hardies’ and the ‘softies’ and, via Wolffl in, between 
the linear and painterly styles. It is in the gap between this enduring 
stylistic opposition that a collectively unanimous ground of affect has been 
iteratively developing through the articulation of models of composition. 
It should be mentioned here that an extremely rich and diverse 
fi eld of ‘new media art’ presents similar issues and tendencies to that 
of processual architecture. An especially relevant account of this terrain 
and the issues therein can be found in Anna Munster’s Materialising 
New Media: embodiment in information aesthetics (2006). In this book, 
Munster discusses a range of works, including some from architects such 
as Greg Lynn, in terms that have signifi cant affi nity with this thesis. Given 
34.  http://www.interactivearchitecture.org
35.  http://www.interactivearchitecture.org/
about/ (last accessed April 13, 2007)
36. As superbly discussed by Mark Wigley 
(2001), the network or patterned/textured 
fi eld was a key fi guration amidst these works.
37. Kolarevic: Malkawi (2005), p210
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4.12  Posters for ‘Intimate Transactions’ and ‘Skins of Intimate Distance’ (projects discussed in Part 3 of this thesis). 
Munster (2006).
the close proximity of my own projects (those discussed in Part Three) 
to new media installation art, it may seem odd that I have not explored 
the terrain of new media art, particularly given the important presence of 
‘interactive architecture’ in the fi eld ‘processual architecture’, where quite 
a literal overlap exists. 
However, not only has Munster approached this subject fulsomely 
already, in exploring the work of others, I made a decision to remain 
focussed largely on projects by architects (largely by Greg Lynn) with 
more ‘static’ outcomes. This is, in part, due to a practical need to limit 
scope. But this focus is mainly because in shifting from the emphatically 
moving to the apparently static, problems of translation become especially 
acute. As such, there is a special interest here in the relationships between 
the design process and built or constructed products of those processes. 
As I will go on to discuss in more detail, the fi eld has afforded a great 
deal of attention to the designing of the design process (in what became 
known as ‘designing the design’). But what the fi eld also raises, and which 
emergence brings forward, is that the product or the outcome of any such 
process needs to be approached as processual as well (even if it stands still 
in the material sense). This relationship has a peculiarly poignant status 
within the practice of architecture because it almost always must straddle 
a divide between what architects do (produce designs through ‘drawings’ 
of some kind) and what they produce (buildings and related artefacts). It 
is because of, and through, this gap or pronounced act of translation that 
an awareness of the binding consistency of affect becomes, as I will go on 
to argue, especially necessary. 
Where my own project work very emphatically enters the fi eld of new 
media interactive installation art (Skins of Intimate Distance and Intimate 
Transactions), what I draw out of them is deeply infl uenced by this 
interest in problems of translation and its peculiarly acute presence in 
architecture.38  It is through my project-based research that I can enter, 
38. This is not to say that problems of 
translation are not present in all other creative 
practices, but simply that it becomes especially 
acute for architecture.
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4.13  Alisa Andrasek/biothing, The Invisibles animation (2003). A series of morphologies from the animation 
showing both the ‘rendered ‘skin’ and the ‘bones’ that underlie that skin. 
experientially, into the zone between the emphatically moving and the 
apparently static to articulate the places, ways and means through which 
to gather an embodied awareness of affectivity or what I go on to discuss 
as ‘affective diagramming.’
6. The return of Composition theory 
“Figures become more intricate, motives intertwine, the order of the parts is 
more diffi cult to grasp…this is connected with the principle of the avoidance 
of absolute lucidity…it becomes increasingly diffi cult for the individual parts to 
assert their validity as plastic values; a (purely visual) movement is set going 
over the sum of the forms, independently of the particular viewpoint. The wall 
vibrates, the space quivers in every corner.”39
In this act I have suggested that composition and emergence theory are 
historically and philosophically linked. If the past is an indication of an 
ongoing pattern, then the discursive return of emergence in the 90s, would 
suggest that composition theory might have similarly enjoyed a return of 
interest.  The development of new theories of composition has, as I will go 
on to argue, been an implicit project of the experimental architecture that 
began unravelling in the mid-1990s.
39.  Wölffl in (1950), p65
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Cache (1995). 4.14  Diagram drawn by Bernard Cache.
42.  Ibid.
43.  Allen (1997), p. 24.
44.  Ibid. p. 29. 
45.  I have found students often referring to 
this paper in recent years. It also appeared in 
the reading list for Alisa Andrasek’s Material 
Potency studio at RMIT in 2005. 
46.  Allen (1997), p. 24.
A defi ning moment in this regard arrived in 1995 with the important little 
book by Bernard Cache, Earth Moves,40  in which he unravels a classifi cation 
system of architectural ‘images’, pertaining to Deleuzian philosophy. His 
system is implicitly a theory of composition in the sense that his ‘images’ 
operate as abstract principles for architectural operations, with a special 
attention to a liquid ground of action pertaining to the primary image of 
infl ection.  Interestingly enough, Cache’s three ‘images’: vector, frame 
and infl ection resonate with Trystan Edwards’ three principles of number, 
punctuation and infl ection.  Cache’s manuscript was written in 1983, but it 
was not published until 1995, in the wake of Lynn’s Folding in Architecture, 
both surfi ng an explicit relation to Deleuzian philosophy.  
A resurgence of discursive interest in the diagram in the late 1990s/
early 2000s, was another emphatic sign of a broader reappriasal of 
compositional principles that following in the wake of Folding. I discuss 
this area of discourse in the next Act. Along a philosophical vien, Brian 
Massumi has extended the architectural discourse on diagramming into a 
concept of the ‘biogram’ as an experientially based compositional guide. 
In the Architectural Design publication Architecture After Geometry 
(1997) edited by LAB architects (Donald Bates and Peter Davidson), the 
subject of composition also crept out of the background of Lynn’s Folding 
in Architecture (1993). LAB’s editorial discusses it as “ a companion issue…
that chart a similar, or at least a congruent territory.”41 This territory, 
they claim, is defi ned by the adoption of new techniques and tactics of 
architectural production that work against more established relations 
between architecture and geometry, through which the transcendental 
imperatives of geometry can be disrupted. While admitting that architectural 
production ends in geometry, they insist it need not start there. Rather, 
one can start with the production of texture fi elds, from which geometrical 
form is drawn out. In other words, it emerges: 
40.  This book was originally written in 1983 
in French under the title Terre Meuble but was 
fi rst published in English as Earth Moves in 
1995.
41.  Bates (1997), p. 11.
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4.15  Images accompanying Stan Allen’s essay ‘From Object to Field’.
“Rather than an operation circulating around degrees of 
correspondence to a pre-existent fi gure (grid, axis, concentric 
layering, symmetry, etc) the development of graphic space, 
liquid space, texture fi elds, pattern effects and fi eld conditions 
is possible only in a context of emergent readability.”42 
This book was full of textures, patterns, fi elds and 
swarms presented as generative, performative diagrams. 
The essay from Stan Allen in that publication, ‘From Object 
to Field’, remains one of the more useful and infl uential 
texts for processual architecture. While Allen makes the 
cautionary point that fi eld conditions “cannot claim (nor 
does it intend to claim) to produce a systematic theory of 
architectural form or composition”43 his essay concentrates 
on architectural composition as the main issue and makes 
the following distinctions:
“If classical composition sought to maintain clear relations of 
fi gure on ground, which modern composition perturbed by the 
introduction of a complicated fi gure against fi gure, with digital 
technologies we have come to terms with the implications 
of a fi eld-to-fi eld relation. A shift of scale is involved and a 
necessary revision of compositional parameters implied.”44 
One of the reasons that this essay remains popular 
10 years later,45 is that he is acutely aware of the 
relationship between the fi eld condition and emergence: 
“Field conditions are bottom-up phenomena: defi ned not 
by overarching geometrical schemas but by intricate local 
connections.”46  But, as Allen says, his essay offers working 
concepts, which may change in their encounter with the 
realities of practice. 
Allen superbly discusses the fi eld condition in relation 
to a broad range of architectural, art and urban examples. 
But how the fi eld condition might operate within a 
meaningful process through which to generate a building 
is not something he addresses. That issue is left to other 
parts of the book.
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4.18  Greg Lynn, House Prototype (1994).4.17  Jeff Kipnis’s ‘School of Fish’ display 
system-sculpture.
The object cast in a fi eld is a key property of processual architecture. 
This operates as forms that emerge through a fi eld of spatial infl uence 
and/or in an experiential body-architecture fi eld. This emphasis became 
powerfully motivated by Lynn’s call to work with a dynamic materialist 
space of forces, in which the object is part of, rather than separate to, the 
space in which it comes into being. In Lynn’s work, however, much of this 
fi eld condition remained hidden in the black backgrounds of the digital 
animations.  Spatial texture in itself was not visualised, but implied and 
made active in the effects it had on the forms within it. With Architecture 
After Geometry, the fi eld of spatial texture was foregrounded as a formal 
device where a fi eld of relations becomes visualised and central to the 
design process. 
With the exception of Jeff Kipnis’s ‘School of Fish’ display system-
sculpture and Greg Lynn’s ‘Hydrogen House’ and related generative process, 
work in this book is largely mobilised through plan-based investigations. 
Graphic texture fi elds become the material from which form is drawn 
out, predominantly through extrusion. From a compositional perspective, 
it’s interesting to note that these graphic fi elds are employed in a way 
that can be likened to the old Beaux-arts methods of indication. David 
Varon’s Indication in Architectural Design (1916) promotes the technique 
of indication as the graphic and visual skills involved in “training the eye 
and hand.”47 This involved the drawing out of form from the simpler, 
more diagrammatic lines of the esquisse. In public lectures Donald Bates 
and Peter Davidson have often discussed “hand to eye coordination” in 
relation to their design processes, which begin with graphic textures out 
of which a developed architectural proposition is gradually drawn out. 
Some interesting relationships with some pre-modernist, traditionalist 
approaches to architectural composition become implied here. 
47.  Varon (1916), p. 19.
4.16  Greg Lynn, Bucharest urban design 
competition study using particle animation 
fl ows to defi ne variable densities across site.
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4.19  Greg Lynn, House Prototype (1994).
As Hyungmin Pai puts it: “we must remember that the essence of 
Beaux-Arts vision was in the ability to see and draw through the density 
of overlapping traces, to envision the possibilities within the lines and 
surfaces.”48 The problem of drawing form out of textured fi elds is an 
endemic one for processual architecture. But while the Beaux-Arts methods 
of indication begins with a fi ne skeletal frame or rigid boundary within 
which the lines and surfaces gather density through the enumeration 
of detail, these contemporary methods of ‘drawing out’ will tend to be 
intricately detailed before becoming simpler. But of greater signifi cance is 
the melt down of the rigid frame, which will deform and develop as part of 
48.  Pai (2002), p62
4.20  Levels of Indication in the progression of an analytique: from simple sketch to rendered 
project, from Ernest Pickering, Architectural Design, 1933. 
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4.21  Peter Ryan, character properties, architecture thesis project, RMIT University, 2002.
the whole developmental picture in which all ‘components’ are embroiled 
in interactions of mutual affect. This has become particularly clear to me 
through a number of thesis projects by students at RMIT, three of which I 
will briefl y mention here. 
A project by Peter Ryan, titled 
‘A Character Building Experience,’ 
involved an extraordinary amount 
of effort developing a generative 
system for the design of a school 
in suburban Melbourne. Using 
characters from the TV show, The 
Simpsons, as the basic ‘score’ or 
reference point, he generated a 
range of different agent characters 
based on numerical fi gures given 
to ‘speed’, ‘sharpness’, ‘acuity’ and 
‘diligence’. These properties were 
related to things like the frequency 
at which the agent would check 
for repulsions and attractions, for instance. Agents/characters were 
programmed with relationships between one another, in that, for instance, 
the ‘teachers pet’ was attracted to the teacher and staff room areas, while 
the ‘nerd’ would always try to avoid the ‘bully’ who in turn would chase the 
‘nerd’. A complex network of fi eld relations were generated. The problem of 
how to draw the form of the school out of this fi eld was eventually developed 
through another layer of codes related to ‘technique’, ‘building’, ‘threshold’ 
and ‘landscape’ (as indicated in Fig 4.21) which offered guidelines for the 
architectural effects of the trajectories. 
The very deliberate attention to ‘character’ as an issue gave an 
immediate qualitative edge to coded relations of the project. Obviously, 
this attention to ‘character’ resonates with the early days of composition 
theory and the picturesque, as discussed earlier in this Act. What seemed 
especially interesting to me was the variety of line qualities created in the 
trajectories of the various agent characters (see Fig. 4.21). The quality 
of the line became discernable and important, in a way that has been 
missing amidst the proliferation of curves in architectural projects. Here, 
there seemed to be glimmers of promise for compositional tools for the 
qualitative differentiation between one curve and another, one curvilinear 
formal gesture and another. Importantly, the emphasis here is on the 
behavioural tendencies of the line or curve. 
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4.22  Peter Ryan, render of school buildings. architecture thesis project, RMIT University, 2003.
4.23  Peter Ryan, program/planning diagrams, architecture thesis project, RMIT University, 2003.
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4.24  Roland Snooks, agent fi elds, architecture thesis project, RMIT University, 2003.
The thesis project, ‘Emergent Field,’ by Roland Snooks (now of 
kokkugia) and supervised by Paul Minifi e, developed a three dimensional 
fi eld through agent interactions (Fig 4.24). As Snooks explained49, agents 
were conceived of little chunks of program, having a set of behaviours 
related to their attraction or repulsion to other agents as well as their 
attraction to various aspects of their surroundings (street frontage, 
adjacent programs, height etc). Once a swarm of these agents began to 
generate recursive patterns or demonstrate some sort of stability it was 
deemed to have found a degree of equilibrium and was stopped. Snooks 
then overlayed a grid, extrapolated from column grids of the surrounding 
built fabric. Nodes of this grid were programmed to respond to the agent 
swarm in particular ways. For example, the grid compressed when in 
proximity to programs such as cafes (to create laneways) and expanded 
when in proximity to offi ce space (to create clear span space). A third 
simulation was generated to carve out public space through the various 
program areas, where agents where programmed to enact various basic 
urban relationships. Like the previous two processes this was run through 
many iterations with an eye for the emergence of coherent fi gures (from 
the traces of their movement). Curves were selectively chosen out of the 
swarm in order to generate surfaces. Snooks explained that the design of 
this process involved developing a satisfying balance between bottom up 
generative process and top down decision making and that it was a very 
slow and diffi cult task drawing out the forms. When pressed he agreed 
that this involved sensing a whole within the simulation and trying to draw 
out surfaces which are faithful to that simulation.
49. The description of his process in this 
paragraph is largely a taken from an email 
(07.01.07) in which Snooks outlined a detailed 
account for me.  
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4.25  Roland Snooks, fi nal project render, architecture thesis project, RMIT University, 2003.
Again, Snooks project would seem quite reminiscent of Beaux-Arts 
compositional techniques such as indication. As Pai describes it, “indication 
was not merely a static method of redrawing but a mechanism of altering 
and transforming”50 and that this involved cultivating “the ability to move 
from simple diagrammatic lines to detailed form – a process that may be 
called fi guration – and the complimentary skill of drawing simple lines 
with a generative idea in mind – the capacity for abstraction.”51 It is as if 
recent digital processes in architecture have, as part of an evocation of the 
aesthetic dimensions of composition, begun to draw back on its academic 
history.
50.  Ibid, p46
51.  Ibid.
129
4.26  Jonathan Podborsek, early Evolver tests and fi nal tower render, architecture thesis project, RMIT University, 2004. 
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Another thesis project, ‘Highly Evolved’, by Jonathan Podborsek (also 
now of kokkugia) worked with fi elds of infl uence that were not visualised 
as swarms as in the previous two examples. While the (invisible) fi eld was 
a key aspect, this project gave more emphasis to the negotiation between 
forms within such a fi eld. 
Paul Minifi e, who supervised the project, had previously appropriated 
Ken Brakke’s mathematics software, Evolver, to work with triply periodic 
minimal surfaces for his architectural projects, ‘Habour Study’ and ‘Corner 
Study’, published in the 2001 Orleans Archilab convention publication. 
Evolver was developed by Brakke for modelling liquid surfaces shaped 
by various forces and constraints. It takes planar formal descriptions and 
refi nes surfaces such that their surface area is minimised – or such that 
they exhibit behaviour similar to that of soap bubbles. 
Podborsek explored the software somewhat differently to Minifi e, 
using it to generate far less ‘pure’ mathematically formal descriptions. 
His project was a high-rise tower composed as three intertwining strands 
of form related to offi ce, residential and void spaces. The intertwinement 
of the three strands was generated through a three dimensional cellular 
automata program. This block model was then ‘evolved’ into a far more 
bulbous, knotted, plait-like form.  The ‘void’ strand was then extracted, 
revealing the shared surfaces between this and the other two strands. 
In observing the development of this project, the nature of these shared 
surfaces always seemed to most clearly articulate the potential of the 
research, if only because of their surprising elegance. 
What was it that made these surfaces so compelling? They embodied, 
not metaphorically but literally, a highly effi cient but complex negotiation 
between two conditions; the feeling of perfectly balanced mutual affectivity. 
They were surfaces of negotiation, expressing the mutually held affects of 
a relationship between adjacent zones of force and constraint.  While, 
visually at least, this was a less explicitly complex generative process 
than the former two examples, its simplicity acted to articulate the 
poignance of mutual affectivity that was, in fact, a key aspect of all these 
compositions. 
4.27  Minifi e Nixon, ‘Corner Study’, 2001.
4.28  Minifi e Nixon, ‘Harbour Study’, 2001.
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4.30  biothing, The Invisibles (2003), diagram of speed-distribution and cellular relationships. These affect 
rotations in a skeletal fi eld that in turn affect the movement of the skin.
4.29  biothing, sample morphological stance 
from The Invisibles animation.
The work of Alisa Andrasek, of biothing, is another young practice 
in which processes of emergence are an explicit interest. biothing has 
developed techniques of design composition that intrinsically involve 
computation, working with fi elds constituted by a very deep ecology of 
relationships.  I have discussed this in detail through her digital animation 
project ‘The Invisibles’ in a paper published in 2006.52 biothing’s way of 
working involves multitudes of micro-components ‘wired’ together into 
a behavioural network such that the resulting forms emerge from this 
network. In other words, form emerges out of interrelated fi elds of micro-
behaviours. This is played out through both digital and analogue models.
The fi rst physical model for her project, ‘bifi d,’ was laser-cut at the Spatial 
Information Architecture Laboratory at RMIT University in Melbourne. In 
this context I was able to literally play with the model, feeling out its 
behavioural tendencies. This occurred while she was in residence, running 
her ‘Material Potency’ seminar as part of a design studio, in which she would 
often evocatively orient the design investigations of the RMIT architecture 
students towards the production of a ‘creature’. This is quite different 
to biomorphism as an approach because it is not about looking like or 
formally resembling a living thing. Rather, a pattern of relations is built 
into a physical model such that the behaviours of both the manufactured 
pattern (a colony of variationally repeated units constructed out of strips 
of material) and properties of the physical material actively codetermine 
the nature of the creature’s swarming morphology, which comes into being 
at a different scale and ontology to the ecology of relations through which 
it emerged. The relations that constitute biothing’s compositional entities 
cannot be singled out: they are never experienced in isolation, not even 
as some part of a whole. As a multitude engaged in an emergent process 
of composition, they generate patterns or textures of multiple, mostly 
invisible, relations: a consistency. What we (aesthetically) experience is 
an all-over, over-all consistency. My interest in biothing’s work has centred 
52.  Ednie-Brown (2006a).
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4.31  Alisa Andrasek and her ‘creature’ during installation of the bifi d project at the KSA Gallery, Ohio State University. 
4.32  biothing, poli::mat – “a genetically designed surface system proposed for MOMA PS1 Warm Up series as a poly-use accessory. It’s variable 
patterns are derived through computational algorithms by scripting relationships of speed distribution through the cellular fi eld. Higher number 
of speed increases intricacy of a pattern, while decreases depth of surface.” 
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around the idea that the aesthetic power of biothing’s projects is integral 
to this mutual affectivity,53 a property that was also constitutive of Ryan’s 
and Snooks’ swarm fi elds and rendered very explicit in Podborsek’s surfaces 
of negotiation. 
The ‘Emergence and Design Group’ and their recent AD publication, 
Emergence: Morphogenetic Design Strategies, has taken the growing 
interest in emergence and design to an even more explicit level. The 
publication offered a very useful probing into the potential of emergence 
for design practice. Both Lars Spuybroek and this group draw signifi cantly 
on the work of Frei Otto, who exemplifi es a focus on embedding structural 
behaviour into processes of emergent form-fi nding. In a sense, this takes 
Le Corbusier’s enthusiasm for the ‘engineer-aesthetic’ through new tools 
and techniques. These issues are enormously interesting and, I believe, 
hold great as yet unrealised potential.
This thesis, however, approaches the subject with a different question 
in mind: what do design processes modelled on emergence imply for the 
ethico-aesthetic know-how of architectural practice? 
A compelling dimension of all the examples given above, is the strong 
sense of vitality they present us with. There is a powerful sense of event 
in which a balance is struck between the out-of-control and intricate 
precision. But this ‘balance’ is less between them, than vitally overfl owing 
and encapsulating them both. 
The focus across this fi eld of work tends to be almost exclusively on 
the details pertaining to process, where the outcome, in all its quivering 
vitality, ‘simply’ emerged. There are some exceptions to this, most notably 
in Greg Lynn’s early work, where he set up the ‘animate’ as an explicit 
target. In the acts to follow, the manner with which Lynn’s practice dealt 
with this target is explored for what it can be seen to indicate about the 
broader fi eld of processual architecture. 
53.  Ednie-Brown (2006a).
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7. The contemporary confl ict
In the patterns perceived across the earlier historical examples related to 
emergence and composition theory, there was always some kind of confl ict 
that these theories acted to mediate, through establishing a shared ground 
of negotiation. If this is a pattern that is being repeated in contemporary 
architecture, how might we see the nature of the related confl ict? 
Despite the quite intensive and diverse academic research into 
architectural design process that has occurred through processual 
architecture, any reciprocal or related work on the nature or assessment 
of design products have remained, at best, peripheral. It is not that the 
products of architecture have not been discussed, ad infi nitum, but that 
the relationship between a studied articulation of process and the nature 
of the outcome is a stunningly rare discussion. 
The recent doctoral thesis on architectural composition by Shane Murray 
(2004), opens such a discussion and suggests something of the confl ict 
being grappled with in the revived attention to composition. His research 
explored the disjunction between the actuality of design process and its 
discursive authorisations, setting out to demonstrate a closure of this gap 
through accounts of his own architectural design work and his approach to 
composition. Murray comments that “much architectural execution relies 
on compositional procedures that have direct historical precedent within 
the history of architectural composition but that these are rarely, if ever, 
disclosed.”54  Murray is very critical of the tendencies of design discourse 
to call upon authorizations that are not embedded in the actuality of their 
process. Addressing architectural discourse of the past 20 or 30 years, 
Murray comments that:
“what has actually taken place is a substantial change in the discourse and pre-
design investigation that surrounds architectural production that still however 
avoids or is unable to account for what is entailed in architectural composition. 
It can still be observed that discourse, including new forms of analysis, act as 
authorising or legitimising agents rather than attempting to actually inquire into 
what we do as architects.54
Murray’s is not an attempt to articulate a set of rules or principles that 
can be generalized for the use of designers in general. Rather, he points to 
the ‘signature’ of the designer (or offi ce) as the basis of a compositional 
practices, and highlights the manner in which this is realized (in the double 
sense of being both developed and understood), through engagements with 
54.  Murray (2004), p3.
54.  Ibid, p18
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contingency: site, architectural culture and architectural expression.54   For 
Murray, it is with an understanding of what a particular “formal language” 
does that opens the path to a more productive integration between the 
actuality of design process and the nature of the design product. 
Murray’s turn back toward architectural composition as a subject 
of discussion occurs as another instance in which a desire to connect 
divergences or temper the fall of a transcendent authority enters the 
scene. In this case the fl ailing authority was philosophy and critical theory, 
which enjoyed a peculiarly authoritative status in the 1980s and 90s. A big 
shift in this status was marked by the fi nal issue of Assemblage, published 
in 2000. The editors, Michael Hays and Alicia Kennedy, make an emphatic 
point that:
“The end of Assemblage has nothing to do with the end of theory…Rather, the 
transitional moment means that theoretical activity achieves a new excitement 
and urgency. We hear the antitheoretical rants to be sure, and, oddly enough, 
coming from deep within the theoretical camp.”55  
Sure enough, this last edition, a collection of one (sometimes two) 
page contributions from those who had been published in Assemblage 
over the years, is riddled with references to, celebrations of and discussion 
regarding ‘the end of theory’. It is interesting to note here that this edition 
also publishes Greg Lynn’s story, ‘A New Style of Life’, to be discussed here 
in Act 7, which in itself is an enactment of a turn away from theory toward 
different kinds of writing. Hayes and Kennedy, while rejecting the fi nality 
of ends, do promote the idea that the work of theory ”now demands new 
formats, new styles, new modalities.”56  This is reiterated in the last essay, 
and fi nal word, of the edition by Robert Somol, who offers a bitingly sharp, 
provocatively critical and amusing synopsis of architectural discourse at the 
time. He bemoans the stagnation of criticality into increasingly predictable, 
‘end-state’ forms and suggests that both writing and design “under the 
regime of criticality have become commoditized, and it remains for future 
confi gurations to see whether they can be rechannelled to the new economies 
and ecologies of experience and engage new audiences.”57   Both this 
doctoral research and Murray’s recent thesis are, in part, responses to this 
‘falling out’ of critical theory and an attempt to establish some new ground 
and fresh forms of consensus. In Melbourne, the research community at 
RMIT’s School of Architecture and Design have given signifi cant attention 
to models of research by practice. This has notably occurred through Peter 
Downton’s publications on the subject (2003, 2004), through Leon van 
54.  Ibid, p. 161.
55.  Hayes; Kennedy (2000), p. 6.
56.  Ibid, p. 7.
57.  Somol (2000), p. 93.
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Schaik’s practice based postgraduate streams and publications  (2003, 
2005), and Mark Burry’s ‘embedded practice’ doctoral model. What has 
been at stake is ways of integrating theoretical scholarship and research 
through practicing. 
8. The material rupture
“Solidity is the fi rst quality a building must have.”58  (1753)
There is another signifi cant rupture or confl ict that has been at stake in 
this contemporary reappraisal of composition. In a paper I wrote in 1999, 
‘Falling into the Surface’, I drew attention to the confl ict between the 
insistent stasis of buildings and the interest in explicit movement within 
contemporary architectural discourse. Given that buildings have always 
been the artefact that defi nes the discipline of architecture, it seemed 
that: “The foundations of authority upon which architecture has curated 
itself have begun to crack.”58  In foregrounding processes of formation as 
constituting the key properties or defi ning conditions of the architectural 
product, processual architecture might be seen, and has been seen, to be 
either irrelevant to the discipline proper, or throwing that which constitutes 
the discipline into serious question.59  
This was related to a strong sense, coming most loudly from cultural 
theory, that through the use of all these ‘virtual realities’ (meant to be 
largely synonymous with digital technologies), we were somehow becoming 
disembodied. It was becoming clear that a reappraisal of what counted as a 
‘body’ and as material reality was required. Again, I am arguing here, that 
the key to establishing a shared ground of negotiation between the stasis 
of buildings and the movements of process, between the physical actuality 
of bodies and the intangibility of ‘virtual worlds’, lies in the abstract but 
embodied reality of affect. 
58.  Laugier (1977), p68.
58.  Ednie-Brown (1999), p8
59.  see Ostwald (2004)
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Act 5.  Expression and the process of formation
138
Act 5 explores the behavioural tendencies outlined in the previous act in more detail 
and with a closer, more involved attention. This allows me to set out some key qualities 
and relations that shape these tendencies within processes of formation. This pertains to 
both the process of forming an object and forming a perception of it.  
Initially I turn to the work of Greg Lynn and his aims for ‘animate form,’ drawing them 
through and against a range of other material in order to fl esh out the aesthetic implications 
therein. This involves a discussion of how my sculptural project, the Animate Casts, helped 
me think through both the process of generating animate form and the expressive nature 
of formal outcomes. Heinrich Wölffl in’s theory of architectural expression and style is 
then recast into a model of behavioural tendencies within processes of production. Here 
there is a juxtaposition of standard and non-standard processes, the later of which is 
implicit to the Animate Casts and Lynn’s process technique. This recasting occurs through 
giving particular attention to the role Wölffl in gives to ornament in expression and the 
production of style. In short, behavioural tendencies within processes of formation are 
highlighted and explored as having particular relevance to the mode of composition that 
this thesis aims to articulate.  
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1. Animated Forms 
1.1 Perception, form and formation
Despite the fact that processes of emergence have been discussed 
within recent architectural discourse, the relevance of emergence to the 
aesthetic nature of a still-standing object is a mute topic. Something akin 
to the scientifi c struggle with emergence is also found in architecture. This 
becomes particularly clear in architectural design studios that focus on 
generative, emergent process where the highly engineered and intricately 
articulated process leads to an aesthetic outcome about which very little, 
it seems, can be said. Something seems to be missing. The less articulable 
movements that pertain to aesthetic judgement seem to be passed over 
in favour of the more explicit actions as formally articulated in processual 
design systems. 
The focus on intricate studies of generative process, in both scientifi c 
inquiry into models of emergence and related areas of design discourse, 
is inseparable from the fact that emergent phenomena are intrinsically 
processual. But this does not mean that the products of emergent processes 
are not relevant to the analysis of those processes. What seems to be 
missing is a deeper consideration of the processual nature of perception 
and the way in which these products are processual as well. This issue has 
been touched upon in Part 1 through amodal perception and came to bear 
in the discussion about ways in which we might perceive a circle.
William James offers a related useful illustration: 2 x 3 = 6. There is 
a difference, he insists, between 2 x 3 and 6. They are not tautological: 
they do not repeat the same meaning. One is a process and the other is 
its issue. However, linking them together does matter, as the number 6 is 
an issue (a form or character) that can be understood through the process 
of formation: 2 x 3. It could, however, also be understood as 2 + 2 + 2: 
a different process of formation and a different patterning of action. Any 
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time we write or read the number 6 it is backgrounded by processes of 
understanding, associations, memories etc: the processes through which 
we know and imagine that number. The nature of those processes, their 
patterning or texture, is tied up with the affective resonance that the issue 
(or number) has for us. 
The baldness of a number printed on a page enters the same stories 
as the circle and the line: some things encourage a sense of background 
eventfulness more than others. When a thing presents us with a strong 
or explicit expression of the situated conditions involved in its process of 
formation it fl ips a sense of processuality into its stillness. John Holland 
touched on this distinction in relation to games: “board games, unlike 
numbers in their raw form, capture the dynamic of unfolding actions 
and their consequences.”1 The board game becomes an event-based 
manifestation of what Lynn was after: the capturing of unfolding dynamic 
of motions and forces. An object or a form is not as explicitly temporal 
or processual as a board game, but they will always be more than their 
formal static being. They will be part of dynamic, unfolding actions. How to 
produce form that powerfully encourages a sense of this dynamic becomes 
a key question in striving, for instance, for ‘animate form’. 
1.2. Animate Form; Greg Lynn and Capturing Life in Form
“The very laws of proportion and style that held together the schemata of beauty 
together in past centuries may have served this additional aim of preventing too 
much life from entering the artist’s creations.”2
 “..the function of design in the visual arts is to imbue inanimate objects with 
the qualities of life…[where] enshrined in each unit is enshrined a sensitive spirit 
which animates it and controls its disposition”3    
Amidst the relationships between aesthetics, design composition and 
emergence, developed over the past decade in processual architecture, 
Greg Lynn’s Folding in Architecture and Animate Form can still be regarded 
as key moments in setting the stage of this arena. Following the brief 
survey of the fi eld of processual architecture in the previous Act, I will now 
turn back to Lynn and to a more detailed examination of the crucial issue 
of vitality and the animate that Animate Form bought to the foreground. 
1.    Holland (1998), p. 203.
2.  Gombrich (1959), p. 289.
3.  Edwards (1945), p. 27.
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Certainly, his emphasis on the ‘animate’ immediately links his work 
to composition and aesthetics. The quote above from Trystan Edwards 
is but one example in an extensive history of the idea that the act of 
architectural design can be associated with the act of creating life. The 
beautiful and vitality (or the living) have long been parcelled together. 
Animate Form can be seen as a rephrasing of that history as it meets with 
digital technology. In the fi nal sentence of the opening essay he writes: “If 
there is a single concept that must be engaged due to the proliferation of 
topological shapes and computer-aided tools, it is that in their structure as 
abstract machines, these technologies are animate.”4 
What it means for a technology to be 
‘animate’ is not something about which he 
is entirely clear. He does state that “animate 
design is defi ned by the co-presence of motion 
and force at the moment of formal conception.”5
 He also takes the care to distinguish, from 
the outset, between ‘animation’ and ‘motion’: 
“While motion implies movement and action, 
animation implies the evolution of a form and 
its shaping forces: its suggests animalism, 
animism, growth, actuation, vitality and 
virtuality.”6 In other words, while motion 
implies moving action, animation implies life 
or liveliness as an evolving infolding of the 
actual and the virtual, matter and force. This 
would seem to be a distinction between the 
mechanics of life and the force of life, the later 
being a more complex, energetic and spiritual 
notion. The implicit claim of Lynn’s book is that digital technologies enable 
us to capture motion and force in architectural form and that this capture 
makes it animate. 
The general technique he offered in this book can be sketched out 
as follows: using the force simulation capacities of animation software, a 
fi eld of forces and infl uences are set up to affect an initial form, which has 
been assigned with properties of its own. Often the form is a collection of 
‘primitives’ (spheres, rectangular prisms, cylinders etc) that are signifi cantly 
deformed by these forces. These ‘forms’ are actually skins: fi lms of 
data defi ning an area of calculated, Cartesian space that are elastically 
4.  Lynn (1999), p41
5,  Ibid, p11
6.  Ibid, p9
5.01  Greg Lynn, Henie Onstad installation design animations.
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deformed as part of a matrix or complex of simulated forces. They bend, 
twist and bulge in response to otherwise invisible infl uences, a little like 
watching a body dancing to silent music. It is these invisible forces and 
dancing motions involved in the deformation of the ‘primitive’ that are, 
supposedly, embodied in the fi nal outcome. However, an understanding of 
how this embodied capture might occur is not self-evident in the projects 
themselves, nor is it addressed in his essay or in the project descriptions. 
A related technique in digital animation is the motion-capture, which 
offers a useful comparison here. In motion-capture techniques, an actual 
body is wired up with location sensors such that its movement can be 
mapped onto a digital model. This saves the animator having to model 
convincing movements, using live capture to circumvent this diffi cult task. 
This process was quite explicitly used by Mark Goulthorpe in his Ether/I 
project (1995) which “is an investigation of motion capturing techniques of 
creative formal production.”7 Here, a form literally traces out a movement, 
in a manner reminiscent of the early nineteenth century experiments of 
Etienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard Muybridge, as Goulthorpe discusses.8 In 
this mode of motion-capture, movements over time (gestures) accumulate 
into a form. Form ‘captures’ movement by being a trace of it. 
A more technically inventive and complex project that involves a 
tracing of movement is The Streaming House (2002) by Minifi e Nixon. 
This speculative project involved running the frame sequence of video/
fi lm through medical imaging software that computes 3D forms (of bones, 
organs etc) out of a series of 2D body scans (Fig 5.04). Using a video 
sequence of a looped path through Mies van der Rohe’s Barcelona Pavilion 
(Fig 5.05), the frames of this sequence (Fig 5.06) were stacked up like a 
series of body scans (Fig 5.07). A series of identifi able object types (fl oor, 
ceiling, columns, sky, walls) were ‘skinned’ across the frames, after which 
the strip was bent back (Fig 5.08) to re-enact the circulation loop of the 
camera path (Fig 5.09),  producing a donut shaped house form. 
Like Ether/I, the house traces out and captures a passage of movement 
in form, but rather than drawing on a physical gesture, it transforms a 
visual registration of the movement through a building into a building 
(albeit a highly speculative one). It enacts a cunning twist on the modernist 
tendency to use circulation diagrams as generative. The Streaming House 
employs both circulation movements through space and the capturing of 
sequential movements across time. Via video camera, the visual perception 
of a body walking along a looped path is stacked, into slices of time, to 
then be reformed into a very strange and compelling after image that one 
can walk around and appreciate from any angle. 
7.  Goulthorpe (1998).
8.  Ibid.
5.02  Mark Gouthorpe, Ether/I (1995). 
5.03  Etienne-Jules Marey, description of 
curvilinear continuity across snapsots.
5.02
5.03
5.04  3D image of head compiled through 2D 
scans.
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5.05 Diagram of movement path through the Barcelona Pavilion through to circular form of the The Streaming House.  5.06 Image frames from the video path 
through a digital model of the Barcelona Pavilion.  5.07 Image frames from video stacked into a linear sequence.  5.08 Stacked images scanned into 3D form and 
bent around into donut.  5.09 Plan section of fi nal house form.
5.05
5.06
5.085.07
5.09
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There are many ways of thinking and appreciating this design act. It 
could be felt as somewhat like a formal incarnation of visual perception 
seen by a third eye, operating independently of time and space (a super 
awareness eye). Or, it makes a radical, formal objectifi cation of the visual 
perception involved in movement and presents it as piece of architecture. 
Or, it burrows into perspectival depth-in-movement such that it is radically 
fl attened before acquiring an entirely new depth. The nature of that depth? 
You can turn around to see the edges of all you saw still there, relentlessly 
stacked up and skinned behind your back. Certainly, this project operates, 
almost surgically, on the constructions of visual perception and the 
Cartesian model of form and space, twisting and grafting them together 
in such a way that, at least potentially, enacts a perceptual, conceptual 
and experiential twist. This topological reconfi guration of constructs of 
experience might be argued to be one clever technique through which to 
twist the animate into form, but it certainly is not the technique that Lynn 
promotes. 
In these examples from Goulthorpe and Minifi e, a passage of movement 
is traced out. At fi rst sight, these examples might appear to confi rm the 
assumption that built form can somehow capture motion. But do they 
capture force? Is this perhaps a key to the difference between ‘tracing’ 
and ‘capturing’? For Lynn, the issue of force is largely about the nature 
of space as a force-fi lled dynamic that is inseparable from matter and its 
forms, rather than the dialectical counterpart of form. He proposes that 
the design space of the animation/simulation software offers architectural 
design process “a conceptual fi eld populated by forces and motion” in 
juxtaposition to the idea that architecture is a static entity in empty, 
Cartesian space, where “movement is something added back to the object 
by the viewer.”9 In other words, force is a property of matter, not something 
added or taken away from it. 
For Ether/I and The Streaming House, it might seem that continuous 
movement need not be added back by the viewer, because a temporal 
passage of movement is literally, formally traced out. But once the trace 
of something that has passed has been fi xed in form, would it necessarily 
be perceived as such? A line formed by the path of an ink nozzle in a 
printer does not tend to be perceived as the trace of movement that it 
most certainly is. It is simply a line; an object. However, like the circle 
discussed in act two, the line can be perceived in terms of infi nite potential 
movements involved in its engagements in the world; of past, present and 
future. But the line itself doesn’t necessarily encourage a sense of this 
moving fi eld of connection. For movement or a process of formation to 
9.  Lynn (1999), p. 13.
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be amplifi ed within the sense of the object itself, something more needs 
to occur. By contrast, if a table, being carelessly carted down a passage 
way, gauges a line into the wall with one of its legs as part of a particular 
‘passage of movement’, that line would very likely be perceived in terms 
of some past event: it embodies both motion and force and, by Lynn’s 
defi nition, is an instance of animate design. If we think of a similarly forceful 
gesture through which, say, charcoal makes a lively mark on a page, the 
‘liveliness’ of the inscription cannot be simply relayed into an architectural 
design project without many stages of translation and, ultimately, radical 
transformation. This is also the case for forms generated via simulation 
software. Trace the line and move it into another place, context and media 
and its eventfulness will only come with it via a very careful attention to 
crucial relations, ones akin to Stern’s ‘vitality affects’.
In both the Ether/I and the Streaming House examples, the nature of 
the objects themselves do encourage the sense of some kind of active 
past or forceful event that generated them. In no way do they necessarily 
point back to the particular process through which they formed, but only 
to a general sense of something having happened. If approached with 
no knowledge of the generative technique, it would take a miraculous 
act of code breaking to back-track the sequence of moves that led to the 
Streaming House. Similarly, Ether/I does not say “traced movement of 
dancers body” in any direct way. What matters is the sense of a history 
rather than a knowledge of a specifi c history. The potential to unravel 
that history through, for instance, accounts of the design processes in 
publications, operates as an embedded depth.  
5.10  Mark Goulthorpe, Ether/1 (1995). 5.11  Minifi e Nixon, The Steaming House (2002-3).
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Clearly both Minifi e and Goulthorpe intended for there to be a strong 
sense of movement as part of the outcomes. If we look at primary 
representations of each, in both cases motion is accentuated in the image, 
through either motion blurring or highlighting the slippage/doubling of 
form. The rhetoric of the motion capture is clear. 
Lynn uses a fi eld of forces to generate a passage of movement (ie. an 
animation). Strictly, he doesn’t adopt a tracing technique, at least in terms 
of the process of formal conception. Rather, an instance of the passage 
becomes the outcome. But in extracting an instance he is suggesting 
that the animate qualities of those motions and forces are inherently 
captured. 
A detailed exploration of Lynn’s techniques, discussed in subsequent 
acts, became necessary because the presentation of the projects in Animate 
Form certainly don’t illuminate the claimed connection between process 
and outcome, as the projects of Minifi e and Goulthorpe do more clearly. 
The quite extensive theoretical paper that opens Animate Form does not 
discuss any of his projects directly. The rest of the book operates as a 
catalogue of projects, each presented though a large number of fi gures 
and a single paragraph of explanatory text. This sharp division between 
the essay and the projects makes the connection between them more 
than a little diffi cult and is quite at odds with the position he takes in the 
essay regarding the inseparability of architectural form and the dynamic 
space of infl uences in which it is produced. One would assume that the 
ideas discussed in the essay where part of that fi eld of force and infl uence 
in which the projects were made, even if the ideas where more felt than 
argued within the act of designing.
These blanks, gaps and inconsistencies in Lynn’s work left me both 
unsatisfi ed and even more curious. How do we ‘capture’ movement in 
form? How do we make things that feel vital and enlivening? It felt as if 
something unspeakable was blocking the potential of what he, and others 
in the fi eld at the time, were doing. 
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1.3 Animated Casts; an analogue anology
In the midst of my early thinking about the use of 3D software as part of 
design practice and, particularly, the modes of generating form promoted 
by Lynn, I produced a series of plaster casts of deformed shower taps that I 
called the turn on. These were produced through pouring liquid plaster into 
a latex mould. In doing this, I actively encouraged the mutable properties 
of the latex to allow the tap shape to be deformed. This produced a variety 
of different casts from the same mould: a variational series. These were 
exhibited in a group show at the Perth Institute of Contemporary Art in 
1998. Later, in 2000, I repeated the process with some small bottles, that 
I called the party. Together, all these castings cluster under the general 
name of the Animated Casts. 
This casting exercise began as an analogue exploration into the qualities 
that computer software offers to the modelling process. I was intrigued by 
the fl uid, elastic deformability of digital models and wanted to explore the 
act of working with these properties. The fl uid state of unset latex and 
plaster coupled with the elasticity of latex skins together seemed to have 
an affi nity with the fl uid and elastic capacities of modelling and animation 
software. Being prior to having developed any signifi cant animation 
software skills myself, I turned to this analogous, analogue procedure.
I began with the liquid latex, brushing it on to all sorts of surfaces in 
and around my living environment, becoming more and more fascinated 
by the degrees of precision with which the texture of those surfaces were 
embedded in the latex skins I subsequently peeled off. For a while, I just 
studied textures and surface reliefs, collecting a large number of textured 
latex skins. Brush marks and other material particularities of surfaces (air 
bubbles, lifted surface dirt) became part of the new life of each texture. 
Removed from its source, lifted off the material situation through which 
it came into being, these textures took on a deathly life of their own, like 
ghosts.  
5.12  Pia Ednie-Brown, The Turn On (1998) 5.13  Pia Ednie-Brown, The Party (2000)
5.14  Pia Ednie-Brown, Latex texture studies 
(1997)
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When I moved on to make a mould of an object with the latex, my 
attention shifted. In order to pull the latex skin off an object, it must be 
topologically the same as a plane or sheet. The outside of a teacup, for 
instance, won’t work, because you can’t pull the mould off the handle 
without cutting the latex skin. The tap form was fi rst chosen because it 
was of this order10: an object that offered a surface from which a skin 
could be pulled off in one piece. I found myself, virtually involuntarily, 
seeing the things around me in terms of their surface properties, analysing 
the continuity of surfaces.
The two dimensions of texture and surface continuity were joined with 
other material differentiations. The latex never went on entirely evenly in 
terms of thickness and when it came to pouring the plaster, thinner areas 
gave in more to the pressure of the plaster. 
Thinking back to the digital skins of Animate Form, these latex surfaces 
have embedded qualities that a set of point data describing a volume in 
Cartesian space does not. The latex skin acted to carry the traces of a past 
engagement (with the tap in my shower) into it’s role as a manipulable 
shape for the plaster with which it negotiated a cast. This elastic skin 
became a primary register of the dynamic relations between all of the 
forces and matters engaged in the process.
The resulting casts arise out of the coalescing involution of a myriad of 
relations within plaster, mutable latex form and the environmental armature 
that I prodded and tweaked. Forms emerged through an assemblage of 
dynamic interactions, falling into one another in a collaborative agreement 
within an overarching but responsive skin. 
10.  The choice was also infl uenced by the fact 
that I was just playing: doing this at home in 
my spare time without expectations for the 
outcomes other than satisfying curiosity. The 
poignancy of the domestic associations of the 
tap are tied up with this mode of play.
5.16  Dried latex being pulled off a tap (from 
‘The Shower’ project). 
5.15  Transformation of donut to cup: a study in continuity properties of surfaces. This illustration was used 
by Lynn in Animate Form.
5.17  Individual pieces of The Turn On (1998). 
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1.4 The Life and Character of Form
“…what emerges does not conform or correspond to anything outside it, nor 
to its own conditions of emergence. A determination of being is not a tracing. 
Determination is a differing. Emergence is always of the different: every genesis 
is a heterogenesis. A thing’s form does not refl ect its formation. It infl ects it.”11
It was immediately striking that each cast seems expressive of a character 
or mood that differs from each other cast. It could be said that one looks 
depressed, another curious and another leaps joyfully. Others might 
feel them differently and make different associations, but a sense of 
differentiated expression and/or character remains. They could be a group 
of different characters of the same species or a series of postures made by 
the same creature. But one or many, they seem semi-alive, or animate. 
Having arisen, to a signifi cant degree, out of a curiosity for the elasticity 
and fl uidity of digital form making, they offered me a satisfying outcome: 
speaking back quite loudly to Lynn’s Animate Form. They also provoked a 
question about how form can be expressive. 
It has to be acknowledged that we can quite easily afford character to 
a standard tap or bottle – we don’t necessarily need an elaborate process 
of deformation to give them this capacity of seeming ‘life-like’. Children, 
after all, do this all the time – where all manner of objects can assume 
life-like qualities and become part of a whole series of imagined actions. 
Where the vivid imagination of the perceiver imbues the object with virtual 
movement, an animation of, say, a series of household objects coming to 
life, will represent this for us. Either way, something affords the object 
with some kind of movement. The idea that this is all a product of our 
desire to anthropomorphise or to see ourselves in things might suffi ce, but 
this implies that any a life-like quality does not involve properties of the 
thing itself, but only of our perception of the thing. 
11.  Massumi (2002b), pp xxxii-xxxiii
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An aspect of the ‘character-like’ qualities of the casts seem to act 
through a sense that every modulation operates in accord with every 
other; all swept into an integrated set of gestures or a posture. In other 
words, there seemed to be something embodied by the nature of the 
forms here, rather than just a perception applied to them. Like the account 
of the circle and the way in which a line may or may not encourage a sense 
of its process of formation, different objects will tend to provoke a sense 
of processuality to varying degrees. Perception does not occur purely in 
the human subject, it occurs in the entanglement of the perceiver and 
perceived. The casts are not a blank or a nothing – they participate in the 
perception.
But this participation is not simply about the nature of the form, either, 
because the way in which they might be placed or situated has an affect. 
Their naming and designation as sculptural works, their exhibition in a 
gallery, their display on my lounge room wall all infl ect their ‘meaning’. 
The title given to the taps, ‘the turn on’, was a quiet joke for me. Taps, 
in their usual state, can be turned on and off. Plaster casts of them can’t 
function in this way, but the modulated state of the casts ‘turned them on’ 
in another way. They were banal objects aroused, stimulated by a process 
of deformation. They were a playful attempt to do something similar to 
the digital modulation of form, but through entirely non-digital means. The 
seductive nature of the digital animation, which had enormous rhetorical 
power in discourse at the time, was shifted into another kind of ‘turn on’: 
form turned into its own deformation. As much as this naming faintly 
amused me at the time, it is not a trivial component of the piece. It forms a 
looping of mutual affect between the signifi cation of the name, the nature 
of an important past infl uence, an allusion to discursive infl uences (the 
seductive power of animations) and the expressive actions of the casts 
themselves.  The signifi cance of the work lay in the resonance between 
those aspects. The importance of my moments of quietly laughing to 
myself about this resonance takes on deeper signifi cance in Act 8. 
‘The party’ was more concerned with community, clustering and familial 
relationships. I made them specifi cally for my family one christmas, where 
small clusters of the larger group would be go to live in separate houses, 
while enacting a sense of connection between them.  Bottles are, obviously, 
also objects that usually feature at most parties, holding the alcoholic 
lubricant that social gatherings so often call for. Alcoholic lubrication works 
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to ease the fl ow of communication, relaxing the various participants. It 
de-rigidifi es, just as the latex mould did for the form of the bottle. A 
set of similar actions come to resonate together through a simple act of 
naming.
 Any object is an ongoing occasion in itself that is then always part 
of some other occasion that it participates in making. Its status as a 
perceivable entity, where it is contained enough to be distinct from other 
things in the world, both differentiates it within any occasion and allows 
a sustained participation. They can then be thrown into a series of very 
different occasions: the ‘joke’ of their encapsulating title ‘the turn on’ 
or ‘the party’, their juxtaposition with digital generative animations in 
architecture, their exhibition in a gallery of contemporary art, their act 
as a family gift, their process of making in a domestic environment, their 
forming the basis of a student workshop and seminars, the use of their 
images in lectures, on posters and as course material, their display on the 
lounge room wall of my apartment (and as backdrop to a number of dinner 
parties). They have lived.
I am insisting here that the expression of form is not simply reducible to 
the relative particularities of a perceiver and that the form itself participates 
in the perception. The expressiveness of things is not simply a negotiation 
between a form and the capacities of tendencies of a perceiving subject. It 
5.18  Pia Ednie-Brown, The Party (2000) 5.19  Pia Ednie-Brown, The Party (2000)
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further expands into situation; to a range of immaterial and passing events 
that fold into the equation, as part of the perception. The deformation 
enacted in the casting process is not the fi nal act in which these forms 
are differentially infl ected. Their ongoing ‘cultural’ life continues to infl ect 
them. 
So, if the product of the casting process is not simply a static object, 
what about the process of formation and the experience of making them? 
Is there a connection between the way it was made and the way that the 
formal outcome participates in the world thereafter? As Massumi states 
in the quote at the commencement of this scene: “A thing’s form does 
not refl ect its formation. It infl ects it.”12 The Animate Casts infl ect their 
process of formation because of the degree to which they encourage the 
sense of a process of deformation. This sense, embedded in the nature of 
the forms, becomes further infl ected by their subsequent engagements in 
the world, through naming, display and exhibition etc.
An important infl ection in this context lies in their relation to the digital 
processes I was trying to explore through making them, The very material, 
physical range of infl uences involved in the casting process can be seen 
as roughly analogous to the fi eld of digitally described infl uences in the 
generative technique developed by Lynn. While one may be very analog 
and the other very digital, both of these generative techniques emphasise 
that the process of formation involves a fi eld of dynamic forces that are 
active despite many of their key dimensions or characteristics being more-
or-less invisible. 
This fi eld-based emphasis regarding the process of formation is similar 
to the emphasis being made here regarding the process of perception. 
 Generative processes and the perception of its products lie on two sides 
of a hinge that swings elusively through a fi eld of forces. The role of the 
process of formation in the ongoing life of the formed is surely an important 
issue for the value of all this attention to generative processes. Identifying 
this connection – its behaviours and mechanisms – is a key problem in 
developing our understanding of emergent behaviour and the relationships 
between the bottom-up and the top-down, the micro and the macro. 
The next scene will leap back in history to the late nineteenth century, 
close to a hundred years before Animate Form, to Heinrich Wölffl in’s early 
attempt to address the very question of how form can be expressive. This 
offers another version of the relations between creating and perceiving, 
but arrives at them from a usefully different direction: from expression 
back to form. 
12.  Massumi (2002b), pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
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2. Wölffl in and the Emergence of Expression
2.1 The Impression of Architectural Expression`
How it might be possible for static form (such as buildings) to be expressive, 
was a question that Heinrich Wölffl in implicitly turned to address in 1886, 
in his dissertation, Prolegomena to a Psychology of Architecture. His thesis 
begins with the question: “How is it possible that architectural forms are 
able to express an emotion or mood?” This impression we receive, he 
writes, is understood as the expression of the object. How it might be 
that architecture could express moods required a conceptual structure for 
the transmission of feeling. Empathy was the psychological concept that 
he, amongst a range of others at the time, used to allow for a mapping of 
feeling between body and building.
Wölffl in notes that most theories regarding the issue of emotional tone, 
form and style have limited themselves to visual properties. But, he insists, 
the impressions of the eye are not enough to explain the expressive nature 
of form. Rather, he turns to the whole body in dealing with this impression, 
coupling it with the claim that “we understand only what we ourselves can 
do.”13 Expression in music, for instance, is only understood in relation to 
how we ourselves express through the sounds of our voices. Architecture 
as formed matter, is expressive to the extent that we express with our own 
bodies: “Physical forms possess a character only because we ourselves 
possess a body.”14 The issue becomes one of full-bodied empathy, wherein 
we judge the expression of form according to the state they induce in us 
via a sympathetic response; we mimetically feel the formal stance of the 
building through our encounter with it. 
For Wölffl in, “Expression is not, so to speak, a banner that is hung out 
in order to show what is going on inside, it is not something that could just 
as well be absent. Expression is, rather, the physical manifestation of the 
mental process.”15 He takes this imbrication further by recognising that 
13.  Wölffl in (1994), p151.
14.  Ibid.
15.  Ibid, p155.
5.21  Heinrich Wölfflin.
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the physical expression in turn affects the psychological experience: “As 
soon as one imitates the expression of an emotion, one will immediately 
begin to experience the emotion. To suppress the expression is to suppress 
the emotion. Conversely, the emotion grows the more one gives in to it 
by expressing it.”16 Wölffl in sets up expression as a kind of circuit where 
feelings, operating simultaneously through mental and physical processes, 
fold from the outside into an inside, whereupon it grows and folds out 
again. The transmission of feeling between bodies and buildings occurs 
through expression as a processual loop that operates as an intensifi cation 
and amplifi cation device. 
While Wölffl in discusses the imitation of emotion, we can take a step 
deeper into the loop, breaking into the categorical blocks of emotion by 
moving attention toward affect. Linking Wölffl in’s ideas of expression back 
to the terms discussed in Part 1, ‘imitating an expression’ can be recast 
as an affect attunement, as discussed by Stern in terms of vitality affects. 
I would argue that this is, in fact, closer to what Wölffl in was getting 
at in that, as Stern wrote, “imitation renders form, attunement renders 
feeling.” In the act of an emotion ‘growing,’ vitality affects are intensifi ed 
and infl ected by the particular subject through which they are felt and 
expressed. Rather than the being of imitation, there is a becoming through 
expression.17 Expression intensifi es and infl ects, where full-bodied affects 
are keyed into attunements with the vitality affects of surrounding bodies 
and things. The transmission of affect links things into a fi eld that is shaped 
by waves of recastings and bursts of amplifi cation that modulate patterns 
and rhythms of affective movement. The ‘life of form’ and the question of 
how architecture expresses mood is part of a fi eld of dynamic relations or 
a textured fi eld of affect. 
The character of the form’s ‘life’ is built up through the refrains or 
variational patterns that course through the repeated recastings in the 
circuits of expression. Wölffl in calls this the ‘force of form’ [Formkraft] that 
he positions as the principle theme of architecture: “The force of form is 
not only the opposite of gravity (a vertically acting force) but is also that 
which creates life - a vis plastica.”18 This formative force “comes from 
within rather than from without, like a creative will that fashions its own 
body.” One might call this ‘creative will’ the character of the form. 
One of the more important aspects of the force of form is that it 
connotes a sense of the form’s coherence or what holds-it-together into a 
recognisable entity such that it can be felt to express mood and character. 
This doesn’t reside purely in the object but in the tendencies that arise 
through its engagements. 
16.  Ibid, p. 155.
17.  The distinction between imitation and 
becoming has been extensively discussed 
by Gilles Deleuze and, more recently, Brian 
Massumi. For an outline of these ideas see: 
Brian Massumi (1992).
18.  Wölffl in (1994), p. 160.
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Puppetry offers a useful image with which to illustrate the operations 
of the force of form. Puppets manage to convey a sense of their character 
through a general quality of movement that pervades all their actions. 
With no variations of facial expression available and their bodies made 
largely of infl exible, mechanical parts, a quality of movement such as, 
for instance, fl oppiness, jerkiness or fl oatiness, pervades the various 
actions of the puppet. In other words, tendencies that infl ect and infuse 
the activation contours shaping the various movements of the puppet 
collaboratively coalesce an overall form of feeling. The character of these 
actions comes ‘from within’ via the guiding hands of the puppeteer, but the 
actions are only ever enacted through engagements, whether this is with 
other puppets or simply with gravity. This character or form of feeling in 
the actions of the puppet can be likened to the force of form in buildings. 
Buildings or static forms don’t move in themselves, but as I have explored 
at some length, formal arrangements can variously suggest a sense of 
eventfulness and a quality of expression in our perceptual engagements 
with it; the ‘life of form’ and the question of how architecture expresses 
mood is part of a fi eld of dynamic relations or a textured fi eld of affect. 
These dynamic relations can be seen as akin to the behaviours we can see 
more emphatically through puppetry. The intelligible will or character that 
constitutes the force of form arises through collaborating infl ections in the 
contouring of its actions. 
While this point is more diffi cult to discern in his model of expression, 
in that he suggests that this force “comes from within,” the signifi cance of 
engagements with forces outside of the object is built into his attention to 
the role of style, which I will now discuss.
157
2.2 Ornament, Style and Sensibility
“The inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted 
by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if a ship 
were a folding of the sea.” 19
Robin Evans has drawn attention to the mystical tone to some of Wölffl in’s 
assumptions: 
“The sense that Wölffl in claimed to make of these buildings was derived directly 
from the architectural forms themselves. There was more than a hint of divination 
in his descriptions… Wölffl in’s formalism, far from being abstract and desiccated, 
was almost mystical in the degree to which true expression was seen to shine 
through stones.”20
The mystical arises through the invisibility of connection between bodies 
and buildings, the animate and inanimate, where the operations through 
which empathy – or attunement – occur remain a mystery. Behaviours 
seem to rise out of an invisible sea, appearing as if by magic. This is where 
theories of affect become so useful because, as Stern emphasises: “They 
concern how a behaviour, any behaviour, all behaviour is performed, not 
what behaviour is performed.”21  This is not only pertinent to theories of 
architectural affect, but also to the mysteries of emergence. If the key 
to a stronger model of emergence lies in a model of creative process, 
Stern’s fundamental domain of subjectivity, formed through the operations 
of affect, offers the mechanisms of that key.
The mysteries of emergence resonate with the mysticism of which 
Wölffl in has been accused. In turn, this resonance acts to illuminate some 
of the problematics lacing Lynn’s work. Wölffl in’s account of how form 
expresses mood and emotion is tantamount to being endowed with life 
or, in Lynn’s terms, being animate. In other words, Lynn’s ‘animate’ can 
be equated with Wölffl in’s ‘expression’. If vitality affects lie at the basis 
of  the operations of expression, equating expression and the animate 
is reinforced by Stern’s defi nition of vitality affects as “those dynamic, 
kinetic qualities of feeling that distinguish animate from inanimate.”22 If 
expression shone mystically through Wölffl in’s stones, the animate shone 
unaccountably through Lynn’s screen to then, as I will discuss in the next 
act, wobble with uncertainty as it attempted to fold out and into a building 
through which it could shine on. 
19.  Deleuze (1988), p. 97.
20.  Evans (1995), p. 4.
21.  Stern (2000), p. 157.
22.  Ibid, p. 156.
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Basking in alternatively named but analogous divine lights, each gazed 
in different directions. Lynn follows the path of forces becoming impressed 
into form, while Wölffl in primarily traces out how form impresses its forces 
into us. But as much as Wölffl in primarily considers how form is expressive, 
he does touch upon the question of how form is impressed, through which 
he and Lynn make contact and we can start to assemble a fl eshier diagram 
of the loopings of expression. Together, they complete the circuit by fi lling 
in the feedback loop. One might call it ‘viciously circular’ like Bedau did of 
strong emergence.
As much as Wölffl in’s ‘force of form’ must come “from within”, he makes 
a point of linking this with the more external infl uences of cultural forces, 
where the character of place and time fashions the way in which the form 
is modulated. Wölffl in’s prolegomenous conclusion commented that within 
the movements of his era, the weighty forms of buildings where too slow 
to respond quickly to rapid fl uctuations of sentiment and too big to engage 
with every minute change of the fi eld. These problems of speed and scale 
gradually infected the larger forms of architecture with an alienation, 
where: “The individual forms continue to be used without understanding; 
they are falsely applied and thus completely deprived of life.”23 Implicitly 
here, life is embedded in form through its capacity to respond to and 
resonate with contemporary sentiment, or the surrounding mood. 
The problem of life-deprived form is relieved when turning toward the 
minor or decorative arts. It is with the lines of ornament, lettering and so 
on, that Wölffl in fi nds the “pulse of the age” being sensitively mapped:24
“Here the sense of form satisfi es itself in the purest way, and here also 
the birthplace of a new style has to be sought.”25 However, this cannot, 
he insists, work by separating the action of ornament from the overall 
form. Rather, they must be explicitly knitted together where, for instance, 
“all the fi reworks of Gothic ornament were possible only because of the 
enormous excess of force of form over matter. Ornament is the blossoming 
of a force that has nothing more to achieve.”26 For Wölffl in, ornament is no 
less important than the structural, physical forces of an architectural body, 
becoming “an expression of excessive force of form”27 or, in other words, 
an excessive living impulse. If the “birthplace of a new style” is to be found 
at this scale of action, the implication is that it should feed into (and out 
of) other scales, ushering otherwise alienated big and slow actions into 
play with sensitive pulsation. The emergence of the new involves a total 
becoming, an all-over, over-all coordination of affects. 
23.  Wölffl in (1994) p.185.
24.  He writes: “The pulse of the age then has 
to be felt elsewhere: in the minor or decorative 
arts, in the lines of ornament, of lettering 
and so on.” (1994), p. 185. This notion is 
reiterated in his much later book, Renaissance 
and Baroque, where he again argues that the 
decorative arts are where “formal sensibility 
fi nds an immediate and unchecked outlet, and 
in them that renewal takes place. A new style, 
infact, is always born within the sphere of the 
decorative arts” (1984), p79.
25.  Ibid, p185
26.  Ibid, p.181.
27.  Ibid, p179
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Within this full-bodied idea of architectural expression, there is a tricky 
set of relations at work. On the one hand there is a force or intelligible 
will that comes from within the overall form of a building, with its excess 
of force fl owing over into ornament. On the other hand, this requires 
sensitivity to the external forces of cultural sentiment, without which 
it becomes alienated and ‘deprived of life’. Ornament seems to be the 
interface between the internal and external forces, where the fl owing over 
of the internally gathered force of form can fi nger the pulse of its age, 
adjusting its clothing and eyeliner to meet with the feeling of the day. How 
these internal and external force fi elds become intertwined is a question 
not directly addressed in Wölffl in’s Prolegomena. However, it is hinted at 
in the peripheral margins of his thesis. 
Attached to his declarations regarding the importance of ornament and 
the minor arts, is a footnote in which he takes the care to admit that since 
printing technology has moved lettering away from hand printing into the 
standardized fonts of mechanical techniques, the fl exibility required for 
a sensitive mapping of ‘the pulse of the age’ through lettering has been 
diminished. He writes: “Since we started to print from cast-metal types, 
this easy fl exibility has admittedly disappeared. Today we have become 
accustomed (in standard [German] type) to put Baroque upper case let-
ters in front of Gothic lowercase letters.”28
This backgrounded observation initially reads a little like an apologetic 
concession to an oversight or exception to his claims. But this observation 
is deeply signifi cant here because it draws attention to the technologies 
and techniques of production in the process of formation. The crucial 
implication of his note is that for architecture to avoid becoming “deprived 
28.  Ibid. p. 185.
5.21  Metal cast type. 5.22  Signature.
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of life” (of not being animate), it’s process of formation must be capable 
of responding with supple alacrity to the forces or infl uences in which it is 
situated. How something comes-into-being is involved with the technologies 
of its making. Cast metal types involve quite different force relations within 
the act of being printed to, for instance, the force relations within hand 
written type. The latter involves more sensitivity than the former: the line 
work can waver, wobble and differ in the sweep of its curves or the width 
of the line. A pre-given form, cast in metal and pressed into the page will 
allow for far less sensitivity to contingency within the moment of making. 
This level of responsivity becomes embedded and embodied in the form or 
line-work produced. 
In Wölffl in’s Renaissance and Baroque, he addressed these issues again, 
emphasising that while technical factors may have a part to play in stylistic 
development, they cannot be the cause of a style: “The forms which result 
from technical necessity…can only endure if they fi t into a formal taste 
already previously established.”29 An implication of his statement is that 
the nature of cast-metal type endured and proliferated through printing 
technologies because they were part of a particular kind of sensibility 
or sense-ability: the ability to sense. Rigidly formed things would seem 
to have dulled their ability to be affected by situational variations, while 
sharpening up their ability to hold onto their internally held relations. 
Perhaps, then, what we see mapped in printing technologies from the 
fi fteenth century onwards, is a sensibility pertaining to a fi rmness of being. 
Ornament, whether it takes on the minimal gesture of the whiteness of a 
wall30 or a fl orid, art nouveau balustrade, is an expression of sensibility: 
where the ‘force of form’ meets with and responds to the sentiment of its 
surrounds. 
Sensibility carries or conditions the growth and development of style. 
Wölffl in identifi es  style as the embodiment of sensibility where: “To explain 
a style then can mean nothing more than to place it in its general historical 
context and to verify that it speaks in harmony with the other organs of 
its age.”31 Style rests on the way in which a given form resonates with the 
general sentiment and character, deportments and social composures of 
its age. It is always about the more ‘global’, overall quality, as amodally 
perceived through a fi eld of instances or ‘organs’. Wölffl in believes that 
this fi eld of cultural, situationally dependent forces may or may not be 
sensitively mapped into the forms created within its atmosphere, depending 
on the sensibility at work. If not, the price is potential alienation, similar to 
that discussed via McMahon and Benjamin in Act 1. 
29.  Ibid, p79
30.  For an account of the white wall and 
ornament in modernist architecture, see Wigley 
(1995).
31.  Wölffl in (1984), p79
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33.  Lynn tries to claim that his forms do 
not appeal to an original form or type, being 
a “multi-type”. But each of the processes do 
commence with a basic form (or ‘primitive/s’) 
that is subsequently deformed.
In that discussion, it seemed as if the modern, alienated, distracted 
subject lacked an image of the whole in which to locate itself and feel 
connected to a fi eld beyond itself. But perhaps it is less that the image is 
absent, but that the dominant image is one composed of rigid fragments, 
between which the connections are not necessarily evident. If the image 
is one that does not encourage a sense of eventfulness (as in the stories 
of the circle and the line), the background modulating fi eld through which 
connectedness  operates will tend to be suppressed. 
2.3 Non-Standard Behaviour and the Flexible Mould
For the purposes of this thesis, Lynn’s work plays the role of exemplifying the 
fi eld of processual architecture where his particular sensibility is indicative 
of more than his own specifi c practice. Lynn’s early animations might be 
seen as contagious diagrams that subsequently unfurled in a variety of 
ways through that broader fi eld of research. These were characterised 
by a supple, infl ecting, responsive alacrity. Here, the coming-into-being 
or the emergence of architectural form is imaged as a process with the 
sensitive plasticity that Wölffl in gives to ornamental blossoming.32
A textured fi eld is the background, linking diagram of the analogy I 
have been drawing between the sentiment a cultural milieu as discussed 
by Wölffl in, the fi eld of forces in the digital animation software discussed 
by Lynn and the fi elds of infl uence, both physical and immaterial, that 
I felt my way through in making and working with the Animated Casts. 
Any object is formed within a ‘lived space’: a fi eld of forces or infl uences 
that infi nitely thicken potential in the event of formation. The degrees 
and kinds of sensitivities and perceptual capacities at work in the process 
of formation tempers the involvement that this infi nitely dimensioned 
potential can have within that formative event. With the diagram of the 
textured event fi eld linking the examples discussed here, we can now recast 
Wölffl in’s notion of how style emerges with an attention to the behavioural 
tendencies within that fi eld. This occurs through another linking diagram 
that is lodged in the micro-behaviours of the textured fi eld: the ‘process 
diagram’ of non-standard processes of production. 
In both Lynn’s animations and the animated casts, there is a primary 
surface or skin that envelopes the casting of an object - a digital surface in 
the former and a latex skin the latter. Both deform a given shape enacted 
32.  Certainly, it is clear that digital or 
information technologies are active players in 
architecture’s turn toward animation and the 
animate. However, if we reduce the cause of 
these architectures of animate persuasion 
to their production via digital technologies 
(such as animation software), the actions 
which render this encounter substantial will 
not be heard. The cast-metal types did not, in 
themselves, diminish the fl exibility of lettering. 
They were only one actor in a fi eld of complex 
interaction. The role of the digital bears the 
same status.
5.23-24  Greg Lynn, frames of generative 
animation for the Artists Space Installation 
(1995).
5.24
5.23
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through a fl exible surface. These surfaces are the clearest site in which, like 
ornament, internal and external conditions coalesce. Both skins operate 
as a surface of negotiation.33 The responsiveness of this enveloping skin 
enables it to negotiate a fi nal form through the process of formation.
But in comparing ornamental blossomings with contemporary processual 
architecture there is a scale shift: rather than weighty forms supporting 
the supple, responsive ornament, walls move, bend and twist with an ease 
of fl exibility. The quivering secretions of excessive force through ornament 
seem to have expanded into another scale of action through folding back 
into the force of the form from which it was expressed. If the “birthplace 
of a new style” was to be sought through the plasticity that ornament 
offers, then the stylistic eruption of ‘folding architecture’ would indeed 
seem to have been born from such a plastic place. As such, if we follow 
Wölffl in’s assumptions, these forms manifested a new style because they 
were responsive and sensitive to contemporary sentiment. 
If we think of each of these surfaces as a kind of mould that casts various 
forms, the deformability of these moulds run contrary to primary modes 
of production characterising the industrial age, where standardisation 
aimed to eradicate variation and deformability in the name of effi ciency. 
As with cast-metal type, the rigidly formed cast is relatively indifferent to 
the specifi city of the moment in which it was formed because it’s mould is 
simply not capable of responding. The moulds which shape the taps of our 
bathrooms are not endowed with a fl exibility to be affected by the material 
they set into shape (they have to remain unaffected in order to produce 
another just the same and to ensure that it will function as planned). 
This is effi cient, useful and predictable. Processes of production and their 
outcomes may not contain any surprises but they tend to deliver what 
they promise.
On the other hand, the fl exibly moulded cast is a set up for an element 
of surprise. Where the mould, or that which holds a primary power to 
affect, also retains the power to be affected, it can respond to a diversity 
of infl uence, without loosing its role as the dominant shape giver. It is not 
effi cient, it is not entirely predictable, but it is responsive to particularities 
of the situation. 
At risk of over generalising but for the benefi t of clarity, we can juxtapose 
rigidly formed things as exemplifying processes of standardisation with 
variably or fl exibly formed things as exemplifying non-standard processes. 
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
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These can be understood as two general sensibilities that are less opposed 
to one another than inseparable companions with a long history of tense 
relations. Non-standard processes of production have been the subject 
of much discussion in the midst of architectural explorations of digital 
tools.  Lynn’s work and the Animated Casts are direct explorations of this 
particular sensibility. Wölffl in’s agenda was also implicitly biased in this 
direction. 
I should emphasise that it would be a mistake to say that variable casts 
are expressive while rigidly formed casts are inexpressive. The distinction 
being made cannot be reduced to an on/off or expressive/inexpressive 
dichotomy. Standardised objects are no less expressive of their formation 
than those formed through a situated responsivity or capacity to both 
affect and be affected. Any rigidity or shape determined prior to the act 
of material formation is always felt in the object: a standard shower tap 
expresses its conformity to a pre-given mould. Like, again, the stories of 
the circle, the line, the printed number or letter, objects of these kinds of 
conformity simply don’t tend to encourage a sense of eventfulness. 
The emphasis I am making here is aimed at how to understand the 
virtuosic and performative nature of the product of any such process of 
formation. While standardised processes aim to rigidly produce sameness, 
a non-standard process produces a dynamic consistency. Consistency is 
a property of holding together; it is a coherence or a kind of agreement 
amongst its constituents through which it holds together into some 
recognisable quality that we might call character or style. Any standardised 
object has a consistency that remains uniform across the many instances 
of its reproducibility, presenting a very stable and rigid character. A non-
standard object, on the other hand, has a consistency that is close to 
but not identical to other instances of its series; a dynamic consistency 
emphatically arises across the series, because of the embedded relations 
between repetition and variation, presenting a more volatile or dynamic 
character or style. The non-standard process amplifi es a sense of an 
emergent quality of this kind, which as a ‘product’ is inseparable from the 
multiplicity that creates it and pervasive in that it modulates that very 
multiplicity.
This variation through repetition allows for a feeling of the limits: 
tendencies become clarifi ed through casting them into different conditions. 
The non-standard series highlights something that the standardised series 
5.30-31 Comparison of standard and non-
standard formations.
5.30
5.31
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suppresses; tendency. Any formation needs to move through variation 
in order for rigid limits to loosen into tendencies. With non-standard 
processes of formation, style becomes quite emphatically an accumulation 
of behavioural tendencies. 
The embedded political and social resonances of this behaviourally 
oriented sensibility are implicit to contemporary processual architecture. 
While often seen as a terrain of superfi cial formalism, I would argue 
that there are deeper ethical dimensions being quietly explored. The 
importance of articulating these implicit dimensions lies in opening up 
paths through which to develop upon the broader and deeper value of this 
fi eld of architectural research. 
If style emerges through a global, overall quality felt through multiple 
instances, then the variational series of casts and the series of frames 
produced by an animation, can then also be seen as collaboratively 
producing an overall global quality pertaining to that particular generative 
process. Rather than simply choosing a particular instance from the 
animation or series, there is perhaps more to be gained from discerning this 
global texture in informing the next moves. This point becomes signifi cant 
in the next act, when discussing how one might assess the relationship 
between the qualities or character of Lynn’s animated diagrams and his 
Presbyterian Church project.
5.32  Greg Lynn, machined forms for Alessi coffee set (2000-2003). 5.33   Greg Lynn, renders for Embryological House series.
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Act 6.  Affective Diagrams and the Problem of Translation 
166
Act 6 puts Lynn’s aims to an especially challenging test, by exploring how they have 
survived the sensitive, volatile and diffi cult problem of translation from drawings to 
buildings. This is explored with particular attention to the developments and revisions of 
the idea of the ‘diagram’ in architectural discourse in the late 1990s, where it became, I 
argue, more embedded in the transformational aspects of translation than it had previously 
been. I discuss this revised notion of diagrams as ‘affective diagrams’, a notion that has 
an affi nity with Brian Massumi’s concept of the ‘biogram’, and stands as the basic tool for 
the mode of composition being articulated in this thesis. Through identifying weaknesses 
that become evident through translation, I explore other evidence in an attempt to signal 
areas of design activity requiring attention.
The Act is launched through Robin Evans’ essay, ‘Translation for Drawing to Building’, 
and his detective work regarding Phillipe de l’Orme’s 16th century architectural 
animations and geometrical trickery. Evans reveals a sleight of hand in de l’Orme’s work 
that covers over a disjunction between what he enacted and what he said about that 
design enactment. This points to the qualitative transformations always at work in acts 
of translation, and the cultural tendency to deny them in favour of technical control and 
the neat completeness of rational systems. The discussion of Evan’s essay is used to 
illuminate some related problems in Greg Lynn’s work, where his claims regarding the 
work remain represented rather than more deeply enacted or embodied. This points to 
a blindspot or gap of attention that, at some cost, evades the messier and more volatile 
problem of qualitative transformation.
These problems have a poignant relationship to the intense revision of the ‘diagram’ in 
architectural discourse in the late 90s, where the diagram itself becomes more volatile, 
operating beyond delimitations of critical, ideological or technical control.  After a discussion 
of this discursive revision of the diagram, wherein the focus shifts to ‘affective diagrams’, 
some gaps of attention in Lynn’s design process are brought to the foreground. This is 
done through a juxtaposition of diagramming in the art practice of Francis Bacon with 
the translation between Lynn’s digital animations and his Presbyterian Church project. 
As a way of tracing out the depths of this gap in attention, this gap is located in terms of 
the compositional stance (or posture) adopted by Lynn, evidenced through his writings 
on architecture. This occurs through juxtaposing his writing manner with that of Wölffl in. 
In short, the behavioural tendencies of the designer or author are implicated within 
the processes of formation (and the behavioural tendencies therein) discussed in the 
previous Act.  
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6.01  Greg Lynn, Bucharest urban design competition study using particle animation fl ows to defi ne variable 
densities across site. 
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1. Tricky Translations
Robin Evans opens his book, The Projective Cast, with a note on the manner 
with which geometry is associated with idiocy as much as cleverness. With 
geometry, he writes:
“there is something desperately incommunicative about it, something more than 
a little removed from the rest of experience to set against its giant claim of 
truth. Flaubert … defi nes a geometrician as ‘travelling on strange seas of thought 
- alone.’ And when Joseph Conrad wished to characterise the futile effort of 
concentration made by the earnest but mentally retarded youth Stevie in The 
Secret Agent, he would describe him as ‘seated very good and quiet at a deal 
table, drawing circles, circles, circles; innumerable circles, concentric, eccentric, 
a coruscating whirl of circles that by their tangled multitude of repeated curves, 
uniformity of form, and confusion of intersecting lines suggested a rendering of 
cosmic chaos, the symbolism of a mad art attempting the inconceivable.’ “1
Geometry, obviously, is no stranger to architecture and as Evans suggests 
“all architects will, from time to time adopt the posture of Stevie, looking 
much the same as he when embroiled in the reveries of design work.”2 The 
experience involved in such a posture, however, is very rarely discussed. 
Perhaps the apparent idiocy, or desperately incommunicative withdrawal 
from the rest of experience, is caught up with our inability to offer an 
acceptable account of what occurs in the immersive event of designing. 
It is then only by stepping out of this mode, back into the landscape of 
shared experience and normative social conduct that something clever can 
be said. 
But when we confront a designed artefact, we are often struck by an 
intelligence that seems embedded in the thing itself. Very often, an account 
of the artefact offered by the designer does not live up to a more embedded 
cleverness, one appreciated through a more aesthetic vein - just, it would 
1.  Evans (1995), p. xxv.
2.  Ibid.
6.03
6.02
6.02  Architect and his compass.  
6.03  Jacopo de’ Barbari, Portrait of Fra Luca 
Pacioli with a Young Man (1495).  
6.04   Le Corbusier, The Modular (1950).
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seem, by looking at it. The split between intellectual, verbal knowing and 
inarticulable, embodied knowing has attained an almost ‘natural’ status, 
packaged up neatly but ambiguously in words like ‘beauty’ and ‘intuition’.
In Robin Evan’s paper ‘Translations from Drawing to Building’ he 
unearths and draws attention to an historical instance of a split between 
an architects claims and an actuality of his design process that, it would 
appear, was actively concealed. He does this through a close examination 
of something whose “virtual absence from our account of the making 
of architecture”3 has managed to conceal its “fugitive character”4: the 
drawing. But his examination of the drawing is not concerned so much with 
the thing itself as the part it played within the moves the designer made. 
Evans’s concluding remarks suggests the possibility of writing a history of 
Western architecture that concentrates on the manner of working rather 
than style5 or signifi cation. Such a history, he suggests, would in large 
part “be concerned with the gap between drawing and building. In it the 
drawing would be considered not so much a work of art or a truck for 
pushing ideas from place to place, but as the locale of subterfuges and 
evasions that one way or another get around the enormous weight of 
convention that has always been architecture’s greatest security and at 
the same time its greatest liability.”6 
One of his case studies is the dome of the Royal Chapel at Anet by 
Philibert de l’Orme (1547-52). Evans’ clever detective work reveals a 
blatant untruth in de l’Orme’s claims  regarding the use of a particular 
technology – projective geometry – and the particular technique – of 
parallel projection – in generating the quite spectacular behaviour of this 
dome. The hemispherical dome is patterned with “a net of lines”, Evans 
4.  Ibid.
3.  Evans (1997), p. 175.
5.  Evans use of the word ‘style’ here is 
different to the way in which it is understood in 
this thesis, where style is inseparable from the 
manner of working.  
6.  Ibid, p. 186.
6.07  A block of stone and its trait, from 
Abraham Bosse, La Pratique du trait (1643). 
6.05  Plan and perspective section of the Royal Chapel, Anet. Engraving by J.-A. du Cerceau. 6.06  Dome at Royal Chapel, Anet, by Philibert de 
l’Orme.
170
writes, whose “properties, hard at fi rst to describe in stylistic, geometric or 
structural terms, are directly accessible to vision… The effect is of a coherent 
diffusion and enlargement or, conversely, of concentration, remoteness 
and rotary acceleration towards the lantern.”7 The experiential qualities 
of the dome are intensively and almost paradoxically dynamic, suspended 
in a tensile double movement of self-contradiction and reinforcement. The 
fl oor pattern enacts a similar movement, albeit in a fl atter way. As Evans 
demonstrates through his own drawings, the dome pattern is produced 
through the projection of a nest of overlapping circles on a fl at surface or 
plane onto a hemispherical surface. The production of powerfully qualitative 
affects produced through the multiplication of circles is perhaps indicative 
of that which the retarded youth Stevie was immersed in, as he drew his 
“coruscating whirl of circles.” 
De l’Orme explicitly claimed that the geometry patterning the interior 
surface of the dome were projectively mapped along perpendicular lines 
into the geometrical pattern inlaid in the fl oor directly beneath it. As Evans 
shows, the geometry of de l’Orme’s fl oor pattern and the dome pattern do 
not actually map into one another in such a way. The directional push and 
pull of the dome’s dynamic movement is tripped up by the experience of 
this pattern when faithfully, perpendicularly projected onto the fl oor. If you 
project the dome pattern onto a fl at surface, or a fl oor plan, it produces an 
image rather like the plan view of a donut such that the powerfully directed 
perceptual movements in the dome bulge into a torus on the fl oor. 
Evans then uncovers the slight of hand that de l’Orme undertook in 
making the fl oor inlay below the dome exhibit the same directionality and 
quality of movement as the elaborately formed action above it: “rather 
than dutifully deposit a piece of didactic evidence on the fl oor, de l’Orme 
tinkered with it, expanded it and then clipped off its outer rim until it 
looked suffi ciently like the system of intersections to which it had given 
shape.”8 In this way, the fl oor and the dome then more readily appear to 
directly map onto one another through their shared tendency of perceived 
movement. De l’Orme breaks the rules in order to make them appear to 
remain in place. 
De l’Orme had to be entirely knowing in his cunning cover up. This 
was no oversight. Evans takes de l’Orme’s Premier Tome de l’Architecture 
(1957) as evidence. This book was “packed with abstruse stereotomic 
diagrams involving projections of nameless exotic curvatures. One of the 
remarkable features of these is that every last one had its origin in a 
circle. But, as the circles are collapsed, elongated, ramped then projected 
7.  Ibid, p. 173.
8.  Ibid, p. 178.
6.08  Photograph of fl oor paving at Royal Chapel, 
Anet, by Philibert de l’Orme.
6.09
6.09  RRobin Evans’ drawing showing the geometry 
of the fl oor paving at the Royal Capel, Anet, with the 
outer rim that was clipped off by de l’Orme. 
6.10  Evans’ plan for the tracery of the dome of the 
Royal Chapel, Anet. Drawn by Robin Evans. 
6.10
171
into cones, cylinders or spheres at glancing angles, they metamorphise 
into thoroughly plastic, volatile shapes, commensurable only through the 
procedure of projection itself.”9 Given this research into the metamorphosing 
behaviours of projection, it seems unlikely that he was not entirely aware 
of the moves he made. 
The question remains: why was de l’Orme compelled to enact such a 
cover up? The issue of mastery, through technical means, over the more 
volatile dimensions of affect rears its head. A desire to control the messier, 
less controllable operations of affect (and the bodies that transduce them) 
through rational means is embedded, as earlier discussed, in the very 
birth of aesthetics. This denial, broadly at work in the idea of “neatness 
as sign of civilisation”10 has had counter reactions, as Evans writes, that 
has operated “in favour of the unpremeditated and unregulated as signs of 
art and feeling.”11 Evans is in favour of neither, suggesting that both need 
to be folded into our manners of working. Between geometry and affect 
– between poetry and physics  – is the art of emergence or an ethico-
aesthetic know-how. The desire for neat, wholesome, mindful bodies has 
led to all sorts of denials that have laced geometry with a strange mix of 
idiocy and cleverness.
 
9.  Ibid, p. 177.
10.  Evans (1997), p. 185.
11.  Ibid.
6.11 Philibert de l’Orme, perspective of the 
trompe at Anet, 1547 – 1551, from Le Premiere 
tome de l’architecture (1567).
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2. Unwholesome Bodies and attention to affective movement
The story of de l’Orme’s denial is a telling tale that illuminates some related 
problems in Greg Lynn’s work. At fi rst sight, the relationship between 
drawings and buildings in the examples of Lynn and de L’Orme would 
seem remarkably different. The later is thoroughly calculated and clear, 
even if a complex puzzle involving deliberate subterfuge. The former, by 
contrast, is loose, undefi ned and simply puzzling. But clearly there are 
remarkable similarities in terms of the actions of their design processes. 
The metamorphosing shapes of de l’Orme’s Premier Tome de l’Architecture 
would seem to have a certain geometrically dynamic sensibility in common 
with Lynn’s Animate Form. Within their respective technologies each sets 
about generating their designs through propelling the static into dynamic 
motion. 
For De l’Orme, as Evans writes, “Parallel projection … engendered more 
potent forms from less, and did it by an ingenious, regulated distortion 
of a shape regarded, by common consent, and by de l’Orme himself in 
writings on architecture, as perfect to start with: the circle.”12 Through 
de l’Orme, the perfect and simply resultant idea of circles (as discussed 
in Act 2) is shown to conceal a potential writhing volatility. For Lynn, 
circles becomes spheres and are metamorphosed into blobs where, as 
he writes: “… even what seems to be a sphere is actually a blob without 
infl uence … complexity is always present as potential even in the most 
simple or primitive forms.”13 The lines of parallel projection are somewhat 
akin to the vectors or forces of animation, in that each renders geometry 
dynamic through the transformative action defi ned by the parameters 
set in place. Both architects, in the very terms through which Lynn 
defi nes ‘animation’, are animators. De l’Orme however, in virtually every 
sense possible, retains the circular perfection that he simultaneously 
perverts. He maintains the purity of geometry, even if he reveals (and 
12.  Ibid, p. 178.
13.  Lynn (1999), p. 31.
6.12 6.13 6.14
6.12  Philibert de l’Orme, frontispiece to the Premier tome (1567).  6.13  Greg Lynn, Stereolithography models 
of the fourth version of the  House Prototype (1994).
6.14  Greg Lynn, Henie Onstad animation.  
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6.15  The Ancient of Days, by William Blake. 
Frontispiece to Europe: A Prophecy (1794).
conceals) that it can behave in less than pure, volatile ways. Lynn, on 
the other hand, explicitly rejects any hold upon the ideal or purity of 
geometry. And where de l’Orme slyly conceals that when pure things 
move from one situation to another their demeanour is less than strictly 
dependable, Lynn longs for the loosely pliable, whose seductive software 
behaviour, fl atteringly set against a black background, have no easy way 
of qualitatively surviving a step out into other landscapes. As I will go on to 
argue, Lynn’s problem produces some unwholesome bodies whose gaping 
holes bear witness to an inverse set problems for the art of translation. As 
Evans comments in this paper: “What comes out is not always the same 
as what goes in.”14
On that note, I want to return to the very last sentences of Evans’s 1986 
essay, which I would suggest lead us directly into the opening section of 
The Projective Cast quoted at the outset of this Act and, perhaps, reveals 
the nature of the entire project of this later book, published two years 
after Evans’s death in 1993. After having pointed to the stories hidden in 
drawings, he professes:
“This is one of my ambitions: the history of Blake’s architect geometer has been 
written a hundred times (Fig 15); I would like to write the history of Giacinto 
Brandi’s (Fig 6.16), not, I would hasten to add, because she is young and pretty, 
but because of the uncharacteristic expression on her face in and in her posture. 
It is the kind of expression normally reserved in seventeenth century painting for 
prostitutes and courtesans. The picture’s subject is uncertain, its title a modern 
supposition resting on the fact that she holds dividers, nothing more. One might 
ask what such a fi gure is expected to do with the instrument she shows us.”15
One might also ask what Lynn really expected of his digital instruments, 
as well as wonder about the relation between his design posture and his 
architectural expression. But in this case the portrait is not painted on a 
canvas, it is scattered across his instances of presentation: in the images 
and essays composed and chosen for publication. This extract, from 
an essay fi rst published in 1992, calls for a less than rigid geometrical 
description accompanying an unwholesome body:
“In systems of proportion, architecture assumes a natural relationship between 
geometry, with its claims to exact measure, and the unifi ed stasis of an organism, 
with its claims to wholeness…Yet we should beware of any architecture described 
as wholesome or organic, for the logic of the organism is the logic of self-
14.  Evans (1997), p. 181.
15.  Ibid, p. 186.
6.16  Giancinto Brandi, L’Architettura (?), 
seventeenth century.
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enclosure, self-regulation and self-determinism…To disentangle the pact between 
organic bodies and exact geometric language that underlies architecture’s static 
spatial types is a monumental task. Any attempt to loosen this alliance must 
simultaneously deterritorialise the autonomy of whole organisms and replace 
the exactitude of rigid geometry with more pliant forms of description.”16
In developing an architectural stance pertaining to a dynamic world rather 
than one populated with static objects requires, Lynn suggests, a double 
dissolution of the past relation between organic wholes and geometrical 
exactitude. Lynn’s Animate Form presents a way of transforming rigid 
geometries into “more pliant forms of description”. 
But the deterritorialisation of organic autonomy in Lynn’s work operates 
primarily in a representational manner. In other words, it is represented 
more than practiced or enacted. This is an aspect of a lack of attention 
– that is in no way unique to Lynn – to the role of one’s own embodied 
stance and affectivity in the act of doing - whether critiquing, analysing, 
designing or whatever. His body, reduced to a critical eye of judgement, 
is an apparently autonomous organism: self-enclosed, self-regulated and 
self-determined in the neutral space of objective observation. Through 
maintaining a distance, he keeps his body whole, not opening it up to 
“more plaint forms of description.” His own decisions are never discussed; 
the process is presented as an autonomous one, even if it represents 
an alternative. And so his blobs, their autonomy partially deterritorialised 
within the representational space of the software, could only enjoy such 
open, dynamic lives when held within that digital system. In a lack of 
attention to the transmission of affect, the move from screen to lived 
space becomes rather problematic in the complex process of translation 
from blobs to buildings. 
But the involvement of these representations in lived space, were 
always actually going on: the designers’ embodied acts were, after all, 
always part of the process. The events of the design process as it happened 
were sensed, felt and perceived in particular ways: they were part of the 
sensual, affective textures of events. The transmission of affect is always 
part of the aesthetic judgements that guide the design process. As I will 
later argue, these affective textures just weren’t (yet) ingested into the 
sensibility and style through which Lynn discursively operated. This makes 
it diffi cult to recognise and acknowledge the affective movement that is 
crucial to the ongoing life of the digital diagrams and how it might guide 
their translation into built form.
16.  Lynn (1998), p. 41.
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3. Diagrams Coming to Life
Lynn’s call to replace “the exactitude of rigid geometry with more pliant 
forms of description” was accompanied by a particularly intense, if brief, 
resurgence of interest in the idea of the diagram in architectural discourse 
the late 1990’s around the same time as the arrival of Animate Form. Here, 
the diagram became a tool that was similarly de-rigidifi ed and rendered 
more lively. One of the key texts of the period, ANY 23; Diagram Work: 
Data Mechanics for a Topological Age (1998), was edited by Ben van Berkel 
and Caroline Bos (UN Studio). This included essays from Stan Allen, R. E. 
Somol, Peter Eisenman, Manuel De Landa, Karl Chu, Brian Massumi, Greg 
Lynn, Mark Rakatansky, Andrew Benjamin and Sanford Kwinter, amongst 
others. This publication was followed by the discussion of diagrams in the 
book on the work of the editors, UN Studio, called Move (1999). In the 
same year, Stephen Perrella’s Hypersurface Architecture II issue of AD 
published a paper by Brian Massumi titled ‘Strange Horizon’. Implicitly 
extending upon his previous paper in ANY 23, ‘The Diagram as Technique 
of Existence’, Massumi’s ‘Strange Horizon’ discusses the computer assisted 
techniques such as those of Greg Lynn in relation to the “abstract space 
of the body.” Massumi further extended this paper in a chapter of his 
Parables for the Virtual. Here, he introduced his idea of the ‘biogram’ as 
a “lived diagram, based on already lived experience”17 – a concept that 
has offered a great deal to the idea of ‘affective diagrams’ developed in 
this thesis. This issue of AD also included a paper by myself, ‘Falling into 
the Surface’18: the earliest of my attempts to articulate the ideas to be 
developed in this thesis. 
Also in 1999, Peter Eisenman’s Diagram Diaries was published, which 
traced out 30 years of architectural research in which the diagram was a 
key tool in developing a critical approach to architecture. While Eisenman 
proclaims great faith in the importance of being critical, he traces out a 
curve through which the diagram as an instrument of a critical architecture 
17.  Perrella (1999), p. 16.
18.  Ednie-Brown (1999).
6.17  Character sketches.
UN Studio (1999).
Eisenman (1999).
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has been forced, more or less against its will, to succumb to something 
else. Eisenman’s book moves sequentially through his work mapping out 
the transformations that have occurred in his investigations that, more 
than anything else, interrogate the possibilities for intensifi ed criticality 
in architecture. This critical activity, mapped out and produced through 
diagrams, is understood as an ideological operation. Toward the end of 
this text, he writes: 
“I no longer feel compelled to insist upon an ideological 
sub-structure in my own work. If one looks back on the 
work, historically, thirty years from now, will it be said 
that this loss of ideology was a late period, a playing out 
of an endgame? Or will it be said that this publication 
marks a new opening to something else, a freeing of the 
work from an ideological necessity?”19 
The fate of this ideological sub-structure lies in the 
fate of the diagram that:
 “has come full circle from the strategies of reading to 
the tactics of visceral experience. At the same time, the 
diagram seems to disappear from the built work … it 
becomes more or less a virtual entity, rather than being 
made explicit in the projects. This is because the diagram 
becomes more of an engine in the projects rather 
than something which transforms itself into a physical 
reality…these diagrams shifted the focus of the reading 
strategy from its origin in formal relationships, and then 
linguistic and textual relationships, to the possibility of 
reading affective relationships in the somatic experience 
itself.”20  
As the diagram disappears both into and out of the projects, such that 
the diagram is present within but no longer explicit, it would seem to 
be fl ailing in the outside of discourse, gasping and squirming in silence. 
Somehow, critical architectural rigour would seem to have been forced to 
confront its own silence. This struggle can be traced back to his paper, 
‘The Author’s Affect: Passion and the Moment of Architecture’, delivered 
at the 1991 ANY conference.21 Like Stevie immersed in “strange seas 
of thought”, Eisenman acknowledges his confrontation with, perhaps, the 
kind of ‘strange horizon’22 implied in Massumi’s ‘biogram’ concept. 
19.  Eisenman (1999), 207. 
20.  Ibid, 208-9.
21.  Eisenman (1991).
22. See Massumi (2002a), ‘Strange Horizon: 
Buildings, Biograms and the Body Topologic’, 
pp. 177-207.
6.18 Peter Eisenman, Staten Island Institute. 
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Across the various publications on the subject, it was clear that the 
diagram became not just a tool with which to investigate or generate, 
but a tool that was in itself being re-investigated and regenerated. In 
general, a common tendency in this reappraisal of the role and nature of 
diagrams was an implicit desire to render them more pliant, responsive 
and performative. Like ‘Folding’ and its subsequent ‘animate’ strivings, the 
invigoration of the diagram was heavily related to Deleuzian philosophy. 
The confi guration inherent to the concept of the diagram channels its way 
as a key artery through Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking. In Animate Form, 
Lynn makes reference to Deleuze’s use of the terms “abstract machine’ 
and ‘diagram’ as ‘asignifying concepts’ that are a key to the problem of 
translation from the virtual to the concrete.23 Deleuze’s defi nition of the 
Foucauldian diagram as “the presentation of the relations between forces 
unique to a particular formation”24 is extended into “the distribution of the 
power to affect and the power to be affected.”25 In other words: the diagram 
is an assemblage of relations wherein the power to affect and be affected 
is distributed. As Eisenman’s observations suggest, the key diagram being 
grappled with is not any one drawing in itself, but is rather the assemblage 
of affective movements that is embodied in drawings without simply being 
that drawing itself. There is a recognition of the abstract operations of 
affect, or how abstract notations, such as diagrams, become part of a 
qualitative assemblage guided through affect attunements. How that 
embodied or felt abstraction moves between states and media, between 
drawings and buildings, becomes a crucial problem.
For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this kind of diagram as an ‘affective 
diagram’,26 to distinguish between diagrams as drawn or visually rendered 
objects and the texture of relations that they embody. The later operates 
through the former, but also through all manner of things, events and 
actions. This kind of diagram intrinsically moves across and through things, 
dynamically reforming as it meets with different media. In other words, it 
is a model of affective movement, of how qualities move from one place 
to another or exist simultaneously in different places. Each instance of 
an affective diagram (wherever it is embodied in things without simply 
being that thing itself), is not the same as any other instance, but they 
have enough sympathy with one another to be, as they say, ‘on the same 
wavelength.’ They are alternative instances of similar confi gurations of 
relations. The affective diagram is perhaps akin to the “clear, physical 
23.  Lynn (1999), p. 40.
24.  Deleuze (1988), p. 72.
25. Ibid, p. 73.
26.  Brian Massumi’s concept of the ‘biogram’ 
has informed the idea of the ‘affective diagram’ 
very signifi cantly. A substantial section that 
explored this connection has been removed 
from this thesis for the sake of word length 
and brevity, but the signifi cance of the biogram 
here ought to be acknowledged. 
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conception” that Holland refers to in his discussion of the missing “carrier 
model” of creative process, exemplifi ed through Maxwell’s translation from 
gears to fi elds.27
In 2000, an issue of Daidalos, titled ‘Diagrammania’ was published, 
positioning itself as yet another publication on the theme of the diagram. 
This issue included an essay by myself, ‘The Texture of Diagrams’28 in 
which I critiqued the generative diagramming practices of Greg Lynn by 
juxtaposing it with Deleuze’s take on the diagramming of the painter, 
Francis Bacon. This paper explored the very sensitive, unstable passage 
between drawings and buildings, where an affective diagram becomes 
crucial to a shaping of that passage of transformation between them. The 
following scene is a reworking and development on that essay.29
27.  Holland (1999), p. 218.
28.  Ednie-Brown, Pia (2000a).
29.  There are aspects of this paper that 
have been revised here. Most signifi cantly, I 
reviewed my earlier (albeit subdued) insistence 
that his animated diagrams were smooth and 
fl uid in quality and thereby at odds with the 
more ungainly qualities of the Church as a 
built form. What I failed to see was that his 
diagrams were actually quite ungainly and 
grotesque in quality and thereby, forming 
a fairly good affective match. At the time, 
the ‘newness’ of the technology made them 
appear more ‘gleaming’ and magical than 
that they seem now. The main premise of the 
paper, however, still stands: that in drawing 
so emphatically on the structure of animation 
when ‘stopped dead in its tracks’ in order to 
produce a sense of movement, he missed the 
fi ner, more ‘particular’ textural properties of 
the animations – or of animate movement. 
6.19  Image from Francis Bacon’s studio: page of photographs by Eadweard Muybridge, from Human and 
Animal Locomotion (1887).
Confurius (1999).
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4. Translation and the Movements of Skin
Animate Form was published in the same year that Lynn’s fi rst building, the 
Korean Presbyterian Church in Queens, New York, was under construction. 
The book includes nothing of the church project, as if speaking alongside 
an unspoken companion and awaiting a discussion about to begin. A series 
of process animations were made available on his web site in late 1999. 
Overall, the project seemed to utilise a series of techniques that were 
developed and tested across the projects published in Animate Form: 
there were blob based massing study animations, similar to ‘Artists Space’ 
installation and the ‘Henie Onstad Kunstsenter’ installations, some wiggling 
entry tubes, similar to the ‘Yokohama Port Terminal’ project and some 
expanding rows of blobs and twisting boxes, similar to those in ‘House 
Prototype in Long Island’. How these processes were set up to operate or 
what force parameters were involved were not discussed in any detail, if at 
all. The very vague status and action of the generative animations leaves 
any simple assessment of the relations between these diagrams and the 
building somewhat diffi cult. Or rather, they open up the question of what 
kind of assessment may be called for. What we can gather, is a general 
sense of the qualities and character, or affective nature, of these generative, 
animated diagrams.  This seems an important issue to consider because 
in the terms set out by Lynn, animate properties of form are captured 
and embodied at an asignifying, abstract level through these diagrams. 
While Lynn doesn’t discuss ‘affect’ per se, the Deleuzian philosophy from 
which he draws concepts of the ‘asignifying’ and the ‘abstract machine’ 
are imbricated in the role of affect. If these affective dimensions can form 
the basis of a fair assessment regarding the relationship between the 
diagrams and the building, the outcome offers some helpful insights into 
some issues at stake. 
The church landed a little like the albatross; a bit ungainly and with 
a mildly comic lack of smoothness. In no way do I want to suggest here 
that it was ‘ugly’ or that if it was, that this would be a problem; its relative 
beauty or ugliness is not my concern. The issue here relates back to the 
animate abstraction that is crucial to Lynn’s project and the degree to 
which the built form might embody the qualities of movement enacted 
in the animations. As I will discuss, at one level the building does this 
extraordinarily well, perhaps too well, but on another level it falls over. 
The fl ight and the fall are as intertwined as the albatross landing. Through 
the fall something indicative of diagrammatic action fell open and comes 
clearly into view. This ‘something’ is suggested here by Francis Bacon:
6.20   Presbyterian Church in Queens, New 
York (1995-1999), Greg Lynn, while under 
construction (1999).   6.21  Sanctuary interior 
under construction (1999), Presbyterian Church in 
Queens, New York (1995-1999), Greg Lynn.
6.20
6.21
Lynn (1999).
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“Valery puts it very clearly: What we want nowadays is the sensation without the 
boredom of its conveyance. That’s very precise isn’t it? Apart from that, we can 
watch our own decay in the interval that separates life from death.” 30 
Between the animation and the building: between life and death? Lynn’s 
building seems indeed to be a suspended decay. A survey of the range of 
his designs reveals a tendency that is hard to overlook.  As the generative 
impulses slow down, stop and reach across the shifts into a coagulated 
stand still of the fi nal form, there is a breaking up of the of continuous 
surfaces into serial, variational facets. The ‘facetting’, perhaps more than 
anything, is tied to the pragmatics of building. Continuous curves become 
sectioned into strips, each of which twists and bends in acting out its own 
particular moment of the trajectory, or of the arrested fl ow of movement. 
In the built church project this becomes most manifestly evident in the 
interior of the main sanctuary space with its staggered skins that extend 
out and peel away along the exterior stair at the back of the building. 
Attention to the production of a sense of movement has been poured into 
its form. Sliced into saw-tooth like strips right across it’s body and through 
its interior, each slice enacts a variation on its serial partners, gathering up a 
sense of active modulation rippling or splaying across this ridged variation. 
These strips are used to successfully generate sequential movement. In 
terms of the shaping of the thing and the way that these shapes have been 
used, there is a strong effort to imbue an animate quality into the building 
through a sense of movement. But there is something more going on here. 
In the fi nal statements of Lynn’s Animate Form essay he writes:
“In order to bring these technologies into a discipline that is defi ned as the 
site of translation from the virtual to the concrete, it is necessary that we fi rst 
interrogate their abstract structure. Without a detailed understanding of their 
performance as diagrams and organisational techniques it is impossible to begin 
a discussion of their translation into architectural form.  ”31
If a detailed undertanding of the abstract structure of these technologies 
is crucial in moving from “the virtual to the concrete”, what does he 
mean by ‘abstract structure’? An animate quality, or particular qualities 
of movement, might be one kind of abstraction to be translated, but 
is this ‘structural’? Or, is he referring to the technical structure of the 
animation itself – or how animations (in general) work to produce a sense 
of movement? Perhaps both.  
30.  Farr (1999) p. 41.
31.  Lynn (1999), pp. 40-41.
6.22
6.23
6.22  Presbyterian Church in Queens, New York 
(1995-1999), Greg Lynn.   6.23  Sanctuary 
space of Presbyterian Church in Queens, New 
York (1995-1999), Greg Lynn. 
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The clipped, staccato strips or staggered slices become a very 
signifi cant clue.  At 24 frames per second or so, speed glues the 
differentiating fragments of an animation into a dynamic line of continuous 
transformation. Leaping out of his contorting animations, Lynn transforms 
the moving image via a brutal slowing down of the rhythmic behaviour of 
the mutations that cross the beat of the frames of animation.  As these 
rhythmic pulsations reach over to meet the speed of the building, the gaps 
open up, come into view and act to entropically decay the continuity of the 
dynamic line, like an aphorism spoken in a stutter. The smooth body of the 
animation is opened up such that it becomes a Bakhtinian grotesque body 
in that “it retains the parts in which one link joins the other, in which the 
life of one body is born from the death of the older, preceding one.”32  As 
the animation dies, it gives birth to a differentiated repetition that bares 
the gaps between the parts of the former action (the ‘gutters’ between 
frames) and bares the teeth of a cruelly indifferent time line. It reveals, 
in a sense, the mechanism of the enigma, the sleight of hand behind the 
representation. The continuous movement of the animation is as much 
of a cover up as de l’Orme’s continuity of projective translation. Lynn’s 
variational, sequentially poised strips remodel the technical structure of 
animation; chewing it up and regurgitating it into built form. The manner 
with which qualities of lightness and fl uidity in the animations are left 
behind as the building beholds us, is tied up in the way that it makes explicit 
the mechanisms of the animation. It becomes a kind of pornography of the 
moving image: an explicit rendering visible of its holes and dark, secret 
orifi ces. This, it seems to me, points to an ‘affective diagram’ of Lynn’s 
church: a diagram that grotesquely stutters.33 The striving to suggest 
past movement in now still form brings about, ironically, a diagramming of 
Bergson’s ‘false time’.34 
There are ways in which this notion of Lynn’s affective diagram operates 
similarly to the way in which Deleuze writes of Francis Bacon’s diagram: 
“This is what Bacon calls a Diagram; it is as if, all of a sudden, we introduced a 
Sahara, a Sahara region in the head; it is as if we stretched over it a rhinoceros 
skin seen through a microscope; it is as if we tore apart two parts of the head by 
means of an ocean; it is as if we changed the unit of measurement and replaced 
fi gurative units with micrometric or even cosmic units. A Sahara, a rhinoceros 
skin, this is the diagram suddenly stretched out. It is like a catastrophe happening 
suddenly to the canvas, inside fi gurative or probabilistic data.”35 
32. Bakhtin (1984), p. 318.
33.  This stuttering is close to the sense through 
which Gilles Deleuze discusses the stutter in his 
well known paper, ‘He Stuttered’. The following 
passage from this text outlines the ‘pressures’ 
through which I see Lynn’s stutter similarly 
operating: “It is when the language system 
overstrains itself that it begins to stutter, to 
murmur, or to mumble; then the entire language 
reaches the limit that sketches the outside and 
confronts silence. When the language system is 
so much strained, language suffers a pressure 
that delivers it to silence. Style - the foreign 
language system inside language–is made by 
these two operations; or shall we rather speak, 
with Proust, of a nonstyle, that is, of ‘elements 
of a style to come which do not yet exist’? Style 
is the parsimony of language. Face to face, or 
face to back, to cause language to stutter, and 
at the same time to bring language to its limit, 
to its outside, and to its silence–all this will be 
like the boom and the bust.” [Deleuze (1994) 
p. 28.] 
34.  With regards to this notion of false time, 
Bergson writes: “we shall see that time, 
conceived under the form of an unbounded and 
homogenous medium, is nothing but the ghost 
of space haunting the refl exive consciousness.” 
[Bergson (1888), p. 99.]
35.  Deleuze (1993) p. 193-194.
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The microscope in Lynn’s case becomes a magnifi cation or slowing 
down of the fi lmic construction of movement. The rhinoceros skin becomes 
the fi lmic time line microscopically bearing its creases and furrows as 
deep oceans that tear the motion apart into discrete packages of stillness. 
The unit of measurement is shifted from units of (false) time to units of 
(Cartesian) space. All this occurs within the vast distance entailed in the 
Sahara state of (computer-aided) design. 
I visited the church in 1999, when it was nearing the end of its 
construction. At this time, these skins where having their exterior panelling 
attached. These skins are a series of large metal frame structures that are 
clad with vertically lined timber on the inside and a silver metal panelling 
on the outside. At the time of my visit, the thin, metal panelling was being 
fi xed to plywood under-cladding. The juxtaposition of the silver cladding 
and the plywood – as two very different surface textures – propelled 
me into a double take. My attention to this detail hinged off a question 
that remained hanging after a visit by Greg Lynn to RMIT in 1997. In the 
context of a small gathering of staff and postgraduates, he explained his 
technique and associated ways of thinking both clearly and enigmatically. 
The digital model, which literally is a form described by a wafer thin skin 
of data, was something he referred to – as he does in Animate Form – as 
a ‘performance envelope’ that registered the interaction of forces in which 
its mutations are embedded. It struck me, however, that the surfaces were 
only registering forces at a particular scale, or only in terms of the general 
form of the object. I wanted to see it occur in the surface itself: traces of 
the fi ne grains of interaction registered as texture. Clearly, this involved a 
different scale of attention, requiring both the digital skin and the forces 
that manipulated it to acquire a fi ner grain of registration. 
6.24  Image from Francis Bacon’s studio 6.25  Francis Bacon, One of ‘Three Studies of Lucien 
Freud’ (1969).
6.26  Presbyterian Church in Queens, New York (1995-
1999), Greg Lynn. Under Construction (1999).
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It was around the time of Lynn’s visit in ’97 that I had been making and 
collecting the latex skins discussed earlier. This research meant that I was 
especially attuned to an attention toward surface texture. With this attention 
alive in the background, my immediate response to the plywood–metal 
cladding juxtaposition was a feeling of regret that the swirling and knotted 
variation of the plywood was soon to be hidden from view. The shiny panels 
seem too an obvious choice: they resemble the shiny surface of the digital 
image but they don’t enact the more contortionist, modulatory movement 
of the animations. The plywood, almost accidentally or incidentally, bought 
these surface qualities to the project in a way that no other surface of the 
building does. All too briefl y. They were soon covered over, hidden away 
under something that, it would seem, was an attempt to look like a digital 
image. Rather than enact the desired movement, they represented the 
still image. That which was fi gured and rendered by the software (shiny, 
animated form) came to stand in the way of that which the animation 
software more qualitatively enacted (affective movements).
One of the interesting aspects of Bacon’s process is the manner with 
which he worked from existing images. Photographs and other paintings 
very often took on a directly generative role. His studio was littered with 
various images that he would use as an impulse in his paintings. He was 
particularly obsessed with Muybridge’s photographs from The Human 
Figure in Motion and Velasquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X which became 
the seed of a series of Pope paintings. “Images breed images in me” he 
is quoted as saying, whereby, “I’m a grinding machine. I’ve looked at 
everything and everything I’ve seen has gone in and been ground up very 
fi ne.”36  Given the manner with which Bacon speaks very pointedly about 
the signifi cance of sensation, this ‘grinding’ would seem to be a kind of 
concentrated refi nement of affects induced by images into increasingly 
granular, particular textures of sensation. These images never acted as 
something to be reproduced or represented, but digested and regurgitated, 
spewed out into the contortions, twists and pulses of the entropic and 
generative action of sensation: “I have deliberately tried to twist myself, 
36.  Francis Bacon, quoted in ‘The Essence of 
Artifi ce’, Micheal Peppiatt in Farr (1999), p. 32.
6.27  Reproductions lying on Bacon’s studio fl oor, 
assembled and photographed by Sam Hunter 1950.
6.28  Diego Velazquez, Portrait of Pope Innocent X.  6.29 Close-up of nurse from Sergei Eisenstein’s fi lm, The 
Battleship Potemkin (1925).  6.30  ‘Study for the Head of a Screaming Pope’ (1952), Francis Bacon.  
6.28 6.29 6.30
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but I have not gone far enough ... in a painting that’s even worth looking at 
the image must be twisted if it is to make a renewed assault on the nervous 
system.”37 Bacon’s ‘diagram’ acts through the rhythm of transformative 
impulses that can be likened to Stern’s notion of affect attunement, where 
the grinding up very fi ne becomes an intricate recasting of activation 
contours, done with an intricate complexity of interweaving.
Bacon’s ‘catastrophes’ work themselves right through the paint and 
across the fi gure, bringing the movements of sensation into a state of 
fi gural animation. He acts to render simultaneous the variable speeds 
and dimensions of duration that give sensation rhythm and consistency, 
expressing it in such a way that it is itself transformed. This simultaneity 
of variable speeds works very much in terms of interweaved modes of 
composition. As Deleuze writes of Bacon: “Each painting is a moving 
sequence or series (and not only one term within a series). Each sensation 
is at diverse levels, of different orders or in several domains.”38 It could be 
said that Bacon ploughs the variable frames into the same plane, weaving 
them together into a thick fabric of violent assault, while Lynn pulled them 
apart, enacting a different sort of brutality.
Lynn’s ‘brutality’, however, didn’t manage to carve out as much depth; 
he hadn’t ground up his data fi nely enough. In a juxtaposition of the 
generative images and the paintings of Bacon, the transformation is 
37.  Francis Bacon, Ibid, p. 41.
38.  Ibid, p. 189.
6.31 Three Studies of Muriel Belcher, 1966.
6.32 Three Studies for a Portriat of Peter Beard, 1975.
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quite radical. He smears the fi ne grounds through the fi gure such that he 
excites sensation, as Deleuze writes, on a number of levels. For Lynn, the 
transformation occurred through the mutation of initial forms through force 
parameter data of the animation software. These generative constructions, 
having come to a stand-still, then stutter and stumble, falling open into the 
differential repetition of form. All of this can be seen to be acting through 
a consistent diagramming in both animation and building: an attempt to 
generate a sense of motion across frames or formal strips. In coming to 
a stand still, the fi nal form is folded back into the abstract structure of 
animations where the frames are now brutally cleaved apart as the facets 
of form. Once the form is generated, it calls upon the structure of an 
animation, the organising principle that becomes clear when you look at 
the strip of fi lm rather than the fi lm played through a projection device. 
In other words, the form draws upon the structure or composition of an 
animation stopped dead in its tracks. 
The dynamic tension embodied here, in a ‘decay’ between life and 
death, between the continuous sense of movement of an animation (and 
the animate) and its pulling apart into frames, to render the ‘gutters’ 
visible, and can be seen to operate productively. A grotesque exposure of 
the dark, secret orifi ces of the animation becomes all the more resonant 
because the diagrams tend, perhaps, toward qualitative grotesqueness 
in any case. The misshapen contortions of these digital diagrams have a 
strong resonance with all the deformed and monstrous bodies discussed in 
his collection of essays, Folds, Bodies and Blobs.39 As I suggested earlier, 
the church project points to an ‘affective diagram’ or an abstract structure 
of grotesque stuttering. While I have suggested here that he managed to 
embody this in a brutal twisting of an underlying abstract structure into 
a cleaving apart of a more continuous form of movement, it would seem 
that this act also suppressed the fl owering of these forces into other, more 
ornamental scales of action. 
39.  Lynn (1998).
6.33  Greg Lynn, Port Authority Gateway project, site forces mapped with particles.
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5. Affective Diagrams
The affective diagram is, perhaps frustratingly, not something that can 
simply be instrumentalised or described through diagrams. But diagrams 
of the drawn variety can be especially useful because they can so clearly 
embody crucial and particular relations. Just as particular diagrams can 
be more or less adept at articulating qualities of relation, they can also 
be used with more-or-less attention to this dimension of them. A very 
common tendency in architectural design is to take a diagram as a plan and 
to extrude it upwards into a three dimensional form. When a plan fi gure, 
or diagram, is qualitatively strong such a move often involves leaving 
behind and loosing the power of the diagrammatic qualities. It’s not that 
extrusion is, in itself, to blame, because this might be an operation and a 
technique that would very productively work with or intensify a particular 
quality of movement. But what so often goes wrong is that an extrusion 
from a diagram-plan occurs because the affective quality it suggests, 
which might be especially charismatic, is not recognised or felt with the 
requisite awareness. Or, a qualitative sense or aesthetic impulse in the 
project, often quite charismatically captured in the quality of a drawing, is 
overridden in the act of extrusion from a plan.  In the desire to transduce 
a compelling movement that might have emerged amidst the design 
process, into a built form, the extrusion then becomes an act of unfeeling 
desperation: a move lacking sensitive affection.  A deep analysis of LAB’s 
Federation Square building in Melbourne (Fig 6.34) could be instructive 
here, because it confronts these very dangers through the extrusion of 
plan fi gures seen to embody the desired qualities. Various infl ections and 
surface articulations seem to resuscitate losses from the initial gesture of 
extrusion. 
The story of de l’Orme demonstrated how an act of parallel projection, 
which is a kind of remapping via an invisible extrusion, signifi cantly altered 
the affectivity of a particular geometrical pattern as it moved from one 
condition to another. It was only because he had a grasp of the consistency 
of movement he was trying to create, that he tweaked it. In architectural 
examples of greater complexity than a relation between a fl oor pattern 
and a dome above, it is not necessary or even possible that this qualitative 
movement stays the same. Even the affect of de l’Orme’s dome and fl oor 
are not exactly the same, they are just very similarly cast. This is not a side 
effect, it is a rule: transformation and transduction are unavoidable. No 
thing or place remains the same as it moves in space-time. The problem 
is how to move with sympathy or with moves that transduce affective 
6.34  LAB Architects, Federation Square, 
Melbourne, Australia.
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diagrams through multiple scales of action. The idea of translation is a 
tool of effi ciency, an unattainable goal, like the wall toward which Zeno’s 
arrow fl ies. Transduction may be less stable (requiring metastability) but 
it accepts the inescapable actuality of change. 
This passage from Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution, in his chapter 
‘Form and Becoming’ offers a deeply relevant, cautionary tale:
“In order to advance with the moving reality, you must replace yourself within 
it. Install yourself within change, and you will grasp at once both change itself 
and the successive states in which it might at any instant be immobilised. But 
with these successive states, perceived from without as real and no longer as 
potential immobilities, you will never reconstitute movement. Call them qualities, 
forms, positions, or intentions, as the case may be, multiply the number of them 
as you will, let the interval between two consecutive states be infi nitely small: 
before the intervening moment you will always experience the disappointment 
of the child who tries by clapping his hands together to crush the smoke. The 
movement slips through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute 
change out of states implies the absurd proposition, that movement is made of 
immobilities.”41
Here Bergson is highlighting the importance of one’s stance in relation to 
moving reality, as juxtaposed with a more fi lmic construction of movement. 
This act of placing yourself within it becomes the crucial comportment. 
In order to ‘capture’ or recast the movement of the swirling curlicues of 
smoke, you have to become the movement, feeling it out through your 
own embodied perceptions, rather than simply attempt to catch the thing 
in motion from the outside. 
42.  Bergson (1998), p. 308.
6.35  Greg Lynn, Artists Space Installation (1995).   
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The disappointment of those hands clapping vainly could be heard in 
the church through the echoes of a missing dimension of its embodiment, 
in the ornamental scales of action. If, as Wölffl in claimed, ornament is 
where “the birthplace of a new style has to be sought”42 then Lynn did not 
quite manage, in this project, to feed his grotesquely stuttering diagram 
into an all-over, over-all coordination of affects across scales. The Church 
project embodied a striking lack of attention to the qualities of its surfaces, 
which are exceptionally homogenous in terms of fi nish and texture. In 
the interior spaces, both the variously postured saw-toothed strips of the 
main sanctuary space and its foyer are white plasterboard. It is the white 
cube, sliced up into ribbons that are twisted about. The exterior skins, as 
I have discussed, demonstrate how working with the representational can 
obstruct a richer or deeper becoming. A key to this blockage lies in one’s 
stance in relation to moving reality, such that the affective movements 
can be tapped into and recast into affect attunements in the shift from 
drawings to buildings.
42.  Wölffl in (1994), p. 185.
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6. Posture
“The body, fresh in the throes of expression, incarnates not an already formed 
system but a modifi cation – a change. Expression is an event…The task of a 
theory of expression is how to account for stability of form, given event.”43 
In the above quote, Massumi enacts a nice inversion of the general problem 
that plagued both Lynn and Wölffl in. While both investigated, in different 
ways, the problem of how stable form might be eventful (or animate), 
Massumi questions how we can account for the stability of form, given 
the eventful nature of the world. For process philosophy, there is no such 
thing as absolute stability. Metastability – a state of relative equilibrium 
harbouring potential change – is as surefooted as it gets. So, how do some 
things ever get to seem so still – or do they? Massumi’s statement perhaps 
outlines more of a philosopher’s problem than an architect’s one, but it 
leads back to the question of how one might be poised to perceive the 
world. As I will now go on to further discuss through the writings of both 
Wölffl in and Lynn, this question becomes one of posture: the practiced and 
cultivated poise, positioning and attitude one adopts in any given event. 
Posture is a composition of behaviour. 
Wölffl in’s thesis is concerned with how architecture can be expressive 
through a focus on the relations between formal objects and embodied 
subjects, or buildings and people experiencing buildings. He is concerned 
with how the human subject receives an impression of, or feels, the 
expression of form. It is through his comments on ornament that he 
begins to suggest specifi c issues regarding how a form comes into being 
as of signifi cance to the general question. The important capacity for non-
standardised modes of production to infl ect and be readily affected by the 
situation is also something he implicitly asks of his reader. His concerns for 
the embodiment of expression is an aspect of the way in which his writing 
asks the reader to consider this very subject. Take this example, where he 
relates proportion to the rate of breathing:
”Of great interest is the relation of proportions to the rate of breathing. It cannot 
be doubted that very narrow proportions produce the impression of an almost 
breathless and hurried upward striving. Naturally, we immediately associate 
them with the idea of tightness, which makes it impossible for us to continue to 
breathe deeply with the necessary lateral expansion. Thus Gothic proportions 
are oppressive: there is suffi cient space for us to breathe, but in living in and 
with these forms we sense them to be squeezing together, pressing upward, and 
consuming themselves in their own tension.”44
43.  Massumi (2002b), p. xvii.
44.  Wölffl in (1994), p. 169.
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Here Wölffl in approaches his reader with a persuasive assumption 
of shared experience, as if to say: ‘it cannot be doubted that we both 
experience architecture in this way’ and ‘as I feel this, so do you’. And 
when Wölffl in fi nally gets to his section on ornament, his breath seems to 
quicken as he opens the fi rst paragraph with the line: “Only with diffi culty 
have I been able to delay the discussion of ornament.”45 His own tendings, 
perceptions and feelings are openly conveyed, directed at ushering the 
reader into related impressions of embodied feeling and expression. He 
writes in a manner that embodies the way in which he believes architecture 
performs. His writing blossoms with an excess of affect, asking his readers 
to be fi ngered by the tendrils exuded by the force of his percepts. One of 
his readers was Walter Benjamin. With thoughts of enlisting his studies to 
the supervision of Wölffl in, Benjamin attended his university lectures in 
Munich in 1915 at the age of 23.46 Benjamin, it turns out, did not enjoy 
Wölffl in’s affective fi ngering, leaving those lectures in disgust. Soon after 
he write: 
“Now it is clear to me that what we have here is the most disasterous activity I 
have ever encountered in a German University. A by no means overwhelmingly 
gifted man, who, by nature, has no more of a feel for art than anyone else, 
but attempts to get around this by using all the energy and resources of his 
personality…He does not see the artwork, but he feels obliged to see it, demands 
that one see it, considers his history a moral act; he becomes pedantic, 
ludicrously catatonic, and thereby destroys any natural talents that his audience 
may have.”47
Architectural historian, John Macarthur, has made an interesting and 
illuminating argument regarding Benjamin’s strong reaction to those 
lectures given by Wölffl in.48 Macarthur suggests that Benjamin’s theory of 
aura can be understood as a reaction to, and correction of Wölffl in. Wölffl in 
affords architecture’s ‘force of form’ such authority that the human body is 
impressed with its affective power, breathing to its rhythms, following its 
footsteps, entering into its stature. But as Macarthur points out, this is not 
altogether so different from Benjamin’s tactile appropriation that could well 
be elaborated with the respiratory and other movement affects that Wolffl in 
describes. Benjamin’s dislike of Wölffl in’s manner, it would seem, lies a 
conjuring of images that smother, rather than more benignly encouraging 
or enabling us to accept an intimate relationship with them. Perhaps the 
45.  Ibid, p. 178.
46.  see Macarthur (2001-2).
47.  Quoted in a paper paper by John Macarthur, 
in Levin (1988), p. 79. This quote is from a 
letter to Fritz Radt (1915).
48.  Macarthur (2001-2), p. 148.
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violence of Benjamin’s reaction to Wolffl in lay in the later actually getting 
quite close  – promisingly close to articulating the operations of something 
like tactile appropriation – but then ruining it by a conjuring of images too 
forcefully, coercively or auratically conveyed.
Distance is a key property of Benjamin’s defi nition of the aura: “as 
the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be.”49  For 
Benjamin the aura of mechanically reproduced work of art has withered. 
That which disappears is uniqueness, the status of the original and the 
cult value of art. It has lost “its presence in time and space, its unique 
existence at the place where it happens to be.”50 As the art work loses 
these auratic dimensions of its being, it loses an authority whose status 
is grounded in its wholeness: of place, time and perceived ritualistic, cult 
or cultural value. Auratic events deliver an aesthetic unity that gathers 
a forcefulness through these colluding factors. The affect of aura in the 
experience of those who meet its uniqueness face to face is similar to 
meeting with a fi gure of authority who returns one’s gaze in terms of their 
power. You can’t attain the kind of closeness that pertains to the intimate 
meeting of eyes in a more even balance of power. In the negotiation of 
exchange or interaction, an auratic affectivity dominates. A particular kind 
of distance always quietly prevails.  
Benjamin does not regard the withering of aura as a tragic loss even if, 
as discussed in Act 1, its absence can provoke distraction and alienation. 
Through Fascism and its aestheticisation of politics, he highlights the 
political dangers of the aura, the power of which can be directed toward 
mass political coercion. ‘Tactile appropriation’ becomes an operation 
of affect that takes over as the aura withers, becoming “useful for the 
formulation of revolutionary demands in the politics of art.”51 
Benjamin illustrates the difference between the aura and tactile 
appropriation through a juxtaposition of the painter and the cameraman, 
the former exemplifying the older forms of art and the later the art of 
mechanical reproduction. The conjuring and mysterious act of the 
magician healer, who lays his hands on the body to cure it, is quite a 
different act to that of the surgeon, who cuts into the body. The magician 
comes affectively close, intimately affecting bodies while maintaining a 
distance through his auratic authority.  The surgeon gets so close that his 
hands move literally inside bodies, but at this moment of intense physical 
intimacy, never meets the patient person to person; the relationship is one 
of operator to body. 
49.  Benjamin (1968), p. 223.
50.  Ibid. p. 220.
51.  Ibid. p. 218.
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If Wolffl in was a magician, Lynn could be seen as the plastic surgeon, 
cutting the body into strips like the cameraman working the structure of 
his perception into an aesthetic makeover of the body. The animations 
themselves, however, held considerable auratic power at the time of their 
discursive fl owering. There is a tension or disjunction set up between 
magic and surgery. This is a product, as I suggested earlier, of a lack of 
attention – that is in no way unique to Lynn – to the role of one’s own 
embodied stance and affectivity in the act of doing. Additional evidence of 
this can be found the manner of his early writing. 
Lynn’s approach to the reader in Animate Form is noticeably different to 
that of Wölffl in. The question of how forms are perceived or experienced 
is left out of Lynn’s Animate Form text except where he explicitly rejects 
the relationship between object and viewer as the key to animate form. 
Integral to Lynn’s claims is an attempt to counter the tendency for force 
and motion to be treated as distinct from form and matter. He complains 
that in architectural discourse the split between form and force is only 
ever reunited in the meeting of object and viewer, where static form only 
becomes dynamic through our movements and perceptions:
“a superimposition or sequence of static forms is put into relation such that 
the viewer resolves multiple states through the instantiation of optical motion. 
Although form is thought in series and motion in these examples, movement 
is something added back to the object by the viewer. This involves a dialectic 
defi nition of motion that is inert while our experience of it involves movement. 
Statics become the condition of matter without force and dynamics becomes 
the condition of matter acted on by force…The modelling of architecture in a 
conceptual fi eld populated by forces and motion contrasts with these previous 
paradigms and technologies of formal stasis.”52
What makes him different, he implies, is the assertion that architecture 
does not move and pulsate only because we perceive it as such but 
because motion and force can be embedded in the form itself through 
the process of formation. The kind of movement that Lynn implies here is 
similar to Wölffl in’s, but by remaining in a representational fi eld rather than 
being engaged with more intimately as lived force and motion (or, better, 
movement) it remains, in practice or in actuality, an architecture of motion 
rather than affective movement. As we have seen, this gets problematic 
when it eventually has to halt its motion and cross the translation into built 
form.
52.  Lynn (1999), p. 13.
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In moving through the issues and examples he draws into his Animate 
Form essay, Lynn adopts a distant, objective stance; the posture of an 
eye surveying a set of object-ive models. There is not too much sense of 
affection prevailing in his writing. There is no intimacy, no immediacy, no 
sense of a perceiving, feeling or even a thinking author. He, manifestly 
unlike Wölffl in, leaves little direct indication of his perceptions. It is all 
statement and pronouncement. Wherever art, philosophy and architectural 
theory is discussed, it is only to the extent that it is scientifi cally inclined: 
time, motion and force remain features of abstract representations of 
space. They are always described as properties of models that lie ‘over 
there’, that we can picture as something discrete in itself. The life of these 
spaces are never lived; they are never discussed in terms of experience. 
Lynn claims to be departing from Cartesian models of space as a logic 
idealised in “an abstract space of fi xed coordinates”53 but only moves as 
far as representational models of dynamic space. As object-images, these 
spaces can be pictured with clarity, from the stance of standing back and 
over-seeing, without the necessary complication of throwing oneself into 
it; of living it. 
But this over-seeing can become an oversight, where the affective 
dimensions of that over-seeing experience can be left in the dark such 
that we skip blindly over the signifi cant infl ections. Ironically, despite the 
manifest objectivity of the tone and stance, the very criteria of judgement 
becomes elusive: as Peter Eisenman kept asking, how does Lynn decide 
what moment of the animation is the one to run with, which framed posture 
does one pick out as the seed of the building to come? Where or when do 
you stop the movement and manifest still-standing form? This became 
known as the ‘stopping problem.’ The problem, really, is that the criteria 
of judgement are of an aesthetic nature and from a scientifi cally inclined, 
analytical stance this kind of criteria become harder to access. When the 
animate is reduced to being force + motion in a representational space 
held ‘over there’ (and separate from one’s ‘wholesome body’) it becomes 
harder to get close enough to the affective movements. As Bergson put 
it:
“Install yourself within change, and you will grasp at once both change itself and 
the successive states in which it might at any instant be immobilised.”54
 
The kind of stance embodied by Lynn’s text might benefi t from a certain 
surgeon-like, dry clarity, but it skips blindly, unfeelingly over affection, 
such that the affective diagram (‘change itself’) becomes subsumed by the 
53.  Lynn (1999), p. 15.
54.  Bergson (1998), p. 308.
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structure of the successive states. On the other hand, perhaps a magician-
like aura of sparklingly new technologies, helped diminish access to an 
intimacy of relation with the animated diagrams, or an entering into their 
affective movement. 
Daniel Stern cites a relevant joke where two psychiatrists pass one 
another in the street and say ‘hello’ to one another, smile and wave, after 
which they both think ‘I wonder what he meant by that?’ The affective 
tone of the greeting cannot be contained by the word spoken, but lies in 
the relations between the way in which the word is spoken, its timing, 
intensity, intonational richness along with facial gestures, the timing and 
intensity of eyes meeting, gestural smoothness or faltering, general bodily 
poise etc. In holding many aspects of expression outside of the formal 
systems of communication means that it can be denied awareness. One 
is accountable for what one says much more than for the way in which 
one speaks, a consequence of which is that “what is deniable to others 
becomes more and more deniable to oneself.”55  The affective dimensions 
and sensual experience of relations – or that which constitute affective 
diagrams – tend to be repressed under the mantle of representations.
In my brief attention to the discursive stances of Wölffl in and Lynn in 
their respective early writings, I am suggesting that the comportment, 
or stance and manner of an author, whatever kind of artefact they might 
be producing, has immeasurable implications on that which it becomes 
possible to openly account for, pay attention to or gain access to.  It is 
embedded in their sensibility, their ability to sense within engagements. 
Walter Benjamin’s insistence on the politics of art speaks loudly of the 
ethical nature of these implications. And at the level of design expertise, 
denied (or unattended to) affective dimensions lose the power to ‘speak’ or 
be registered within the designer’s attention, while the overly forceful aura 
can block or diminish an intimacy of engagement with affective diagrams, 
so necessary in delicate moments of translation. 
This, as I have argued, is what happened in Lynn’s fi rst building. But 
then, as I will now go on to argue, in his early work Lynn’s diagram had 
not yet been through enough iterations for his style to have been more 
deeply developed. 
55.  Stern (2000), p. 181.
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ACT 7.  Style and Sensibility
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Act 7 synthesises the arguments from the previous three acts through the issue of how 
style is developed through affective diagrams and sensibility. This also involves a looping 
back to Part 1, tying this synthesis back to discussions of the art of emergence and the 
ethico-aesthetic know-how of emergence. 
This Act re-opens the issue of style, as discussed earlier through Wölffl in, to clarify the 
relationship between style, expression and the process of formation, as discussed in Act 5, 
and affective diagrams, as discussed in Act 6.  I offer a brief account of the development 
of style and sensibility through Lynn’s later projects and writing. Through a turning back 
in history to some related instances I further argue how the sensibility we fi nd being 
developed here is relevant beyond his work in particular, being implicit to the fi eld of 
process architecture in general and its development upon a rich discursive history. I 
characterise this new style as one developing through a growing awareness of affectivity 
as the foundation of both design process and its products, where this awareness is part of 
an increasingly explicit attention to behaviours, dynamic interrelations and interactivity. 
I then raise an example given by Isabelle Stengers regarding the style of science of 
geneticist Barbara McClintock to look at a related way of working in a scientifi c context. 
The common ground between McClintock’s style of scientifi c research and the valuable 
implications of process architecture is characterised by a particular ethics of behaviour 
or a research posture. 
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1. Styles of Life
”Let us on the contrary grasp ourselves afresh as we are, in a present which 
is thick, and further more, elastic… let us grasp afresh the external world as it 
really is, in the present, but in depth, with the immediate past crowding upon 
it and imprinting upon it its impetus… immediately in our galvanised perception 
what is taut becomes relaxed, what is dormant awakens, what is dead comes 
to life again.”1 
Style is often thought to be a superfi cial mask pertaining to how things 
‘look’ or visually appear to us, as distinct from a more internal, authentic 
depth. Amidst this notion of style is a distrust of how things appear: a deep 
Descartian suspicion that some kind of ‘evil genius’ might be presenting 
us with a deceptive image. Along a similar vein, style has become a word 
associated with the commodifi cation involved in today’s packaging of 
‘lifestyles.’ But as Bruce Mau observed in his book, Lifestyle: “fundamentally 
style is a decision about how we will live. Style is not superfi cial. It is a 
philosophical project of the deepest order.”2 This understanding of ‘style’ 
touches upon how the subject has been discussed, via Wölffl in’s early 
work, in terms of behavioural tendencies and sensibility. Sanford Kwinter 
summarised it neatly when he suggested that “style means nothing less 
than a whole new way of doing things.”3 Brian Massumi’s essay ‘Too-Blue’4 
offers a detailed account of style in related terms. 
When style shifts from superfi cial appearances to ways of doing, it calls 
up an attention to posture, understood here as the practiced poise,  stance 
and cultivated attitude one adopts. The development of style becomes an 
issue of building up and refi ning a performative or behavioural consistency 
through practice – something like the ‘signature’ that Murray highlights as 
the basis of compositional practices. As Foreign Offi ce Architects recently 
admitted: 
1.  Bergson (1992), pp. 128-9.
2.  Mau (2000), p. 27.
3.  Kwinter (2000), p. 35. 
4.  Massumi (2002a).
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“we have lately realised that there were several features that appeared in various 
projects. This helped us to accelerate processes and improve on discoveries we 
had made, and we began to understand style as the improvement of techniques 
and operations through repetition in different projects.”5 
In previous Acts I have been arguing that style is indeed related to the 
techniques and operations that generate the ‘force of form’ but also to the 
forces of relation assembled through ‘posture’, which shapes the potential 
of generative techniques and operations. Developing one’s style is an 
issue of building up and refi ning affective diagrams. This occurs through 
iteration: a process through which “the presentation of relations between 
forces” – or the diagram – are refi ned or ‘improved’. Iteration enables a 
snowballing effect, where the variations across the series of works start to 
build up a strong sense of tendency and limits. 
Style becomes contagious when such a behavioural refrain resonates 
with, for instance, the sentiment of a cultural milieu. Resonance both lingers 
and spreads outward, affecting and modulating things around it through 
the power of its amplifi ed vibrations. Affect contagion relies on resonance: 
where a sympathetic vibration arises in the encounters between things, 
provoking an amplifi cation of a force and form of feeling. This pertains to 
how a style emerges through a specifi c body of work, where resonances 
occur across projects and their iterations, amplifying and folding back such 
that a style feeds back into and develops itself. The resonating feedback 
loop similarly pertains to how a new style can emerge, develop, take hold, 
spread, modulate a milieu and be modulated in turn. In the manner of 
strong emergence, the emergent macro-level style folds back to affect its 
micro-level behavioural constituents.
When understood in these ways, the problems of translation laced 
through Lynn’s early work can be seen to arise through a relatively 
undeveloped style in that his body of work had not gathered enough 
iterations for a powerful, all-over and over-all resonance to have arisen. 
Weak resonance is like weak emergence, it does not have a powerful and 
unavoidable downward causation. The more that style has been gathered 
through the iterations of practice, the more easily diffi cult gaps or leaps, 
such as translation (or transduction), can be bridged through the glue of 
developed affective diagrams. 
In laying out the collection of Lynn’s body of work since the Presbyterian 
Church, by now quite an extraordinary and prolifi c array of investigation, 
one can gather a sense of his developing style as an affective refrain 
through the variations and repetitions across each project. As Wölffl in put 
5.  Hensel; Menges; Weinstock (2004), p. 36.
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it: “To explain a style then can mean nothing more than to place it in its 
general historical context and to verify that it speaks in harmony with 
the other organs of its age.”6 ‘Speaking in harmony’ pertains to how the 
affective movements of the numerous ‘organs’ operate in relation to one 
another, where a sense of style emerges through both the divergences 
and reinforcements within these relations. This is no less true for the style 
of an era, a particular practitioner or a specifi c project. This technique 
of gathering a non-linear sense of affective movement across instances 
was perhaps Lynn’s missing move in the Presbyterian Church. Rather than 
extract one frame from the sequence of the animation and then discipline 
its performance to dance with the technical structure of animated motion, 
one could gather a sense of the character of movement across the frames. 
This sense would be related to patterned changes over time, or activation 
contours yoked into forms of feeling that qualitatively mould the character 
of a style. This character of (affective) movement, or style, can then 
operate as a compositional guide, even as it changes mood, reveals hidden 
dimensions, transforms and matures with age and in sympathy with its 
era, like a signature.
An attention to the more ‘global’, overall quality of the work becomes 
easier when there is a bigger fi eld of projects to assist in the gathering 
of a sense of movement  – where the style or texture of a meta-diagram 
becomes easier to discern. Certainly, an assessment of the formal moves 
of the Church project start to change in hue and gather richness when 
considered in concert with subsequent projects. 
The use of the formal mechanism of breaking modulating surfaces into 
variational strips or shreds, as discussed through the Church project, began 
in the early installation projects and remained emblematic in his work up 
until around 2000-2001. Both the Embryological Houses (1998-1999) and 
the Predator installation (1999-2000) utilised this formal mechanism to 
some degree, but in a fi ner, more fi ligree and less dominant way, and could 
be seen as the events through which this tendency began to be digested, 
absorbed and transformed. 
6.  Wölffl in, Heinrich (1984), p. 79.
7.02 Greg Lynn, Predator (1999-2000).
7.03 Greg Lynn, Pretty Good Life.com, 
Stockholm, Sweden (1999-2000).
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Lynn’s research into surface texturing through CNC milling, such as 
in his showroom for PrettyGoodLife.com (1999-2000) began to mark out 
an attention to texture and ornament. Then, the Predator project added 
another dimension to this, where the aim was “to produce a relief surface 
modulated by painterly effects.”7 Lynn writes of this collaborative installa-
tion as skins that “can be moved through, around and within presenting a 
variegated combination of spatial and pictorial sensibilities.”8 The effort to 
integrate ornament/surface texture and form that came after the Church 
is quite marked. It is as if a texture of affect leapt out of the background of 
the Church and very quickly embossed Lynn’s surfaces with a blossoming 
of forces.
The development of Lynn’s style as a whole could be seen to have 
integrally involved a struggle to access the background texture of affect 
such that he can direct its animate abstraction (or affective movements). 
Eisenman had the foresight to observe that “the diagram has moved from 
the strategies of reading to the tactics of visceral experience”9 and Lynn 
has gradually developed this aspect of his work in a way that is at once 
a maturation of his practice and, I would argue, a development of the 
subtexts of the broader style of processual architecture. 
Interestingly enough, thinking back to Wölffl in, ornament has played 
a very signifi cant role in the development of Lynn’s style. Ornament is 
an aspect of architectural form that is relatively freed from the range of 
constraints that larger forms must deal with and operates almost entirely 
in terms of aesthetic impulse. As Wölffl in argues, it is a blossoming of 
excess force that is sensitive to the ‘pulse of the age.’ In other words, it 
settles into place with a sensitivity to the atmosphere of the situation, or 
what we might call an atmospheric sensibility (sense-ability). 
John Macarthur has drawn attention to the compatibility of Wölffl in’s 
ideas of movement and its bodily relations to those of his contemporary, 
the philosopher Henri Bergson.10 For Bergson, movement is distinguishable 
from motion. While motion is related to actions in space, or the act of 
physically moving, movement is experienced as a whole and indivisible 
‘image’ – or in the terms developed in this thesis, as an affective diagram. 
The Wölffl inian-Bergsonian kind of affective movement is, I argue, the 
very ‘force’ of the animate that Lynn has been implicitly refi ning, as not 
only something implied in the Animate Form essay but also as a consis-
tency that gradually unfolds in his ongoing  practice. I would suggest that 
this has, at the same time, involved a breaking down (or grinding up into 
fi ner ‘particles’), of the auratic magic that surrounded his earlier animated 
diagrams. In those earlier days, the glow surrounding the use of new tech-
7.  Lynn (2006), p. 133.
8.  From ‘Predator.pdf’, a fi le downloaded 
from Greg Lynn’s web site; www.glform.com 
(accessed 30th November, 2005).
9.  Eisenman (1999), p. 208-9.
10.  Macarthur (2001-2).
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7.04  Back Cover of catalogue for: Greg Lynn (curator), Intricacy, Institute of Contemporary Arts Philidelphia, 2003.
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nologies was a formidable force that smothered a more nuanced under-
standing of an emerging performative intricacy. Since then, Lynn’s work 
has become less surrounded by a kind of hyper-commodifi cation of the 
new, developing a more sophisticated and multiplicitous edge. His more 
recent exhibition, Intricacy (2003), emphatically articulates the develop-
ment of this understanding. 
Rather than support this argument through further and more detailed 
investigations of Lynn’s later work, I will touch back on the earlier com-
parison of Lynn’s and Wölffl in’s respective writing postures by turning to 
Lynn’s piece of science fi ction, ‘A New Style of Life,’ in which his mode of 
expression radically shifted. The story was intended to be part of his book 
‘Embryological House’,11 which has not been published. 
In ArchiNed News, March 7, 2002, it was reported that Lynn read out 
an excerpt of this story at a presentation at the Berlage Institute. The 
reporter writes:
“To escape from the promise that ‘architectural theory’ presupposes, Lynn has 
recently started using science fi ction as a medium for expression, since it is a 
more narrative way of describing the desired atmosphere and spatial quality.”12
This resonates with the sense we are entering “the post-critical  era”13 
marked out by the fi nal issue of Assemblage in which the story was 
published as Lynn’s one page contribution. ‘A New Style of Life’ is indeed 
remarkably different to his earlier writing style. This short story takes 
place in a house that is a living, or at least a semi-living entity: it breathes, 
sleeps and feels. Inside the guts of the house, dwells a man in a developed 
bio-technological world. Along with his dreams, rituals and sensations, 
we hear about his animate contact lenses and other bio-prosthetics, his 
farm-raised clothing (genetically engineered from the cells of a frog), his 
coffee beans processed through the digestive tracks of Lemur monkeys 
(a process he attempts to replicate through surreptitiously feeding them 
to his vegetarian girlfi end). While the ‘Embryological Houses’ are only 
drawn and modelled as a form viewed from the outside, never giving an 
indication of its inhabitability, Lynn steps inside the house through the 
story – into a new style of life – and into an internal state of affairs. While 
the point of view is still of ‘a man’ (over there) like his blobs in another 
space (over there) rather than, for instance, being written in fi rst person, 
it nevertheless offers an account of his inner life and of the practices 
of living that might be imagined to occur within the scene of his formal 
architectural speculations. 
11.  In Lynn (2000), it is stated that the story 
is “Excerpt from the chapter: ‘A New Style 
of Life’ from Embryological House, Princeton 
Architectural Press, forthcoming Fall 2001.
12.  Jeroen Mensink, http://www.classic.
archined.nl/news/0203/greglynn_en.htm
13.  Lavin (2000), p. 40.
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7.05  Greg Lynn, Embryological House (1998-1999).
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This ‘new style of life’ is characterised by an environment and domestic 
objects that are highly responsive. In the relations between human 
activities, built environments and items such as clothing, prosthetics and 
food, there is an amplifi ed dynamism through the liveliness or biologically 
lived dimensions of all ‘participants’. In relation to a more familiar domestic 
scene, there is a kind of redistribution of powers to affect and to be 
affected. The life of objects is amplifi ed and highlighted – becoming, quite 
literally, animate forms. By exploring these relations from the perspective 
of a particular man’s domestic style of life, Lynn is foregrounding these 
relations from an intimate, behavioural perspective, rather than from 
the more external, distant approach to the responsive, supple digital 
diagrams and forms through which his work began gathering power. While 
responsiveness was largely active only in terms of the content of academic 
critique in the earlier text, in ‘A New Style of Life’ it becomes aptly recast 
into the stance of the storyteller, shifting the focus to lived relations that 
literally fl esh out the idea of responsive environments. Like the gradual 
refi nement of the formal mechanism of variational strips, as discussed 
above, through this shift in his writing we can see the responsive diagram 
being digested, absorbed and transformed. This would appear to be a 
phase shift involving a signifi cant recasting of an affective diagram. As a 
style is developed, so is its diagram. 
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2. Background Sensibilities
“…criticism must now understand sensibility as a form of intelligence rather 
than opposed to intellection…the building in ecstasy is a concept that takes on 
provocative signifi cance and opens pleasurable new dimensions to the theoretical 
project.”14
The emphasis on responsiveness in Lynn’s work resonates with the 
‘surfaces of negotiation’ and mutual affectivity discussed in Act 5 through 
kokkugia and biothing. Indicative of the nature of the sensibility being 
developed, all involve a sensitivity to complex, or intricate, negotiation. 
Negotiation always involves a dynamic play of power relations through 
which a balance or agreement can be struck. This resonates with Holland’s 
search for a balance between poetry and physics, as well as Evans call for 
manners of working that lie between orderly neatness and unrestrained 
feeling. One could say, then, that this is a sensibility that pertains to the 
art of emergence or an ethico-aesthetic know-how.
In using Lynn as an exemplary fi gure I am suggesting that the sensibility 
we fi nd being developed in Lynn’s work is part of the production of a new 
style that is relevant beyond his work in particular, being implicit to the 
fi eld of processual architecture in general. But this kind of sensibility and 
this stylistic fl avour is not entirely ‘new’, it is a recasting of a long history 
of related tendencies. In order to appreciate the difference that might 
allow us to call it ‘new’, we need to explore some background history – or 
confi gurations from which it emerged.
In a short essay ‘The Triumph of Software,’ published in New Society in 
1968, Reyner Banham chews over a growing sensibility related to software 
and responsive environments. This essay offers a laudatory review of the 
fi lm Barbarella, which had been released that year, using it to exemplify 
this growing sensibility. He holds this in contrast to a hardware related 
sensibility, exemplifi ed by Stanley Kubrick’s fi lm, 2001, also released in 
1968. He writes of Barbarella’s “ambience of curved, pliable, continuous, 
breathing, adaptable surfaces” and juxtaposes it with “all that grey 
plastic and crackle-fi nish metal, and knobs and switches, all that … yech 
… hardware!” in 2001. Banham’s essay was printed with an image from 
2001 of a semi-naked male lying somewhat impassively relaxed in a hard 
surfaced, hard edged environment juxtaposed with an image of Barbarella 
in tight, sheer garments and on all fours in her fur-lined space-ship, looking 
a little startled. 
14.  Lavin (2000), p. 40.
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Banham paints a picture of a battle between the behind-the-times 
hardies and the fi nger-on-the-pulse softies. Banham, being a softie, 
celebrates that which he sees as the “whole vision” of the fi lm as “one in 
which hardware is fallible, and software (animate or otherwise) usually 
wins.”15 Banham hails Barbarella as a cult movie whose responsive 
environments will “become what the fi lm is remembered to have been 
about.”16 It is a “splendid coincidence”, he writes, that a company called 
‘Responsive Environments Corporation’ went public on the New York 
stock exchange in the same week that the fi lm premiered: “Whatever the 
company is about, Barbarella is about responsive environments, of one 
sort of another, and so has been the architectural underground for the last 
three years or so.”  Banham exposes his admiration for fur as a superior 
and super-friendly material, linking its enigmatic nature to the infl atable, 
and thereby to Archigram’s infl atable prototype personal environment. He 
makes a connection, in other words between ‘natural’ materials such as 
fur and plastic membranes.
Interestingly enough, this essay has been re-addressed in recent 
architectural discourse by Greg Lynn’s partner, Sylvia Lavin. In an essay 
titled ‘Plasticity at Work,’ Lavin briefl y critiques Banham’s essay on 
Barbarella in order to position the role of plasticity in relation to modernism. 
Her essay appears in the book Mood River produced in association with 
an exhibition of that name at the Wexner Centre, Ohio, staged in 2002. 
This book was published with a somewhat toxic smelling but luminously 
translucent, plastic orange cover in which ‘Mood River’ was embossed in 
an elaborately infl ected, fl owingly ribboned font. A sense of plasticity, 
materiality, affectivity and infl ection was wrapped around her words. 
Lavin claims that Banham, through this essay, is “more-or-less the 
only architectural critic to say anything interesting about plastic,”17 but 
she critiques the opposition he sets up between hardware and software, 
suggesting that the plasticity of software rather bought something 
repressed within hardware to the surface. She tracks the role of plasticity 
in architectural discourse back to its earliest days, with Vitruvius’s Ten 
Books, where he codifi ed the ‘plastic arts’ as derived from the Greek term 
plassien, or to mould.18 The plastic arts were rooted in the material and 
manual labour of ceramics, stucco, plaster and sculpture and distinguished 
from the ‘higher’, liberal arts which pertained to abstract rather than 
material properties. 
Lavin notes that in modernism the use of the term ‘plastic’ seems to 
attain a higher status, where she claims that almost every major modern 
architect was interested in the kind of plasticity discussed by le Corbusier 
15.  Banham (1968), p. 630.
16.  Ibid, p. 629.
17.  Lavin (2002), p. 75.
18.  Lavin (2002), p. 76.
7.06  Text from cover of catalogue for Mood 
River exhibition (2002), organised by Jeffrey 
Kipnis and Annetta Massie and held at the 
Wexner Centre for the Arts.
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7.07  Juxtaposition of images from the fi lms 2001 and Barbarella.
7.08  Archigram, Infl atable Suit-Home, Milan Triennale, 1968. 7.09  Images from the fi lm Barbarella (1968), 
Dino De Laurentiis, Paramount Pictures.
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as a pure creation of the mind. Architecture was now both of a ‘higher’, 
abstract order and a plastic thing: “Plastic…is modernity itself for Wright and 
Le Corbusier in the form of plasticity.”19 The growth of plastic production 
and application in the 1960s becomes a very material analogue of the pure 
but plastic, conceptual mind such that “plastic exceeds modernity’s logic 
when in the form of a material without an ethical mandate.”20 A tension 
arises here between mind and matter. This gave rise to a sensibility in 
which, as Lavin puts it, modernity itself “is disfi gured by a plastic already 
embedded in modernity’s ideology.”21
As Lavin’s argument suggests, through this shift in the connotations of 
the term ‘plastic’, one can see less of an opposition between the hard and 
the soft (or the rigid and the responsive) than a transformational surfacing 
of a materiality “without an ethical mandate” implicitly embedded in logic 
of modernity. This background materiality, I would argue, can be seen as 
the plasticity of affect, which highlights the sensual aspects of thinking and 
the bodily reality of the mind. The battle between hardware and software 
becomes yet another instance of a sensibility clash that gave rise to a 
compositional reappraisal wherein a shared ground between competing 
parties is proffered as a site of mediation. Lavin points out that the history 
of modernity has involved repeated ruptures and is “thus an inconsistent 
phenomenon, riddled by moments of oscillation that have opened archi-
tecture to spaces of signifi cant experimentation and that have demanded 
extraordinary agility. These ruptures have given to architecture’s history 
dynamic moments of plasticity.”22 The conditions for the articulation of 
new modes of composition are, in other words, characterized by the prop-
erty of plasticity. 
The main point of Lavin’s essay seems deeply related to her later 
published book on the architect Richard Neutra, Form Follows Libido, where 
she writes that her “study seeks to explore the zones of affective intensity 
that came to infi ltrate the cool and neutral spaces of modernism.”23 That 
which infi ltrated and disfi gured modernism was “affective intensity” – the 
force of relations at the fold of mind and matter. If this sensibility – this 
sensitivity to affective intensity – was emerging in the 60s, it re-emerged 
in a different form in the 1990s, when ‘folding’ explicitly took centre stage 
through Greg Lynn.  
Lavin gave birth to her and Lynn’s fi rst child while fi nishing the fourth 
chapter of Form Follows Libido, which was titled ‘Birth Trauma.’ This was 
in the late 90s, around the time that Lynn’s Embryological Houses were 
being widely published. If something was conceived around that time, 
it was perhaps lodged in Lavin’s introductory question regarding why 
19.  Ibid.
20.  Ibid.
22.  Lavin (2002), p. 75.
22.  Ibid, p. 74.
23.  Lavin (2004), p. 9.
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Neutra’s work is still considered to be contemporary.24 This eventually 
leads to her fi nal remarks that “today’s interest in Neutra, the moodiest 
of architects, reveals that architecture… [is] again able to generate new 
affective environments. That’s why these houses by Neutra are not merely 
modern but rather contemporary.”25 If Neutra’s affective sensibilities 
are poignantly contemporary, then Lavin must have had some particular 
contemporary architecture in mind. In drawing attention to Neutra’s part 
in a history of relationships between architecture and psychoanalysis (or 
the analysis of affects) she associates his work with both Peter Eisenman 
and Frank Gehry. But in her relationship with Lynn, there is perhaps an 
even more poignant association. 
In her book, Lavin tells us how Richard Neutra’s wife, Dione, would 
often play the cello in the background while he delivered his lectures. The 
air would be fi lled, explicitly, with a constructed background tone. Her cello 
playing was, in a sense, part of his architectural atmospherics; the air 
fi lled with a musically composed affective texture. Like Dione’s cello music 
swirling around and through Richard’s lectures, Greg’s plastic diagrams 
and environments could be considered as the architectural atmospheres in 
which Sylvia speaks of a contemporary, affective sensibility. 
But is this contemporary sensibility really the growth of a new style? 
In Wolffl in’s later work, we can fi nd something very similar in what he 
called the ‘painterly style’. He contrasts this with the ‘linear style’, one that 
resonates with Banhams juxtaposition of the ‘hardies’ and the ‘softies.’ 
Wolffl in’s description of this distinction is of such pertinence it is worth 
quoting at length: 
“The great contrast between linear and painterly style corresponds to radically 
different interests in the world. In the former case, it is the solid fi gure, in the 
later, the changing appearance: in the former, the enduring form, measurable, 
fi nite; in the latter, the movement, the form in function; in the former, the thing 
in itself; in the later, the thing in its relations. And if we can say that in the linear 
style the hand has felt out the corporeal world essentially according to its plastic 
content, the eye in the painterly stage has become sensitive to the most various 
textures, and it is no contradiction if even here the visual sense seems nourished 
by the tactile sense–that other tactile sense which relishes the kind of surface, 
the different skin of things. Sensation now penetrates beyond the solid object 
into the realm of the immaterial. The painterly style alone knows a beauty of the 
incorporeal. From differently orientated interests in the world, each time a new 
beauty comes to birth.”26 
24.  Ibid.
25.  Ibid, p. 144.
26.  Wolffl in (1950), p. 27.
7.10  Juxtaposition of one of Greg Lynn’s 
Embryological Houses (1999) and Richard 
Neutra’s Chuey House (1956).
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There is a neat likeness between Wolffl in’s description here of the 
‘painterly style’ and those characteristics I have been emphasising as 
key to the fi eld of processual architecture. Rather than something ‘new’ it 
starts to seem like more of a development of a style that has long operated 
through related sensibilities. But like all reappraisals of compositional 
principles, I have argued, there is an attempt to establish a new ground of 
shared action between divergent styles. 
What Wollfl in refers to as ‘plastic’ does not appear to be the same as 
the conceptual plasticity that Lavin refers to. Rather than plastic images 
of the mind, Wolffl in’s plastic pertains to the precise, measurable, solid 
dimensions of fi nite things that can be staked out with the hand, and 
seems related to the ‘base’ materiality implied in Vitruvius’s notion of ‘the 
plastic arts.’ But rather than a dichotomy of mind and matter carving the 
division between these two styles, he allocates them to the hand and the 
eye: the plastic pertains to a sensibility developed through the manual acts 
of the hand, whereas the tactile pertains to the change and movement of 
the thing in its relations, as felt out through the eye. The ground shared by 
stylistic leanings is, for Wolffl in, bodies, which act differently according to 
their particular interests in the world. What’s different in the contemporary 
affective sensibility is that the eye and the hand, along with the rest of the 
body (including mind), fold into a complex collaboration in what Massumi 
calls “the glue of the world”: affect. 
Processual architecture tends to focus on the behavioural relations that 
defi ne a generative process through which form emerges. I have been 
trying to suggest that this emphasis on behavioural relations is not confi ned 
to the models, diagrams and fi elds being designed, but implicates the 
behaviour, attention and modes of perception of the designer within the 
design event and in their relationship with the materials they work with. 
The mode of composition that holds together this new style comes to bear 
through the dynamic balance struck between affecting and being affected. 
The standard and the non-standard, yet another way of imagining this 
broad and enduring stylistic division, was earlier discussed as a distinction 
pertaining to the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be 
affected within a given negotiation. Style, as I suggested at the beginning 
of this Act, is about ways of doing things and modes of engagement, and 
this is just as relevant to the formal poise of solid things as it is to the 
behavioural dynamics of living action.
If various ruptures of modernity have repeatedly produced dynamic 
moments of plasticity, this plasticity arises through a reassembling of 
the shared ground of affective action. The compositional guides that 
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have emerged historically have been, for all their abstraction, relatively 
fi gurative systems such as character and elastic geometries. In this next 
stage of compositional regrounding, the affective contours have been 
withheld from fi guration, where affective quality remains uncategorized 
into named feelings or fi gures. The navigational guide of composition 
becomes an affective texture, or an uncapturable movement-image, that 
emerges through situational negotiation. This guide pertains to modes of 
behaviour and an ethics of action performed by the designer, the design 
process and the designed. 
The soft, non-standard and painterly are differentiated from the hard, 
standard and linear through ways of recasting affect into form. With 
processual architecture, the emphasis is not just on the formal behaviour, 
nor on the behaviour of the designer, but on the affective relations, shaped 
or affected by the generative processes, through which they mutually 
affect one another. The formal result is not an end point, but a trigger 
of affective relations, transduced from the act of designing to the act of 
engaging in the world.
As Mark Twain apparently said: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it 
rhymes”. And this variation of this rhyme perhaps offers the poetry of 
composition a new sense of its dynamic unity; of the affective life of its 
character and the affective character of its life.
But, if this says something about the poetics of composition, what about 
its physics? Given Holland’s call for a conjunction of poetry and physics, a 
loose bit of science might help to tighten up the poetry. 
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3. The Intricacy of Intimate Relations
Isabelle Stengers has written on what she sees as the style of science 
as practiced by Nobel prize winning geneticist, Barbara McClintock, who 
made substantial contributions to genetics through her studies of corn. 
McClintock was seen as something of an oddball amongst her fi eld; her 
way of working was foreign to the normative modes of scientifi c research. 
Stengers writes that McClintock’s research documents were:
“… detective articles: frenzied constructions, abounding in details, seemingly 
incoherent for those who only gave them a superfi cial reading; a slow and subtle 
creation of meaning, a narrative that could not be condensed from an encounter 
with a multiple and ambiguous adversary and that could only be understood by 
those rare few who knew that one does not “force” corn to speak, that one can 
only interrogate it by way of its distinctive and demanding conditions.”27 
The delicately poised stance that Stengers associates with the implicit 
demands of complexity science (Act 2) are embodied in more detail here 
through the particular work of McClintock. McClintock’s stance could be 
seen, from an external viewpoint, to be similar to the posture of Stevie 
(discussed by Robin Evans), while offering an insight into that experience 
of creative immersion that is so rarely discussed. McClintock becomes 
so immersed in her work that, as she herself puts it, she would forget 
herself: 
 The more I worked [with chromosomes], the bigger and bigger [they] got, and 
when I was really working with them I wasn’t outside, I was down there. I was 
part of the system ... As you look at these things, they become part of you. And 
you forget yourself. The main thing is that you forget yourself.28  
But she forgot herself through throwing herself into the world, 
suspended in the question of what, in the particularities of this moment, 
is happening? This is quite different to the normative question of mod-
ern science – ‘what, in any-moment-whatsoever, is happening?’ – that 
generates a different kind of suspense: a departure into the airspace of 
universal, transcendent truths. In such a space it is hard to land without 
ruining everything; one cannot ‘properly’ leave such ideality. Alternatively, 
the openness in the act of forgetting takes her mode of engagement out 
of the objective, distancing, critical posture and threads it more intimately 
into the texture of the situation. Rather than attempting to ‘measure up’ 
27.  Ibid, p. 127.
28.  Cited in Root-Bernstein, Robert (1997), 
p. 9.  
7.11  Barbara McClintock, 1980. 
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an observed occurrence she practiced how “to measure oneself against it 
[the subject] like a subtle, complex partner, whose secret will only ever 
be uncovered by an effort that combines the minutest details and the 
imagination.”29 
‘Forgetting oneself’ is not the same as dissolving or losing the self nor 
is it an objective distancing and denial of the sensual experiences of the 
self. Self-awareness involves differentiating ourselves from the rest of the 
world in order to be actively engaged. Of course, this operates in reverse 
as well, because we achieve that differentiation and self-awareness 
through the act of relationship. Rather than observing the mechanics of 
relations and denying the sensual affects of this engagement, or dissolving 
oneself and loosing a sense of the contours of engagement, this is the 
intimate, complex, visceral engagement of an intimate relationship with 
one’s research. 
McClintock does not present us with a fi gure of scientifi c neatness and 
orderly behaviour. Clearly, however, she is also not so unregulated that 
her research outcomes were only suggestive or poetic. Rather like Francis 
Bacon perhaps, she ground up her data very fi ne, taking an ‘image’ or a 
model of gene behaviour and twisting it through an effort to combine “the 
minutest details and the imagination.” In a very complex, intricate, many 
dimensioned affect attunement with her subject, she generated a model 
so profoundly innovative that, eventually, it scored her a Nobel Prize. 
This was a creative process that delved deeply and intimately into a very 
particular situation in order to live the dynamic relations of micro-level 
operations. Her style of science emerged through sensibility, as conditioned 
by a posture that combined the strengths of, for instance, the surgeon and 
the magician. She didn’t force the corn to magically speak, nor did she 
objectively analyse by denying a sense of affection. She engaged with it 
eye to eye, allowing an affective connection to build from both directions, 
enabling a new model of genetic behaviour to emerge.
In a convergence within the ethico-aesthetic know-how of emergence, 
art and science dance together through shared styles of movement. 
The art of emergence is tightened through a very fi nely ground level of 
attention to affective movements – that constitute its overall or macro-level 
compositions. The science of emergence is loosened through embracing, 
affectionate engagements in its approach to micro-level relations.
29.  Stengers (1997), p. 125. 
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PART THREE
Collective Composition
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Act 8.  The Flexible Mould and Collective Resonance
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Act 8 discusses my teaching practices within the postgraduate program I directed at SIAL 
and the resulting collaborative exhibition-event, Skins of Intimate Distance. I examine 
Gilbert Simondons model of individuation and the way he incorporates the action of 
moulding within his conceptual schema. Simondon’s model offers a way of articulating 
the mode of composition that I put into play within this project, and its value in terms of 
its more enduring outcomes, that are embedded in relationships rather than purely the 
more tangible outcomes of the exhibition-event itself. 
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1. Skins of Intimate Distance
1.1  Here. Now.
I am here now, writing. You are now in some time and place unknown to 
me, reading. We can’t see each other but you know I was here and I know 
that you’re here. There is a sharing that reaches across our nows through 
written words. I feel touched by your immanent presence and I hope you 
are touched, here, in your moment of reading.
Between your now and mine is a shared here. Here. The specifi cs of its 
time and place are neither here nor there but caught up between things, 
within assemblages, across passages. It’s an elusive here, a dispersed 
now.
Writing for print is one form of remote communication. Information 
technology offers other forms. This often involves the opportunity to ‘go 
live’: to share otherwise dispersed now’s simultaneously. Reception time 
is signifi cantly de-lagged. The temporal gap gets squeezed out of play as 
moments collide across distance. We can very easily both be here, now, 
sharing aspects of the same worldly moment. This is enormously affective: 
the feeling of you, over there now, brings you closer. Sharing the now.
Temporal de-lagging becomes even more vital and extensively affective 
when considered in tandem with other responsive sensitivities involved 
in our technologies. Objects and events are animated with new kinds of 
life-like power and complexity. This occurs in quite literal ways through 
technological invention (such as the proliferation of sensors, artifi cial 
intelligence systems etc) but can also be felt in more general ways through 
the intensifi ed variability, instability and sensitivity of socio-cultural 
operations.
8.01
8.01  Poster for the Skins of Intimate Distance 
event. Designed by Arianna Wilson.
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8.02 First four pages of the Skins of Intimate Distance catalogue (October 2003). 
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Rather than just temporal simultaneity, we take ‘liveness’ to be a 
more expansive sense of living presence. It’s not just that technology is 
converging with biological aliveness, or that the biological is getting more 
technological. Both of these are occurring. Between them is an involuntary, 
emergent reassessment of what counts as ‘life’. This biopolitical age is 
one in which life itself becomes an object of manipulation, recreation and 
reassessment.
And within this, what counts as material, body and substance is opened 
up. Embodiment is not about objects limited to the fi eld of visuality, nor is 
it defi ned by the fl esh of individuals. It’s a mistake to think that our digital, 
biopolitical age involves disembodiment. We can live intensively embodied 
lives in ways not previously possible.
Skins of Intimate Distance plays with liveness. It began with the 
idea that we could produce a new media artists version of Big Brother: 
an arts event that lives an unpredictable life - evolving through folding 
into fi elds of infl uence well beyond it’s control. Rather than a series of 
personal interrelations being monitored, we would give live broadcast to 
the relations between projects, their engagement with a public and the 
evolving character of each work. As such, all the projects needed to be 
open and responsive enough to allow for a fruitful engagement.
We’ve been letting this evolve, uncertain of where it will go - or what 
sort of beast we will have produced by the end of the event. You can 
contribute to this product through engaging with the installation and the 
web site. Here is your user’s guide.
Our shared here and now matters. Sharing carries the substance of the 
world. It feeds life (you are what you share).
See you there.
[catalogue essay for Skins of Intimate Distance essay, 2003]
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1.2. The Postgraduate Program
“Use your imagination: no single logic, geometric or otherwise, is fl exible enough 
to encompass the concrete abstractness of experience in all its ins and outs. 
Just as the body lives between dimensions, designing for it requires operating 
between logics.”1  
Skins of Intimate Distance was produced in the fi rst year of a postgraduate 
program developed for the Spatial Information Architecture Laboratory 
(SIAL).2 This program was a one semester (of a two semester year) 
Graduate Certifi cate program that lead to a research Masters. The program 
took its fi rst group of students in early 2003. All these initial students did 
the program part-time rather than full-time, so it was stretched out over 
a year.
As a research laboratory, SIAL explores the convergence of new 
technologies, design and spatial information. The program was designed 
to operate at this nexus. But this nexus was not pinned to developing a 
specifi c knowledge base or set of skills. Architectural design knowledge 
was clearly the foundation of SIAL as most researchers and teaching staff 
are architecturally trained, but the school itself encompasses architecture, 
interior design, landscape architecture, industrial design and fashion. 
The laboratory was set up to feed into and out of these multiple design 
disciplines with an exploratory research agenda. In accord with this agenda, 
the postgraduate program was to accommodate a range of disciplines and 
to be focussed on project based research.3 
I envisaged the program would attract postgraduate students from 
a range of disciplines through a structure wherein they produced their 
own research within a collectively held overarching project. As such the 
program could both exercise and expand the expertise of each individual 
practitioner through productive intersections with others. I had hoped that 
the range of disciplines involved in the program would be broader than the 
various threads of design, mixing these with people from, for instance, 
biological science, computer programming and art. The program attracted 
largely artists. But as it turned out, all those attracted to the program were 
already ‘discipline hoppers’ - each person having quite mixed backgrounds, 
having done or at least started, several degrees or already actively shifting 
their work outside the boundaries of their primary discipline. Across the 
four primary students there was background experience in sound art 
and composition, comparative literature, architecture, digital rendering, 
1.  Massumi (2002a), p. 207.
2.  SIAL and the postgraduate program were 
instigated by Leon van Shaik. Professor Mark 
Burry was bought in to direct this research 
laboratory.
3.  An explicit research orientation is unusual 
for a Graduate Certifi cate which is ordinarily 
aimed at pre-defi ned skills acquisition. We 
had initially intended to put together a SIAL 
Masters program, which did not happen for 
a number of reasons. From the University 
perspective, a requirement of the program was 
that it be full fee paying which meant it had to 
be structured by course work (unlike research 
masters). For various political and structural 
reasons embedded in the relationship between 
the Bachelor of Architecture degree and the 
Masters (by research), the development of 
full fee paying Masters by coursework was 
problematic at the time. Instead, we articulated 
the Graduate Certifi cate as the fi rst semester 
of a Masters by research, should a student wish 
to carry their research on to further study. This 
did occur with about a third of the students. In 
this way we also answered to the ‘risk factor’ of 
cross disciplinary programs. For students with 
no prior contact with the School of Architecture 
and Design and/or design disciplines, this 
offered a way to become involved in the SIAL 
research environment without the longer term 
commitment of a Masters or PhD.
8.03  Advertisement for the SIAL Postgraduate 
Certifi cate program, for 2004 intake.
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management, photography, fi lm, installation/sculpture and performance 
art. It was set up to be a kind of creative think-tank to work on problems 
in individual projects while chewing over problems about broader, more 
collectively defi ned issues. 
At a pragmatic level, the value of transdisciplinarity lay in the sharing 
of knowledge, skills and expertise in the development of projects and the 
potential therein for explicit convergences into collaborative work. All of 
these hoped for outcomes did occur successfully, sometimes quite explicitly, 
certainly variously but often in ways we barely noticed at the time. 
In terms of both action and content, the program was focused on an 
elusive issue: transversality or that which links, connects and moves 
between things. Trans- is a prefi x meaning ‘across’, through’ and ‘beyond’. 
The transdisciplinary moves across, through and beyond the disciplinary. 
This emphasis was related to a broader, more implicit research project that 
was loosely defi ning the emphasis of the program, that being a desire to 
make some kind of sense of the paradigmatic shift, to put it in Deleuze-
Foucault terms, from disciplinary societies to societies of control. 
As a broad or general posture, the postgraduate program was infl ected 
by an effort to make some sense of a spatiality characteristic of our times, 
or to give some articulation to a background, socio-cultural atmosphere. 
This program involved an effort to thoughtfully materialise indicative signs, 
or to express something of its rhythm and composition through dancing 
with it. 
The theory seminar component of the program was called ‘Vital Signs’, 
alluding to ‘feeling the pulse’ and signs of life, aliveness, cultural vitality. 
One ‘sign of the times’ that was emphasised lay in forms of participation 
through which engagement with cultural artefacts and events are 
shaped.  Experiments with ‘interactivity,’ that were active throughout the 
last century,4 involve a shift in art and architecture to shape the form 
of encounter as much as the form of the thing in itself. Reality TV is a 
culturally pervasive and popular example of this. By opening an unfolding 
or live narrative event to responsive feedback, this form of art (if we can 
call it this) loops in and out of collective feeling. Reaching far beyond the 
example of reality TV, objects and mechanical systems are becoming less 
readily separated from one’s own actions. 
Within this participatory emphasis the artefact becomes more 
emphatically performative. Artefacts such as paintings are already 
performative, just in a muted or more suppressed fashion. The atmosphere 
4.  Interactivity is not purely a fascination of 
the digital era, and can be related to the efforts 
of early modernism, with cubism for instance. 
It became particularly intense in the 50’s and 
60’s as can be seen with the Cedric Price’s Fun 
Palace, Archigram and Situationism. Banhams 
emphasis on responsive environments in 
relation to the 1968 fi lm Barbarella was part 
of this. 
8.05 SIAL postcard. 
8.04  Bruce Mau Design, Promotion for the Power 
Plant, Contemporary Art Gallery, Toronto.
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of viewing and presentation is always affecting the perception of the artefact, 
and on a different time-space scale, its cultural status is inseparable 
from its reception. Live performance always involves this feedback and 
participation because the audience cannot help but contribute to the 
general atmosphere of the event, simply by being there. This atmosphere 
affects the performers and the performance as well as the audience. While 
feedback is always there, the ways and degrees with which it is active 
differs signifi cantly. Pantomimes, for instance, far more actively encourage 
audience heckling, while ballet and opera require that the audience only 
actively offer feedback in their fi nal applause, the intensity of which is 
taken as measure of appreciation. Nevertheless, in between the applause 
or the heckling, the performance itself is always being affected by the 
atmosphere. Big Brother could be seen as a pantomime leveraged out 
beyond television through its combined use with other communication 
technologies. 
One of my agendas was to approach theory in a similar way. Rather than 
announce its end or its death, I believed the issue was more one of how 
we approach and engage with theory. Like the increased performativity 
of the object, various theories, offering accounts of aspects of the world, 
could be approached with the attitude that it would not be a studied as a 
discrete object or closed system but as something that would be infl ected 
through engagement. Obviously, this implicated the ‘Vital Signs’ theory 
unit, which asked that students approach readings by continually returning 
and turning into discussions of their creative projects, such that divisions 
between theory and practice were unsettled from the start. 
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1.3. Liveness
‘Life’ is a somewhat encompassing term, loaded to the hilt with assumptions 
and habits of thought. So rather than place an emphasis on life and the 
living, I embedded the issues in the term ‘liveness’, which tends to mean 
things happening in ‘real time’, like watching a live band, seeing a game 
of tennis live on tv or listening to talk back radio. These ideas of liveness 
tend to assume an idea of an authentic perception of life/events as 
distinguished from a recorded and reproduced (and simulated) encounter 
with an event. This appeal to ‘authenticity’ mostly hinges on simultaneity 
in time. Liveness is about experiencing something ‘as it happens.’
As it happens, I used the term ‘liveness’ here in a slightly different way, 
one infl uenced by Massumi’s discussions on the signifi cance of the virtual 
and Bergson’s duration. While the perception of something happening 
NOW - even when it’s happening elsewhere - induces a powerfully direct 
sense of co-presence and immediate co-relation, events that have already 
happened also co-inhabit the moment, just as directly but less opaquely, 
like ghosts. We call this the virtual dimension which, when perceived as an 
aspect of the present, becomes an important dimension of duration. But 
this historical presence is only the beginning of the story of the virtual: 
things virtually there are not just historical, they are also in potential: 
potential actions and futures, imaginations, unconscious or nonconscious 
activity, hidden knots and peripheral visions. Most of what happens is 
not clear or conscious. Most of it, in fact, is virtual: so much intangible 
presence that folds into every present moment. Suppress the virtual and 
things get rather lifeless or pallid. Amplifi cations of virtuality make things 
lively: there is a palpable sense of liveness, aliveness or liveliness, three 
terms which here become somewhat synonymous. 
So, liveness is more than experiencing something ‘as it happens’, it 
is a more expansive sense of aliveness. It is the duration that Bergson 
philosophically urged us to feel, that Wölffl in promoted architecturally and 
Lynn has struggled to work with. I chose ‘liveness’ instead of ‘liveliness’ or 
‘aliveness’ in a gesture of connection between the Bergsonian, Wölffl inian 
movement-image and the deeply held, infusive affects of information 
technologies on the conditions of our present experience. 
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distance:
Liveness +Affect
inti
-mate
Spatial Information Architecture Laboratory
www.sial.rmit.edu.au
Intimate Distance: Liveness and Affect
Visiting Fellows Program, RMIT University As part of the SIAL Graduate Certificate Program.
August 4th – 11th 2003.
Liveness is the sense of living presence. This often involves the sense of a presence that is elsewhere,
where actions are registered simultaneously across different spaces (geographical, operational,
perceptual, disciplinary....). Today, related phenomena are frequently tied up with the increasing
perceptual sensitivity of technological operations, often acting to animate objects and events with new
kinds of life-like power and complexity. This occurs in quite literal ways through technological invention
(such as the proliferation of sensors, artificial intelligence systems etc) and can be felt through the
intensified variability, instability and sensitivity of socio-cultural operations.
The SIAL Graduate Certificate program explores these conditions with an emphasis on the production of
closeness across geographic and/or representational distance or, in other words, the sense of
immediate, intimate presence through remote means. Attention is focused on ways that affective
(qualitative, emergent) dimensions of events might be transduced across distinct media, moments and
spaces: how we allow the openness of affectivity to survive (instrumental) shifts of register.
INTIMATE DISTANCE: Liveness and Affect is a week long visiting fellows program involving lectures,
colloquium and workshops related to the above issues. Workshop activity will predominantly be aimed at
developing an installation-event for October 2003 SKINS OF INTIMATE DISTANCE; surfacing unnatural
histories being produced by the RMIT SIAL Graduate Certificate program in partnership with
Experimedia (State Library of Victoria) and RMIT undergraduate students from Fashion, Communications
Design and Architecture.
Many of the events during the week will be open to the public through webcam streaming. Links to the
webcams and details of these events will be available at http://liveness.sial.rmit.edu.au and through
http://www.sial.rmit.edu.au
Participants include: Brian Massumi, Natalie Jeremijenko, Hellen Sky, Stelarc, Marcelyn Gow, Daniel
Norell, Jonas Runberger, Mark Burry, Pia Ednie-Brown, Tom Kovac, Spela Mlakar, Don Bates, Ned
Rossiter + others.
Brian Massumi Stelarc Natalie Jeremijenko Hellen Sky Marcelyn
Gow Daniel Norell Jonas Runberger Mark Burry Pia Ednie-Brown
Tom Kovac Spela Mlakar Don Bates Ned Rossiter + others
Wednesday 6th August, 5.30-8pm
Storey Hall RMIT University
Natalie Jeremijenko
(techno-artist, Yale+ Centre of Advanced Technology, NY)
Stelarc
(international performance artist)
Thursday 7th August, 5.30-8pm
Storey Hall RMIT University
Marcelyn Gow
(architect, SERVO; Los Angeles, Zurich, NY)
Brian Massumi
(philosopher, Uni of Montreal)
1.4. The Event
“A political ecology is an amoral collective ethics. Ethics is a tending of coming 
together, a caring for belonging as such.”5
Each of the postgraduate students had some kind of project proposal to 
work from, laid out already in their application to enrol in the program. I 
was keen to actively foster intersections, overlaps or, perhaps, mergers 
between these projects as they developed.  Fairly early in the year, 
within the context of the theory seminar, I put a proposal to the group, 
suggesting that we start with the idea of staging some kind of new-media-
artists Big Brother, except that rather than the behaviour of the person 
being the subject of public scrutiny, it would be the behaviour of projects 
in development. I suggested that after some initial project investigation, 
they would enter into an intensive ‘live-in’ scenario of a studio environment 
from which project development would be streamed, in some way, for 
public engagement and feedback. All were enthusiastic. It was a vague 
proposal that was focused less on specifi cs than the general confi guration 
found in contemporary forms of participation, where relations of intimacy 
and distance become twisted into a feedback loop of responsive on-the-fl y 
‘tweaking’. 
While the postgraduates began their project investigations they also 
searched for possible venues. The best option we found was an exhibition 
space called ‘Experimedia’ in the State Library of Victoria. On deciding 
on this venue, we were also restricting our capacity for live streaming 
of events. Firewall and bandwidth issues meant that this would have to 
remain fairly modest. 
I called the event ‘Skins of Intimate Distance’ and at the beginning 
of the second semester we staged a visiting scholars program, ‘Intimate 
Distance; liveness and affect’, involving student workshops and seminars, 5.  Massumi (2002a), p. 255.
8.06 Inger Mewburn, Relationship diagram of Skins of Intimate Distance 
confi guration. 
8.08  Poster for Intimate Distance visiting 
scholars program. Designed by Arianna 
Wilson.
8.07  Schematic layout diagram of installation.
8.09  Scene from the SIAL student lab during 
the Infoliations, virtools workshop run by Gow 
et al.
228
50
40
3-
44
8
44
8
20
28
6
14
1
19
30
19
7
378
381
809
703-809
30
2-
44
99
305-2390
705
-A-1
200
306-3986
52
0
1278
38
6
300
38
5
300
300
435
203
38
3
38
0
19
8
704-1575
308-B-694
235
344
115
308-A-2259
72
0
21
8
33
2
33
4
33
6
2011
30
4-
52
0
125
276
300
322
34
0
34
0
34
4
17
1015
694
22
59
930
341
211
29
1
40
5-
29
1
12
5
16
6
40
6-
10
2510
25
18
2
43
8
40
5
407-12
781 284
281
277
272
163
516-A
515-A
514-A
513-A
307-1766
530-B
1766
414-947
947
3
115
315
1575
288
272
247
183
373
260
252
160
514-B
515-C
244
3986
413-3401
517-C
516-C
343
1109
1534
1254
89
211
227
188
2390
80
44
99
10
80
81
30
0
30
0
30
0
30
0
30
0
30
0
30
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
29
7
29
7
29
7
22
0
404 303
173
457
529
527
1506
104
791
610
70
5-
C-
12
10
12
10
63
16
4
22
3
29
7
28
0
18
3
10
87
26
7
25
4
23
6
20
9
66
521-C
41
2-
10
87
410
-10
95
395
401
213
87
705-B
-1377
1337
256
300
303
306
172
120
0
25
318
312
308
238
109
5
411-1600
523-C
524-C
1600
520-C
518-C
1896
308-C-2011
129°
138°
144°
147°
149°
145°
151°
156°
159°
160°
160°
158°
157°
159°
162°
163°
107°108°108°108°107°
106°103°
100°
99°
99°
99°
116°
118°
121°
124°
515-B
516-B
517-B
518-B
519-B
520-B
521-B
522-B
523-B
524-B
525-B
526-A
527-A
528-A
529-A
530-A
531
529-B
528-B
527-B
526-B
525-C
522-C
519-C
513-B
512-B
525-A
524-A
523-A
522-A
521-A
520-A
519-A
518-A
517-A
512-A
511-A
511-B
300
where we assembled the key guests of Brian Massumi, Natalie Jeremijenko 
and Marcelyn Gow (SERVO). Along with Mark Burry and other SIAL 
researchers, those involved included Stelarc, Hellen Skye (Company in 
Space), Daniel Norell, Jonas Runberger, Tom Kovac, Spela Mlakar, Ned 
Rossiter, Robyn Barnacle, Brent Allpress, Donald Bates (LAB) and Andrew 
Benjamin. This week long event involved public lectures, a design workshop 
with Gow, numerous discussion seminars with Massumi and others, and 
the opportunity for the postgraduates students to present their projects to 
this community of people for discussion. 
For the design workshop, a group of undergraduate architecture and 
fashion design students gathered in a seminar through which to design 
and construct the exhibition structure: the ‘housing’ of the work. They 
worked with Gow, Norell and Runberger (assisted by Roland Snooks 
and Jonathan Podborsek) in producing a set of highly speculative and 
exploratory propositions that were focussed around the use of a particular 
software package, Virtools. 
This then had to quickly turn back into a range of particulars required 
for the exhibition structure, that were only then becoming clear as the 
postgraduate projects took shape and the limits of budget, sponsorship 
and such forth congealed. These clarifi cations and the need to resolve the 
design of the structure all happened in a very short time frame.  It was not 
unlike the animated casts: once the mould was strung up and the plaster 
poured, we could push things about to some degree but we had to move 
fast. 
We knew we had an aluminium system with which to construct the 
‘bones’ of the structure (donated to us by AME systems). We decided to 
use this to support large sheets of skin textured latex (recently developed 
in the production The Shower, as discussed in the next Act) that would 
wrap around and enclose each project, suggesting a continuity between 
them. Apart from its textural, qualitative dimensions, the latex offered 
8.12  Making the latex skins. 
8.13  Constructing the installation structure. 
8.10  Part ceiling plan of Skins of Intimate Distance exhibition 
structure. 
8.11  Skins of Intimate Distance installation with Boo Chapple inside the skin.
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‘wall’ surfaces that could be manipulated (through pulling, stretching, 
puckering etc) by each postgraduate to ‘fi t’ the project, while remaining 
a fairly continuous entity, or as a single enveloping skin or mould. I drew 
up a basic schematic plan based on the intentions of, and relationships 
between, each project. This shifted and twisted into place through a range 
of infl uences and constraints to do with siting, required areas, buildability 
and various aesthetic judgements. The roof structure was designed to add 
another layer of connection from above, for which a relatively elaborate 
skeletal patterning was generated using Rhino software. Primary paths 
of movement and intersection acted as kinks in a striated ‘hatching’ fl ow, 
that visually and structurally held the structure as a whole together.
The resulting piece was made with 50m or so of 3 meter high sheets of 
latex hung and attached to a structure about the size of a small apartment. 
A long and exhausting process was set in place in which sheets of latex 
were cast with laser cut timber ‘moulds’, one by one, in an unused space 
at RMIT. This material afforded the exhibition a literally, or physically 
responsive dimension, where the housing was elastic and responsive 
to touch. These skins were supported by an extraordinary amount of 
aluminium donated to us very generously by AME Systems. Latex is a 
smelly substance and the Experimedia gallery was soon highly ‘perfumed’ 
by a strong latex odour. We managed to obtain some other ‘perfumes’ 
that would add to this olfactory dimension. These perfumes were ‘blood’, 
‘breast milk’, ‘rotten wood’ and ‘swamp water’. Small vials of these were 
placed in various locations to delineate ‘smell zones’.6  The outcome was 
quite monstrous: smelly, skin-like, glowing with a range of responsive 
movement occurring within it. There was a series of interactive pieces 
housed in this latex monster:
Responsive Wall (Fig. 8.15-16), by Inger Mewburn: a very large 
projection of falling particles onto which the shadow of passing bodies was 
also projected. The shadows collected the particles on the edges of their 
silhouette inducing a phantom feeling of being touched.
6.  Unfortunately these didn’t work well, being 
too subtle to noticeably push their way through 
the overwhelming latex odour. 
8.14  Too Close for Comfort, Boo Chapple, 
inside performance space.
8.15  Responsive Wall, Inger Mewburn, one version of 
the particle fall against a silhouette.
8.16 Responsive Wall diagram, Inger Mewburn.
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Close for Comfort (Fig. 8.14), by Boo Chapple: a small, narrow latex 
bed space which would vibrate from underneath. On one wall of this space 
a projection was being manipulated live by the artist, who sat in a different 
enclosure in a near naked state with her computer and video camera, 
performing for her tightly held, vibrating audience.
 Nearness of You (Fig. 8.17-18), by Ronald Aveling: a baby’s face on a 
screen at the end of a corridor that would respond in various ways - such 
as to cry or smile - as you moved closer or further away. 
One of the postgraduate projects never made it to the show due to 
personal diffi culties. We used the space set out for her in the exhibition 
structure to house a minor piece created by some profi cient programmers 
in the undergraduate student group. This was Phantom Fingers (Fig. 
8.19): a perspectivally rendered surface projected onto the vertical latex 
that, through light sensors, would modulate to the pressure of ones hands 
pushing into a nearby taut latex skin.
A web site was produced, which was intended to become the on-
line access to the projects. Embedded in the web site was a further 
project, designed and produced by Inger Mewburn and Boo Chapple: the 
Live Presence Field (fi g. 8.20). This was an animated visualisation that 
registered activity occurring in the exhibition space for those not present, 
but visiting the project on-line.  Data was gathered from three different 
types of sensors mounted in separate zones in the space. Close for Comfort 
involved a motion sensor, The Nearness of You involved a proximity sensor 
and two pressure pads were placed in the Phantom Fingers area and in 
front of the Responsive Wall. Each of these sensors uploaded its state data 
to the SIAL server where scripts interpreted the data sets and propelled 
the visualisation into various kinds of action.
8.17, 18  The Nearness of You’: a diagram, Ron Aveling (with Robert Salvatore). 8.19  Phantom Fingers, produced by Kynan 
Woodman, Jan-Oliver Kunze, Peter Ryan, Tim 
Schork. 
8.20  The Live Presence Field, Inger Mewburn 
and Boo Chapple.
8.17 8.18
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Developments on the interactive works during the three week period 
were recorded on blogs. Each postgraduate posted regular notes on 
their experiences, tests and adjustments they were making to the piece 
in response to public interaction. We hoped these blogs might elicit 
comments and discussion, adding to the feedback gleaned through public 
interaction on the exhibition fl oor. While this feedback did not happen to 
any signifi cant degree, they became a useful resource when the projects 
were being discussed and reprocessed later. 
2. Resonance and the Flexible Mould
“..no rigid distinction between the living body and inorganic matter is sustainable. 
Sensation is in the world, which carries its own charge of vitality. The difference 
between the sensitive capacities of organic and inorganic matter is of transductive 
mode and degree. It is not a difference in kind.”7
2.1 Gilbert Simondon
In coming to terms with the Skins project, as well as exploring its relations 
to my other projects, Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation offers 
a valuable conceptual armature. This theory is in no way limited to the 
nature of human individuality.  It offers an elegant, though complex, way 
of approaching non-organic and nonhuman life in which, for instance, 
architectural form can be understood as a participant in an ongoing process, 
wherein its ‘life’ or its ontology cannot be reduced to formal concerns 
alone. He bases individuation in a pre- or trans-individual reality through 
which human and non-human players connect.8
Gilbert Simondon’s philosophically bent theory of individuation 
resonates with Stern’s empirical account of the self and the experience 
of emergence. Simondon’s L’individu et sa genèse physio-biologique has 
clear affi nity with the science of self-organisation, providing a psycho-
philosophical companion to complexity and emergence theory despite 
having been written in the 1950s. In this sense it is perhaps not at all 
surprising that Simondon’s work has enjoyed signifi cant celebration in 
recent years. Amidst more extensive references from cultural theory, his 
7.  Massumi (2002a), n. 5, p. 276.
8. There is much in common here with Actor 
Network Theory and the work of Bruno 
Latour. I have not explored Latour’s work here 
thoroughly enough to comment extensively 
on the similarities or differences, or what ANT 
may offer to my discussion. I can only signal 
an affi nity here.
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work infl uences and is drawn upon by those such as by Brian Massumi and 
Manuel Delanda. Adrian Mackenzie’s Transductions: bodies and machines 
at speed (2002) worked Simondon’s theories through many contemporary 
situations in an exploration of how one can, without getting bogged down or 
blinded by the baggage that the term ‘technology’ carries, engage critically 
with specifi c technologies. Very little of Simondon’s work is published in 
English and much of my understanding of his writings have been informed 
by the accounts of others. As such, my understanding of his work is very 
partial, mostly (but not entirely) second hand and I am only drawing on 
limited and specifi c aspects of his work. 
2.2  Individuation
Simondon delves into the question of  ‘what is an individual?’ or how 
can one be distinguished from all others? His answer quickly alters the 
question from the ‘what’ to the ‘how’ in that Simondon’s individual is not 
an entity so much as an ongoing process: individuation. 
With individuation no ‘individual’ can be isolated from its surroundings, 
or from other individuals. As Steven Shaviro writes: 
“the individual can only be defi ned in relational terms, in contrast and connection 
to its ‘milieu,’ or to what it is not, but from which it has emerged. That which 
allows us to distinguish an individual, to see it as separate from everything 
else, also forces us to link it to everything else. I cannot be an individual at all, 
without the presence of that which is not me, not my individuality.”9 
At the core of his theory is the metastable status of the individual. 
Metastability is a state of constant internal agitation. It is a stability 
harbouring instability. The constant of metastability is its excited state that 
operates in varying degrees and kinds of consistency. Living individuals 
are bundles of internal tension, which resonate in the playing out of an 
always moving character. But this is no less true of groups or gatherings of 
any kind; various scales of envelope, from the individual to the group, to 
a group of groups etc, are individuating metastabilities.
Individuation is an event in which multiple, disparate dimensions form 
a:
9.  Posted by Steven Shaviro on his blog, 
December 4, 2003 11:46 PM, http://www.
shaviro.com/Blog/archives/000221.html 
(accessed April 04, 2005).
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  “partial and relative resolution manifested in a system that contains latent 
potentials and harbours a certain incompatibility with itself, an incompatibility 
due at once to forces in tension as well as to the impossibility of interaction 
between terms of extremely disparate dimensions.”10  
This out-of-step internal confl ict is an aspect of the metastablity of the 
system, where it can never be a simple, or non-complex, unity. Rather, it 
is always inseparably part of its milieu or its environment such that it is 
both less than and more than whole. As Simondon writes: “Individuation, 
moreover, not only brings the individual to light but also the individual-
milieu dyad.”11 
Again, this is not restrained to the human. Individuation is a process 
that also plays itself out in nonliving entities, albeit with some important 
distinctions to that of the living. We have already seen this dyad being 
foregrounded by Wölffl in in relation to how form and style unfold in a 
milieu. For Simondon, the primary difference being living and non-living 
individuation is that “the living being conserves in itself an activity of 
permanent individuation”,12 whereas the non or semi-living is the result 
of an individuation. But the form of this result is never absolute: just as 
stability is always metastabilty, form is always information or in other 
words, remaining in (the process of) formation. Even when the supple, 
transformative individuating process comes to an end, aspects of that 
process await the potential of its ongoing engagements. Things are always 
part of events; places and times. Matter is never simply inert, because 
always embedded within its stability are metastable states or implicit 
potentials for participation in events.
2.3 Transduction and Resonance
Simondon brings the concept of transduction into this individual-milieu 
relation. Usually, transduction refers to the transfer of information from 
one medium to another: such as when the ear converts a sequence of 
pressure waves in the air into nerve impulses. But Simondon’s use of the 
concept doesn’t restrain itself to a linear idea of movement, progression 
or conversion, but rather sets up an operation that always involves a more 
spatial, expansive matrix of relations. Here, information does not so much 
move across and through things as if travelling along a passage. Rather, 
transduction is modelled more on the idea of internal resonance, where the 
pattern or rhythm of things such as pressure waves and nerve impulses 
enter into a sympathetic vibration, moving into a shared rhythm. This 
10.  Simondon (199
11.  Ibid.
12.  Ibid, p. 305.
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involves, in a sense, a form of feeling that swells out of a sea of diversity. 
A ‘form of feeling’, as Stern discusses it, and the ‘force of form’ that 
Wölffl in emphasises, are that which emerges from the resonant intensity 
of affect. 
Simondon’s concept of individuation is one that necessarily incorporates 
a diversity of disparate dimensions into the consideration of, for instance, 
how form both emerges and continues to be actively part of dynamically 
unfolding actions. It offers, for instance, an antidote to reductive formalism. 
It allows for both a kind of wholeness and a diversity and divergence that is 
integral to it. A form of feeling may arise but not without having emerged 
out of an internal complexity that is certainly not a set of peaceable, 
seamlessly connecting compatibilities. As Adrian Mackenzie summarises: 
“The main point is that transduction aids in tracking processes that come into 
being at the intersection of diverse realities.  These diverse realities include 
corporeal, geographical, economic, conceptual, biopolitical, geopolitical and 
affective dimensions.  They entail a knotting together of commodities, signs, 
diagrams, stories, practices, concepts, human and non-human bodies, images 
and places.  They entail new capacities, relations and practices whose advent 
is not always easy to recognise.… Every transduction is an individuation in 
process.”13
At a broad scale of action a knot in which diverse realities twist into one 
another might be a useful image through which to conceptualise the idea 
of a ‘pulse of the age’. Similarly, internal resonance could be likened to 
Wölffl in’s ‘intelligible will’ or force of form. While in the living being there is 
“a perpetual individuation that is life itself,”14 the non-living individuation 
occurs in the process of formation, wherein the qualities of the object 
become manifest. It is through this process of formation - when all its 
diverse realities enter into a complex inter-relational negotiation, that a 
resonance emerges, captured, in Wölffl in’s terms, as ‘the force of form’:  
“Internal resonance is the most primitive form of communication between 
different orders of reality; it comprises a double process of amplifi cation and 
condensation.”15 
Scientifi cally-colloquially speaking, resonance occurs when things 
vibrate in relation to a provocation that is somehow ‘on its wavelength’. 
An object has a natural frequency (or a range of them) such that if it 
encounters a vibrational frequency similar to its natural frequency they will 
13.  Mackenzie (2002), p. 18.
14.  Simondon (1992), p. 305.
15.  quoted Massumi (2002a), n. 48, p. 273.
8.21, 22  Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse, 1940, 
USA.
8.21
8.22
10.  Simondon (1992), p. 300.
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reinforce and amplify one another. The collapse of bridges when vibrated 
at their natural frequency is one example, as is the resonance of strings, 
cavities and tubes in musical instruments. Resonance is always internal 
in that it arises in some particular entity to emanate outwards. In these 
states of excitation, a movement occurs. Whether we see it or hear it, 
this movement has a discernable quality to it: a quality of feeling or a felt 
quality. 
A more complex but fi tting example is the resonance of sensation. 
Whether a pin pricks the skin, a sight meets the eye, a memory lunges 
into consciousness or a thought is thought, there is an accompanying 
sensation, no matter how minute ones awareness of it is. Sensation is a 
resonation of some quality of feeling. Even if a sensation can be tracked to 
a spot as small as a pin prick on a fi nger, it resonates throughout the body 
like a shock wave as the arm pulls back in alarm, back muscles twist, etc. 
Even the sensation of thinking will do this, such as when we stop to think. 
We resonate with sensation, engaging with the world through affective 
movement.
2.4 Internal resonance and moulding
Of signifi cant interest here is Simondon’s discussion of internal resonance 
and moulding.  He uses the example of a brick, where a mould is used to 
compact a lump of clay into shape. In the moment where the process of 
moulding takes place, everything fuses into a highly integrated complex of 
relations (internal resonance), where the function of the mould, he argues, 
is to stabilise rather than impose a form: 
“matter in the process of taking form is in a state of complete internal resonance; 
what takes place in one point resonates with all others, at all points and in 
all directions . . . The mold, as limit, is what provokes this state of internal 
resonance, but the mold is not that through which the internal resonance is 
realised.”16
The role of the mould could be likened to the social moulding that 
shapes individual behaviour into particular kinds of gestures, comportments 
and composures. These moulds provoke agitation and confl ict in the 
individual and are a necessary aspect of the individual-milieu relations of 
16.  quoted Mackenzie (2002), p. 48.
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all individuation. They condition but do not determine the interrelations of 
forces that constitute the contents of any event. Nevertheless, the mould 
is not separable from the contents and the nature of the mould does have 
signifi cant implications. 
The mould of the brick is not of a variable nature. Simondon’s assertion 
that the mould does not impose a form but rather supplies “conditions under 
which a reciprocity of forces within the clay occurs”,17 might suggest that 
the difference between a rigid and fl exible mould is irrelevant. As discussed 
earlier (Act 5), it is indeed irrelevant to the existence of expression. But it 
does impact upon the nature of its expressiveness.  As Mackenzie points 
out, the complications of variable moulds is something we need “to consider 
in relation to electronic information; as, for instance, in the encounter 
between gestures, word-processing software and display of text occurring 
as I write.”18 What the mould does, Simondon writes, is offer “an end 
to the deformation”19: it provides an overarching fi eld of infl uence that 
conditions and mediates the individual-milieu relations, while provoking 
and enabling intensities to form. But what if degrees of deformation are 
built into that overarching infl uence/provocateur/conditioning mediator? It 
still provides the necessary limits, just limits of a different nature: limits 
that vary within limits. 
A simple, clarifying example can be developed through juxtaposing 
dance rituals of very different natures. Consider the difference between 
a group of people engaged in a highly formulaic dance, where they each 
follow a pre-given sequence of actions, and the modulating terrain of a 
contemporary dance party, or rave. In the former, there is a rigid mould 
in the form of a dance routine or choreography that every body must 
follow and comply with if they wish to be an integral part of this collective 
experience. Undeniably, this rigidly formed fi eld holds within it a vast range 
of experiences and individuating complexity. In other words, its stable, 
predictable appearance conceals a battlefi eld of internal difference and 
inter-relational complexity: it is a metastability. In the latter, the moulding 
is less rigid. The music connects, but each body responds differently to that 
collective experience, generating a highly differentiated but nevertheless 
cohesive fi eld. Certainly, the movement and gesture sequences are mostly 
related to a palette of shared and expected behaviours, but the limits 
of acceptability are very broad and replete with diversity. The mould 
has a very elastic range of potential composures. It does not suppress 
the internal difference and inter-relational complexity; it allows it to be 
expressed. Stability expressly gives over to metastability.
17.  Mackenzie (2002), p. 47.
18.  Ibid, p. 49.
19.  quoted Mackenzie (2002), p. 47.
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That the limits of the overarching mould are fl exible enough to enter 
into negotiation with that which it moulds, is crucial to the aesthetics of 
emergence. This was clearly at work in the animated casts but it is also a 
property of Skins as a collaboratively developed entity. The limits of the 
mould (in this case a particular scenario focussed on forms of participation, 
while also embodied in an enveloping mutable skin) provide a certain 
pressure of interrelation and communication through which a resonance 
emerges that, in turn, affects the limits of the mould/fi eld of infl uence. 
Because it folds its internal resonance out and back into itself it is capable 
of a more responsively situated expression. 
2.5 Moulding ‘Skins of Intimate Distance’
Skins of Intimate Distance involved many and varied accomplishments and 
frustrations, successes and disappointments. But in exploring the potential 
of situating individual research development within a connective, collective 
fi eld, these outcomes pointed to the role of the ‘mould’. This mould was 
little more than the suggestion that I put to the group, one that was 
intended to be open, affected and infl uenced by the range of particulars 
and vice versa. This mould acted as a dynamic, responsive provocation that 
was cast through the messy fi eld of collaborative process. Understanding 
this collaborative project in relation to moulding is obviously an extension 
of earlier research – most obviously, the animate casts but in this case 
the ‘mould’ is untied from a necessary association with a literal enveloping 
surface or skin.
My role in Skins was as a kind of director or designer that was very 
much a participant in something, where my ‘guiding hand’ largely acted to 
provide a fl exible mould rather that to dictate or delineate. It was perhaps 
something of a picturesque movement-image that guided development. 
This movement-image or mould thereby attained properties of fl exibility 
in a different guise: that of a game. As quoted earlier, John Holland writes 
about how “board games, unlike numbers in their raw form, capture 
the dynamic of unfolding actions and their consequences.”20 This game, 
or form of participation, was no longer a skin or a surface, it was an 
arrangement of dynamic interrelations, through which negotiations were 
both encouraged and intensifi ed. 
The fi eld of infl uence within which the Skins developmental process 
took place was so full as to be bursting at the seams. It involved not only 
the postgraduates and their projects, but also the visiting scholar event 
and all the infl uences that this entailed, the undergraduate students, the 
pragmatics of building the exhibition structure and the web site and so 
20.  Holland (1999), p. 203.
8.23  Skins logo.
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on – together participating in the interrelations and personal dynamics 
that this ‘coming together’ entailed. The enveloping framework of a Big-
Brother-like confi guration gave a fl exible ‘diagram’ through which mutual 
infl uences could be guided into intensifi ed negotiation.
The value of this mould became clearer with the second group of students 
in the following year of the postgraduate program. For various reasons (not 
the least being my own exhaustion produced by the extraordinary effort 
Skins had required), the provocative catalysts of the ‘envelope’ or ‘mould’ 
that bought individual projects into a shared project fell away, as did the 
emergence of any signifi cant or lasting cross-disciplinary collaboration 
within the group. While this larger group contained some extraordinarily 
interesting and intense individuals who produced some exceptional work, 
their projects did not mutually inform one another to nearly the same 
degree. The manifold was not afforded as much intensity or pressure: there 
was no collectively manipulated mould to provoke the internal resonance 
that Skins of Intimate Distance achieved.  The role of the teacher is not 
unlike that of the designer engaged with emergent processes.
The outcome of Skins of Intimate Distance was, in one sense, the 
exhibition-event itself. But the most enduring outcome arose from the 
resonances that emerged through the process. Two from the initial group, 
Inger Mewburn and Boo Chapple, went on to do their masters research with 
myself and with each other (in some subsequent collaborative projects), 
both completing in 2005. The resonances between us all, in a strong sense 
of both shared and complementary sensibility, has been part of a process 
of formation in which The Liveness Manifold developed into an ongoing 
envelope for our collaborative practices involving, currently, the three of 
us. Collectively, we embody a certain style.
As Wölffl in said, you can’t explain a style through any specifi c cause. It 
is a form of feeling or a resonance produced through a practiced diagram, 
or the iteration and swelling of a “presentation of the relations between 
forces unique to a particular formation.”21 The ‘practiced diagram’ is always 
affective, in that it pertains to the experience of relations – experienced 
through the iterations of practice. Through a subsequent project, that 
I will go on to discuss in the next Act, a more emphatically embodied 
understanding of the know-how pertaining to affective diagramming is 
unravelled. 
21.  Deleuze (1988), p. 72.
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Act 9.  Vibrating Bodies
240
Act 9 discusses my involvement in the development of a collaborative interactive, multi-
user game installation project called Intimate Transactions. The discussion is focussed 
on the way in which tensions at work in the collaborative process resonate with the very 
interactive problem being tackled within this multi-user installation. These tensions are 
very emphatically of a social nature, involving dimensions of intimacy and distance in 
the relationships between people. The social mechanisms at work in these relationships 
are explored through phenomena such as shame and laughter. The exploration of the 
collaboration and the experience of the installation operate to offer an account of how 
affective diagrams become emphatically embodied experiences. 
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1. Intimate Transactions
“Listen carefully. Every collaborator who enters our orbit brings with him or her 
a world more strange and complex than any we could ever hope to imagine. By 
listening to the details and the subtlety of their needs, desires, or ambitions, we 
fold their world onto our own. Neither party will ever be the same.”1   
When we were developing Skins of Intimate Distance I became aware of 
the Transmute Collective (Keith Armstrong, Lisa O’Neil and Guy Webster) 
and their early version of an interactive piece titled Intimate Transactions. 
An email exchange in October 2003 between myself and Keith Armstrong 
led to a joint proposal for a collaborative project through the auspices of the 
Australasian Centre for Interaction Design (ACID).  In 2004 I approached 
Inger Mewburn, who had by then moved on from the graduate certifi cate to 
a masters, to participate in this project as part of her research, which I was 
supervising. We did initially play with the idea of creating an entirely new 
work, but it quickly became clear that the wisest move was to focus on input 
into the next phase of development of the existing Intimate Transactions 
piece. Keith was keen to draw on our exploration of tactility and haptics in 
the relations between intimacy and distance. Inger discussed some ideas 
she had played with regarding adapting electronic Braille reader displays 
into a haptic device. This seemed a good place to start.
Intimate Transactions is based around a game in which the player 
can enter into an internal space within ‘creatures’ in the game, collecting 
objects from inside them. The more you take from the creatures, the 
slower, more viscous and ‘dead’ the movements within the game become. 
This viscosity is registered through sound, speed of movement and visual 
1.  Mau (2000), p. 90. 
9.01  Intimate Transactions main screen 
image. Two avatars can be seen wandering 
through the game, amidst the fi ve creatures. 
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cues. In order to ‘free-up’ the game world again, the objects have to be 
given back. This can only happen by literally joining forces with another 
player (playing from another geographic location), linking up avatars and 
releasing the captured objects back to their creatures. When we stepped 
in, its capacity to operate as a multi-user game was in development. 
This interactive work involves an overtly embodied engagement on the 
part of the player. A body shelf interface shifted interactive operations out 
of the fi nger click into a dance. A player is required to direct the movements 
and actions of their avatar with the bends and twists of their body. This 
coupling of body and avatar is then coupled again - at least potentially - in 
a dance with another body-avatar: two glowing objects that glide across a 
screen, leaping out and diving into the crevices of networked spaces.  Each 
avatar is tied to gyrating players that remain invisible to one another, like 
two puppeteers on different sides of a screen. 
An aspect of this phase of development was the design and construction 
of two new matching shelves that could be transported easily around the 
world.  Our job was to amplify affectivity or the feeling of presence through 
adding a haptic feedback layer to Intimate Transactions such that, when 
it did attain its multi-user networked goals, contact with the other would 
be augmented by some kind of physically registered feedback. The dance 
that was structurally embedded in the work meant that the ground of 
engagement with the piece was already coiled through embodied gestures. 
Our aim was to deepen the sense of touch in moments of contact with 
both game elements and other players. For us, from our architectural 
perspective, we were ushering a sensory density or temporally defi ned 
architecture into a landscape of gestures. I imagined the vibrational bursts 
as sensorial structures (that inhabit bodies rather than bodies inhabiting 
them), spatially located in a landscape whose contours were constantly 
being remapped in the relations between activity on the screen and 
movements of the body. 
When Inger and I eventually turned to write about this collaboration 
for a chapter in a book dedicated to the project, we came to value some 
of those challenges that we might usually rather forget once the process 
is over: all those obstacles and tensions that seemed to complicate the 
ease of passage towards desired outcomes. An issue that had loomed 
strangely large in our memory of the collaboration was that a great deal 
of laughter saved us from frequent clutches of frustration. As it turns out, 
these challenges and the echo of laughter neatly dovetail into a major 
9.02  Intimate Transactions: two avatars co-
joined (Stuart Lawson).
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9.04  Lisa O’Neil testing the new Intimate Transactions body shelf. Photo 
by Keith Armstrong.
9.05  Intimate Transactions at Kickarts, Cairns. 
Player collecting objects inside one of the 
creatures (player refl ected on screen). 
9.03  System Diagram of Intimate Transactions with haptic system and multi-user capacity. 
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defi ning problem that this project as a whole grappled with. As we saw 
it, the general research problem can be summarised as: the diffi culty of 
forming a sense of shared experience amidst the undeniable difference 
between us. 
This had a great deal of relevance to the little defi ning statement I had 
laid out for ‘Skins of Intimate Distance,’ which went as follows:
skin is a substance of expression
intimacy is shared transformation
distance occurs through positioning
Skins of Intimate Distance is research into the substance of elusively 
shared positioning.
Our experience of the Intimate Transactions collaboration took the 
issue of ‘elusively shared positioning’ into a new territory, generating some 
clarifying realisations.  
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2. The Threads of Design
In the initial phase of development Inger acted as a kind of energetic 
provocateur: throwing up concrete ideas, one after the other, for the crowd 
of collaborators to chew over and develop. Obviously, many of these ideas 
fell by the wayside but they reveal something about our predilections and 
the background threads that shaped the haptic system that we went on 
to develop. Inger was largely responsible for these early ideas and the 
following account of them, as well as the subsequent two episodes, has 
been adapted from the essay we co-wrote.2  
The fi rst suggestion was to incorporate a modifi ed, refreshable, digital 
Braille reader into the bodyshelf. Such Braille devices are composed of 
linear arrays of small, movable pins that confi gure themselves in response 
to text information from the screen. We proposed adapting this device to 
produce dynamically forming pin patterns that would press into the skin of 
players. The abstract nature of the patterns, and their capacity to generate 
an enormous palette of differently felt ‘activation contours’ were the main 
strengths of this suggestion. However, existing Braille devices turned out 
to have a very low resolution and building our own would have been both 
time-consuming and expensive. 
The next proposal involved the use of hot and cold water to produce 
dynamically differentiated zones of warmth and coolness against the 
players’ bodies. Perhaps a pair of colourful, bubbly fi sh tanks would act 
as the water reservoirs and the water would run through a series of 
tubes embedded, but still visible, within the bodyshelf. The mechanics 
of this design afforded the possibility of playing up certain aspects of the 
2.  Ednie-Brown, Mewburn (2006).
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9.06  Diagram of hot + cold water reticulation system idea. Designed and drawn by Inger Mewburn.
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experience of the technology, such as the hissing of water as it was pumped 
through the tubes. There were some technical hurdles with this proposal 
but the main attractions for us were the quite visceral bodily associations 
of the fl uid running through the pipes and the explicit physicality inherent 
in temperature changes. In relation to the project’s aspirations towards 
providing a sense of intimacy, producing dynamic, bodily warmth through 
the bodyshelf seemed qualitatively strong. Outfi tting the bodyshelf in this 
way would have turned it into something akin to a responsive hot water 
blanket; bringing a sensual, living quality to the interface. 
The subsequent idea of a wireless, vibrating pillow drew upon similar 
associations with intimacy and the bed. Here we envisioned players 
positioning the pillow on any part of their body to receive its touch. The 
incorporation of vibration would enable us to build upon our prior research 
with vibration-based interactivity: specifi cally Boo Chapple’s ‘Close for 
Comfort’3  piece and my previous research for ‘The Shower’, that will be 
discussed in Act 10. Off-the-shelf ‘rumble packs’ could be used to create 
the vibrations. Cheap and easy to modify, they offer a good range of 
differentiation within the vibrations themselves.  We liked the idea of the 
fl eshy bulk and cosy comfort of the pillow. The Transmute Collective thought 
that the simplicity of the interface might be compromised by moving the 
pillow about. Nonetheless, the potential of the vibrations seemed clear to 
us all and this became the favoured approach. 
We settled on developing a vibratory system that would be embedded 
both within the bodyshelf and within a garment to be worn by the players. 
This approach incorporated various aspects of the previous ideas: the 
dynamic patterning of the pin array, and the contouring of responsive 
feedback through soft bodily closeness at work in the pillow and ‘hot water 
blanket’. Vibrations offer a form of tactility that can be contoured and 
3.  This project was part of Skins of Intimate 
Distance and is documented at http://
corpuseclectica.net/closeforcomfort.html
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9.07  Quiver pillow idea diagram. Designed 
and drawn by Inger Mewburn.
9.08  The vibration actuator removed from a ‘rumble 
pack’. Photographed next to mobile phone. 
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embedded with texture through modulations (such as frequency, intensity, 
rhythm, and texture) with relative technical ease. The capacity to embed 
qualitative difference into the tactile feedback was of great importance to 
our approach. 
The buttocks and the stomach were identifi ed as the two bodily regions 
through which the players would feel the vibrations. These are the two 
fulcrums through which the body moves as it negotiates the bodyshelf 
interface. 
The buttocks are the site of relatively continuous contact with the 
bodyshelf as well as being a region of the body that is highly sensitive to 
intimate touch. To incorporate vibrations that would stimulate the buttocks, 
a vibrating actuator was attached to each of two ‘spreader plates’ that were 
built into the shelf, one for each cheek of the buttock. These became active 
within the ‘meeting space’ of the Intimate Transactions game, when the 
avatars of each player locked together into joint movement. As each player 
attempted to direct this shared avatar, by moving their backs from side to 
side against the sensors in the bodyshelf, this generated data related to 
their directional ‘push.’ We used this data to generate the vibrations in the 
two buttock plates, such that each player could feel the directional ‘push’ 
of the other.
The design of the Intimate Transactions body interface involves a 
choreography of movement that revolves around the stomach. The 
stomach is a central hinge through which the body curls as the back is 
pressed onto the shelf and lifted away, in moving from one game space 
to another.4  Importantly, the stomach is also a very sensitive part of the 
body. The garment, worn around the neck, fastened around the waist 
and held against the stomach, was designed to house another vibrating 
actuator. 
4.  This was developed through Lisa O’Neill’s 
dance practice, which deals with energy in the 
stomach and through the legs. 
9.09  Inger Mewburn tracing the shape of my buttocks against the wall at SIAL, for the design of the spreader 
plates.  9.10  Paper stencil of the spreader plate shape and dimensions.
9.11  CAD drawing of new shelf assembly with spreader 
plates incorporated. Image Steven Curran.
9.09 9.10
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These vibrations were related to contact with the various characters 
in the game space, where vibrations would be activated every time the 
characters are ‘touched’ by the movement of the player’s avatar across their 
image. These characters, in the form of creatures, had been descriptively 
named ‘confl ict’, ‘insatiability’, ‘torment’, ‘permanence’ and ‘change’. We 
assigned differently contoured vibrations to play through the garment for 
each of the resident characters, attempting to approximate the ‘feeling’ of 
these names through the way the vibrations were contoured. This would 
give each character a unique ‘signature’ or activation contour sketched 
through a rhythmic pattern of amplitude and frequency modulations. 
Furthermore, the strength, or loudness, of each character’s vibration 
signature was affected by the global state of ‘viscosity’ in the game, linking 
the vitality of the creature with the state of the environment.  In this way, 
we hoped that players would – through their stomachs – ‘feel’ a sense of 
the character with which they made contact, as well as the ‘state’ of the 
environment.
9.12  The fi ve Intimate Transactions creatures with avatar in the top left hand corner (by Stuart Lawson).
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3. On Not Being Cool: sensibility and the vibrating pink lipped 
garment 
From the beginning, the geographical distance between the two teams 
made the collaborative process diffi cult. Most of the action was in Brisbane, 
some 1600 kilometres away, and always seemed hard to access despite the 
plethora of communications technologies at our disposal. And then, both 
groups had their histories: their own, mostly unspoken, internal dynamics 
and shared assumptions. Each group had almost no way of working out 
how the other ‘ticked’ because we rarely met. 
As is usually the case, our predilections and silent preconceptions, as 
well as those of the Transmute Collective, initially operated more implicitly 
than explicitly. Each proposal in the catalogue of early versions was left 
behind for a range of reasons: some pragmatic and technical, others more 
to do with sensibility. Sensibility was always the least explicit contention, 
probably because it is harder to account for let alone admit to. But sensibility 
was a very real and extremely active tension in this collaboration. Our soft, 
warm, pink, bodily predilections did not glide well into the ‘cool’ and stylish 
palette of the existing Intimate Transactions piece.
These differences in sensibility became most explicit in the process of 
designing the garment to house the stomach actuator. We commissioned 
the assistance of Naomi Raggatt, a recent fashion design graduate from 
RMIT who had been involved in the Skins of Intimate Distance project, 
to help design it. The design constraints on this piece of clothing were 
formidable. It had to house the electronics securely, be adjustable to many 
different body sizes, be resistant to sweat and body odour, be attached 
and detached within 20 seconds, and allow people to easily mount and 
remove themselves from the bodyshelf. Nonetheless, these issues were 
resolved relatively easily. The bigger diffi culty lay in the hotly contested 
issue of the appearance of the garment. We were always very conscious 
of, and insistent that, the most important aesthetic consideration was the 
garment’s tactile qualities. Part of Naomi’s brief was to fi nd materials that 
were not only robust but felt soft and skin-like. We wanted to push, as far 
as we could, the sense that the garment was a bodily prosthetic. So while 
we openly admitted that if we had free reign, it would probably be very 
pink, fl eshy and possibly hairy, we weren’t too bothered about restraining 
ourselves in the direction of the cool toned, functionalist minimalism 
already established in the visual aesthetic of Intimate Transactions. The 
garment’s primary role, as I had repeatedly insisted, was to be felt rather 
than looked at. 
9.13  Naomi Raggatt working on one of 
the early prototypes for the haptic device 
garment.
9.15
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But our insistence on the amplifi cation of tactile dimensions nevertheless 
produced problems. After we had mocked up the fi rst prototype, we 
noticed that when the vibrations started, people often put their hand on 
the front of the actuator, as if to feel it from both sides. For us, this meant 
that the tactile qualities of the front of the garment was important. During 
the developmental process I had found an elastic frisby product made of 
a rubbery material called ‘hyperfl ex’. This very elastic, stretchy material 
has an extremely soft texture likened by many to the delicate skin of 
lips and genitals. Responses to the touching this material were almost 
always quite extreme. Some would recoil while others would delight in it. 
Whichever way, this material was highly affective.  In a desire to afford a 
strong tactile affectivity into the garment, we worked the ‘hyperfl ex’ frisby 
into the design which happened to fi t very well onto the circular vibration 
actuator. We used a top circle of leather through which to sew it into the 
garment. Beyond this black leather, a circular fl ap of hyperfl ex stuck out 
for the enjoyment of a hand placed onto the front of the garment. 
When we sent the fi rst prototype to The Transmute Collective in 
Queensland, they were not happy. Some tense email exchanges and 
telephone conversations ensued. Relevant extracts from their email 
response were: 
“We think that the wearable is really whimsical and the item as it stands would 
work really well in some contexts - however these are our feelings with regard to 
showing it with this particular work, which has quite a different, strong aesthetic 
- as you can see from the design of the shelf and the graphics … the pink circle 
got a strong reaction which is good - some ppl dont like to touch it - everyone 
fi nds it texturally interesting - however in this form, standing up it has distinct 
sexual nature to it which we felt wasn’t appropriate to this project context.”5
The sexual associations afforded to the garment came in different 
forms. In a telephone conversation we were told that the males of the 
group thought it looked like a bottom (an asshole?) and the female saw 
vagina lips. I saw a possible association with a breast and with the feel of 
genital skin, but an asshole had certainly not occurred to me. In any case, 
and to our great amusement, we seemed to have covered associations to 
all the more sensitive body parts. 
Not only was it too bodily for them, it was too colourful. When we 
sent them some images earlier that month, they asked us to play down 
the splash of colour in order to, “match the body shelf aesthetic (grey 
aluminium and charcoal neoprene/backrests/footboard).” They suggested 
5.  Keith Armstrong, email to Pia Ednie-Brown, 
Inger Mewburn, Naomi Raggatt, (cc - Guy 
Webster, Gavin Winter), January 21, 2005 9.33 
PM.
9.14  Early prototype of the wearable device. 
9.15  First prototype sent to the Transmute 
Collective. Worn by Lisa O’Neil.
9.14
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that, “The design [of the garment] needs to be in greyscale -- this will also 
match the visuals and give a svelte, stylish look.”6  However, the soft pink 
was the least garish colour of the range of frisbies and to our taste, the 
most appropriate. 
The ground of difference between us had opened up and now rang with 
vibrant tension. Negotiating this disagreement posed diffi culties. Even if 
we risked being a little clumsy and crude, especially in relation to the 
smooth, cool of Intimate Transactions, we felt that making ‘cool’ with this 
garment worked against its effi cacy. The aesthetic difference it enacted – an 
aesthetic grounded in touch – seemed productively resonant. As we saw it, 
it ushered tactility and qualities of intimacy into the otherwise hard, grey 
palette of the overall Intimate Transactions environment.  At one point, 
Inger suggested that our ‘artistic differences’ were becoming a bit like 
‘Barbarella’ vs ‘2001.’ Our sensibility was obviously ‘Barbarella’: colourful, 
sensual, playful and a bit clumsy. The Transmute Collective was closer to 
‘2001’: mysterious, serious, slightly spooky and highly composed. 
We had to laugh.
We also had to hold our ground. The pink fl eshy rim was not removed, 
nor was it recoloured. 
We were certainly not the fi rst to use a Barabarella vs 2001 comparison 
to make a point or to have a laugh. As discussed in Act 7, Reyner Banham 
did it in his 1968 essay ‘Triumph of Software’. This sensibility clash can 
be seen as indicative of a broader set of tendencies. Banham alludes to a 
shared history or common background in less-than-fully-serious artefacts, 
which he embraces in the tone of his essay: 
“Both Barbarella and its original French cartoon strip form, and Archigram’s 
plug-in city project are half-jokey European intellectual derivates from the basic 
US pulp SF. Both stand in a tradition that runs back visually through the comics, 
and verbally through texts like Isaac Asminov’s Caves of Steel (now in Panther 
paperback; don’t just sit there, go and buy it!).”7           
Intimate Transactions is a serious piece of work, in the sense that 
it holds importance within a new media art milieu. It was awarded, for 
instance, an Honorary Mention in the Prix Ars Electronica, it toured widely, 
including being staged at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London, 
BIOS in Athens, the National Review of Live Art in Glasgow, the 2006 
Brisbane Festival and COCA in Cairns. It continues to tour with showings 
6.  Email from Keith Armstrong, Lisa O’Neil 
and Guy Webster to Pia Ednie-Brown, Inger 
Mewburn, Naomi Raggatt, (cc - Guy Webster, 
Gavin Winter), January 6, 2005 6:10 pm.
7.  Banham (1968), p. 629.
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planned in China and the USA in 2008.  And it had been styled to suit a 
prestigious life. Their discomfort with our Barbarella-like comportment may 
well have involved some sense that we were not-being-serious-enough or 
not ‘high-art’ enough.
Both the geographic distance and the artistic differences that emerged 
poignantly highlighted this constant issue of never quite understanding 
each other. In retrospect, we wonder if this issue of distance acted to 
strengthen our insistence on evoking qualities of sensual vibrancy, 
embodiment, warmth and closeness. We always wanted to bridge the gap 
we felt between the groups by pushing a sense of embodiment into the 
picture. 
All this led us to perhaps the sweetest realisation of all. There was a 
deep and poignant irony at play amidst this particular research process. 
The Transmute Collective and the Liveness Manifold had the same problem 
to deal with as the general one that Intimate Transactions sets up for its 
two players. Both embodied the diffi culty of forming a sense of shared 
experience when there is so much distance (and difference) between us. 
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4. Materialising Affective Intensity
The experience of the Intimate Transactions piece does not simply 
involve the particulars of the game, the meeting of avatars, the feeling 
of the vibrations and one’s related movements of the body shelf: these 
are all involved, along with other factors in the production of an over-all 
atmosphere, or the feeling of the encompassing environment. As I have 
discussed and as the images from the piece demonstrate, the general 
aesthetic can be characterised as smooth, cool and minimalist. There was 
a noticeable effort to minimise any ‘mess’ – cords were concealed as much 
as possible and the staging of the game occurred in a room that was 
extremely darkened such that the game and one’s body, basking in the 
cool, blue-hued light of the projection, were more-or-less fl oating in a 
black surround – much like the digital, translucent forms cast against a 
black background in the game space itself. Certainly, the darkness of the 
room was related to some pragmatic issues; it allows the image on the 
screen to be brighter and more luminous, and any distracting aspect of 
the actual room in which it occurred was minimised. Nevertheless, the 
similarities between this set up and Lynn’s ‘old style of life’ (and indeed 
most image renders in that fi eld of work) are quite striking. 
At the ACMI showing, a white line was taped along the fl oor so that 
participants could more easily navigate their way through the blackness to 
the shelf. A comment made to me in passing at the opening night at ACMI 
was that the body shelf was reminiscent of the electric chair and the tone of 
the space meant it was like being led to one’s execution. This was certainly 
an over dramatisation, but a sense of threat and looming danger could 
be one way of provoking an affective intensity that would draw attention 
to one’s embodied affectivity. An active design attention to generating 
an atmosphere of this nature could be a productively dramatic approach 
to take. But our impression was that the Transmute Collective had been 
focussed, understandably, on action in the game and on the shelf and that 
the environment as a whole was not a subject of such intense attention. 
For us, in contrast, our desire was (and had been from the start)8 for the 
experience to be held by a more intimate enclosure rather than fl oating in 
space like the astronauts in 2001. Something of this nature was discussed 
as a positive, potential reworking in one of the research sessions during 
the ACMI showing. The point of our comments at the time was part of our 
desire to foster and usher a sense of intimacy into the overall sense of piece 
and the experience of participation. This desire to recast the experience 
into a closely held, tactile enclosure was yet another Barbarella moment 
(oh, if only we could have made a fur lined spaceship!).  It was a desire to 
8.  As mentioned earlier, prior to beginning 
work on the haptics for Intimate Transactions, 
we had initially considered creating an entirely 
new piece rather than developing this existing 
one. In the early proposals, we had been keen 
on the creation of a small, intimate space in 
which remote communication of various kinds 
could occur. 
9.16  Greg Lynn, frame from generative 
animation for the Artists Space Installation 
(1995). 
9.17  Intimate Transactions avatars (by Stuart 
Lawson).
9.16
9.17
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render the affective intensity of the environment more manifest, material, 
palpable. If we could design that environment now, I suspect we might 
start with the question: how can a small inhabitable environment elicit a 
form of feeling akin to shared laughter? And then, we would laugh. 
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5. Sensibility, Shame and Affective Intensity
“In shame, a person immediately launches a search that is frantic because the 
grounding that is sought, a grounding of self in community, is not to be found 
in any visible place.”9  
Of anyone in the project, it was Zeljko Markov, designer of the body shelf, 
who had the clearest, cleanest and strictly held sensibility of us all. Markov’s 
individual practice had, in 2003, spent six years focussing on shelves10: 
minimalist formal compositions of planes cantilevered from the surface of 
the wall. In light of this aesthetic manner, it is not surprising that Markov 
would oppose any move to interrupt the smooth, fl at, undifferentiated 
plane of the shelf - not just in relation to our suggestions that the buttock 
pads be afforded a tactile articulation rather than be concealed under a 
continuous rubber surface - but also in response to any surface interruptions 
or lumpiness from the back sensor area. He wanted, in other words, to 
make the interface as smooth and transparent as possible. 
By contrast to Markov’s exceptionally clean line of conduct, our sensibility 
was perhaps something to blush about. It was lumpy, expressive, bodily 
and blushingly, comically sexual. Did we have no shame? Katz’s study of 
shame offers much to the problem embedded in the question:
 “We see in the experience of shame a taken-for-granted, ubiquitous, 
even ontological demand that the individual make sense of his or her 
conduct in society, which means shaping his or her behaviour in some 
coherent relationship to collectively recognised forms; and, further, that 
the process of making sense be itself disguised aesthetically, i.e. by 
becoming a seemingly natural, idiosyncratically tailored way of being 
with others.”11 
Shameful feelings are not restrained to individual behaviour but 
operate, primarily, as a collective operation. Collectively, certain things 
are hidden from view, isolated, undiscussed. The moment that any such 
thing is revealed as a part of our selves – even if only to ourselves – we 
struggle with being outcast into places that are forbidden from collective 
acknowledgement. Shame involves seeing oneself as morally inferior in 
some way from the standpoint of others wherein we fold that standpoint into 
ourselves, such that the associated sense of distaste sweeps throughout 
the whole self. 
9.  Katz (1999), p. 323.
10. See: http://www.intimatetransactions.
com/zeljko.htm
11.  Katz (1999), pp. 173-174.
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Just as the need to drink answers to thirst, the need to make sense of 
our conduct answers to the threat of falling out of the family of collectively 
recognised forms. Making sense of our conduct and of the world is a process 
of socialisation. The struggle of this process is largely concealed, made to 
seem ‘natural’ or effortless. As such, the nature of that process, or the 
way in which we make sense is hard to openly acknowledge because so 
much effort has gone into hiding the process, let alone the very contingent 
nature of it. The way in which we make sense of things signifi cantly affects 
the nature of any act. Our ways of making sense is the process through 
which sensibility is formed. 
To make sense of things is not an effortless enterprise; it involves an 
active incorporation into social forms. Isn’t this document is one such 
effort: a shaping of acts and thoughts into (something close enough to) 
a collectively recognised or socially acceptable form? If it falls too close 
to already-collectively-recognised-forms its potential contribution will 
be muted, or simply non-existent. If it runs too far away it’s potential 
contribution will be simply unrecognisable. Discursive events are always, 
to a signifi cant degree, about a striving for active participation, sometimes 
with a particular problem or issue but always with a community. We make 
an individual utterance in order to contribute to, engage with and be part 
of something bigger.
If Inger and I had no shame, we were perhaps failing to suffi ciently tailor 
our suggestions to the (disjunctive) standpoint of our collaborators or in 
terms of the sensibility that they clearly adhered to. Our participation in the 
overall project seemed a little out-of-step. This led to a momentary ‘falling 
out’. But we simply didn’t see their sensibility as necessarily excluding our 
own. Our falling did not exactly lead to a sense of shame, but rather to a 
sense of shamelessness. This became productively revealing. 
Shame, writes Katz, is interesting for what it reveals: “What is revealed 
[in shame] is the existence of an abiding mystery, a personally resonant 
something-that-had-been-hidden-and-must-be-kept-hidden.”12 Equally, 
the existence of an abiding mystery is revealed in the idea that something 
is shameful or someone ought to be ashamed. This hidden ‘something’ lies 
within the process of making sense, or within that which holds together 
a sensibility. Katz is suggesting that it becomes a mystery because it is 
“disguised aesthetically” – masked by an artful composure that gives a 
sort of ‘natural’ air to one’s way of being. The juxtaposition of Barbarella 
and 2001 rests quite emphatically on apparently discordant aesthetic 
12.  Katz (1999), p. 150.
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sensibilities. This was the case for us when we laughed about the sense 
of ‘good fi t’ of the analogy with the discordance between us and our 
collaborators. Banham saw it in a similar fashion. But something more is 
hidden in the juxtaposition, that took a while for us to realise. 
When the primary fi gure of evil, Durand Durand (Milo O’Shea), in 
Barbarella tries to kill her with the Excessive Machine (a device that 
induces such heights of ecstacy that it kills its victim) she not only survives 
it, it does not survive her. As Banham writes: “the insatiability of her fl esh 
burns its wiring and blows its circuits, thus giving O’Shea the best line in 
the script: ‘Have you no shame?’”13 
13.  Banham (1968), p. 630.
9.18
3.19 3.20
9.18  The fi lm includes a long sequence focussed on Barbarella’s face as she passes into ecstasy.  9.19  The Excessive machine blows up. 
9.20  Duran Duran with the muscial score to be played through the Excessive Machine.
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The line “have you no shame?”, expresses disgust regarding Barbarella’s 
ability to embrace affective intensity – of an intensely pleasurable kind 
– to the degree that it can move within her and her within its movement, 
without becoming submissive and being too easily impressed or attempting 
to control it through distancing and denial. Barbarella had the power to 
both affect and be affected. Software triumphs over hardware. Barbarella, 
it seems, had nothing to hide or, at least, her capacity to embrace and 
affi rm affective intensity was not kept hidden. Her ‘shamelessness’ or the 
perception that her actions were shameless, revealed something that could 
not (or should not) be seen from the accusing standpoint. 
As Katz discusses, shame arises when we fall out in some way. 
But the fall out does not necessarily lead to shame. He gives the fall 
a far more extensive role, being the provocative element that traverses 
emotional expression: “Falls lead to shame no less regularly than they lead 
children to crying, burlesque audiences to laughter, and injured parties to 
anger.”14  Our fall led to laughter. Perhaps, implicitly, this was a little bad 
mannered:
“Through the matter of manner, one provides a basis for others to take for 
granted that there exists a collective ground, independent of the participant’s 
machinations, for the conduct on which they collaborate. The social order 
appears to demand, not only that naked self-interests be covered by the 
substance of conventionally recognizable social roles, but also that each put 
the self aesthetically at risk of spiritual pretentiousness in order to sustain the 
identity of others.”15 
The conduct with which we collaborated put ourselves at risk in another 
way. We didn’t clothe our naked self-interests or our lewd sensibility. It 
was perhaps a bit naughty and maybe a little juvenile, but amidst the 
process we realised another way of thinking about – and feeling out – a 
collective ground. 
I have argued earlier that underscoring the effort to articulate principles 
of composition is an effort to mediate a confl ict through articulating a 
collective ground.  I have also argued, in relation to the sensibility clash 
exemplifi ed by Barbarella and 2001 and Wolffl in’s juxtaposition of the 
‘painterly’ and the ‘linear’, that what is at stake is different ways of unfolding 
or recasting forms of feeling into affective forms. The value of these 
stylistic or sensibility clashes lies in generating an attention to a common 
ground in the collective fi eld of affective relations. We can also turn this 
general principle into the clash between the vague and complex nature 
14.  Katz (1999), p. 173.
15.  Ibid, p. 174.
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of emergent phenomena and the simplicity and exactitude of the micro-
relations from which they arose. Theories of emergence and composition 
offer conceptual and pragmatic armatures that amount to a mould of 
some kind (and with varying degrees of fl exibility and rigidity), which will 
enable an internal resonance between disparate participants, linking them 
together while accepting their differences. Emergence seems like a form of 
magic (or God) when this affective ground falls out of sight. 
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6. Laughter as realisation of the problem
“The valuable features of shame are more visible when we ask, what is necessary 
so that people may act together. Then we can appreciate that manner, style, 
grace, and other ways of acting so that one’s role appears to emanate naturally 
as if through some kind of transcendent guidance, are always diffi cult, always 
contingent, but always necessary elements in the process of sustaining the 
identities of the others with whom we interact.”16 
In everyday life, the need often arises to smooth over cracks in the 
fragilities of social cohesion: we are compelled to maintain ease in 
social relations. In his study on laughter, Katz points to Arthur Koestler’s 
argument that humour is, “in its essence a simultaneous orientation 
to two or more inconsistent perspectives.”17   But, as Katz goes on to 
point out, this is only part of the story. In addition to the co-presence 
of inconsistencies he suggests that to provoke laughter, “a formal 
inconsistency of perspectives must become practically untenable.”18  In 
other words, there has to be a compulsion to integrate or exert a common 
interest. The Intimate Transactions collaboration bought forward problems 
of apparently incompatible perspectives, or sensibilities. Laughter brings 
incompatibilities together through a desire or need to simultaneously 
realise and acknowledge both that incompatibility and another level of 
connection. As Katz summarises:
“Laughter does not deny the diffi culty of reconciling personal standpoints; it 
joyfully fi nesses the issue by tapping a visible corporeal bond … to insist on 
presumptively shared reality.”19  
Laughter does not obfuscate the extreme diffi culty and frequent 
absurdity of our attempts to pretend that we act together easily. It simply 
acts as a bridge while leaving the gaps open. 
When Intimate Transactions was staged between the Australian Centre 
for the Moving Image (ACMI) in Melbourne and The Creative Industries 
Precinct at QUT (Queensland) in April 2005, several research sessions were 
held in which particular participants played the game, followed by a video 
link discussion session involving both the players and ourselves. In addition 
to this, Inger and I sat hidden in the darkness, watching players engage 
with the piece as they came in, one by one. We noticed that people often 
laughed at the moment when the avatars of the two players fi nally made 
contact and connected. When connection was really felt, people vibrated 
of their own accord: they laughed in an eruptive recognition of contact 
16.  Katz (1999) pp. 173-174.
17.  quoted in Katz (1999), p. 104.
18.  Katz (1999) p. 105.
19.  Ibid, pp. 318-319.
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that was realised despite the distance between them. They expressed the 
incompatibility of simultaneously experiencing intimate contact across 
actual and qualitative distance through their own vibratory variation. 
What seemed so delightful to us is that they rendered the vibrations of 
the actuators virtually redundant – all the better because the Transmute 
Collective had turned the initial intensity of the vibrations down so low that 
most people barely felt them.20  Our response (of inserting vibration into 
the work) to the broad research problem met neatly with their embodied 
response to the felt realisation of that problem. 
Every fold of this research project has seemed suspended in the 
particular problem of meeting amidst the vibrations of difference and 
distance. This is precisely what laughing can achieve. Laughter not only 
rescued us all from bouts of frustration and awkward moments, it prodded 
at precisely the problem we were working with: that intimate connections 
occur not only despite the gaps we have to bridge, but because of them.
As such, these observations on the operations of laughter connect 
back to earlier suggestions where an appeal to emergence and principles 
of composition points to some kind of metastable whole that functions 
to rejoin divergence through a shared, in principle ground. The rhythms 
of laughter, in its embodied expression, become a kindred act, happily 
touching on Wölffl in’s idea that the rate of respiration relates to proportion. 
Rather than a mathematical or geometric proportional system being the 
compositional hinge that connects divergent styles, here the respiratory 
vibrations of laughter become a more emergent proportional connector. 
A sense of unity is generated that does not transcend or obfuscate 
differences, but acknowledges them. This sense of unity is a movement 
that arises through, and joyfully retains, incompatibility. 
It must also be acknowledged that laughter is not always such a positive 
force. It does not, in itself, necessarily initiate happy moments of shared 
experience. It can instead be derisive; where the act of acknowledging a 
difference or incompatible points of view is also one of mocking, pushing 
away, alienating, or shaming. What becomes clear here is that laughter 
forges social or formal arrangements. Derisive laughter enacts a standing 
away and a pushing of something ‘over there’, while asserting that this 
something is part of a particular viewpoint. Laughing together produces 
a collective, shared body through which divergent standpoints, styles and 
sensibilities can resonate together. 
20.  Although this was, I believe, corrected at 
later showings. 
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7. Ethico-aesthetic know-how and laughter
Laughter involves problems of value and ethics. Addressing a related set of 
issues in the terrain of scientifi c research, Isabelle Stengers writes: 
“Our sciences no longer make us laugh. Any dreams they might provoke have 
lost their speculative quality.”21 
What is the link between laughter and speculative quality? A speculative 
act is a throwing open, an offering that is risky because the armatures are 
unstable and you can’t be sure where it will go. Laughter unsettles the 
postures of the unquestioning and the structurally serious: the stance of 
those who cannot admit to the possibility of the Emperor’s naked body. 
The maintenance of forms of authority often requires that the risky, truly 
speculative act is withheld. As Stenger’s reminds us, denunciation is no 
better, but despite the lack of certainty and the risk always taken in this 
regard, it is productive to learn how to laugh because: 
“The laughter of someone supposed to be impressed always complicates the 
life of power. And power is always lurking behind objectivity or rationality when 
these are arguments used by authority.”22 
Laughing allows something to move through you without it taking hold or 
inscribing marks on submissive fl esh: without being too easily impressed. 
Barbarella’s multiply orgasmic non-submission to the Excessive Machine 
did something similar. The bodily shudders of laughter and orgasmic 
pleasure are at once an all-over, over-all embrace of a situation. When 
we laugh it’s often because what generated the humour is unthinkable or 
uncomfortable to admit: if we stop to think, we often have a hard time 
articulating or explaining precisely what made it funny (without, at least, 
explaining the humour away). But we do know one thing: we have been 
tickled – we have felt a provocation and expressed its touch. If we laugh 
together, we fabricate a common sensual body. We forge an opportunity 
to feel the unthinkable and/or rethink the unspeakable, together. This 
is potentially generative and tantamount to re-creating interest. It can 
unsettle fi xed positions and open the door to an affectionate embrace of 
collectively held conditions, both despite and because of the disparity this 
involves. As Walter Benjamin wrote: 
“there is no better start for thinking than laughter. And in particular, convulsion of 
the diaphragm usually provides better opportunities for thought than convulsion 
of the soul.”23  
21.  Stengers (2000), p. 41.
22.  Ibid, p. 44.
23.  Benjamin (1978) p. 236.
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But perhaps Sanford Kwinter summed it all up best of all and in a way 
that loops back to Stengers, speculation and to an ethics he describes as 
a ‘cultivation of life’:
“a commitment to the cultivation of life is a practice whose value far transcends 
the pettiness of individual products; it represents an heroic enlargement of work 
to an ethics, and a commitment to a human social ecology that far exceeds the 
usual posture of voluntary submission to the law of markets. No one knows 
where such an experiment will go, and it is one certainly rife with traps and 
dead ends. What is most beautiful about it, in fact, might well be its potential 
to magnify risk. To bring design into such close proximity to life is to make 
laughter a necessary component of work and action. For only laughter makes 
risk tolerable.”24  
If laughter makes the cultivation of life and its risks tolerable, this is 
surely because – both despite and because of the appearance of intolerable 
incompatibilities – it is a moment of resonance and vitality emanating from 
the effort to generate a binding, affectionate sympathy that will cushion 
the falls. This, as I have argued, has been a motivation behind articulating 
new theories of composition.
24.  Kwinter (2000), p. 37. 
9.21 
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8. Embodying Affective Diagrams
Laughter is a powerful force: it can pull people together as well as push 
people out, alienating and isolating them. But the role of this discussion 
on laughter is not to afford the act of laughing some kind of special status 
for experimental practice, as vital an ingredient it may be. Rather, laughter 
has been explored here because it offers an especially clear embodiment 
of affective diagrams. 
As bodies open up, shudder and vibrate, they literally embody a 
reassembling and realignment of the affective contours of the given 
situation, in a way that bridges some kind of rupture or a falling apart of 
the taken-for-granted landscape on which actions otherwise silently rest. 
Laughter is an emphatically embodied moment of affective diagramming 
in the sense that it articulates an intensifi cation and highly embodied 
condensation of the dynamic qualities of relation. Relations are intensifi ed 
because something we take for granted has been thrown off balance, 
wherein we search for something to hold on to and to hold things together 
such that social cohesion doesn’t fall apart. The coincidence of poignant 
incompatibilities, putting at risk the assumptions that delicately condition 
the possibility of acting-together, come to resonate through laughter, even 
in instances where this might involve a group cohering at the expense 
or expulsion of another. This resonance operates as an abstract but 
expressly embodied texturing of the moment. As Katz puts it: “A kind 
of metamorphosis occurs in which the self goes into a new container or 
takes on a temporary fl esh for the passage to an altered state of social 
being.”25  
Moving from drawings to buildings is one passage of metamorphosis 
in which the affective diagram, as a ‘temporary fl esh’, can ‘carry’ qualities 
of relation across the passage from one state to another. The affective 
diagram, in its role as a ‘new container’ or a ‘temporary fl esh’ is a fl exible 
mould – and, as such, conditions the possibility for a resonance between 
drawings and buildings to occur. 
 In the emphasis I have given to the posture and modes of attention 
of the author/designer there is an insistence upon the embodied reality 
of any such affective diagram. Rather than being purely fi gments of a 
disembodied mind or a transcendent imagination, affective diagrams are 
as corporeal as they are fl eeting. Fleeting, elusive things are easily lost 
unless they can be re-accessed, or embedded in know-how and, as such, 
operate as an aspect of our embodied actions. 
25.  Katz (1999), p. 343.
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Affective diagrams are, just like Massumi’s biogram: “lived diagrams 
based on already lived experience, revived to orient further experience.”26 
They are diagrammatic, experiential and navigational feedback loops that 
can be seen as ‘images’ offering compositional guidance. As quoted earlier 
from Katz: “We rest our subjectivity on rhythmic sensibilities, feelings for 
directions, and visions of unfolding patterns, allowing aesthetics to guide 
us.”27   
In the context of this research, the Intimate Transactions project 
provided material through which to emphatically draw forward the always 
embodied reality of affective diagrams.  I was always aware that this 
project acted to extend my research into the role of embodiment within 
relations experienced across (or despite of) a lack of physical immediacy 
(or, of virtuality and affect), that had framed the Skins of Intimate Distance 
event. In both, digital communication technologies were key issues and I 
knew, theoretically,28  that the understanding of ‘the virtual’, so commonly 
used to describe the nature of these technologies, was a highly reductive 
form of the virtual as understood more philosophically by those such as 
Massumi and Bergson. I also felt, along with Massumi and others,29  that 
this reduction was at the core of the mild hysteria in cultural theory, still 
quite active at the time, regarding problems of disembodiment in ‘virtual 
worlds.’  These quite new technologies played a crucial part in raising 
questions about what constitutes ‘bodies’ and embodiment. The need to 
address these questions was an important aspect of my overall research 
project. However, I didn’t expect to fi nd something valuable in the most 
mundane actualities of practice: in the diffi culties of collaborations and in 
related acts of laughter. 
In a sense, this loops back to the tactical approach in the research 
act of making The Animate Casts, where I reached for very non-digital 
processes of making in order to explore the qualitative relations at work in 
the generative techniques involving digital animation, such as Lynn’s digital 
diagrams and all the other forms fl exing their way seductively across black 
backgrounds. As I said in the introduction, after the last decade of research 
in ‘digital design’, it is clear that digital technology in itself is not the pri-
mary issue, but simply part of an equation. By turning to very embodied, 
material acts to explore qualities of relation threaded through events that 
are signifi cantly shaped by digital technologies, we can more easily discern 
patterns of behavioural relations that are not media-bound or technologi-
26.  Massumi (2002a), pp. 186-7.
27.  Katz, Jack (1988), p. 5.
28.  As developed in Ednie-Brown (1999).
29.  see Massumi (1998) and Beckman 
(1998) was a key collection of essays for me 
in addressing these issues. It contains two 
essays by Massumi that were later developed 
in Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual (2002). 
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cally specifi c. Rather, they are part of the broader, textured complex of 
relations that affect and are affected by these new technologies. Certainly, 
between the problems of disjunction set up by digital communication tech-
nologies and the implicit disjunction at work in the simple act of laughter, 
we found a sympathetic vibration. And at the core of those vibrations was 
vibration itself: bodies vibrating mechanically or through social eruption. 
Each one of those vibrations was contoured slightly differently. Despite 
(and because of) their differences, they resonated, generating a form of 
feeling. These variable patterns of relation are very ‘micro’ acts, like little 
nests or assemblages that together constitute a more ‘macro’ situational 
complex: an overall form of feeling. Likeness gathers, grows and spreads, 
binding action through difference. 
In the project to follow, a diagrammatically affective compositional 
guide, and the way it became imbricated in the micro-relations that 
constituted it, take on a more ‘environmental’ or architectural spin. 
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Act 10.  Affective Intensity and the Ethics of Engagement
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Act 10 discusses another collaborative project involving the conception, development and 
production of an interactive installation called The Shower. Again there are resonances 
between the tensions in the collaborative process, the affective tone of the work and the 
challenges of engaging with the piece. Through this project, an embodied manifestation 
of the affective diagram can be seen to have played a crucial role in generating the design 
and I explore how this manifested itself in a number of dimensions of the work. This 
project operates to draw together all the primary issues explored through the previous 
Acts and projects and, I argue, operates to bring attention to ethico-aesthetic know-how 
through the challenges it presents to those who engage with it. 
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1. Affective Intensity
1.1 The Shower
ple·num   A. n. 1.a. Physics. A space completely fi lled with matter; spec. the 
whole of space regarded as being so fi lled. Contrasted with VACUUM n. 2a. b. 
Chiefl y literary. In extended use: a condition of fullness or great quantity; a 
place fi lled with something.
2. A full assembly; a meeting of a legislative body, conference, association, etc., 
at which all the members are expected to be present. Originally used of meet-
ings of one of the legislative chambers of the Swedish parliament. During the 
20th cent. the term was particularly associated with communist parties, esp. in 
the Soviet Union.
3. A plenum chamber or space.
B. adj. (attrib.).  Relating to or designating a system of ventilation, air-
conditioning, etc., in which fresh or conditioned air is forced into a building 
at various points and drives out the stale air, esp. in plenum method, plenum 
system.1 1. Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford 
University Press, 2007.
10.01  Eva Hesse, Untitled (1968).
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The Shower is an immersive, sonic-architectural environment produced 
in collaboration with artist Bruce Mowson and with the assistance of a 
group of architecture students. It’s development spanned from late 2002 
through to late 2005, with the most intensive period being the fi rst nine 
months of 2003. 
The Shower project was initiated by Mowson through a proposal to 
Experimenta Media Arts, a Melbourne based contemporary arts organi-
zation, for their 2003 House of Tomorrow exhibition. His initial proposal 
had been accepted for the second round of developed proposals. He was 
interested in constructing a small space, under the guise of a futuristic 
shower, designed to be a space in which one was ‘showered’ by a sound 
composition of his making. He approached SIAL looking for a collabora-
tor in designing and building this ‘shower’ cubicle. I had met Bruce once 
before and discussed his work with him. While I hadn’t experienced his 
sound pieces directly, I was familiar with his concern for the production of 
sound as a ‘mass’ or static sound-matter. Having agreed to collaborate, 
he and I worked on a second proposal, which was submitted in February 
2003, launching an intensely challenging process.
The Shower was produced to be a plenum: a space intensively fi lled 
with matter and/or a condition of fullness or great quantity.2  It is a skin 
toned, skin textured, latex enclosure, about the size of a small shower 
cubicle. A latex skin is suspended between a rectangular ceiling and an 
oval shaped fl oor area. It has speakers, lights and a ventilation fan in 
its ceiling and a pressure sensor under its spongy fl ooring. An encounter 
with it goes something like this: you enter through a slit in the latex skin. 
Stepping inside, the pressure of your foot on a sensor activates a sound 
piece and its associated vibrations. The sound was constructed to produce 
a ‘mass’ or thickness through the perpetual repetition of the same sound 
loop; one is showered into a tightly knitted vibratory fi eld. Once inside, the 
fan sucks the latex taut around the body. There is a moment before realis-
ing that the latex skin is pulling in around you, enacting a kind of vaccuum 
pack on the body. This tight but fl exible membrane can be pushed around 
in various ways such that both the shape and acoustics of the space can be 
actively manipulated. One can play this environment as an instrument. 
The Shower has an integrative role amidst my projects, folding together 
key confi gurations of the other projects discussed so far. It was in this 
project that the fur fi elds found, at last, an explicit, diagrammatic role. 
2.  See OED defi nitions above.
10.02  Rachel Whiteread, Ghost (1990). 
Whiteread’s casts became something of a 
sculptural equivalent to the way I thought about 
Mowson’s idea of the ‘sound mass’, where he 
produced something akin to the experience of 
inhabiting her casts. 
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As the main physical fabric of the piece is a large latex skin assembled 
into an inhabitable enclosure, it can be easily likened to the latex moulds 
of the Animate Casts. Rather than plaster, living bodies and a specifi c 
sound confi guration were poured into this mould. Along these lines, the 
Shower can be understood to be an experience of immersion within a 
casting process. 
The Shower preceded both Skins of Intimate Distance and Intimate 
Transactions, providing the latex skin for the former and informing the 
emphasis on vibration in the later. As such these later projects were 
informed by The Shower, but they have also enabled me to refl ect on it 
in a way that I couldn’t have done without them. Developments of The 
Shower also occurred during and after those two projects, so what was fed 
into them from The Shower, to be retested and transduced, was then fed 
back. The Shower is the fold into and out of which the four other projects 
discussed here are looped; it can be seen to operate at a developmental 
hinge of my practice and the fi nal synthesis through which a conceptual 
fi gure of design composition, understood in terms of the aesthetics of 
emergence, is fl eshed out. Importantly, engaging with the installation 
such that it becomes akin to ‘playing an instrument’ demands, as I will 
later argue, the development of a poise related to an ethico-aesthetics of 
emergence. 
10.03  Inside the Shower. 
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1.2 Threat, Fear and Claustrophobia
pho·bi·a (fb-)
n.
   1. A persistent, abnormal, or irrational fear of a specifi c thing or situation that 
compels one to avoid the feared stimulus.
   2. A strong fear, dislike, or aversion.
Source: The American Heritage® Stedman’s Medical Dictionary
When I fi rst met with Bruce to discuss the project at length, a few 
things became clear to me regarding the background tone that Bruce had 
in mind. While his initial proposal was wisely pitched as a fun, pop-slick 
and somewhat parodic series of three media showers for soaking oneself 
in an ever increasing fl ow of information, there was a sharper edge hid-
den in its quiet sarcasm. We discussed horror movies and murder scenes. 
Bruce scribbled down ‘Sex and Death’ as a kind of summation of his sense 
of where the piece should go. As a kind of fl ip side of the innocent, cartoon, 
sparkly clean, comically futuristic Jetson’s, the 1960 Hitchock horror fi lm 
‘Psycho’ became a key association for us very early in the development of 
The Shower, largely in terms of it’s shower murder scene, brilliantly edited 
and sound-tracked to screeching violins. For the second, joint proposal I 
developed a very sketchy depiction of the structure and its interior tactil-
ity that was emphatically aiming for a ‘bodyness’: a semi-blobby soft and 
fl eshy interior. The proposal incorporated a webcam, such that a person 
inside the installation would be under surveillance, something that I was 
quite fascinated with at the time.3  Embodied self-awareness was not sim-
3.  This was very much a part of my fascination 
with the Big Brother phenomenon that 
infl uenced the Graduate Certifi cate program 
and the development of the Skins of Intimate 
Distance event. It was also an aspect of 
the design studio I ran at the same time, 
‘Omnipresent Architecture’ in which students 
were designing a ‘suburb’ of houses that in 
some way re-invented the Big Brother game. 
10.04  Images from the famous shower scene of the Hitchcock fi lm, Psycho.
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ply about what happened under the skin (of either the persons body or 
the latex skin) but aimed to incorporate the sense of an expanded, social 
fi eld of connection, where being watched was also part of one’s self-aware-
ness. 
The rather cartoony, clunky images I produced for the document 
employed images from the fi lm, Psycho. The cover featured a shot look-
ing up into the shower rose. The image of the heroine with her arm and 
hand outstretched, reaching for the shower curtain in the throws of death, 
was blurred and made pink as if in a kind of fog. The shot of her face, 
pressed dead against the bathroom fl oor was montaged into an interior 
shot to illustrate someone listening to sounds beating inside the ‘skin’ of 
the interior. 
The associations with the fear of the thriller resonate with the sense 
of something palpably looming. The production of fear involves the invis-
ibility of that which threatens, or signifi cantly unknown dimensions. As 
Massumi has written, with a more political problem in mind: “A threat is 
unknowable. If it were known in its specifi cs, it wouldn’t be a threat.”4 
Bruce intended to develop upon an existing series, called Static Tones, 
in producing the sound piece for the installation. It was not until I expe-
rienced Static Tones directly that I more fully understood this associa-
tion with horror and fear. Static Tones are electronically composed sound 
pieces constructed to produce a ‘mass’ or thickness through the perpetual 
repetition of the same tiny, 250 millisecond long sound loop. 
4.  Massumi (2005), p. 35.
10.05
10.06
10.05  The fog image derived from the Psycho shower scene.  10.06  The Shower rose shot from Psycho.  10.07  Image of dead Psycho herion in early 
conceptual ‘sketches’.
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Once the proposal was accepted and commissioned by Experimenta, 
I assembled a small seminar of architecture students5 to work with us 
in producing the piece. In one of the fi rst seminar sessions, Bruce took 
us all into a small sound studio, turned all the lights off so the room was 
impenetrably black and turned the sound on. The volume level he set was 
high and we all jumped in our seats in the dark. But it wasn’t just the 
volume that was shocking, it was also the nature of the sound: a harsh, 
unforgiving machinic repetition. After the leap in our seats, a mild panic 
ensued and every fi bre of my being was longing to either leave the room 
or turn the sound off. He seemed to leave it on for a very long time. I kept 
wondering, in the midst of this internal, psycho-physical panic,what on 
earth could be the point of this torturous experience. 
But once it became clear that he wasn’t going to turn it off anytime too 
immediately, I managed to relax somewhat. It was once this happened 
that variations started to creep into conscious perception. Or perhaps it 
was the creeping realization of the variations that enabled me to relax; it 
seemed somewhat co-determining. I was experiencing a sense of three 
dimensional fl ow formations; something like a fl ock of boids invisibly 
moulding space. The becoming-conscious of a shifting, rather than static, 
fi eld was certainly part of a lifting from distress to curiosity: a desire to 
listen to what felt like a subtly shifting form in the blackness of the room. 
The strength of the image I ‘saw’ in the room was such that it was like 
being awake in a dream – this graining of space was right ‘there’ in front 
of me but ‘not there’ in that it was apparitional.   
5. Jonathan Podborsek, Jane Caught, Tim 
Schork and for the pre-production part, Jon 
Racek.
10.08  Jeff Kipnis’s ‘School of Fish’ display 
system-sculpture. 
10.09  ‘Flockers’ by MASON software: an implementation of Craig Reynolds’ Boids algorithm.
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Once the sound was tuned off and the lights turned back on I asked for 
confi rmation that the sound really was made of unvarying sound loops. 
Everyone seemed to have shared the experience of variations having crept 
into their perception and we discussed how the experience of the sound 
was in confl ict with the nature of its structure. From that point on, my 
interest in Static Tones lay in the fact that, while objectively the sound 
doesn’t vary, ones experience of it does. I began to afford greater value 
to the potential of datum: a fi xed standard or point of reference against 
which variation can be measured. Here the sound structure became an 
experiential datum: the complete lack of variation across the loops of 
sound data act to highlight one’s own embodied, perceptual variation in 
the conditions of a particular environment. The design task for The Shower, 
it seemed to me, involved the production of an environment that would, 
in concert with the sound, help to highlight the experience of embodied 
variation. In bouncing off the way in which Static Tones does this, one 
might imagine that a minimalist approach to the design, involving the 
repetition of standardized elements, might be the way to tackle it. As the 
initial ideational images indicate, this was not how I began approaching 
it. However, where it landed was perhaps somewhat like an elasticized 
version of minimalism – somewhere between the rigid and the pliable, 
the standard and the non-standard: a literal embodiment of the fl exible 
mould.  
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1.3 Affective diagram 
Figure 10.10 is an image of the microscopic structure of the latex which 
I found in the late nineties when I fi rst started playing with latex as a 
material. I imagined that it explained something of why latex castings 
could pick up incredibly fi ne detail in its surface, where its homogeneous 
grid provided a stable invariant  micro-structure against which minute 
variations within surfaces could be registered. My interest in the image was 
also that it’s homogeneity could be seen to describe the micro-structure of 
Cartesian space, as defi ned by points measured across axes. 
In the context of The Shower, I turned back to it as an image with 
which to diagrammatically visualise the microscale of Static Tones: both 
being constituted by a tight fi eld of identical, repeated units. The circles 
of latex become a visual analogue of the loops of sound. Where I had 
imagined that the lack of variance in the structure of latex enabled it to 
very evenly and precisely register the surface textures against which it is 
set, the lack of variance in the sound provided a datum against which the 
textures of experience could be perceived. 
The experience of the invisible forms in dark space strongly evoked 
the fur fi elds. The sense of swarming dynamic formations around me, 
such as that illustrated by many boids simulations, felt very much like an 
inhabitation of the fur drawings unfolding into actual space. If the latex 
microstructure offered a diagram of the objective structure of the sound, 
the fur fi elds became a diagram of what became of them – in experience 
– vaguely formed intensities and fl ows shifting about in a fi eld. 
The ‘unseen’ but perceived image of formations in the blackness of 
the room sound a lot like the dynamic synesthetic forms that Massumi 
discusses as: “not mirrored in thought; they are literal perceptions. 
They are not refl ected upon, they are experienced as events.”6 These 
synaesthetic forms are much like Stern’s  ‘forms of feeling’ or the affective 
diagram. The way in which Static Tones was able to provoke attention to 
an awareness of the embodied variations of the moment became clear to 
me through this affective diagram whose image stayed with me through-
out the design process. The affective diagram wasn’t the fur diagram in 
itself, but rather an uncapturable ‘image’ that lay between the fur fi eld and 
the micro-structure of latex: somewhere between too much order and too 
little contour. Thinking back, their juxtaposition diagrams a similar differ-
ence to the one Deleuze discussed between abstract expressionism and 
modernist abstraction. If I had felt lost in the fur drawings, not knowing 
where to go with them, it was related to their lack of contour and their lack 
6.  Massumi (2002a),  p. 186.
10.10  Microscopic image of the structure of 
latex.
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of edge condition or clear way of defi ning the whole. I have since come 
to understand that the key defi nition is not about outside edges, or the 
delimitation of external limits, but about defi ning ‘boundaries’ in terms of 
behavioural tendencies. 
The early struggle to make the fur fi elds ‘useful’ or make sense of them, 
seemed to resonate with the initial trauma of the Static Tones experience 
as an event through which this affective diagram emerged.  Trauma is 
characterized by an affective intensity felt acutely in one’s embodied state of 
being, but where that state is somehow inconceivable or incomprehensible. 
It contains, like shame, an abiding mystery and sweeps through the whole 
self while suspending an ability to act. In recent years trauma theorists 
have come to consider shame as the emotion that most defi nes the post-
traumatic state.7 Both are affective intensities caught in suspension, with 
nowhere to go. The perception of the affective diagram in the dark room 
fi lled with sound mass was not so much part of an inability to respond to 
the affective intensity, but rather the appearance of a way into moving 
with it or approaching it, at last. It opened a door into the opportunity to 
think through and transduce this intensity. If we can frame the affective 
diagram as a kind of design tool that I have gradually articulated across this 
research, then this particular apparitional appearance was one important 
phase shift within a very non-linear process.
7.  See Leys, Ruth (2006) ‘Image and Trauma’. 
This essay draws on her extensive study 
on trauma ‘Trauma: a Geneology’ in which 
she argues that since its invention in the 
nineteenth century, “the concept of trauma 
has been fundamentally unstable, balancing 
uneasily, or veering uncontrollably, between 
two antithetical ideas or theories.” (p 139) She 
names these antithetical theories as ‘mimetic’ 
and ‘antimimetic’.  Mimetic theory understands 
trauma as involving such a profound immersion 
that it precludes the possibility for the distance 
necessary for a cognitive understanding of 
what happened. As such the traumatised 
person is bound into repeated re-enactments or 
imitations of the traumatic event. On the other 
hand, antimimetic theory sees the traumatised 
victim as remaining aloof and a spectator of the 
traumatic scene. Rather than the immersive 
becoming of mimesis, the trauma is an 
external event. She sees the recent attention 
to shame as the primary emotion of trauma as 
fi tting into the antimimetic tendency because it 
relates to the shamed subject’s consciousness 
of being seen. This is not the context in which 
a critique of her paper is called for, but I 
would nevertheless like to suggest that Jack 
Katz’s study of shame may lead productively 
to an understanding of trauma that rejoins 
the mimetic and antimimetic theories. This 
is not unlike the role of composition theory 
that I suggest in this thesis. The linking act 
that shame could provide for trauma theory is 
perhaps related to the way in which it points to 
a condition that always sweeps up the whole 
self. 
10.11 Pia Ednie-Brown, fur fi eld (pencil on paper). 
281
“The birth of a new technical object is never a linear progress. It is knotty, a 
mangle-prone emergence across a threshold of surprise.”8 
Where, as Bacon wrote, an image has to, “be twisted if is to make a 
renewed assault on the nervous system,”9 this affective diagram seemed 
to offer a twist on both the fur fi eld diagrammatic image and the structure 
of Static Tones. This twist most certainly emerged though an experiential 
assault: beginning as a knotted muscularity of adverse reaction, then to 
pass through a surprising threshold in which the experience of the event 
was literally reshaped through this ‘image.’ But in experiencing this per-
ceptual image and identifying it as crucial to the project, I then needed to 
twist it again into another ‘renewed assault on the nervous system’.
‘Capturing’ and ‘twisting’ this transitional image into the project did 
not occur as an application, in the sense of rendering it visible. Rather, it 
swirled around the process, with all its little sensitive hairs suggesting inti-
macy, tactility and immersion. In a quiet and indirect but powerful way it 
informed the relations that constituted the composition of the installation 
design. The design development process took all sorts of dead-end turns 
and cul-de-sac twists. On a number of occasions I tried to force related 
images into the work: the images of being inside a body in the early docu-
ment were heading in that direction, as was an image of a looping fl ow 
formation that I played with at another time. The relationship between 
the affective diagram and the installation was not a smooth ride or an 
undeviating path. It squirmed and writhed (very) uncomfortably through 
a developmental falling-into-place.
8.  Massumi (2002a), p. 215.
9.  Farr (1999), p. 41.
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1.4 Futurity and the Process of Change
fu·tu·ri·ty .
1. The quality, state, or fact of being future; = FUTURITION 2. rare.    
2. Future time; the future; a future space of time.
3. What is future.    a. What will exist or happen in the future; future events as 
a whole. Also those that will live in the future, posterity (obs. rare). b. pl. Future 
events.  c. State or condition in the future. Also, existence after death.10 
The call for proposals for the House of Tomorrow were fronted by a blue, 
cartoony, Jetsons-like house image. This was later developed into the 
exhibition ‘logo’ of a Jetsons-like space ship. (Fig 10.12) In the catalogue 
published for the exhibition, the curators, Liz Hughes, Shiralee Saul and 
Helen Stuckey, claim that the exhibition belongs to a “strong twentieth 
century tradition of Houses of the Future,”11 associating it in particular 
with Robin Boyd’s House of Tomorrow featured in the 1949 Modern Home 
exhibition in Melbourne. Other references to houses or images of the future 
are dated between the 1920s and 1968. The Jetsons were a product of 
this period, being a feature of 1960s television screen along with their 
fl ip-side, the Flintstones, which fi rst screened in 1960. But both of these 
cartoons, produced by the same studio, Hanna-Barbera, were a recasting 
of the socio-cultural-technological present into either the future or the 
Stone Age past. The past and the future of the ‘contemporary era’ were 
both explicitly cast into the present. It is fi tting then that Boyd’s 1949 
House of Tomorrow was, as the Experimenta curators write, “less of a 
vision for the future than a plea for good design in the present”12 and 
“provided a forum to critique the present, to parody and play.”13 
The curator’s essay makes a swift jump from the 1960’s to what 
they saw as today’s ‘mediacentric’ home of the future where ubiquitous 
computing has turned the home into “a media command centre.”14 In the 
future-present something with a mechanical intelligence anticipates your 
needs and moves: raising the room temperature, making your coffee while 
you shower, ordering the groceries as supplies become depleted. What you 
are feeling and are about to think is being dealt with already: the house of 
the future is poised in the very near future-past: in anticipation. But only 
in anticipation of what you already thought you needed. The future gets 
closer and closer only to what has already been anticipated. Experimenta’s 
House of Tomorrow was poised as “a translation device between yesterday’s 
10.  Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford 
University Press, 2007.
11.  Hughes et al (2003), p. 9.
12.  Hughes et al (2003), p. 8.
13.  Ibid, p. 9.
14.  Ibid.
10.12  ‘The House of Tomorrow’ exhibition logo 
(2003).
10.13  The Jetsons.  10.14  The Flinstones.
10.13
10.14
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Modernist exhortations and tomorrow’s technophiliac commercials.”15 As 
such it becomes caught in the already known and inscribed, between the 
idea of yesterdays tomorrow, which is more-or-less today, and the already 
anticipated, next move. 
I was never comfortable with the Jetsons genre as a way to imagine 
the future. Rather than represent the future as a ready-made, nostalgic 
image, I was more interested in how we feel the emerging potential of 
the future, or how we sense looming change. This ‘shower’ was made for 
a ‘House of Tomorrow’ but aimed at a different kind of futurity: a way of 
approaching that which might, but hasn’t yet been anticipated. This is akin 
to Bergson’s call to: 
“Install yourself within change, and you will grasp at once both change itself and 
the successive states in which it might at any instant be immobilised.”16  
In approaching the future, in a way that thinking-feeling doesn’t get 
caught in the already inscribed, The Shower project aimed to tip experience 
into a intensifi ed here and now through an amplifi ed alertness to one’s 
embodied sense of aliveness: “One’s sense of aliveness is a continuous, 
nonconscious self perception (unconscious self-refl ection of lived self 
referentiality).”17 Rather than inscribe an image of what the future might 
be, the aim was to produce the sense of something bodily but intangible, 
palpably looming but as-yet-unknown: an intense feeling of potential or 
an affective intensity. But it was also about tendency, something I have 
highlighted in relation to all kinds of behaviour. As Massumi has written: 
“Tendency is futureness: pure futurity.”18 
15.  Ibid, p. 11.
16.  Bergson (1998), p. 308.
17.  Massumi (2002a), p. 36.
18.  Massumi (2002a), p. 15.
284
1.5 Now Moments and Moments of Meeting
‘The unity of emotion, which is the unity of the present occasion, is a patterned 
texture of qualities, always shifting as it is passed into the future. The creative 
activity aims at preservation of the components and at preservation of 
intensity.”19 
The interest in the here and now as an affective intensity was, at the time, 
being informed by the idea of the ‘now moment’, as discussed by a group 
a psychoanalysts, involving Daniel Stern and his wife, who call themselves 
‘The Process of Change Study Group’ (PCSG). Their modelling of a kind of 
‘pivotal moment’ of experience is a useful one here in that it offers a way 
to conceptualise the event through which the affective diagram emerged 
in the Static Tones experience discussed earlier. This later unfolds into a 
way of understanding the potential of the installation experience. 
In a paper by the PCSG titled ‘Non-Interpretive Mechanisms in 
Psychoanalytic Therapy’ (1998), they are specifi cally interested in 
how one brings about psychological change. Standard psychoanalytic 
therapy revolves primarily about the process of interpretation as central 
to methods of provoking change in a troubled patient. But, they claim, 
change also requires “something more than interpretation”; something 
non-interpretative that is highly affective. They are drawing attention to 
undeclared knowledge that operates implicitly rather than explicitly in 
relationships, an example of which might be the difference of sensibility 
in the Intimate Transactions project. It dwells in the midst of things but 
operates “outside both focal attention and conscious verbal experience.” 
They call this ‘implicit relational knowing’, a form of knowing that is 
non-symbolic, nonverbal and not refl ectively conscious, involving things 
like affects, expectations, shifts in activation and motivation, and styles 
of thought.20 Like sensibility, implicit relational knowing is embedded in 
our particular processes of making sense, occurring in the realm of inter-
relationality and manifesting itself in what they call the ‘shared, implicit 
relationship’. In daily life, this becomes discernable in the way we socially 
and culturally gather in clusters of shared sensibility; implicitly we share 
something of a way of making sense of the world and can feel at home 
together. In any relationship, this undeclared fi eld of shared knowing shifts 
as the dynamics of relationships play themselves out. The PCSG paper 
draws attention to moments in which a particular kind of relatedness 
emerges that is integral to a process of signifi cant change in this shared, 
implicit relationship. Importantly, these shared changes involve shifts of 
19.  Whitehead (1968), p. 167.
20.  Stern (2004), pp. 113-114. 
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awareness for the patient, that being the primary aim of the therapeutic 
process. They describe this non-interpretive process as involving “special 
moments of person-to-person connection” which they call ‘moments of 
meeting.’
These special moments of connection begin with a ‘now moment’ which 
emerge through the falling apart of implicitly held conventions that normally 
structure and authorise the professionalism of the situation. This structure 
of the situation, which arranges the professional format and the roles of 
each party, could be seen as an enduring environmental armature that 
holds and conditions the exchange. If something happens that disrupts 
or destabilises this structural environment and its authorising status, the 
atmosphere shifts from a relatively stable and familiar set up, to one of 
turbulence and uncertainty. Pre-formed procedural approaches loosen into 
a high risk, artful moment of vulnerability and spontaneity. 
In the emergence of a ‘now moment’, the conversation (or discourse) 
was just moving along and then suddenly, that path of action is thrown off 
balance and into suspension. This might occur when something outside the 
traditional therapeutic relationship framework occurs, such as the patient 
and therapist meet unexpectedly in the street, or the patient asking a 
question that shifts the focus from the intimate life of the patient to that 
of the analyst. In the falling away of certain conventions and structures 
that scaffold the standard interchange between patient and therapist, an 
affective tone looms large. Otherwise humming along in the background, 
affect now overfl ows and fi lls the foreground, making the atmosphere ‘hot’, 
or in other words, thick with the feeling of a feeling. Space becomes dense 
and thick. This is what they call a ‘now moment’. They write that:
“these moments are unfamiliar, unexpected in their exact form and timing, 
unsettling or weird. They are often confusing as to what is happening or what 
to do. …The present becomes very dense subjectively as in ‘a moment of truth’. 
These ‘now moments’ are often accompanied by expectancy or anxiety because 
the necessity of choice is pressing, yet there is no immediately available prior 
plan of action or explanation.”21  
These moments present an enormous opportunity for positive change, 
but can easily be lost or, worse, botched such that the therapeutic 
relationship becomes damaged. The therapist, in the midst of a ‘now 
moment’ hot spot, has to leap from the scaffolding of technique and draw 
upon a more personal kind of knowing. The Process of Change Study Group 
discuss the ‘moment of meeting’ as a moment of ‘truth’ because: 
21.  Stern et al (1998), p. 903.
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“The therapist must use a specifi c aspect of his or her individuality that carries 
a personality signature. The two are meeting as persons relatively unhidden by 
their usual therapeutic roles, for that moment.” 
Importantly, the moment has to be seized and acknowledged such that 
a jointly constructed ‘moment of meeting’ emerges, wherein something 
unique is contributed from each party. There is, once again, a mutual 
affectivity within the process of forming a new understanding. The individual 
or personal, idiosyncratic difference is part of a shared moment in which 
the implicit knowing of the relationship is reassembled. Something is 
realised, materialised and transformed – becoming palpable, manipulable 
and less of an abiding mystery. But it is not simply that something hidden 
has been uncovered or discovered, because nothing is ever quite the same 
again. The emergence of a palpable change in the scene would seem to be 
akin to an interference pattern, a moiré of intimate interaction.
The affective diagram that emerged through the experience of Static 
Tones – an apparitional fl ow suspended between relentless repetition and 
embodied variation – would seem to be an instance of such an interference 
pattern. It could be understood as the emergence of a moment of meeting 
in that it was formed by contributions from both parties: the abstract 
structure of the sound and ones abstract embodiment or affect. It 
twisted the encounter from an anxiety-ridden one into a moment tickled 
by curiosity. But as much as this apparition emerged, it did not emerge 
entirely ‘unwillingly’, being both “involuntary and elicited.” This emergence 
of a moment of meeting becomes a crucial one that defi nes, as I will go on 
to discuss later, the potential of The Shower. 
While not as fully articulated as they are now, the ideas of trying to 
elicit a ‘now moment’ and for people to generate a ‘moment of meeting’ 
with the work, while not as fully articulated as they are now, were quite 
consciously active from the early phases of the project development.22
  This was when it all seemed to be going well. What was looming, but 
was as-yet-unknown, was the knarly, knotted monster of a collaboration 
nightmare. 
22. My interest in Stern’s work came about 
when, shortly after the birth of my child (2001), 
I re-read Guattari’s Chaosmosis (1995) and his 
reference to Stern’s The Interpersonal World 
of the Infant (2000). This led me to the paper 
by Stern et al (The Process of Change Study 
Group) in 2002, and my discussion of art as the 
provocation of ‘now moments’ in the opening 
lecture (‘Too True to be Real’) for my Vital Signs 
theory seminar in 2003. I then got a copy of 
Stern’s newer book The Present Moment (2004) 
which I read in Jan/Feb 2004. In relation to the 
futuristic agenda of The House of Tomorrow, I 
saw an approach related to the ‘now moment’ 
and then ‘the present moment’ as having a 
great deal of potential.
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1.6 Collaborative trauma
This project was the most diffi cult collaboration I have ever experienced. 
Complex diffi culties built up through a range of tensions coming from 
layered and diverse dynamics within the group and between the group and 
the curators who had commissioned the piece. As the project developed a 
series of tensions of various kinds, largely unspoken, built up and became 
integral to its particular ontogenesis. Collaborative diffi culties between 
Bruce and myself continued, seemingly involuntarily, or beyond our 
control, across the phases of its development for both its showing in 2004 
(Melbourne) and 2005 (Perth). 
I will not be attempting to analyse the complexities of these diffi cul-
ties in depth here. However, it is worth mentioning that sensibility was, I 
believe, an important aspect of the tensions. Bruce’s work is minimalist 
in nature,23 bringing up a not dissimilar situation to the sensibility clash 
discussed in the Intimate Transactions project. As discussed in the last 
Act, the resonance of shared laughter emerges because of the appearance 
of incompatibilities. At an opening of a group show in 2005, of which The 
Shower was a part, I commented to Bruce that it was a miracle that the 
piece had made it this far, given that the collaboration had been so incred-
ibly unsuccessful. He shook his head: “No Pia, it was a highly successful 
collaboration.” He was right: the incompatibilities and tensions between 
us, while diffi cult at the time, were highly productive. The atmosphere of 
the process was transduced into the potential within the outcome. The 
creature we created, embodied the traumatic, monstrous tone of its his-
tory, but in the fi nal analysis, I believe it also redeems itself as a piece with 
as much to offer as the collaboration itself did. 
In 2005, for the same exhibition mentioned above, Bruce wrote the 
following rather elegant text for the catalogue, in which he points to his 
relationship to minimalism and abstract art:
“The Shower was conceived as a way of bringing sound to the gallery, in a 
fashion less compromised by that space’s typically poor acoustics – fl accid, 
echoic emptiness. The desire to bring sound to the gallery comes from a need 
to experience the physicality, immediacy and transience – the power of sound 
– within the slow, elastic space of visual art. The piece is touched by the more 
extreme minimalist and abstract artists, with their inward gaze, their folding 
of the meaning of an object down, creating a quality of experience distilled 
from the conscious desire and unconscious expression of the artist. Rather than 
achieving the elegant simplicity of minimal forms, The Shower, I think, captures 
a certain savage vitality, an existential awareness that time is slipping past us, 
and us through it.”
23. This is quite evident across his solo 
pieces and he explicitly describes his project 
‘Blue Balls’ in this way. See: http://www.
brucemowson.com/performances.html (last 
accessed, 05.04.07).
10.15 An animated gif of this monster was 
one of the fi rst things to appear on our project 
development wiki. 
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If the collaboration had gotten a little savage at times, the work became 
all the more vital for it. If a plenum is something akin to “an enclosure or 
chamber containing gas that is at a higher pressure than the surrounding 
atmosphere,” then the shower became a plenum that resonated with 
affective intensity partly through the pressure that built up through tensions 
we found almost impossible to pin-point, articulate or clearly understand, 
despite several efforts to ‘talk it through.’ Between my tendency to fl esh 
out affectivity into fi gurative embodiments and his tendency to channel 
it into and out of rigid, minimalist abstractions, an affective intensity was 
squeezed out in a high pressure bubble of tension. This interest in vitality 
was something we shared, even if we came at it or arrived there from very 
different sensibilities and routes. Rather than shared laughter, there was a 
shared tremor of a more traumatic nature, keeping the gulf between our 
approaches open and unapproachable, while holding it all, qualitatively, 
together. In relation to far broader historical tendencies that have been 
discussed in earlier Acts, this condition of confl ict and rupture is one that 
characterises the conditions in which new theories of composition tend 
to emerge. In the much smaller scale situation of this particular project, 
this tendency seems to be reinforced, as it was here that the model of 
composition presented in this thesis became most clearly embodied and 
articulated. And it was the perception of an affective diagram quivering 
in the darkness of the room that fi rst let in the breeze, lingering like a 
whorl of grease that lubricated the transductive hinge between process 
and product with a quality of vibration. A mantra for surviving the col-
laboration, dealing with the affective diagram and, as I will go on to later 
discuss, the installation itself, could well be:
“A quality is an actual presentation of lived relation. World-glue made visible. 
See it, be surprised, live it and like it (or not). But don’t just emote it. Above all, 
don’t take it personally.”24 
Affect is an impersonal matter, like the looming, unknown-as-yet 
potential of the future folding into the present. 
24.  Massumi (2002a), p. 221.
10.16, 17, 18  Examples of Mowson’s work: 
‘Infracinema’, ‘Blue Balls’ and ‘Barney’.  
10.16
10.17
10.18
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2. Ontogenesis.
10.17   The fi rst big skin, peeled off a shower recess. 
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2.1 Skin development
About fi ve weeks into the seminar investigations, a decision was made to 
investigate using latex as the interior skin. We began with the production 
of a single latex sheet being cast and peeled off a tiled shower cubicle. The 
size of the skin and the very skin-like colour and texture of the material 
tended to elicit a sense of horror, being reminiscent of skin peeled off 
a body – or perhaps, a skinned architecture-animal. As a thing, it was 
highly evocative; fl oppy and lifeless while also exceptionally lively with 
suggestibility. It made people recoil or it made them reach out to touch, 
eyes a little more open than usual. As a thing, it had affective power. 
We strung up the skin on props during a working session in order 
to get a sense of what it produced as a surrounding surface and how it 
worked with light and shadow, including the projection of video capture 
onto it. Because of the way we set the camera-projection up, where the 
viewpoint of the camera captured the projection of the video onto the 
skin, recursive feedback images were generated, resonating with that 
10.18  Jane Caught peeling the latex off the 
shower recess.
10.19   The fi rst big skin, peeled off a shower recess.   10.20  Photographs from the working session tests. 
10.19 10.20
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10.21  ‘Touching Myself’.
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which I had hoped the experience would produce; a perception of self-
perception. In particular, the image of Bruce’s hand, which I later named 
‘touching myself’ (Fig 10.21) seemed especially and amusingly poignant 
in relation to the self-perception involved in successfully forging a moment 
of meeting. Our play with the multiply recursive layering of image in the 
projection had generated a great deal of laughter.25  
In amplifying the ‘skin-like’ nature of the latex, we went on to test a 
literal texturing of the latex with human skin patterning. Digital photos were 
taken of a range of people’s hand palms. These images were magnifi ed, 
stripped of colour and put at high contrast such that they became black 
lines on a white background. (Fig 10.22) This pattern became the image 
that guided the laser cutting of the particleboard sheets from which the 
latex skin was cast. 
The fi rst test pieces took my breath away. This skin-like latex fabric was 
both delicate and robust, beautiful and abject. Sometimes you just know 
when its right. That was one such moment. 
We introduced the shower tile pattern back into the skin as a way of 
dealing with the fact that we could only laser cut small sheets of timber, 
that would have to joined together to make a large enough single sheet of 
latex for the enclosure. The tile lines helped to conceal the joins between 
the smaller panels in making the larger surface onto which we cast the latex 
sheet. Not only did this retain a textural association with the conventional 
tiled shower interior, it knitted together the variational pattern of skin into 
the standard repetition of the tiles. 
25.  I was particularly interested to hear 
later that Bruce identifi ed this event of play 
and laughter as a point at which he fi rst felt 
clearly alienated from the group, because he 
felt we weren’t taking it seriously enough. 
My disgruntlement, on the other hand, came 
from his increasing distance and unwillingness 
to actively contribute to the playfulness of 
designing, where we were left to ‘do all the 
work’. It took me a long time to realise that 
this generative ‘work’ occurred through that 
very double-sided tension. 
10.22  The skin texture images used to cut the particleboard.
10.23  The fi rst skin textured latex sample test.
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2.2 Vibrating and Sucking
Ways of making this latex surface vibrate in accord with the sound were 
given a great deal of attention. I wanted to throw the shivers that the skin 
seemed to induce in people and the vibratory intensity of Static Tones into 
the skin itself, such that it operated as a skin that shivered with you. When 
we placed one of the early latex test pieces on the front of a speaker cone, 
it was sucked in and out in a vibratory oscillation such that the texture on 
the skin appeared three dimensional; it acquired a body-presence through 
dissolving into multiply perceived after-images of this sucking in and out 
movement.
While I knew that we could not achieve quite the same affect in the 
piece (without the vibrations being isolated to circular areas of speaker 
cones pressed against the skin) I was keen that some vibratory action in 
the skin was built in. The ‘jonophones’26 were developed as vibration actu-
ators: speakers with the fronts removed so they no longer make sound but 
still vibrated (Fig 10.24). Disks were made for the front of the actuator to 
which strings could be fi xed and pulled taut between them and the skin. 
We toyed with the idea of attaching the string to the skin by tying the end 
around a marble nestled in the latex, such that from the inside the attach-
ment detail appeared like little ass holes. We then moved to making little 
‘nipples’ out of latex covered rubber grommets (Fig 10.25) that would hold 
a thread between speaker and skin.
But something unexpected happened that contributed to leaving the 
vibration actuators and ‘nipples’ out of the piece. I had been concerned 
about the space getting too sweaty and smelly through large amounts 
of use, as was expected in the House of Tomorrow show. It needed to 
breathe. To ensure this wouldn’t be a problem, I had included an exhaust 
fan into the ceiling plan. Then, to our surprise and delight, once we had 
fi nally got all the elements in place and strung up the latex skin, we dis-
covered that the fan sucked the air out to the degree that it also sucked 
the skin inwards, constricting the space around the body. Not only was 
this incredibly powerful experientially, it ensured that the skin would be as 
taut as possible and have an in-built forcefulness against which the person 
inside could push. Pushing the skin outwards away from the body involved 
a noticeable, through not prohibitive, muscular effort. 
As we wrapped the constricting, elastic latex skin around the thick 
sound mass of Static Tones, it was starting to feel somewhat like Bergson’s 
urging toward durational perception, where we, in an attunement with the 
actions of skin and sound, ”grasp ourselves afresh as we are, in a present 
which is thick, and further more, elastic…”27  
26.  They were given this name after one of 
the students, Jonathan Podborsek (see p. 131) 
presented the idea of cutting the fronts off 
speakers to make the ‘vibrators’. He thought 
of this when he heard a radio discussion about 
how deaf people feel the radio in order to ‘hear’ 
it. 
27.  Bergson (1998), p. 129.
10.24  Jane Caught and Aphra Ednie-Brown 
with the ‘jonophones’: speakers adapted to 
operate as vibration actuators.
10.25  The rubber grommet ‘nipples’ in the 
process of being made.
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10.26  Bruce Mowson inside the Shower. 
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2.3 Rejection 
“…there are people who are attracted by the permanence of stone. They would 
like to be solid and impenetrable, they do not want change: for who knows 
what change might bring?...It is as if their own existence were perpetually in 
suspense. But they want to exist in all ways at once, and in all one instant. They 
have no wish to acquire ideas, they want them to be innate … they want to adopt 
a mode of life in which reasoning and the quest for truth play only a subordinate 
part, in which nothing is sought except what has already been found, in which 
one never becomes anything else but what one already was.”38  
The fi rst signifi cant response to the work was another traumatic event. A 
week or so before the opening, the Experimedia curators came to inspect 
the piece. Their response was stony and silent. Shortly after they left, they 
called to inform us that they could not accept the felt outer covering and 
we would have to cover it with white plastic. In explaining their decision, 
there was some mention of health and safety issues (related to dust) but 
it was eventually admitted that it was a stylistic or aesthetic issue of sorts, 
where they felt that it simply did not look futuristic enough. Bruce recounts 
the events in a letter we eventually sent to the Experimenta Board:
“On Saturday 30th August, the curators saw The Shower, and subsequently 
informed Pia and myself that the work could not be included in the exhibition in its 
present form. It was explained that the thick grey felt, which comprised two of the 
structures walls, made the work “big and hairy” and it would “stick out like dogs 
balls”, whilst all the other works in the exhibition are … slick.” The curators stated 
that the work could be included in the exhibition if the felt was covered by opaque 
plastic. After enquiries on Monday morning, Pia and myself found only clear plastic 
of workable dimensions. In a meeting later that day, the curators said that the clear 
plastic was not suitable, and it was agreed that white plastic might be both suitable 
and available. Helen Stuckey offered to try to fi nd such material, but failing this, the 
artwork would be withdrawn. On Tuesday 2nd at 1pm, Helen phoned Pia and myself 
to say that the piece would have to be withdrawn.”
38. Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) quoted Mary 
Douglas (2002), p. 200.
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Too hairy and not slick enough. We had indeed made a monster 
suffi ciently repulsive to have it expelled from the House of Tomorrow. 
But by the time of the opening the students made up a range of circular 
felt badges, with one of the following phrases laser cut into their surface:
‘tomorrow can be felt’
‘here to be felt’
‘too hairy for experimenta’
Laser cutting felt is a very smelly business. It smells like burnt hair and 
the odour lingers for a long time. So, as we handed out hundreds of these 
badges at the opening, we were also attaching a burnt hair perfume to 
their experience of the event.  We laughed a lot that night.
10.27  Tim Schork and Jane Caught laughing about the curators’ response. 10.28  Tim Schork and Jonothan Podborsek 
constructing the Shower. 
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2.4 Public life
The Shower was fi rst exhibited in a group show called Job Lot #59, curated 
by Louise Ann Zahra at The Project Space, Cardigan Street, Melbourne, 
June 2004. This fi rst showing was a welcome relief from a fairly long period 
of storage, after its curatorial expulsion. In the fi rst version of the work, 
we had the felt draping over the front and back such that people entered 
the latex interior via a slit in the felt.  The ‘nakedness’ of the latex skin 
was ‘protected’ on all four sides, held within an outer enclosure of felt and 
perspex. When it came to exhibiting the piece in Job Lot #59, we became 
keen to expose the latex more openly while still incorporating the ‘bodily’ 
and ‘fl eshy’ mass of the felt within the piece. So, I pulled the felt back off 
the front and draped it like a trail from behind.  Over the course of it’s 
exhibitionary appearances it did a kind of gradual striptease. 
For the next iteration for a show in Perth in 2005, Bruce and I decided 
to try removing the felt (and steel support structure) altogether (see 
‘iteration 2’). I then developed a hanging system for its suspension from 
the ceiling. We were struck by a sense of relief in its nakedness, as if it had 
fi nally thrown off some heavy and unnecessary clothing.39 
The gradual letting go of the felt was also a process of throwing off 
the last vestiges of fl eshy heaviness. The initial rather heavy and clunky 
drawings of the piece, that tried to gather a sense of bodily presence, had 
at last been disposed of. The body-ness became less weighed down by 
fl esh and veered closer to an abstract embodiment of tensile relations. 
As it lost gravity and gained more suspension and lightness the laughter 
around the piece began to get more audible and noticeable. Following 
the 2005 exhibition, the following extract from a review, published in The 
Australian newspaper, was written by artist, Ted Snell:
Adjacent to le Brun’s work, Bruce Mowson and Pia Ednie-Brown from RMIT 
University have installed another environment that one enters with trepidation. 
The problem they have identifi ed is more solipsistic, requiring their participants 
to confront their own existence by stepping inside The Shower, a life-size rubber 
lung suspended from the roof.
Once inside, the latex skin of the booth envelopes you when the air is sucked out 
with an eerie mechanical whine. The thin walls press against your body until your 
breathing and your beating heart become intolerable and the claustrophobia 
drives you out into the relative comfort of the gallery. For the next few minutes 
the heightened sense of mortality and the mechanics of respiration deliver the 
punchline the artists have carefully crafted.40 
39.  We had to reluctantly admit (smiling 
wryly) that perhaps the curators, and their 
dislike for the felt, had been onto something 
after all. Although, it seems unlikely that the 
naked latex would have submitted to the ‘slick’ 
they were after. 
40. Ted Snell, ‘Shape Shifters’ (exhibition 
review), The Australian, 04 jun 05.
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10.29  The Shower exhibited at the Perth Institute of Contemporary Art (2005).
10.30  Images of The Shower exhibited at The Project Space, Mebourne (2004).
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Snell’s recognition that the installation required “participants to 
confront their own existence” hit a chord for us, but such a confrontation 
was something that many were not willing to take on. 
When The Shower was fi rst exhibited we found that many refused to 
go inside, many others very quickly exited while some remained inside for 
surprisingly long periods of time. In Melbourne, I witnessed one man enter 
the gallery and run straight to the installation. He was in there for 3 or 4 
minutes, playing with the skin quite actively. When he got out he looked at 
us, smiled widely and said “It’s still the best trip in town!” and then, appar-
ently energized, literally ran out of the gallery again. But moments such as 
these stood out as unusual at this fi rst showing in Melbourne. 
The more common reluctance of many to engage with the piece, 
either at all or in any extended way, is not hard to understand. With the 
combination of the sonic assault, the constricting space and the creepiness 
of the skin, The Shower presented itself as highly impositional rather than 
‘responsive’, something like that which Benjamin objected to in Wolffl in’s 
comportment. The character of the piece was too strong, its affectivity too 
imposing (too viscous). But unlike Wolffl in, this was less of a charismatic 
imposition than a repulsive one: the sound is ‘unfriendly’ in its relentlessly 
machinic repetition; the enclosure sucks around the immersed body in 
a way that can feel ominous and claustrophobic; the latex itself, with its 
human skin like qualities, is quite intensely affective to many, often induc-
ing revulsion. It has a tendency to evoke various forms of revulsion and 
fear. To some extent, it is a phobia or fear inducer, particularly claustrophia 
and body-horror.
The importance of this tendency to induce fear, revulsion or trauma lies 
partly in what the process of overcoming it entails. 
When I think back to the initial exposure to Bruce’s Static Tones in the 
darkened room, the mild trauma of that experience and the perceptual 
images that emerged through enduring that experience now stand as an 
important moment. The trauma of that experience and the partial resolu-
tion of that trauma became, mostly unwittingly, a crucial operation of the 
piece that emerged. That resolution rested on turning from a reactionary 
tension to a more relaxed stance of a listening-feeling of the subtle varia-
tions of the situation. This would seem to be like willingly moving from 
a stance that insists on one’s separateness from the (repulsive, fearful) 
thing into a working with rather than in reaction to something other.
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3. Composition
3.1 Building Suspense: Oscillations of Attunement and 
Misattunement
‘’The signifi cance of art does not lie in the meaning it is said to convey, or in the 
meanings it is meant to convey but in its alteration of meanings that have been 
constituted elsewhere.’’32  
A young girl33, around 3 years old, walks onto a suspension bridge.  “It’s 
like being in a wish”, she said to her mother, who was standing just behind 
her.  This scene, recounted to me by a friend (the mother) struck me 
as a superbly sophisticated, deeply spatial instance of synesthetic affect 
attunement. ‘Being in a wish’: truly felt but only barely real, tentatively 
and bravely poised in the air, as an event that is both here and coming 
toward you from the direction of the hoped-for future – like daring to 
step into and anticipate the experience of crossing a wavering suspension 
bridge to the other side of a dropping away of the ground. 
The sense of a coming future, looming in the imagination, unknown 
in its specifi cs as yet but nevertheless directing ones orientation or next 
step, is a property of threat as much as ‘being in a wish’. Suspense is a 
state of uncertainty or being ‘up-in-the-air’, accompanied by a sense of 
anticipation of what might be about to occur or how things are going to 
‘land.’ Because it involves the sense that things have not yet become clear, 
it is more affective than emotive – one is unsure about how to feel because 
there is nothing to clearly name yet. Eliciting a sense of suspense is a way 
of intensifying affect. 
32.  Evans (1995), p. 37.
33.  Cora Hughes, a friend of my daughter. 
10.31  Perspex connection detail of The 
Shower (iteration 1, 2004).
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In the transition between the latex micro-structure image and the fur 
diagram/images is a tension between repetition of the same and variation 
through repetition. The power of this transition does not simply lie in the 
move from one form of repetition (sameness) to another (variation). It lies 
in an oscillation between one and the other: a suspenseful tension strung 
between two ends of a spectrum.  
One of the details of The Shower made a textual allusion to suspense. 
We made little circular, perspex washers for the junction between the 
large perspex sheets and the metal frame, around the edges of which was 
etched:
“tomorrow never comes” 
This was partly a tongue-in-cheek comment related to the name of the 
exhibition for which it was made: ‘The House of Tomorrow’. Tomorrow is 
a name for something always on the horizon; something about to happen 
but still looming. Given the desire to invoke an embodied ‘here and now’ 
through the experience of this installation, an allusion to a never-ending-
present was a way of intensifying that state, letting it roll round and round, 
building up in intensity. 
Suspense was built into The Shower through a range of affect attune-
ments and misattunements oscillating in the relations between compo-
nents or aspects of the installation. 
As quoted earlier from Stern, “Attunement takes the experience of 
emotional resonance and automatically recasts that experience into 
another form of expression.”34 The distinguishing feature of attunement is 
the degree to which a given behaviour is recast into a different form. An 
attunement is not affect moved or translated from one place to another 
(as the idea of empathy implies) but transduced into different forms such 
that a feeling across these forms can be felt (both because of and despite 
these differences). As such, attunements resonate, as in shared laughter. 
As Stern summarises:
“Affect attunement, then, is the performance of behaviours that express the 
quality of feeling of a shared affect state without imitating the exact behavioural 
expression of the inner state…imitation does not permit the partners to refer 
to the internal state. It maintains the focus of attention upon the forms of the 
external behaviours. Attunement behaviours…recast the event and shift the 
focus of attention to what is behind the behaviour, to the quality of the feeling 
that is being shared.”35 
34.  Stern (2000), p. 145.
35.  Ibid, p. 142.
302
To enact an affect attunement, one needs to ‘get inside’ the movement 
of a vitality affect, much like the way Bergson writes about installing one-
self in change (Act 6). Imitation comes from ‘standing outside’, respond-
ing to movement as an external object. Unlike attunement, very close 
imitation will often seem a little robotic or machine like, becoming more 
of a joke or those comic imitation routines done in the service of ridicule. 
The sharing of feeling states is a joining-in-with, rather than a mirroring 
or throwing back. “Imitation renders form: attunement renders feeling” 
– but these different modes of engagement, Stern notes, do not present 
a dichotomy, but “occupy two ends of a spectrum.”36 Form and feeling 
perhaps become most powerfully combined, in fact, through a related 
trajectory of ‘misattunement’. 
Misattunement is not the same as ‘non-attunement’, which involves a 
defi cit of affective connection. Rather, misattunement loops provocatively 
out of attunement: it still involves, ‘getting inside’ an action and recast-
ing it, but with enough mismatch for it to become more covertly coer-
cive, or more actively redirecting or bending the fl ow of activity without 
entirely departing from it. A shift from empathy or imitation to attunement 
and misattunement can be diagrammed in a shift from pattern to tex-
ture: pattern implies repetition that suppresses variation, texture implies 
repetition through variation.
For all the emphasis I have given to the rupture or confl ict at work 
in the articulation of new modes of composition, the nuances of misat-
tunement, as a (pushy) type of attunement, reiterates the suggestion 
discussed through laughter, that these confl icts and incompatablities can 
equally become a moment of sharing as divergence. 
36.  Ibid. 
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3.2 Compositional Relations
Compositionally, the piece was held together through a series of juxta-
positions that operated as a fl ux of attunements and misattunements.
The fi rst instance of this was the square tile lines in the latex and the hand 
texture that coursed between and across them. One was a standardised 
repetition of straight lines in a grid, the other a meandering variation 
of the line. If these might seem to be radical or polar opposites, this is 
similar to the point I stressed earlier in relation to the standard and non-
standard, where it is not that one is expressive and the other inexpressive 
but expressions that enact a different balance between affecting and being 
affected. They become misattunements in the sense that they present the 
same sets of relations, albeit as modulations of one another, rather than 
close matches. 
Another key property of the latex was it’s skin-like appearance, not only 
because of its skin texture, but because of the skin-like colour of latex. As 
a secondary, signifying layer to the affective dynamics between shower 
tile pattern and skin texture, was the suggestion of a merging of the skin 
of bodies and the interior tiled surface of showers: potentially eliciting 
a sense of merger between body and environment. As the skin sucks in 
around bodies, this relationship between ones own skin and a second, 
latex skin was amplifi ed. The attunement lies in the similarity between 
skins, but where one pushed about the other through their differences. 
This sucking inward bought the latex texture into a very close visual 
range, such that the already-scaled-up skin texture worked to emphasise 
its proximity to the eye/body. The amplifi cation of skin texture through 
scaling and proximity resonated with the suggestion of amplifi ed physical 
closeness or intimacy.
Another dimension of the latex was its smell. The strong scent of the 
latex fi lled the space with a density that resonated with the density of 
the sound ‘mass.’ These two non-visual dimensions offered a mutually 
reinforcing sense of spatial thickness and a palpability of the incorporeal. 
The warm, humid air in which showering takes place has a similar density 
to it. This added to the initial idea of the sound operating somewhat like 
the stream of water that comes from above in a shower. The relationship 
between the relentless streaming of water and the relentless streaming of 
sound was added to by a resonance between the experienced variations 
in the sound and the swirling of humidity in the air. And then, as an action 
that played in the reverse direction, the fan was actively sucking the air 
out of the space.
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10.32  One of the skin texture images used to cut the particleboard.   10.33  Hand against latex inside The Shower. 
10.34  Latex sheet texture from fi rst shower recess peel.
305
A further quite noticeable auditory attunement-misattunement arrived 
through  the sound of the ceiling fan and Static Tones slipping, variably 
together and apart. The mechanical whirring of the fan was quite like 
Static Tones and the two were at times indistinguishable (at least to the 
unattentive ear). But as the skin sucked in around the body, the fan would 
slow down considerably, because there was, up to a point, a gradual 
evacuation of the air that it could suck out. This intensifi ed a sense of 
creeping stillness, a slowing down and a gliding of match and mis-match 
between the two whirring sounds.
Certain social tensions were played out in the installation. Being inside 
was to be visually closed off from the outside but also exposed, with 
ones shape and actions inside set in a kind of naked view to others in 
the gallery. One was caught in a space of tension between hereness and 
thereness, vulnerability and protection, being naked and clothed, exposed 
and enclosed. It was not just the experience inside the installation that 
was important, but also the experience of re-entering the social fi eld of 
the gallery, where we found people searching to catch the eye of another, 
in order to smile or laugh, to seek a shared acknowledgement of the 
strangeness and unfamiliarity of that experience as they departed from it, 
hooking back into the gallery landscape. 
10.35-38  People engaging with The Shower at the Perth Insitute of Contemporary Art (2005).
10.35 10.36
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To return, once again, to the site of the ‘original trauma’ when we fi rst 
experienced Static Tones, the twisting of the repeated sound loops into the 
apparition of three dimension fl ow formations in the darkness of the room, 
becomes the fi rst misattunement: it involved ‘getting inside’ the vitality 
affects of the sound and recasting or transducing it into the variations 
of embodied experience. This moment was one in which a reactionary 
posture shifted into a participatory one of active modulation through a 
form of misattunement. 
The piece was set up to vibrate in a suspended oscillation: a swinging 
back and forth between attunements and misattunements between 
relational confi gurations. At the start of this Act, I referred to The Shower 
as a plenum: space intensively fi lled with matter. This ‘matter’ began with 
Bruce’s idea for Static Tones as the production of a sound ‘mass’. The 
environment designed for this ‘mass’ acted to provide an instrument-
environment through which to participate in or become an active part 
of the modulations of that mass. In terms of acoustic modulation, the 
space was immediately reshaped through the sucking inwards of the 
skin. The imposition of this aural density was coupled with the imposition 
of a physical crowding of ‘personal space’, where the automatic actions 
of the environment also triggered a range of affective slippages, such 
10.37 10.38
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as the slowing of the fan noise rubbing against Static Tones. All these 
compositional dynamics activated the mass, somewhat like shifting it 
from solid to liquid concrete: the mass become dynamic much like the 
sound structure shifting into the affective diagram. If The Shower can be 
understood as a plenum, its matter retained a viscosity: a “thickness”, or 
resistance to fl ow. This might be related to why, as I will go on to discuss, 
so many found the installation repellent. To quote Mary Douglas, as she 
paraphrases Jean-Paul Sartre’s attention to viscosity:
“Viscosity, he says, repels in its own right, as a primary experience. An infant, 
plunging its hands into a jar of honey, is instantly involved in contemplating 
the formal properties of solids and liquids and the essential relations between 
the subjective experiencing self and the experienced world…The viscous is a 
state half-way between solid and liquid. It is like a cross section in a process of 
change. It is unstable, but it does not fl ow. It is soft, yeilding and compressible. 
There is no gliding on its surface. Its stickiness is a trap, it clings like a leech; it 
attacks the boundary between myself and it. Long columns falling off my fi ngers 
suggest my own substance fl owing into the pool of stickiness. Plunging into the 
water gives a different impression. I remain solid, but to touch stickiness is to 
risk diluting myself into viscosity. Stickiness is clinging, like a too-possessive 
dog or mistress.”37    
 
Viscosity is itself a kind of suspension in an ambiguity between solid 
and liquid: or the state of being unclassifi ed, of being in the process of 
change. This was, after all, what I had been after with this installation 
experience. The opportunity to push back, modulate and play with this 
viscosity by, for instance, simply manipulating the proximity of the latex 
to one’s own body, to open the slit to let in air (a moment of ‘breath’), and 
to do it over and again in a playing with the environment, was up to the 
initiative of the person inside. Like not running away from the dark sound 
studio on that day of the ‘original trauma’, overcoming the imposition of 
viscosity involves relaxing into an active engagement with it, such that 
one both affects and is affected. Along these lines, The Shower might be 
promoted (albeit somewhat tongue-in-cheek) as an exercise or training 
chamber for the art of emergence, ethical expertise and emergent design 
practices. 
 
37.  Douglas (2002), p. 47.
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10.39  Jacob Mohr, Proofs, c. 1910. The Prinzhorn Collection.
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3.3 Form Caught In-formation
“No closed circles and no repetitive patterns exist to defi ne the constantly 
adjusting relations of man and environment. They evolve in curves, never 
duplicating themselves.”28  
Bruce’s initial proposal to Experimenta, done prior to my involvement in 
the project, included an image of what The Shower might look like. He 
created an image through photographing a portion of a pink lampshade 
made of curved strips. When he showed it to me I commented that this 
kind of structure was similar to the faceting techniques by Greg Lynn, in 
particular reminding me of the Embryological Houses; being something 
like a ‘primitive’ of the variably curved surfaces of the house iterations. 
Bruce’s lamp was to the Embryological Houses as the sphere was to the 
blob: “a sphere is a blob without infl uence”. This relationship might, again, 
be seen in the relation between the structure of the repeated sound loops 
and the experiential fi eld in which they are recast, between the image of 
the latex sphere micro-structure and the fur fi elds. As Lynn writes: “Every 
Embryological Houses© is designed as a fl exible, curvilinear surface rather 
than as a fi xed set of rigid points.”29 Lynn’s houses offer up a series of 
forms, not unlike the process through which the animate casts were 
produced. Importantly each produces multiple versions through infl ections 
of the one processual assemblage or process of making. 
The Shower did something akin to this, but in a very different way. It 
enfolds the infi nite array of possible infl ections-variations of the processual 
assemblage into the one environment. Rather than being outputs, the 
possible variations are embedded potentials. This is the case most literally 
in terms of the way in which the latex can be actively manipulated, within 
limits, into many formal arrangements by a person inside it. But it’s more 
than just an issue of it taking on many potential forms, because this also 
folds into many potential forms of feeling.
The act of pushing the latex from within involved, as I mentioned 
earlier, a noticeable, through not prohibitive, muscular effort. Through the 
force of inward sucking, the skin acquired an in-built forcefulness against 
which the person inside could push. Here, Wölffl in’s notion of the ‘force of 
form’ takes on a different infl ection: the quality or mood of this force is 
not pre-given, but felt out through engagement and negotiation or in the 
forces at play within the encounter. The latex skin became quite a material 
surface of negotiation through which the force of form becomes literally 
felt in a muscular manner while simultaneously and dynamically taking 
form through its encounters. In this negotiation of forcefulness there is 
28.  Giedion (1948). 
29.  Rahim (2000), p. 32.
10.40  Photograph taken by Bruce Mowson to 
indicate what The Shower might look like.
10.41   Greg Lynn, an Embryological House 
(1998-1999). 
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an affective transaction: an emphatically experienced form of (embodied-
sensate) feeling. The form of the piece does not hold together through a 
particular ‘intelligible will’, as Wolffl in would say, because this ‘will’ comes 
about through a negotiation between the environment and the person 
engaging with it. If each of the Animate Casts captured a potential stance 
of the one mould and generative process of moulding, The Shower kept the 
mould alive to modulation, providing instead an experience akin to being 
inside the mould. If the mould provokes an internal resonance, then here 
one’s own behavioural tendencies become internal to that resonance. 
Formally, as an object, the piece seems almost unfi nished. It does not 
convey the sense of a refi ned piece of formal composition. But if I was to 
further develop this aspect of the piece, the sense of being ‘unfi nished’ 
would need to be transduced into a related sense of open eventfulness, 
rather than being designed to look, fi nally, fi nished in a polished over way. 
This was a property of the fur fi elds, which lacked clear contour or defi nite 
boundaries, but with a character defi ned by behavioural tendency. 
In relation to Shane Murray’s propositions50 regarding the value of a 
thorough understanding of what a particular “formal language” does, my 
discussion of Lynn’s work suggests that the key tendencies of action of 
such a language emerge through affective diagramming. As such, this 
language is one of vitality affects or time-forms, which for The Shower 
began with a tone of threat:
“A threat is only a threat is it retains an indeterminacy. If it has a form, it is not 
a substantial form, but a time form: a futurity. The threat is nothing yet – just 
a looming.”51 
While this project did begin with a very literal association with threat, 
threat itself is not so much the important issue. Rather, the issue is affec-
tive intensity: an affective forcefulness that is offered in a way that is not 
yet interpreted, symbolically rendered or narrated, not yet unfolded into 
response, not yet rendered as an emotion or a categorical affect such as 
a feeling of ‘revulsion’, ‘fear’, ‘pleasure’ or ‘beauty’. The affective intensity 
is a time-form that looms or atmospherically swirls, pressing for a com-
ing snowballing into forms of feeling. Snowballs form by rolling round and 
round, gathering and changing as they go. 
In the compositional narrative of this thesis, the mould and the furry 
fi eld of infl uence snowballed into an affective diagram, which then, like 
the mould, conditioned but did not determine the interrelations of forces 
50.  Murray (2004).
51.  Massumi (2005), p. 35. 
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that constituted the composition of The Shower. This installation acted to 
suspend form in formation, becoming an embodiment of the process of 
moulding. 
This property of The Shower, where defi nite form is withheld has much 
in common with an emphasis in the fi eld of process architecture on ‘design-
ing the design’ or designing a generative process through which multiple 
instances can be unfolded. But here the outcome never leaves the experi-
ential space of performance. In a sense, The Shower could be taken up as 
a design process ‘training or exercise chamber’, where the stance required 
to play the installation as an instrument becomes a training process for the 
stance required for emergent design process. 
As I see it, the greatest value of The Shower as an installation experi-
ence lies in the challenge it presents to those who engage with it, as an 
architectural extension of the experiential challenge presented by Bruce’s 
Static Tones, where the architecture offers a tangible instrument for play-
ing with that experiential challenge.  To metamorphose the trauma into 
play, requires something akin to what Katz discusses as “the sensation of 
the tickle”, which is:
“the product of a focus on the thin line between doing and being done, between 
the body as lived from within and as acted upon from without, between the body 
given three dimensional awareness through physical interaction and the body 
effaced by its use in collective symbolic interaction.” 52
In other words: an ethico-aesthetic know-how of emergence. As out-
lined in Act 3, the crucial attention to the texture of events is not just an 
awareness of some ‘outside’ situation, because it also relies on self-aware-
ness, or a sense of the texture of the self. 
The Shower aimed to elicit, virtually involuntarily, an amplifi ed sense 
of situated self-perception. Not in order to promote navel gazing or self-
refl ection, but in order to provoke a heightened awareness of the self-
environmental coupling. Ironically, this is the kind of self-perception that 
leads to what Mclintock refers to as ‘forgetting yourself’ where you become 
part of something and it becomes part of you. It is a self-perception that 
involves differentiating ourselves from the rest of the world in order to be 
more actively engaged with it. This is a stance that lies between ambigu-
ous merging and rigid distinction. 
52.  Katz (1999), p. 342.
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An ethics of behaviour has been drawn out here through how one 
responds to an affective intensity. This is not to say, I must emphasise, 
that people who refused to hop in or leapt out quickly, shuddering, were 
somehow ‘wrong’ and that those who managed a state of play were ‘right’. 
All of these responses were crucial aspects of the ‘meaning’ of the work. 
The right and wrong, the good and the bad, are ideas of morality whereas 
the concern here is for an ethics or ethical expertise. Ethics is about ways 
of engaging with the world, that inevitably involve an aesthetics of behav-
iour. Here, I am highlighting the value of a particular mode of engage-
ment for the specifi c context of ‘age of emergence’ and the way in which 
this installation might be of value in thinking/acting through this mode of 
engagement. 
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The Last Laugh (a conclusion)
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In concluding, I will now revisit aspects of the thesis, bringing them together into a 
clarifi ed outline of the model of composition and composure proposed by and through 
this thesis. This occurs in two parts, where I discuss:
1. The model of composition, broken into three key components:
a. Resonance as a key to compositional complexity 
b. Affect and the fi eld of shared activity
c. Aesthetics and the processual complexion of vitality
2. The poise or stance that is integral to the above mode of composition: an ethico-
aesthetic know-how.
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1. Composition
In his new introduction to the revised edition of Folding in Architecture 
(2004), Greg Lynn emphasises that digital technology was never the 
core issue of the publication. Rather, he suggests that Folding marked 
another phase in architecture’s interest in compositional complexity, as 
earlier marked by Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction and the wave 
of Deconstructivist architecture sparked by Philip Johnson and Mark 
Wigley. Looking back on the decade between editions, Lynn identifi es 
three streams of architectural thought connected to the main issues raised 
in Folding: voluptuous form, stochastic and emergent processes, and 
intricate assemblages. But no sooner has he assembled these categories, 
he blurs them back into one another, coming to rest on “the loss of the 
module in favour of the infi nitesimal component and the displacement 
of the fragmentary collage by the intensive whole.”1  This is one way of 
saying that emergence – the micro infi nitesimal component and the macro 
intensive whole – is a model holding together diverging threads within the 
fi eld. 
This model – the model of emergence – becomes felt as poignantly 
contemporary, or very ‘now’, because it resonates with the way in which 
broader socio-economic operations (or the ‘pulse of the age’) are similarly 
confi gured.
This thesis is offering a highly processual way of understanding the 
abstract ‘structures’ that hold together a composition. Fields of pure 
relations, or affect, and the internal differentiations that arise through 
the resonance and jostle of similarity and difference, become akin to, 
say, the mathematical principles that Renaissance architects employed as 
purveyors of the divine. 
As much as the model of composition I am proposing here departs from 
those set out by Lynn in his 1993 and 2004 Folding in Architecture essays, 
I do not see this as a departure that simply leaves this history behind, 
1.  Lynn (2004), p11
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in the way that Lynn initially positioned Deconstructivist approaches as 
superseded by Folding. Rather, my aim is to provide a way of approaching 
the operations of compositional coherence that scoops previous 
compositional emphases together into a new way of understanding their 
shared ground of action. While an in-depth analysis of some key examples 
is required to demonstrate this, I am confi dent that the shards, criticality 
and disjunctions of deconstructivist architecture would be productively 
reviewed (rather than dismissed) and rejoined with its smooth, folding 
‘post-critical’ offspring if reassessed through the model I am proposing 
here. 
The different dimensions, layers and components of a design composition 
might attempt a smooth continuity, a contradictory discontinuity or, as is 
most frequently the case, both at the same time (by virtue of one another). 
But however the emphasis is swung, it is an emergent resonance that 
forges compositional vitality (and fresh ground of shared action). In other 
words, resonance is the key property of aesthetic coherence (whatever the 
tone or character involved).
1.a. Resonance: the power of connection
Throughout this thesis I have drawn attention to the affective dimensions 
involved in engagements of many kinds. I began by outlining a relationship 
between affect and emergence fi rstly within a broadly scoped notion of the 
contemporary situation and secondly in terms of how we might approach the 
idea of emergence. Particular importance was given to our understanding 
of creative process and aesthetic composition as emergent processes. 
The emergence-affect relationship was laced through the imbrications of 
aesthetics and ethics in developing an idea of ethico-aesthetic know-know 
– as a way of operating with a heightened awareness of affect amidst all 
manner of engagements. I explored the role of affectivity in the act of 
drawing and making, within the translation from drawings to buildings, in 
the act of engaging with a range of different artefacts (texts, drawings, 
sculptures, buildings, installations) and within collaborative scenarios. 
Having suggested that ethico-aesthetic know-how is important to the 
development of practices of many kinds (daily life, scientifi c enquiry, design 
or creative practices and collaborative exchange), an appraisal of my own 
research projects demonstrated how a related affect-oriented attention 
can allow for quite unexpected ways of appreciating those research acts. 
What surprised me as I worked through the very local, particular 
material in the fi nal Acts, was the way in which key affective dynamics
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 within the design process lived another life as part of the dynamics of 
the outcome or product. The relationship was not a ‘mirroring’, where the 
products refl ect or offer access to the process, for it is far more complex 
– or emergent. 
While it is convenient and clarifying to see process and product as a 
two part narrative that swings about a connecting hinge, this is a little 
misleading. The fi nal Acts began to demonstrate a breakdown of any 
linear progression from process to product where the affective diagram 
(that could be seen as the hinge) becomes more than an assemblage that 
connects sequential phases of a project, as was implied in the discussion on 
translation in Lynn’s work. Rather, an affective diagram – or assemblage of 
relations – reappears in different guises, sweeping together a temporally 
non-linear, highly performative compositional coherence through the 
resonance that arises between them. 
In Intimate Transactions, for instance, we found a poignant relation 
between the coincidence of collaborative confl ict (or mismatched sensibility) 
and the diffi culty of achieving mediated co-presence in the game itself. This 
coinciding produced a resonance that we found exemplifi ed and embodied 
through laughter. Vibration on contact (a key property of our haptic system 
design) attained new signifi cance in its coincidences (and resonance) with 
laughter. All of these instances involved the issue of fi nding ‘ways of acting 
together’ which did not eradicate differences, tensions or confl icts, but 
rather folded them back into the situation in a rhythmic manner. Laughter 
became the emergent embodiment of the relational confi guration – or 
affective diagram – that was common to these instances: a tensile jostling 
of connection and disconnection, convergence and divergence, similarity 
and difference, holding together and falling apart, etc. In shared laughter, 
the body transduces this jostle into a gesture that enacts the tension once 
again, throwing open bodily expression into an instability of fl uctuating 
sounds (or vibrations of muscle and air) that connects with a similar gesture 
in another body. The bodily act of laughing resonates with the feeling that 
induced the laugh (inducing a self connection), as well as resonating with 
the bodily act of laughing in another (inducing a self-other connection). 
 As Bedau might say, there is a “vicious circle” at work here: a resonance 
of resonances. Laughing, it seemed, was an act that both embodied and 
produced a resonance in the same gesture, folding the confl ict back into 
itself and letting it run into an amplifi ed expression. In appreciating how 
shared laughter both relieves and enacts the tensions that arise through 
confl ict or obstacles to connection, we also found that it diagrammed 
how resonance acts to connect divergent events in general. This could 
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then be folded back to resonate with earlier propositions about the role of 
composition theory in establishing shared ground for stylistic divergence. 
But a key issue with laughter, as Katz pointed out, was that “a formal 
inconsistency of perspectives must become practically untenable.”2 There 
needs to be a pressure or motivation to deal with and, in some sense, 
resolve the inconsistency. This is where the fl exible mould or affective 
diagram becomes a key in providing that pressure. But here the chicken 
and the egg – the feedback loop or rhythmic refrain – loops back again. For 
the confi guration of the affective diagram – or the assemblage of relations 
 –provides the pressure within which similar confi gurations will resonate. 
It all seems to be going around in circles. Are we hopelessly circulating 
round and round, suspended in a refrain from which there is no escape? 
Yes, if we focus on the question: ‘which came fi rst?’ No, if we are able 
to enter into the qualities of activity that make each enactment of the 
refrain – or life cycle – both idiosyncratic and related to every other. This is 
what Barbara McLintock, for instance, seemed to excel at. In entering into 
these qualities, or into the aesthetic properties of relating, we can tweak 
them, remodel them in various directions, through complex processes of 
affect attunement and misattunement. An act as small as the timing of 
a laugh or the manner of hand gesture is an aspect of setting up the 
condition of possibility for larger scale resonances to occur. This is why 
the very intimate, micro scale modes of engagement and relating to the 
world become so important, because they all, potentially, play a part in 
modulating the complexion of a resonance in which it participates. This is 
also why there are such profoundly ethical dimensions at work here. 
The particular events or issues foregrounded in any of the examples 
explored throughout this thesis, arose through the approach of regarding 
the products and processes of creative production as forms of social or 
relational interaction rather than acts applied to the social.3 Given this 
conditioning factor, each event is nevertheless a relatively minute detail 
amidst a much vaster sea of human and inhuman relationships that the 
development of any project involves. Any one particular issue or event is 
highlighted because the relational assemblage they embody was amplifi ed 
through resonating with other very different but uncannily similar 
assemblages that were at play within the project development. As such, 
things rise to prominence through resonance, rippling the surrounding fi eld 
with their affective tone. It is impossible to fi nd clear causes and effects 
in a fi eld of this nature, where one gesture or parameter affects another 
and vice versa. This is the case both within any given level of interaction 
or relatedness and between levels. 
2.  Katz (1999) p105
3.  Although, it has to be said, I did not fi nd a 
methodology and then apply it. I was drawn 
to a methodological approach as a way of 
clarifying the ways and means through which 
I was exploring the signifi cance of the projects 
through writing. 
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Here, I am highlighting resonance – another case of strong emergence 
– as the phenomena through which the relatively autonomous levels 
collaborate in the production of vitality. Resonance is an emergent process, 
but unlike the more mechanically described understanding of processes, it 
is, in itself, an intensive whole that integrally involves downward causation. 
If affect – or pure relation – is the fundamental fi eld-ground of composition, 
or ‘holding together’, resonance is the process that modulates and knots 
this fi eld into its differentiations.
A diagram of these operations, based on a rhythmic refrain, might look 
like this drawing by artist Cameron Robbins (Fig 11.01)
This ink pen drawing made in 2005 is one of a series of many produced 
by a wind drawing machine designed and made by Robbins. I have written 
about this machine elsewhere,4 with particular attention to an earlier 
drawing called The Fall of Pia and the story of its making. The machine 
is propelled into repeated passages of movement by wind, tempered by 
its speed and direction. Every drawing is different. They hold far more 
sophistication than any of my contrived diagrammatic sketches of similar 
confi gurations (fi lling my sketch books with loops of black ink, over and 
over). This drawing embodies more information in the linework with, for 
instance, the momentum of each circuit of the pen registered in dots made 
as it leaps out of one passage, lands momentarily before returning back 
to begin another. Other layers of information are also embedded, where 
it bears traces of having been an outdoor drawing in the splatters of light 
4.  Ednie-Brown (1999). 
11.01  Cameron Robbins, Untitled (2005).
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rain drops that occasionally spread the black ink into grey blotches. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it provides an apt diagram of the confi gurations I am 
outlining. Any one of Robbin’s series of line drawings would do, becoming 
all the more apt for the very particular character they each embody. 
In ‘reading’ this drawing as a diagram, it involves three primary 
components: material/substance, process and product. In terms of what 
I have outlined in this thesis, the primary material is complexes of vitality 
affects, embodied here by the passages of the line work and their wobbles 
(or the activation contours of each patterned change over time). The 
process is a series of affect attunements and misattunements, embodied 
by the fl ux of difference and similarity running across those lines. The 
product is the character or complexion of the whole drawing: a resonant 
vitality that exceeds any particular aspect, but is utterly inseparable from 
them.
1.b.  Affect: The Field of Shared Activity
Affect, as the fi eld of ‘pure’ relations, is deeply knotted into refrains 
whose repetitions and variations are tempered by material tendencies. 
Physics, chemistry, mathematics, biology, engineering and other sciences 
give us accounts of the more reliable tendencies of relation. They give us 
rules of behaviour that we can more-or-less count on: glass will shatter 
in particular, mathematically defi ned conditions, a bridge will stand up 
according to conditions defi ned through simulations, one chemical will react 
with another in a certain way. But beyond a certain level of complexity, 
rule becomes probability and the possibility of prediction gets shakier the 
higher the degree of complexity. In the midst of this shaky ground, in 
walks emergence, a model that accepts the unknown and offers a new 
frame of reference. 
For all its ultimate vagueness, the model of emergence makes one 
quite defi nitive move: it re-situates rules within dynamic and fl exible 
fi elds of performance. The ground of action is a fi eld textured with rules 
and tendencies, but defi ned by the dynamics of performative relations. 
Ways of understanding how the fi eld is internally differentiated were 
discussed in this thesis through Stern’s discussion of affect attunement 
and misattunement. These processes work with the basic material of 
vitality affects (patterned changes over time). Here, vitality affects become 
the infi nitesimal ‘element’ or minute ‘particle’ of (temporal) form. These 
patterned assemblages of relation pass from one moment and media to 
another, modulating along the way like a game of ‘Chinese whispers’. The 
pattern match is never perfect and, in fact, might actively modulate or 
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shift the ‘meaning’ it coercively enters into. This way of understanding 
the ongoing, endless modulations of the fi eld of shared action (or ‘the 
relations we live’), describes (coercively?) many other confi gurations 
discussed throughout this thesis, such as: the multitude of instances in 
an animation of morphological distortions; a fi eld of work that describes a 
particular style; the movement of bodies dancing at a rave party. In these 
fi elds textured by similarity and difference, convergence and divergence, 
something else arises: resonance. This resonance has a complexion we 
might call ‘atmosphere’, ‘style’, ‘character’, ‘texture’ or ‘quality’, to name 
a few. 
Affect is the performative glue whose adhesive power (in holding together 
‘space’, material properties or characters) is based on rhythmic refrains 
of assemblages whose presence is powered by resonance. Assemblages 
interact, resonate, spread outwards and fold back inwards, bringing with 
them the affects of the specifi cities they encounter along the way. This 
occurs in waves that rise and fall, at many scales of mutual interaction. It’s 
a complex weave in which we breathe.  
I have discussed the translation of qualities in architectural design 
processes to explore affect attunements embodied through non-human 
media. The quality or complexion of the resonance becomes paramount, 
but the importance of the translation is not simply about moving desired 
qualities from one place to another, nor in generating a continuity between 
process and product. The value of achieving these diffi cult translations 
is that the multiple, variational instances form a transductive gathering: 
a pleating that puckers together layers of diversity and history into a 
collaborative gesture of resonating together (as in shared laughter). 
Earlier, via Simondon and the example of moulding a brick, I explored 
the idea of internal resonance as the ontogenetic operation through which 
an intensive whole was formed. Resonance can be seen as a physical 
phenomenon that both exemplifi es and offers some ‘shape’ for the 
operations of affect. Evan Thompson, for instance, describes affect as 
not just “a prototypical whole-organism event”5 but also a “prototypical 
self-other event.”6 This emphasis, along with the organism-milieu relation 
emphasised by Simondon, defi nes the internally resonating ‘whole-
organism’ as both distinct and inseparable from others/milieus. Things 
resonate with their own distinctness as part of their involvements beyond 
themselves. An ‘intensive whole’ is never a separate entity or closed whole 
 – it is connected and ‘continuous’ with the world to the degree that it is 
defi ned as distinct. 
5. “Affect has numerous dimensions that 
bind together virtually every aspect of the 
organism – the psychosomatic network of 
the nervous system, immune system, and 
endocrine system: physiological changes in the 
autonomic nervous system, the limbic system, 
and the superior cortex; facial-motor changes 
and global differential motor readiness for 
approach or withdrawal; subjective experience 
along a pleasure-displeasure valence axis; 
social signalling and coupling; and conscious 
evaluation and assessment.” Thomson (2001), 
p4.
6.  Ibid. 
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1.c. Aesthetics and the processual complexion of vitality
Both emergence and composition theory are concerned with articulating 
rules, principles and general observations about how things ‘come together’ 
or become organized into something coherent enough for it to become a 
discernable thing.  Forms of organization arise in ways that are never 
entirely in our control. Life itself is a supremely wondrous example and 
the living of life endlessly provides cases in point. Creative composition 
becomes similarly wondrous to the degree that it seems to hold or generate 
a vitality: that ‘life-like’ property of things that is afforded such status within 
aesthetics.  But what is vitality, after all? It might be named ‘beautiful,’ but 
it might equally be grotesque or deathly. A key thing is intensity: a kind 
of resonance, where encounters, engagements and negotiations strike a 
chord, together. Affect, as I have argued, always involves resonance. And 
resonance always involves feedback loops, where that which emerges is 
always shifting about the relations from which it emerges. 
When an architectural project really ‘works’ or ‘sings’ with vitality – in 
that it all ‘comes together’ – you have the satisfaction of witnessing a 
process of transformation that loops back into itself, through a resonance 
within its processual history and virtuality. This is why so many projects 
feel as if they are ‘coming alive’ when we fi nd out more about what lies 
behind them. The surface of appearance of the project gathers depth and 
internal, virtual passages to explore. That which is produced makes sense 
of the fragments of its own history, by transforming them in terms of what 
it becomes.  But this gathering of depth only comes from ‘paying attention’ 
to and engaging with the overall atmosphere of the thing, an attention 
that includes but is never limited to technical matters, pragmatic details 
and focused (or reductive) agendas. Attention, as quoted earlier from 
Pierce, “is the power by which thought at one time is connected with and 
made to relate to thought at another time.”7 Through attention, temporal 
moments and ontological levels collide in the present moment, resonating 
in the affective complexion of the event. This kind of appreciation is the 
experience of emergence: an intrinsically aesthetic experience. 
Aesthetics is densely populated with the question of what counts as 
‘beauty’ or the ‘beautiful’. Beauty is a category or a name for a judgement 
given to an affective texture. We feel an intensity – intense in the sense 
that it is strong enough for it to demand a felt response. But the nature of 
the response depends upon our ways of making sense (sensibility) and our 
related modes of engagement. The question of ‘what is beauty?’ has to dig 
7. Peirce, (1992), p 44
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deeper into the event or the process through which something is felt to be 
beautiful. Beauty is a category of feeling much like emotions. Emotions, 
as James, Massumi and Katz seem to agree, are affectivity rolled into a 
response. 
This changes the problem of beauty, and other aesthetic categories 
quite signifi cantly. It shifts attention from the categories themselves to the 
process through which they emerge and the conditions of their emergence. 
Across this thesis I have taken up a series of aesthetic categories – style, 
sensibility, composition – and recast them in these terms. I have tried to 
draw attention to the experience of processes: to the emergent processes 
of ontogenesis, involving diverse kinds of relational dynamics. Developing 
a greater awareness of the experience of these processes is important 
because this is the only access there is to their amodal, affective level of 
operation. ‘Observing’ the process and attempting to account for it through 
largely rational, cognitive frameworks, offers us boats on which to travel 
across such seas, as well as other structures that might help us invent 
new navigational tools. But these frameworks don’t, in themselves, offer 
access to the ever-present fi elds of infl uence that need to be assessed and 
negotiated in an on-going way.
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2. The Poise of Ethico-Aesthetic Know-How
I have argued that processual architecture is a fi eld of practice that implicitly 
enacts a reappraisal and reworking of modes of creative composition in 
which the operations of affect take on an amplifi ed or more explicit role. 
This is related to ways in which the fi eld foregrounds – in various ways 
and to different degrees – processes of formation as constituting key 
properties or defi ning conditions of the product, which is often framed 
as a processual system in itself. Processual architecture characteristically 
focuses on setting up conditions or generative systems through which 
outcomes will emerge. This often involves the inter-relational arrangement 
of behaviourally defi ned micro-components. The performance of the 
designer is met with dynamic, life-like diagrams that are themselves 
confi gured in terms of behaviours and performance. The strength of the 
life-like nature of these diagrams means that they become like puppets 
that the designer guides, but with enough in-built character to take a part 
in leading or guiding the way. In other words, the design material is not 
passive but explicitly pushy, involving a dynamic  relationship between 
designer and the designed wherein each both affect and are affected by 
one another. 
Composition becomes performative, more emphatically related to ques-
tions of experience and pertaining to form in terms of the dynamic rela-
tions in which it is engaged. In other words, rather than composition being 
about the formal arrangement of a facade, it pertains to the resonance 
that arises between multiple dimensions of its virtual and actual presence. 
The invisible relations holding together a composition, such as a system 
of mathematical ratios, become dynamically behavioural. While not pre-
cluding the possibility of remaining computationally describable at some 
level, this dynamic compositional glue becomes like an empathic feeling 
of pleasure modulated by the specifi c mannerisms that animate the face 
into a smile, rather than the formal arrangement of a smiling face. And 
like the dancer, the designer can’t perform well without an attention to the 
transmission of affect between bodies and infl uences and a practiced grasp 
of a style of movement. While this is acutely important in the case of the 
designer, it is also relevant to the subsequent engagements of others with 
the design products.
By entering into a performative, dynamically relational terrain, ethico-
aesthetic know-how becomes the fundamental compositional expertise 
that might develop these practices in productive and unexpected ways. 
Pedagogically, this becomes very signifi cant, in that it raises the issue 
of how to help students develop the forms of know-how required. As 
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I suggested briefl y in Act 8, this is less something that can be taught 
directly than ushered into the studio environment, through the manner 
of one’s engagements with the students and the material they generate, 
and providing a framework that is both fi rm enough to provide constraint 
and responsive enough to adapt to material and issues that arise. This 
approach to teaching is diffi cult and risky but close to the practice that 
Kwinter discusses as the ‘cultivation of life’, where one must bear the 
knowledge that, as he writes, we cannot know “where such an experiment 
will go, and it is one certainly rife with traps and dead ends.”8 
This calls for an ability to keep the risk alive while managing to recognise 
the dead ends when they arise, to twist traps into realisations, and to 
match fi rmness with sensitivity.  But, perhaps what is most diffi cult about 
practicing (or teaching) in this way is that it requires an awareness of and 
sensitivity to one’s own consistency or texture of practice, including both 
strengths and frailties (or fallibility9), such that one’s design moves can 
work with enough sensitive openness or affection. 
A texture of practice is not contained by internality, but arises through 
all our actions, involving all kinds of engagements.10 Context-sensitivity 
has been discussed as integral to this awareness because it is inescapably 
about engagements within the tissue of particular circumstances. Rather 
than contextual, it is more precise to call the sensitivity situational, where 
the backdrop or background nature of ‘context’ folds into a more full-bodied, 
active ‘here and now’. But the texture of practice cannot emerge (either 
be developed or enter into consciousness) without the transductions that 
occur across situations, instances, moments and events: through iteration. 
As such, a situational-sensitivity becomes a trans-situational sensitivity, 
or an ethico-aesthetic know-how of emergence based in a sensitivity to 
affect (and an ability to withhold from ‘owning’ or ‘emoting’ it).11 
This trans-situational sensitivity is also a sensitivity to affective 
diagrams: an ability to, as John Holland puts it, engage in ‘metaphoric 
conjunction’ where pattern matching across situations or conceptions 
resonate and generate a new affective texture. This does not necessarily 
lead to innovation as such, but it is integral to creative process. With 
Intimate Transactions and The Shower, the main ‘thrust’ of these 
projects, in terms of the affective diagram that they can be felt to embody, 
becomes dislodged quite emphatically from ‘ownership’ by any particular 
party, emerging through the dynamics of the relationships within the 
collaboration as much as the relations between the inhuman parameters 
of the projects. 
8. Mau (2000), p 37
9. For a more extensive discussion on fallibility, 
see Ednie-Brown (1999).
10. Daniel Stern’s The Present Moment 
suggests that our patterning or tendencies 
of behaviour, that might be described in 
psychological terms, are played out in our 
actions at the most everyday level. His 
micro-analytic interview, through which he 
demonstrates this relationship, focuses on 
mapping the experiences/events in a time 
frame as short as 30 to 90 seconds, while 
preparing breakfast. 
11.“Reserve the term “emotion” for the 
personalized content, and affect for the 
continuation. Emotion is contextual. Affect is 
situational: eventfully ingressive to context. 
Serially so: affect is transsituational. As 
processional as it is precessional, affect inhabits 
the passage. It is pre- and post-contextual; 
pre- and post-personal; an excess of continuity 
invested only in the ongoing: its own. Self-
continuity across the gaps. Impersonal affect 
is the connecting thread of experience. It is the 
invisible glue that holds the world together. In 
event. The world-glue of affect is an autonomy 
of event-connection continuing across its 
own serialized capture in context.” Massumi. 
(2002a), pToo-Blue
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Trans-situational sensitivity dislodges the ‘contextual’ from the 
assumption that one stands back and observes things ‘as-they-are’, 
as if there is a fi xed worldly essence to be found.  Similarly, it erodes 
navel-gazing or self-absorption in which the kingdom of the self and its 
expressions reign insensitively supreme. 
In part, one could say that its all about fi nding a ‘balance’ between the 
polar ‘opposites’ of all conditions (too much order and too little, tightness 
and looseness, the one and the many, etc etc). But these are less opposites 
than categories that defi ne the limits of various states of relation. ‘Balance’ 
does not equate to stillness or sweet, peaceful composure, because it 
might tend more toward a wildly oscillating performance of relation. It is 
rare for situations to be free of struggles to connect, confl icts of interest/
affect or obstacles to sharing/engaging. Extremes of these conditions 
lead to various forms of war, but milder instances are everywhere: in the 
dynamics of relation, relevant to political, social, personal and creative 
assemblages such as the design event. 
If the embodied stance of a designer or a group of collaborators have a 
guiding role, it is because they channel transductions of affect, modulating 
them through engagement and negotiation with situations and media. The 
project (or reason for acting together) forms a mould in which they, as 
characters, relationally modulate the cast. 
The virtuoso of ethico-aesthetic know-how will not only manage to walk 
the tightrope act, but to dance along it with a practiced grasp of a style of 
movement, preferably one that can turn the inevitable falls into produc-
tively generative moments. In that sense, the clown has as much to offer 
ethico-aesthetic know-how as the tightrope walker. As soon as any saintly 
overtones of ethics become situated, or part of the grit of everyday activ-
ity, the inconsistencies, contradictions, fault lines and fragilities become 
integral to the embodied consistency of any particular style.  As such, I 
am certainly not claiming that processual architecture achieves some kind 
of ethically superior practice, or that any such ideality is achieved here, in 
this thesis. But I am suggesting that some especially useful frameworks, 
relevant to a continual striving for an ethics of behaviour, can be found in 
the fi eld of architectural research addressed here.
There is no particular texture of overall composure that pertains to the 
ethico-aesthetics of emergence. There is no valorisation or romanticisation 
of beauty, elegance or the virtuous, ‘balanced’ poise. Compositional 
vitality is more often messy and grotesque, but this does not preclude a 
resonant ‘holding together’ across its orifi ces, gaps, internal disparity or 
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contradictions. In fact, I have suggested that ruptures of these kinds can 
produce and intensify vitality, as savage or as sweet as it might be.
There are, however, modes of relating that work against the ethics 
proposed here. Annihilation, obliteration or active suppression, for instance, 
are contrary to an ethics of striving for a balance between affecting 
and being affected. Group hysteria or collectively enacted erasure is as 
common in design events as they are in social formations, or individual 
people for that matter. Affective intensity can build and spread, capturing 
collective entities into fi ercely-bound consistencies that might resist trans-
situational sensitivity. Forms, fi gures and images snap together into an 
hyper- or over-attunement that becomes, in effect, formally imitative. 
This is sensitivity without the awareness, consistency of being without the 
becoming. While acts of obliteration actively sweep away virtual and actual 
realities (whether this be a species, an individual, an expression, a fact of 
feeling), it need not be a conscious act. In fact it often isn’t, which is why 
awareness and sensitivity become so critical. But the overly sensitive and 
hyper-aware can be in danger of crumbling into self-obliteration without the 
coupling with an equally intensely held consistency of being and becoming 
(which one might call non-reactive ‘self-confi dence’). 
An ethico-aesthetic know-how of emergence is about a ‘measured’ prac-
tice of engaging with the world, of how we behave, of what we acknowl-
edge is at stake. It is about the amplifi cation of potential – which doesn’t 
necessarily lead to the ‘good’ because it magnifi es risk. Rather than being 
framed around the virtuous, ethical know-how is about the virtuouso: the 
skilled performer (Virno). The important principle or navigational directive 
is that the performance of any act strives for a balance between affect-
ing and being affected, between active refl ection and the immediacy of 
embodied response, between sensitive responsiveness and determined 
agency. This is a politics of action that neither caves in passively to collec-
tive desires or beliefs nor holds to individualism, authorship or dictatorship 
as the power of truth. It is both determined and respectful, pushy and 
playful. It involves raising both thinking and acting to their highest pow-
ers, such that they affect and fold into one another. Or, in short, it involves 
the embodiment of wisdom.
Ethico-aesthetic know-how has always been an integral aspect of daily 
life, in unremarkable and remarkably unrecognizable ways because it slips 
so seamlessly into the surface of appearances.12  While this ‘expertise’ 
is nothing new, I have suggested in this thesis that it is becoming an 
increasingly important aspect of contemporary life, from the ways of 
12. see Katz (1988), Katz (1999), Katz 
(2002). 
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doing at an individual level to global politics. This places pressure on each 
individual to develop a heightened awareness of that process, but it is 
also an incredible opportunity. The problem is that most of our responses 
happen faster than thought can know. But we can think-feel our way 
through our responses in retrospect until we can better feel-think our way 
through them at the time, or in the midst of them. 
This is related to the problem of developing adequate ways of discussing 
or accounting for the sensual, affective experience of designing, as well 
as the experiential affects of built environments. Experiencing, whether 
in design acts or other inhabitations, are always events of fl ux, change, 
development, ongoing emergence: they are the experience of emergence 
and the reality of change. Faith in this metastable, sensitive consistency, 
that it is operating and informing one’s moves, only comes from practice; 
from realising later what one didn’t realise at the time, from coming to 
realise the repetitions across the variations and from feeling out the 
transformations across the ever-evolving repetitions. In other words, 
developing the trust required to throw oneself into the event of designing 
while knowing that this consistency will have bearing, comes only from 
having developed a sense of this consistency through the iterations of 
practice. 
For the sake of pedagogy and discourse, an ability to express and develop 
heightened awareness of qualitative consistencies (and the ‘structure’ of 
resonant assemblages) – and of how one’s moves are related to them 
– might enable processual architecture to more actively (and ethically) 
contribute to issues well beyond its usual focus on formally articulated 
virtuosity – by virtue of its virtuosic emphasis.
Or it might not. But it’s worth the risk. 
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